Civil Society as a Conflictual Sphere in Post-Liberalization Tanzania: The Roles of NGOs and Trade Unions by McQuinn, Mark
 
 
McQuinn, Mark (2011) Civil Society as a Conflictual Sphere in Post‐Liberalization Tanzania: The Roles 
of NGOs and Trade Unions. PhD Thesis, SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) 
 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13632 
 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted 
extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
1 
 
Civil Society as a Conflictual Sphere in 
Post-Liberalization Tanzania: the 
Roles of NGOs and Trade Unions  
 
Mark McQuinn 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in 2011 
 
Department of Development Studies 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Declaration for PhD Thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented 
for examination is my work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other 
person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished 
work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination 
 
 
Signed ………………………………………………    Date………………………………. 
 Mark McQuinn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express sincere thanks to my Supervisor, Dr Carlos Oya for his excellent advice, 
constant encouragement and good humour. Through Dr Oya‟s supervision I have been provided 
with access to many stimulating ideas, arguments and readings. 
 
I would also like to thank Dr Kevin Manton of the School of Oriental and African Studies, for 
his incisive insights and comments.  
 
I express my great appreciation to Dr Mikako Nishimuko of Hosei University in Japan for her 
generous support and practical advice. 
 
I received inestimable help when in Tanzania from Professor Samuel Chambua at the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, who provided me with a lot of information 
on the labour movement and kindly gave me a copy of his book on Democratic Participation in 
Tanzania. 
 
I owe a large debt of gratitude to all the members of the Tanzanian trade union movement who 
gave me their time and help so willingly. I would particularly like to thank Mrs Margaret 
Mandago for her valuable advice.  
 
Thanks are also due to the following officials and ex-officials from the Trade Union Congress of 
Tanzania; Mr Nestory Ngulla, Mr Hasan Raha, Mr Nicholas Mgaya, Mr John Gonza and Mrs 
Sihan Ahmed. 
 
At the Tanzania Teachers Union, Mr Anthony Mtavangu gave me a great deal of useful advice 
and warm hospitality.  At the Tanzania Railway Workers Union much help and kindness was 
shown to me by Mrs Helen Katala. Mr Victor Kassian, formerly Deputy General Secretary at the 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union, provided me with useful insights into labour 
issues. 
 
I also thank all the people from the NGO sector who gave me their time and help and, in 
particular; Mr Andrew Mushi, Ms Mary Rusimbi, Dr Joseph Kisanji, Mr Rakesh Rajani, Ms 
Gertrude Mugizi and Mrs Claire Lwehabura. 
  
Grateful thanks are given to my mother, Mrs Jane Johnston and to my step-father, Mr Bruce 
Johnston for their proof-reading. In particular, I would like to thank my mother for her tireless 
advice, support and encouragement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
This research examines, through a Gramscian perspective, the reconfiguration of civil society in 
post-liberalization Tanzania, centring on the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions. 
The liberalization of the Tanzanian economy, which started from the latter half of the 1980s, and 
was accompanied by a move to multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s, has led to 
conflicts in the sphere of civil society. Since liberalization, influential multilateral and bilateral 
donors have driven the state to reconstitute civil society as an independent variable, based on a 
de Tocquevillian vision, whereby a wide variety of freely-formed organizations take part in 
national policy-making processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the 
state. This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, avoiding 
dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens. However, the donors have 
supported the rise to prominence of a few urban-based non-governmental organizations 
(composed of well-educated professionals) versed in the hegemonic discourse, which revolves 
around the concepts of partnership, participation and ownership. In contrast, trade unions have 
been marginalized by the donors and the state, as they are regarded as a threat to neo-liberal 
hegemony in Tanzania, since they have engaged in a war of position, by organizing a small 
number of industrial actions and rhetorically challenging the state‟s treatment of the workforce. 
In responding to their marginalization, trade unions are hampered by two substantive problems: 
an ideological vacuum concerning perceptions of their role within the sphere of civil society in 
the post-liberalization period and structural constraints caused by lack of finance, falling 
membership and poor facilities. By using a Gramscian framework to analyse the position of trade 
unions in post-liberalization Tanzania, it is possible to understand how the integral state has 
maintained hegemony through the combined use of moral and intellectual leadership and 
coercive legal-bureaucratic means. Thus, the use of a Gramscian analysis provides a considerable 
amount of explanatory power concerning the ways in which associational life is integrated into 
national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, and allows the weaknesses in 
the prevailing liberal conception, with its de Tocquevillian ideological roots, to be clearly seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements                                                   3 
Abstract                                                                                                                   4 
List of Tables                   7 
List of Figures                  8 
Acronyms and Abbreviations                           9 
 
Chapter 1 – The Research Problem                         12                              
1.1 Objectives and Themes                                12  
1.2 Civil Society Sector in Tanzania as a Case Study             13 
1.3 The Changing Development Context for the Civil Society Sector in Tanzania 
 Following the rise of Neo-liberalism                                                     15 
1.4 Civil Society and the Stress on Participation and Ownership                                           24 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis               29 
1.6 Summary                                                  31 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Approaches to Civil Society                       35 
2.1 Introduction                 35 
2.2 The Rise to Prominence of Civil Society in the Development Discourse                       36 
2.3 Key Civil Society Strands               37 
2.4 The Prevailing Paradigm: the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil Society 
 in Development Processes                                     38 
2.5 Countervailing Views to the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil 
 Society in Development Processes; the Gramscian Perspective                                      42 
2.6 The Rise of NGOs as Key Civil Society Actors in Development Processes                    47 
2.7 Critiques of the Liberal Conception of the Role of NGOs                      54 
2.8 Summary                            61 
 
Chapter 3 -The History of Development Policies in Tanzania                                                63 
3.1 Introduction                                       63 
3.2 German Colonialism                                      63 
3.3 British Colonialism to the Second World War                                                                  65 
3.4 The Independence Struggle after the Second World War                                                 68 
3.4  Independence: From the One Party State to Structural Adjustment                72 
3.5 The Post-liberalization Period                                                                                77 
3.6 Summary                                       92 
 
Chapter 4 – Methodology                                      94 
4.1 Methodological Approach                          94                  
4.2 Preliminary Fieldwork Issues                                                           95 
4.3 Fieldwork Experience                                                            95 
4.4 The Selection of Research Sites and Population Samples           97                   
4.5 Research Instruments                                                            98 
4.6 The Role of the Researcher                                               103 
4.7 Procedures of Data Analysis                                                                     108 
6 
 
4.8 Summary                                                            109 
 
Chapter 5 – The NGO Sector in Tanzania             110 
5.1 Overview of the Development of NGOs in Tanzania                                110 
5.2 NGOs during the period of British Colonialism           111 
5.3 NGOs from Independence to the New Policy Agenda                                           112 
5.4 NGOs in Post-liberalization Tanzania                       117 
5.5 NGOs in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings                       121 
5.6 Summary                144 
     
 
Chapter 6 - Trade Unions in Tanzania                                   147 
6.1 Introduction                147                                                
6.2 Theorizing Trade Unions                                                          148 
6.3 The Labour Aristocracy Debate             151 
6.4 The Trade Union Movement in Tanzania from the Origins to Independence       154 
6.5 National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA)             156 
6.6 Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA)                                                 160 
6.7 Trade Unions and Structural Adjustment                                             161 
6.8 Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania                                            162 
6.9 Trade Unions in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings                                 179        
6.10 Summary                                                                                                                   199   
  
Chapter 7 – NGOs, Trade Unions and the PRSP Process in Tanzania                                202 
7.1 Introduction                202 
7.2 Overview of the Role of Civil Society in the PRSP Process                                           204 
7.3 Conceptualizing Civil Society Participation in the PRSP Process                               208 
7.4 Measuring Civil Society Participation in, and Ownership of, the PRSP Process            209 
7.5 The Tanzanian PRSP                                                                                                       213 
7.6 NGO Engagement in the Tanzanian PRSP                                                                      214 
7.7 Trade Union Engagement in the Tanzanian PRSP                     227 
7.8 Summary                239 
 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions               241 
8.1 The Position of Civil Society Organizations in Post-liberalization Tanzania                 241 
8.2 The Marginalization of Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania                           242 
8.3 Tanzanian Trade Unions and the Labour Aristocracy Debate        245      
8.4 Tanzanian Trade Unions and Social Movement Unionism         246 
8.5 The NGO Dominance of Civil Society in Post-liberalization Tanzania                         247 
8.6 Trade Unions and NGOs in the Tanzanian PRSP Process                                              250 
8.7 Policy Implications              252 
 
Bibliography                                                                 
    
Appendices               
 
7 
 
List of Tables 
Table 3.1 - ODA as a Percentage of GNI in Tanzania 
Table 3.2 - Tanzanian National Policy Instruments 
Table 4.1 – Description of Survey 
Table 5.1 - Budget Analysis of NGOs Interviewed 
Table 5.2 - Website Analysis of Macro Group NGOs 
Table 6.1 – Phases of Trade Unionism in Tanzania 
Table 6.2 – Level of Trade Unionism in the Tanzanian Labour Force 
Table 6.3 – Barriers to Effective NGO-Trade Union Collaboration in Tanzania 
Table 7.1 - Basic Ownership Matrix 
Table 7.2 - Did the PRSP Process Add Value to Poverty Reduction Strategies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 – The Washington Consensus: Key Policy Reforms 
Figure 1.2 – Tanzania: Basic Indicators              
Figure 1.3 – Tanzania: Political Map                                                       
Figure 6.1 - Tanzanian Trade Unions: Membership Concentration                              
Figure 6.2 – Hakielimu Cartoon: At the Health Centre 
Figure 6.3 – Hakielimu Cartoon: At the School 
Figure 7.1 - JSA Guidelines for Assessing Participation in the PRSP 
Figure 7.2 - Assessing the Current Status of Participation: A Typology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ATE – Association of Tanzanian Employers 
BAWATA - Baraza La Wanawake  
BINGO – Big International NGO 
BSPS – Business Sector Programme Support (DANIDA) 
CBAs – Collective Bargaining Agreements 
CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi  
CHODAWU - Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
COTWU (T) - Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania   
CSO - Civil Society Organization 
CTI - Confederation of Tanzanian Industries  
DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency 
DDT - District Development Trust 
DFID - Department for International Development  
DOWUTA - Dock Workers Union of Tanzania 
DSA-TWG - Dissemination, Sensitization and Advocacy, Technical Working Group of the 
Poverty Monitoring System 
DSM – Dar es Salaam 
ECNGO – Elite Centred NGO 
ESRF - Economic and Social Research Foundation 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
FCS – Foundation for Civil Society 
FFUNGO - Foreign Funded NGO 
FONGO - Foreign NGO 
GBS - General Budgetary Support 
GONGO - Government-organized NGO 
GURN - Global Union Research Network 
HIPC – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative) 
ICFTU - International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
IDA - International Development Association 
IEO – Independent Evaluation Office 
IFC – International Finance Corporation 
IFIs - International Financial Institutions 
IGWUTA - Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania 
ILO – International Labour Organization 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
ITDG – Intermediate Technology Development Group 
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency 
JSA – Joint Staff Assessment  
JUWATA - Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania 
LEAT - Lawyers‟ Environmental Action Team 
LGP - Learning Group on Participation 
LHRC - Legal and Human Rights Centre 
LONGO - Local NGO 
10 
 
MKUKUTA - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania 
MKUZA - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar  
MCT - Media Council of Tanzania 
MNC – Multi National Corporation  
NACONGO - National Council for NGOs 
NEC – National Electoral Commission (of Tanzania) 
NGO - Non-governmental Organization 
NNGO – Northern Non-governmental Organization 
NSGRP - National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
NUTA - National Union of Tanganyika Workers 
NYC - National Youth Council 
ODI – Overseas Development Institute  
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OED – Operations Evaluation Department 
PAR - Participatory Action Research 
PEDP – Primary Education Development Programme 
PF - Policy Forum 
PFPs – Policy Framework Papers 
PHDRs – Poverty and Human Development Reports (Tanzania) 
PINGO - Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization  
PLA - Participative Learning and Action  
PO - People‟s Organization 
PPA - Participatory Poverty Assessment  
PRA - Participative Rural Appraisal 
PREM – Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (Network) 
PRGF - Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
PRS - Poverty Reduction Strategy 
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
PRSC - Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
RAAWU - Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union 
REBA - Regional Evidence Building Agenda 
REPOA - Research on Poverty Alleviation  
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme 
SME – Small Medium Enterprise 
SNGO – Southern Non-governmental Organization 
SOE – State Owned Enterprise 
TACOSODE - Tanzania Council for Social Development 
TADREG - Tanzania Development Research Group  
TAFICAWU - Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
TALGWU - Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
TAMICO - Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
TAMWA - Tanzania Media Women‟s Association  
TANGO - Tanzania Association of NGOs 
TANU - Tanzanian African National Union   
TAPP - Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program  
TASIWU - Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
11 
 
TASOET - Tanzania Social and Economic Trust  
TASU - Tanzania Seamen‟s Union 
TAWU - Tanzanian Agricultural Workers Union 
TCDD - Tanzania Coalition for Debt and Development 
TEDG - Tanzania Ecumenical Dialogue Group  
TEN/MET - Tanzania Education Network  
TEWUTA - Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania 
TFL – Tanganyikan Federation of Labour 
TGNP - Tanzania Gender Networking Programme  
TMW - Tanzania Media Workers Union 
TPU - Tanzania Pilots Union 
TPAWU - Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union 
TRAWU - Tanzania Railway Workers Union   
TTU - Tanzanian Teachers Union 
TUCTA - Trade Union Congress of Tanzania 
TUGHE – Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees 
TUICO - Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers 
TUJ - Tanzania Union of Journalists  
TUPSE - Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees  
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF – United Nations Children‟s Fund 
URT – United Republic of Tanzania 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
VENRO - Verbrand Entwicklungspolitik Deutscher Nichtregierungs-Organizationen 
VPO - Vice President‟s Office  
WDM – World Development Movement 
WFTU – World Federation of Trade Unions 
WTO – World Trade Organization 
YPC - Youth Partnership Countryside  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Research Problem  
 
1.1 Objectives and Themes 
This thesis centres on a Gramscian analysis of the changing position of civil society in Tanzania 
following the liberalization of the economy which was accompanied by the move to multiparty 
liberal democracy during the 1990s. The research analyzes, in particular, how these substantive 
shifts in the political economy of Tanzania have led to conflicts in the sphere of civil society 
where clear distinctions are made between which groups should, and which should not, play a 
meaningful role in national policy-making processes. How these changes are having mutually 
contrasting effects on the participation of two types of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), 
namely trade unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in national policy-making 
processes is examined as fieldwork-based case studies.  There is also an analysis of the modes of 
participation by trade unions and NGOs in national policy-making processes and whether these 
are leading to perceptions of their ownership on the part of these organizations. This focus 
derives from the importance accorded to these concepts by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) which have largely driven the liberalization of the economy and the move to 
multiparty democracy in Tanzania.  
 
To accomplish these aims an overarching research question was posited: 
How and why have trade unions been largely excluded from „civil society‟ as it has been 
constituted practically and rhetorically in post-liberalization Tanzania? 
 
This in turn necessitated examining four sub-questions: 
1. Are Tanzanian trade unions representatives of a labour aristocracy in the form of a 
decreasing number of wage labourers in the formal sector? 
2. What possibilities exist for trade unions to embrace 'social movement unionism‟ by 
forming effective alliances with other associational groups in Tanzania? 
3. How and why have NGOs been able to dominate „civil society‟ input to national policy-
making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania? 
13 
 
4 How have trade unions and NGOs been included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP) process and with what outcomes? 
  
1.2 Civil society in Tanzania as a Case Study 
Tanzania has become an IFI show-case, portrayed as „one of the best performers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank, 2010b: 1). For the IMF (Nord et al 2009: 1), Tanzania has experienced a 
„remarkable turnaround‟ characterized by „buoyant‟ economic growth, „booming‟ exports and 
poverty „heading downwards.‟  Tanzania was listed as one of the top ten reformers in the World 
Bank‟s „Pro-Business List‟ for 1996 (IFC, World Bank, 1996) and is currently ranked as the best 
country in Africa in terms of enforcing contracts (International Finance Corporation, World 
Bank, 2011). For the Tanzanian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, (Kallaghe, 2010) 
Tanzania is a „rising star‟ in Africa and has a „robust economy.‟ Moreover, the Mo Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010) rates Tanzania as the best 
governed country in East Africa and 12
th
 out of 53 countries ranked Continent-wide. For the 
donor community, „Tanzania serves as evidence that ownership can be constructed through 
partnership between state and donors‟ (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom 2009: 295). 1 
 
This depiction of Tanzania as a recent „success story‟ in developmental terms has been 
problematized in this research through an analysis of changes in civil society. The activities of 
civil society organizations were circumscribed following the formal move to a one-party state 
four years after Tanzania gained independence from Britain in 1961. The state maintained firm 
control over civil society from this period until the adoption of the neo-liberal economic policies 
and multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s. In the post-liberalization period civil society 
has become an arena of struggle in which different types of associational groups have contested 
the newly available policy spaces. However, only a relatively small number of NGOs have 
managed to play an active role in national policy-making processes, to a large extent championed 
and financed by external donors. While the donors argue that their support and funding is 
important in constituting and cementing a vibrant and varied civil society (Mercer, 1999), this 
                                                          
1
  Key development indicators are listed in Figure 1A at the end of the chapter. Below this, a map showing the large 
geographical area of Tanzania, which is important to the debate concerning the role of a wide number of civil 
society organizations in national policy processes, is provided in Figure 1B. 
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view sits uneasily with their failure in practice to assist and include other types of associational 
groups, such as trade unions. The hegemony of neo-liberal policies in Tanzania, driven by the 
IFIs, has been consolidated with the active consent (Gramsci, 2011) of most of the leading NGOs 
working in the country since the 1990s, which take part in national policy-making debates 
through forums created by the IFIs and the government, such as the PRSP process, thus 
conferring on them legitimacy (See chapter 5 for details). In contrast, associational groups such 
as trade unions, which put forward counter-hegemonic perspectives, unwelcome to the 
government, such as the need for tighter regulations regarding the entry of foreign firms into the 
domestic economy, are subordinated and struggle to play any role in the formation of national 
policies (See chapter 6 for details). Both the winning of active consent from civil society groups 
and the subordination – or elimination - of those providing counter-hegemonic perspectives are 
equally important in achieving hegemony (Gramsci, 2011). These two strategies have been used 
by the state in post-liberalization Tanzania. For the purposes of this research, hegemony is 
regarded as being the rule within a culturally diverse society of one group, through the 
manipulation of the beliefs, values and perceptions of subaltern classes, so that its worldview is 
accepted as a universally valid ideology. The resulting status quo is perceived by all as 
benefitting the whole society, whilst in reality only the ruling group gain (Gramsci, 2011).  
 
Trade unions face a narrow range of possibilities in confronting the hegemonic discourse of neo-
liberalism. Revolutionary unionism, through concerted militant confrontations with neo-liberal 
hegemony, along with a fully worked-out vision for alternative economic and political policies, 
is improbable in Tanzania, given the emasculation of the movement by the state for thirty years 
following independence from Britain in 1961. Another option for the labour movement is to 
embrace social movement unionism by going beyond the workplace to form strategic alliances 
with other civil society organizations, thus creating a „historic bloc‟ of oppositional groups in 
Gramscian terms, capable of forming counter-hegemonic discourses and promulgating them 
through institutions which determine the thinking and actions of individuals and groups within 
society (Gramsci, 2011). This scenario has precedents in pre-colonial history (See chapter 3 for 
details) but after becoming quasi-governmental organizations, as part of state-led development 
policies in post-independence Tanzania, trade unions have formed few meaningful relationships 
with other civil society organizations (See chapter 6 for details). Thus, while a shift to social 
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movement unionism has attractions for the labour movement its realization is problematic.  
 
1.3 The Changing Development Context for Civil Society in Tanzania following the rise 
of Neo-liberalism 
The change on the part of the Tanzanian government during the 1990s, manifested in its 
liberalization of the economy and adoption of multiparty liberal democracy after three decades of 
statist dirigisme, can best be understood through an examination of the rise to a hegemonic 
position of neo-liberalism globally, driven by powerful development actors and institutions, 
notably the IFIs.  These institutions made the acceptance of neo-liberal policies, in return for 
provision of official development assistance and debt relief, difficult to avoid for an aid-
dependent country such as Tanzania.
2
 These major policy shifts have led to civil society 
organizations facing a new set of circumstances involving an ideological and physical 
restructuring of their relationships with the state, private enterprise and supranational 
organizations. 
 
Neo-liberalism can be defined as a „theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets and free trade (Harvey, 2009: 2). Neo-liberal policies rose to prominence in the early 
1980s with the accession to political power of Thatcher (1979-1990) in Britain and Reagan 
(1980-1988) in the US and the increasing influence of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school 
of economists (Mirowski and Plehwe eds, 2009, Friedman, 1968, Friedman and Heller, 1969), 
advocating monetarist economic policies. 
 
Neo-liberals mounted a concerted attack on pro-state positions throughout the 1980s, based on a 
distrust of the public sector and an emphasis on the negative effects the state was having on the 
development process (Little, 1982). According to neo-liberals, the fundamental problem with the 
public sector – which maintained an iron grip on development policies for three decades in 
Tanzania following independence - is the lack of institutional incentives to ensure that self-
interested bureaucrats behave in ways that enhance the public good (Hayek, 1988).  State control 
                                                          
2
 See chapter 3 for details. 
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of the economy inevitably leads to rent seeking (Lal 1997, Kreuger 1974) and other forms of 
Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) behaviour (Bhagwati 1982). Bates (2005: 8) sums 
up this position in the context of Africa with the argument that „states distort incentives out of 
regard for their own needs and those of powerful interests in their own societies.‟ Even where 
corruption is not a major problem, neo-liberals argue that public sector officials cannot know 
enough to predict markets and „pick winners‟ (UNCTAD, 2007) and that informational 
asymmetry inevitably results since „the totality of resources that one could employ in such a plan 
is simply not knowable to anybody, and therefore can hardly be centrally controlled‟ (Bauer, 
1988: 85). 
 
Neo-liberals argue that policy-making should be in the hands of independent institutions, such as 
central banks, staffed by well-trained technocrats (Easterly, 2002). The IFIs employ such 
technocrats and argue that they are thus able to put forward universally appropriate policies, 
signatories to which gain the confidence of domestic and foreign investors. In this way the IFIs 
assist in closing the „expertise gap‟ in developing countries. In sum, the neo-liberal position is 
that, „independent domestic and international policy-making institutions ensure that governments 
pursue economic policies that promote long term economic development [and] prosperity‟ 
(Chang and Grabel 2004: 48).  
 
For neo-liberals, the market mechanism is posited as aligning self-interest with the social good 
(Myint, 1987). Thus, the optimal role of the state should be limited only to the provision of 
essential public goods – law and order, defence, education and possibly health; „beyond that, 
economic activities are best left to private agents‟ (Lal, 1997: 225). These attacks on arguments 
in favour of a leading role for the state as an agent of development during the 1980s, led to 
Williamson (2000) devising a list of specific strategies in 1989 – the Washington Consensus - to 
overcome problems caused by the previous decade of „de-development in Latin America, which 
has become a neo-liberal template. 
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Figure 1.1  The Washington Consensus: Key Policy Reforms 
 (i) Fiscal discipline 
(ii) Redirection of public expenditure priorities to areas offering high economic returns 
and potentially better income distribution, such as primary health care, primary 
education and infrastructure 
(iii) Tax reform 
(iv) Liberalization of interest rates 
(v) Competitive exchange rates 
(vi) Liberalization of trade 
(vii) Liberalization of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
(viii) Increased privatization 
(ix) Deregulation  (abolition of barriers such as quotas, tariffs and embargoes) 
(x) Protection of property rights 
Source: Williamson (2000) 
 
The Washington Consensus influenced the content of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs), which had been introduced in many developing countries from the early 1980s (Karcher, 
2001). SAPs were introduced to remedy the perceived over-extension of the state in Africa and 
to stop private enterprise being crowded-out by the public sector. This was posited as creating 
the conditions for the (re)-establishment of „homo economicus‟ (Bernstein, 2004) in Africa; 
workers driven by profit maximization and able to achieve this within the institutional conditions 
of assured property rights and allocatively efficient markets. Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and international trade were strongly encouraged, while wages were to be set by the 
market mechanism.   
 
Around the same time as Williamson‟s work was published, the World Bank (1989) brought out 
a report (Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth) which cited the „crisis of 
governance‟ as being a significant factor contributing to the hitherto disappointing results of 
SAPs. The report (1989: 5) emphasized that in Africa there was a need for „not just less 
government but better government – government that concentrates its efforts less on direct 
interventions and more on enabling others to be productive.‟ This was a formative influence on 
18 
 
the 1990s move to a focus on „good governance‟ in developing countries, in the form of 
improved public sector management, the creation of robust legal frameworks, increased 
accountability of public servants and better transparency of public administration, which has 
come to be accepted by the IFIs as the political remedy for development problems (Minogue, 
2002). The attempts to engender neo-liberal economic policies based on private-sector growth 
along with multiparty liberal democracy in developing countries has been termed the „New 
Policy Agenda‟ of the major Western multilateral and bilateral donors and involve a substantive 
role for civil society in coalescing and advocating the views of citizens. 
3
 However, by the 
second half of the 1990s, growth outcomes for countries which had adopted both aspects of the 
New Policy Agenda were generally poor. Poverty reduction had not happened to any great extent 
if at all, the liberalization of domestic finance and international capital flows had been partly 
responsible for  global crises, such as Asia in 1997 (Basu, 2006, Chang, 2005, Wade, 1998).. 
Both market and institution failures had occurred in many of those that had applied Washington 
Consensus policies. 
 
This led to a shift to a Post-Washington Consensus in the form of wider policy prescriptions 
based on trying to remedy market and institution failure.  These changes have become the focus 
of a battle between orthodox policy makers (senior officials at the World Bank, the IMF and the 
WTO) and critics (Jomo and Fine eds, 2006, Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus eds, 2001), who want 
the abandonment of the model on the basis that its policy prescriptions are fundamentally flawed. 
 
The World Bank, IMF and WTO want to build on what they consider to be the successes of 
„first-generation‟ Washington Consensus policies and introduce „second-generation‟ reforms, 
centring on increasing the efficiency and durability of institutions in the development process in 
a bid to reduce poverty and inequality (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, Kanbur, 1999, Burki 
and Perry, 1998). This has led to the World Bank broadening the range of its activities from the 
economic to the political, social and cultural spheres and promoting a stronger regulatory role for 
the state when pursuing market-oriented reforms. The stress is on a more accommodating 
                                                          
3
 Although the details of the New Policy Agenda vary from donor agency to another a key role is assigned to NGOs 
in the democratization process. NGOs are an integral part of a vibrant civil society and the promotion of pluralism 
(Hulme and Edwards, 1996). See chapters 3 and 5 in particular for details of the growing influence of NGOs on 
development policies in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
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„knowledge bank‟ (Kapur, 2006, Cohen and Laporte, 2004) advocating national ownership of 
policies based on the vigorous participation of civil society organizations in their formulation 
(Pincus and Winters, 2002).  
 
The Post-Washington Consensus concentrates on four main aspects of the development process; 
addressing institution and market failure, promoting the information-theoretic paradigm, creating 
a new governance model and developing human and social capital. The latter two of these four 
elements have been particularly important in providing new opportunities for civil society 
organizations to contest national policy-making processes. 
 
Regarding the first of these aspects, institution and market failure, the reaction to the lack of 
success of the original Washington Consensus led to the creation of an „augmented‟ version 
based on broader and deeper institutional reform packages (Rodrik, 2006). 
4
 The policies 
resulting from these reforms are empirically at odds with the historical experiences of developed 
countries, since they reflect their contemporary institutional structures and processes rather than 
those which pertained during the early stages of development. 
5
 Overall, the „augmented‟ version 
of the Washington Consensus is based on a lengthy, vague and technical set of policy 
prescriptions, which do not accommodate the historical specificity of development processes in 
individual countries and fail to recognise „that institutional reform is deeply political‟ (Khan, 
2002: 36). 
 
Second, an information-theoretic „paradigm‟ (Stiglitz (2010, 2002, 2000, 1999) has been 
devised, which concentrates on remedying problems caused by information asymmetries, 
whereby groups have varying access to market information and differing transaction costs across 
regions and countries.  The state has been „allowed back in‟ to remedy these market 
imperfections. 
6
   Despite this enhanced role for the state, the information-theoretic paradigm 
remains – like the original Washington Consensus - based on methodological individualism, 
                                                          
4
  Rodrik‟s (2006) „augmented‟ Washington Consensus comprises corporate governance; anti-corruption; flexible 
labor markets; WTO agreements; financial codes and standards; „prudent‟ capital-account opening; independent 
central banks/inflation targeting; social safety nets; targeted poverty reduction.  
5
 See Chang (2002) and Rodrik (2004) for empirical examples. 
6
 Advocates of the Post-Washington Consensus stress the need for detailed micro-economic analyses of information 
to be made available to those participating in the market, which will allow generalizations to be made.       
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where the focus of analysis is the rational behaviour of singular actors and the economy is 
posited as comprising no more than an aggregation of utility-maximising agents. There is no 
examination of how rules and institutions governing markets are created and change through 
contestations based on class or occupational interests involving levels of power which vary 
according to the particular development paths of individual countries. In sum, the information-
theoretic paradigm is reductionist and based on an ahistorical view of the roles of regulations and 
institutions governing markets. 
7
    
 
The third key aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus, the new governance model advocated 
by the IFIs, focuses on developing partnerships between agents of development. This should 
involve the participation of as wide a variety of civil society organizations in policy discussions 
as possible, so that governments can be held to account for the progress of national development 
plans and citizens will feel a sense of ownership and thus be committed to their implementation. 
However, the ways in which the key issues of participation and ownership are conceptualized 
and measured by the IFIs are suffused with problems, which are examined in detail in Section 
1.4 below.  
 
The fourth distinctive aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus is its placing of greater 
emphasis on non-economic factors in development, particularly the roles of social and human 
capital, than was the case with the original Washington Consensus.  Using social capital in the 
locus of civil society organizations to build trust and reciprocal relations in developing countries 
has become a major part of the donors‟ development strategies from the middle of the 1990s, 
evidenced by the fact that the World Bank has developed an extensive website dedicated to the 
concept. 
8
  
 
Strong social capital is regarded as fostering development but few policy prescriptions are 
provided in the Post-Washington Consensus literature as to how it can be inculcated. Phrases 
such as, „missing link‟ (Schuurman, 2003, Grootaert, 1998) and „social glue‟ (Narayan, 1999) are 
used to characterize social capital and to illustrate how the concept provides a complement to the 
                                                          
7
 See Hodgson (2007), Fine (2006, 2001) and Standing (2000). 
8
 See the World Bank - http://worldbank.org/poverty/scapital. 
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economic policy prescriptions of the Post-Washington Consensus. Stress is put on the way 
building social capital through the work of civil society organizations can play a role in changing 
societies from „low-trust‟ to „high-trust‟ (Fukuyama, 1996). The definitions and views preferred 
by the World Bank on social capital, come from Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2003, 2000, 
1993a, 1993b) and are rooted in a liberal theoretical framework. Coleman (1988) defines social 
capital as any social arrangement which allows individuals more readily to achieve their goals. In 
this conception social capital is potentially inherent in all social structures and should not be 
regarded as a dependent variable. Putnam‟s (2003, 2000, 1993a, 1993b) work during the latter 
half of the 1990s has stimulated much research on how institutionalized forms of civil society 
can have an  impact on increasing social capital, leading to greater trust and connectedness in 
societies, as well as the development of universal norms and networks. Putnam‟s focus is on 
societal consensus, which can be achieved through the development of universal norms and his 
work lacks a systematic analysis of sources of conflict between classes, groups and individuals 
which are imbued with varying levels of power.  The flaw in Putnam‟s „pluralist heaven‟ 
(Schattschneider, 1960) is the failure to address the issue that civil society often represents the 
interests of powerful classes and/or high income groups, which have the ability to set up 
organizations with considerable institutional and financial capacity. In contrast, the needs of poor 
and marginalized groups are downplayed or ignored because they are framed and articulated in 
loose and informal associational forms, which lack financial capacity and do not attract interest 
or funding from major donors.  
 
The work of Bourdieu (1990), which stresses the way social capital leads to a reproduction of the 
dominance of an elite class, is cited rarely by the World Bank. Bourdieu (1990) defines social 
capital as non-economic processes of stratification by which classes demarcate themselves and 
reproduce and consolidate advantage. It is an important way by which culture and education are 
formed and become the preserve of a dominant class. This class and context-based analysis – 
which has parallels with the Gramscian perspective on civil society (examined in the following 
chapter) – has been disregarded in much of the literature on social capital and civil society.  
Bourdieu (1986) makes the point that levels of social capital are inextricably linked to the 
distribution of resource ownership, wealth, income and power in any society. These substantive 
factors are largely ignored in the arguments of Putnam, Coleman and other writers using a liberal 
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theoretical framework, which the World Bank endorses. From such a perspective, civil society is 
portrayed as a level playing field where a diverse range of associational groups compete freely to 
put forward the views of citizens. 
 
A related problem, with many analyses of civil society organizations as vehicles for promoting 
social capital couched within a liberal framework, is the lack of a rigorous examination of what 
can, and what cannot, be classified as a „civil society organization.‟ (See, for example, the failure 
to provide such an analysis in the work of Burawoy, 1996, Evans, 1996a, Evans, 1996b, Heller, 
1996, Lam, 1996, Ostrom, 1996).  This issue is examined in depth in the following chapter as it 
is important in regard to which associational groups are able – and which are unable – to insert 
themselves into national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania and why this 
should be the  case.  
 
This „rediscovery‟ (Mamdani, 1996) by the IFIs and bilateral donor agencies of civil society 
organizations as vehicles to increase social capital and thus build trust is based on a narrow view 
of the range of associational life in developing countries. The IFIs argument that social capital is 
a valid and important concept because it addresses the „neglected‟ role of civil society does not 
stand up to scrutiny. In fact, the literature on civil society is voluminous and covers the key 
arguments centred on social capital in a thoroughgoing way (See, for example, Howell and Lind, 
eds 2010, Armstrong et al, eds 2010, Cheema and Popovski, eds, 2010, Anheier, Glasius and 
Kaldor, eds, 2009, McKeon, 2009, OSSREA, 2009, Jobert and Kohler-Koch, eds, 2008, 
Edwards, 2004, Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 2001 and the arguments in chapter 
2 for details). 
9
  
 
The Post-Washington Consensus stresses education as a means for development, focusing on „an 
uncritical faith in the notion of human capital‟ (Rose, 2006: 162). Increasing human capital is 
justified by the World Bank in terms of its ability to raise the productivity of the poor (Rose, 
2006, 2003, Becker, 1975). Rose (2003) argues that the emphasis on human capital as part of the 
Post-Washington Consensus is leading to the marketization and privatization of education, and to 
a World Bank and WTO-driven global education industry. Analyses based on calculating „Rates 
                                                          
9
 See also Fine (2010) on this point. 
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of Return to Education‟ (RORE) are used to justify investment.  
 
The emphasis on RORE has been criticized technically for using flawed data (Bennell, 1996) and 
conceptually for failing to examine adequately the moral and social impacts of education and not 
recognizing that education systems are the outcome of historically developed socio-economic 
practices that are particular to a country (Fine and Rose, 2001). The World Bank (2010c) claims 
that their approach has broadened in recent years. However, even in 2010, a major World Bank 
publication (Banerji et al. 2010: 1) outlines an interlinked conceptual framework for education, 
aimed at fostering economic growth, which focuses on „developing the technical, cognitive and 
behavioural skills conducive to high productivity [author‟s emphasis] in the work environment.‟ 
Thus, the Post-Washington Consensus perspective on education remains rooted in human capital 
theory, justified in terms of a „Rates of Return to Education‟ framework of analysis.  
  
Overall, the Post-Washington Consensus preserves much of the core elements of the Washington 
Consensus; a stress on getting the fundamentals of macroeconomic policies „right‟, a concern 
with the stabilization of economies and the pre-eminence of the private sector in the development 
process. It remains economic-reductionist in that it fails examine the foundations upon which 
groups gain economic, political and social power, and how they maintain it.  The core policies of 
the Post-Washington Consensus encompass the World Bank‟s stress on the value of liberal 
democracy, good governance, education, high levels of social capital and civil society 
participation in policy debates leading to national ownership as key aspects of development 
processes. These policies have become largely add-ons to the original policies of the Washington 
Consensus. However, they do involve an enhanced role for civil society. The most important of 
these policies in this respect are the building of human and social capital (which draw 
significantly on an expanded role for civil society in development processes) and the good 
governance agenda, which focuses on bringing about greater levels of accountability and 
transparency in the political sphere. Incentives should be provided to act in the public good by 
minimizing information asymmetries in capitalist markets and increasing participation in - and 
ownership of – national policies, through the institutionalized means of civil society 
organizations. 
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1.4  Civil Society and the Stress on Participation and Ownership 
Participation and ownership have become central to the donor discourse in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. How they are conceptualized and operationalized with regard to civil society 
organizations thus merits analysis. Summarized as the „buzzword of the 1990s‟ (Cornwall and 
Pratt 2003: 1), 
10
 participation is „the process by which stakeholders influence and share control 
over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations, and/or program implementations‟, 
according to the World Bank (2004b: 237). This definition links participation to the „good 
governance‟ agenda in development with its emphasis on shared responsibility for project 
creation, implementation and evaluation between donors and participants with civil society 
expected to play a significant role.   
    
Fundamentally participatory approaches are concerned with power and control over resources 
and life chances, whereby those with less power struggle to gain more control over their lives 
(Nelson and Wright, 1995). The concept has become imbued with various ideologies and 
meanings. Thus, any definition of participation should only be a base from which to explore the 
meanings attached to it in particular contexts, such as NGO and trade union participation in 
national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, and how these are contested 
and deployed, leading to gains for some and losses for others.   
 
Types and levels of participation in the development process vary markedly, from low-intensity 
forms, where the target group is provided with information about projects and programmes, to 
participation as self-mobilization on the part of the intended beneficiaries. A middle ground is 
commonly occupied, centred on participation-as-consultation, where intended beneficiaries have 
the opportunity to express their views to donors and other stakeholders, without guarantees or 
mechanisms to ensure that their perceived needs will be addressed substantively (Pretty, 1995). 
 
The focus of participatory approaches has shifted since the 1980s when Robert Chambers (2008, 
2007, 2005, 1999, 1997) was influential in getting actors and institutions to put the views of the 
poor to the forefront and to take a bottom-up approach to development processes. During the 
1980s, „first-generation‟ participatory approaches were mainstreamed mostly at the 
                                                          
10
  See also Leal (2007). 
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microeconomic level during the planning and implementation stages of development projects. 
  
The creation of the Learning Group on Participation (LGP) at the World Bank in 1990 provided 
a fillip to advocates of participatory perspectives.  The group produced three influential reports 
and published the Participation Sourcebook in 1995. The LGP‟s 1994 report (World Bank, 1994) 
called for a new focus, whereby stakeholders in development projects and processes would be 
identified systematically and divided into two groups - primary (intended beneficiaries) and 
secondary, including a substantive role for civil society organizations which could show they had 
technical expertise and links to the primary stakeholders. With this increasing acceptance by 
mainstream development organizations, the use of participatory perspectives enlarged and spread 
from a few sectors and countries, with NGOs becoming champions of the approach. 
 
As a result of this expanded vision for participation, „second generation‟ concerns developed, 
based on the institutionalization of the concept, as the approach spread to development planning, 
policy research, monitoring and evaluation. Overall, the „participation in projects‟ emphasis of 
the 1980s was challenged during the 1990s by a more radical concept of participatory 
development. For Chambers (1997) „they‟ participate in our projects encapsulates the former 
position while „we‟ participate in „their‟ projects sums up the more radical alternative.   
 
From 2000 onwards, „third generation‟ issues have come to prominence, focusing on 
governance, ethics and power. The emphasis has changed to how to bring participatory 
approaches into the areas of governance and rights. The development of the „good governance‟ 
agenda and the stress on the developmental benefits of an active civil society have led to a 
deeper analysis of participatory approaches both in theory and practice, including the emergence 
of a thoroughgoing critique of the concept (Cooke and Kothari, eds 2002, Mosse, 2002). 
Participatory development has been questioned in two main ways.  One critique centres on 
technical limitations concerning the formulation, application and analysis of participatory 
approaches (Anello, 2003, Anwar, 2003, Clemente, 2003, Malik, 2003, Swantz, 2003). A more 
radical attack focuses on theoretical, political and conceptual weaknesses and raises the 
possibility that participatory approaches per se may be the problem (Hickey and Mohan, 2005a 
and 2005b, Cooke and Kothari eds, 2002, Mosse, 2002).  
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Concerning the former, there is clearly a need for improvement in the application of participatory 
development approaches. As Drinkwater (2003: 62) puts it, while the „rhetoric of participatory 
practice abounds, laudatory practice is a great deal thinner.‟  Participatory approaches have been 
denigrated for being blind to context and thus mechanistic in their application (Datta, 2003, 
Mohan, 2002).  
11
  Regarding the latter, participatory approaches have been criticized for 
becoming a „tyranny‟ (Cooke and Kothari, 2002), leading to the exclusion of other development 
strategies which may be legitimate and effective. They have also been decried for adopting the 
neo-liberal discourse of individualism and consequently underplaying structural constraints 
which make groups unequal, which can work against the interests of the poor and marginalized 
when applied to development projects ((Hildyard et al, 2002, Kohl, 2002). Thus, participatory 
approaches allow target groups to be involved in development processes only within a system 
where they are systematically disadvantaged, which inevitably maintains their subjugation 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005a).  
 
Hickey and Mohan, (2005a, 2005b) make the point that it is not enough to regard 
institutionalizing participation as expanding political democracy to include more people and 
places in shaping policy processes and institutions. There is also a need for participatory 
democracy in the economic sphere, which should lead to a fight for structural reforms. For 
participatory processes to have a significant impact, they should focus on bringing about  
long-term social, economic and institutional change. Participatory approaches need to 
systematically address power relations, which constrain access to resources and opportunities. 
How these power relations involving the major external donors, the state and civil society have 
been manifested in post-liberalization Tanzania, leading to the marginalization of trade unions 
and the dominance of a small group of NGOs, is analysed in chapters five, six and seven.  
 
Along with participation, the IFIs stress that national ownership is the key to the success of 
national policies in developing countries (IMF, 2010, IDA and IMF, 2002). Fundamentally, 
ownership is based on the belief that local institutions must be run by locals, since if patterns of 
                                                          
11
  Cornwall and Pratt (2003) outline the problem of „facipulating‟ – the facilitating and manipulating by 
development professionals of the direction or conclusion of the analysis - after a „token‟ (Mohan, 2002) 
participatory process has been utilised.  
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behaviour have altered only in response to a carrot or a stick, slippage will happen once the 
carrot or stick is removed (Thomas, 2004). The emphasis on ownership reflects a concern 
amongst IFI staff that policies, such as SAPs, failed, in no small measure because there was a 
lack of true national ownership of them on the part of recipient countries.  
 
The rise to prominence of the concept of ownership may be traced back to a major IFI policy 
document by Johnson and Wasty in 1993, which emphasized the importance of ownership to the 
credibility of reform programmes, stating that there is a symbiotic relationship between the level 
of success of a programme outcome and the level of borrower ownership. 
12
 They posit 
ownership as a four-dimensional independent variable and outline four levels for each 
dimension, creating the possibility of sixteen different ratings for reform operations.  The four 
criteria are (i) locus of initiative, (ii) level of intellectual conviction among key policy makers, 
(iii) expression of political will by top leadership and (iv) efforts toward consensus-building 
among various constituencies. Applying this classification scheme to eighty one World Bank 
operations, Johnson and Wasty find a significant degree of positive correlation between 
programme success and levels of borrower ownership. 
13
 However, following the publication of 
their work ownership was ignored in donor literature until the end of the 1990s when it was 
adopted by the IFIs as a key part of their New Policy Agenda and has since been portrayed 
largely as a „magic bullet‟ to solve development problems.  
 
Critics of ownership can be broadly divided into reformers, who are largely supportive of the 
concept and concentrate on improving its technical limitations (World Bank 2004a, IMF, 2004, 
2001, Drazen and Isard 2004, Drazen, 2002, Killick 2004, 1998, 1997, Booth, 2003a, 2003b) and 
radicals, who are critical, sometimes to the point of being dismissive (Pender, 2007, Carvalho 
2001, Abugre 2000, WDM, 2001), on the grounds that the concept involves „playing with words 
whose meaning is too vague for rigorous analysis‟ (Weeks et al., 2003: 1). 
 
                                                          
12
 Johnson and Wasty (1993: 1) themselves trace the origin of the concept to the late 1980s when, in the first World 
Bank Report on Adjustment Lending, it was stated that „progress has been stronger where governments have 
“owned” the program and hence were committed to carrying it through.‟  
13
 Subsequent attempts to draw up criteria with which to assess levels of ownership, notably Killick (1997) and the 
World Bank (2004a) have drawn on Johnson and Wasty‟s classification scheme.    
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Radicals make the point that there is a need to address a fundamental contradiction concerning 
the way ownership is conceptualized and operationalized in national policy-making processes. 
Ownership is chosen as a concept by external donors which they claim is necessary if effective 
anti-poverty strategies are to be put in place. However, the concept has been introduced by the 
donors as a priori containing merits in terms of leading to the creation of effective national 
policies and the recipient countries have no chance to reject it as unsuitable for their particular 
political and socio-economic environment. They are not allowed to argue that ownership itself – 
which can only be achieved if civil society organizations play a significant role in national 
policy-making processes - is a concept being imposed on them by external actors which they 
reject as being inappropriate in a context-specific environment. Ownership can thus be regarded 
as a „super-conditionality‟ (Weeks et al, 2002). 
 
While the donors claim that an important criterion for assessing levels of ownership is the 
amount of participation of civil society organizations in national policy-making processes, 
detailed and accurate measurement of the concept has proved problematic. The quantitative 
measurement of independent variables as formulated by Johnson and Wasty (1993) has been 
accepted conceptually and developed by the World Bank (2004b). Giving summary answers to 
key questions in matrix form (Weeks et al, 2002 and Lerche, Pincus and Weeks, 2003) has been 
put forward as an alternative approach, providing qualitative data. 
14
 However, since the formal 
inception of PRSPs in September 1999 - which is the policy most associated with transferring 
ownership to aid recipients (Weeks et al, 2002) - the World Bank has not used its own 
measurement of independent variables schema to assess levels of ownership or a matrix format. 
Instead they measure the concept by employing broad rankings (from 1-5) based on methods 
which lack rigour, transparency and consistency. In the case of Tanzania, the level of 
participation of civil society organizations, which contributes to the composite ownership score 
of between 1 and 5, is summarized in one or two sentences in World Bank/IMF Joint Staff 
Assessments, which are of such a general nature as to make meaningful analysis impossible. 
15
 
 
                                                          
14
  The matrix has three dimensions; the range of owners, the stages of the project cycle and the type of aid 
instrument or modality used. The matrix (set out below in Figure 3.6) is used to summarize the activity assessment 
of the stakeholders during the various stages of the project cycle. The summaries can be updated as the process 
moves on, which takes account of its dynamic nature.  No numeric values are used. 
15
 See chapter 7 for details. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
In order to achieve a Gramscian analysis of the reasons for the exclusion of trade unions from the 
reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania and to highlight in contrast the 
leading role played by NGOs, it is necessary to analyze the theorization of civil society, the 
changing nature of development policies in Tanzania since the onset of colonialism, the 
historical role of trade unions and of NGOs and the way both groups have taken part in the PRSP 
process.   
  
To this end, in chapter two the theorization of civil society is analysed, focusing on why liberal 
perspectives have taken precedence and how this dominance influences the way in which certain 
civil society organizations are included in national policy-making processes while others are 
marginalized or excluded. The key argument of the chapter is that a Gramscian perspective has 
been wrongly neglected, since it has greater explanatory power concerning the ways in which 
associational life is integrated into national policy-making processes in post-liberalization 
Tanzania than the prevailing liberal conception. A critical appropriation of a Gramscian theory of 
civil society is then used in the three fieldwork-based chapters (five, six and seven) to provide an 
understanding of the roles of trade unions and NGOs in national policy-making processes.  
 
In chapter three the history of development policies in Tanzania is examined. An overview is 
given of developments in the political economy of Tanzania, starting with the period of German 
colonization, in order to bring out how this has substantively shaped the ways in which civil 
society organizations take part in national policy-making processes at present.  The reasons for 
Tanzania moving from the left-wing populism of the Nyerere regime after independence in 1961 
to accepting the main precepts of the IFI-driven liberalization policies from the latter half of the 
1980s are outlined. It is argued that in order to maintain high levels of aid, the Tanzanian 
government has ceded a large measure of economic and political control to the IFIs. This in turn 
influences the way the government attempts to determine which civil society organizations 
participate in national policy-making processes, as well as which groups are excluded.  
 
Chapter four contains an outline of the methodology used for the research, particularly focusing 
on issues concerning the fieldwork. Chapter five is based on an analysis of the NGO sector in 
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Tanzania. An assessment of the development of associational life in Tanzania under different 
periods - classified in terms of political economy - is undertaken, which shows the diverse nature 
of civil society in the country. The core arguments centre on why and how a small number of 
well-resourced, urban-based NGOs, staffed by highly-qualified individuals, have come to 
dominate civil society participation in national policy-making processes. The arguments draw 
substantively on fieldwork interviews, participant observation and document analysis, focusing 
on two main areas; the priorities of NGOs in discourses and their relationships with other 
important development actors. 
 
The main arguments in chapter five are linked to the assessments in chapter six of the role of 
trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. The analysis in this chapter focuses on how and why 
trade unions have been marginalized as civil society organizations in contrast to the dominant 
position of NGOs. An overview of the theorization of trade unions is set out. This is followed by 
an outline of the labour aristocracy debate, which provides the basis for an examination of 
whether trade unions in Tanzania can be regarded as representing only a small number of 
relatively privileged wage labourers within the formal sector of the economy. Key aspects of the 
history of the labour movement in Tanzania are examined. These elements are linked to the 
fieldwork section. The fieldwork findings reveal three key problems for trade unions; lack of 
legitimacy, lack of capacity and lack of an ideological vision on the part of the leaders to drive 
the movement forward. As with NGOs, the fieldwork analysis of trade unions centres on the 
issues of their priorities in discourses and relationships with other key actors.  
 
Chapter seven takes the PRSP process as a case study which provides a window on the broader 
processes concerning the participation of civil society organizations as development actors in 
post-liberalization Tanzania. Drawing on fieldwork findings, the analysis focuses in detail on the 
processes and ideologies through which a group of elite, urban NGOs, which dominate civil 
society participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, have been able to 
occupy strategic nodes within the PRSP matrix, while trade unions have been marginalized.  
 
In chapter eight conclusions are drawn from the analysis in the preceding sections, focusing on 
the  point that the contrasting positions of trade unions and NGOs in post-liberalization national 
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policy-making processes in Tanzania has been shaped by the development of the country into 
one which embraces a plethora of donor-led programmes employing similar terms as objectives 
and justifications, as well as de-politicised policies which are articulated through technicist 
procedures, such as Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). A small group of NGOs, well-funded 
by foreign donors have the resources and the staff familiar with such procedures and policies to 
engage in national policy-making processes on these terms. Trade unions, however, lack 
knowledge of them, as well as resources, and tend to discuss development issues in overtly 
political terms, which leads to them being marginalized or excluded.  Conceptually, the ways in 
which trade unions and NGOs are integrated into the process can be explained more fully by 
using Gramscian perspectives on civil society than by employing the dominant liberal 
conception, favoured by the donors. The latter is based on the view that the various strands of 
civil society are taking part in post-liberalization national policy-making processes on an equal 
footing. The Gramscian perspective reveals that the civil society sphere is a ‟public room‟ where 
ideological hegemony is contested and very different levels of power and influence on the part of 
associational groups are both sourced and realized. A minority of civil society groups have 
contested hegemonic discourses, rather than accepting them as being apolitical and in the best 
interests of all, as is portrayed by the donors. However, these counter-hegemonic discourses are 
not currently leading to significant challenges to the current economic and political orthodoxy or 
to substantive grassroots campaigns. 
 
1.6 Summary 
The central planks of post-liberalization policy processes in Tanzania - greater participation on 
the part of the wider population within the institutionalized setting of civil society organizations 
in forming national policies, leading to their ownership – have clearly emerged from the change 
of ideological emphasis within the IFIs and the major bilateral donors.  The state-civil society-
policy matrix is mutually constituted (Gramsci, 2011). With the adoption of multi-party liberal 
democracy and neo-liberal economic policies on the part of the Tanzanian state during the 1990s, 
changes in its policy orientation at national level have impacted substantively on the position of 
civil society. The role of civil society organizations in post-liberalization national policy-making 
processes in Tanzania is therefore of importance. Fine, (2006, 2001), Harriss, (2006), Van 
Waeyenberge (2006) and Standing (2000), are among analysts who point out that taken overall 
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the Post-Washington Consensus underplays notions of class, power, conflict and development as 
a contradictory process involving major social and economic transformation. However, new 
policy spaces have been opened up through the focus on the four aspects of the development 
process outlined in this chapter which mark out the Post-Washington Consensus and these 
changes have given oppositional civil society organizations opportunities to contest the 
hegemony of neo-liberalism and their own marginalization. Civil society in Tanzania is, in the 
post-liberalization era, a sphere of confrontation concerning which groups should - and which 
should not – be classed as „civil society organizations‟ and included in national policy-making 
processes by the government, as well as supported by external donors. Civil society 
organizations with sufficient technical and institutional capacity, allied to a concerted ideological 
vision, have the opportunity to participate in national policy-making processes in ways that may 
force governments to confront substantive issues, such as protection of local economies from 
foreign competition, arguing that failure to do so will result in a lack of national ownership, since 
these are issues which citizens have evinced as being of vital importance to their lives. An 
analysis of how successfully trade unions and NGOs are able to insert themselves and their 
visions into the new policy spaces that have opened up provides a way to examine the limits of 
the IFIs‟ Post-Washington Consensus rhetoric, espousing openness to economic and political 
heterodoxy if a sufficient level of participation by civil society leading to ownership of national 
policies, has been demonstrated. The way in which the theorization of civil society in the post-
liberalization period has become dominated by a liberal framework and conception, driven by the 
IFIs, is analyzed in chapter two. The  point that the liberal conception  posits an erroneous view 
of civil society as a sphere where in a multi-party liberal democracy, a plurality of associational 
groups compete consensually and equally to represent the views of citizens, is highlighted. Trade 
unions and NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania do not participate in national policy-making 
processes on an equal basis and a Gramscian perspective, emphasizing how hegemony is 
continually resisted, modified and challenged – as well as accepted - by different civil society 
organizations, despite pervasive structural inequalities in the sector, is shown to have greater 
explanatory power than the liberal perspective. 
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Figure 1.2 Tanzania: Basic Indicators 
Demography 
Land Area – 883,749 sq. km. 
Population – 41, 892, 895 
Population growth rate – 2.03%  
Urban population – 25% 
Urban growth – 4.2% (annual rate of change 2005 – 2010) 
Total Fertility Rate – 4.31 
  
Economy 
GDP - $57.89 billion 
GDP per capita (PPP) - $1,400 
GDP growth rate – 4.9% (2009 figure) 
Agriculture as a share of GDP – 26.6% 
Industry as a share of GDP – 22.6% 
Services – 50.8% 
Inflation rate – 11.6% 
 
Education 
Literacy rate (total population) – 69.4% 
Literacy rate (females) – 62.2% 
Literacy rate (males) – 77.5% 
Primary level enrolment rate – 99.3% 
Population with at least secondary education – 6.0% 
Tertiary level enrolment rate – 1.5%  
Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP – 2.2% 
 
Health 
Life Expectancy at birth (total population) – 52.49 
Life Expectancy at birth (females) – 54.03 
Life Expectancy at birth (males) – 50.99 
Infant Mortality Rate – 67 (per 100,000 live births) 
Under 5 Mortality Rate  - 104 (per 100,000 live births) 
Public expenditure on health as a share of GDP – 3.7%  
 
Sources: URT (2010d), CIA (2010), UNICEF (2010), UNDP (2010) 
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Figure 1.3 Tanzania: Political Map 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Civil Society 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter an analysis is made of theoretical approaches to civil society, contrasting the 
liberal view, influenced by the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, which dominates the thinking of 
the main donors driving the New Policy Agenda, with counter hegemonic views, focusing in 
particular on the arguments of Gramsci. The following section outlines the rise to prominence of  
the civil society sector as a driver of development, which became a significant part of  the New 
Policy Agenda during the 1990s,  bearing in mind Khilnani‟s (2003: 17) point that the 
„rediscoveries of the idea of civil society obscure its historical depth.‟ The prevailing liberal view 
of the role of civil society is then discussed, highlighting important weaknesses. Counter 
hegemonic views are subsequently examined, centring on the Gramscian perspective, which has 
a considerable amount of explanatory power concerning the position of civil society 
organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania. An evaluation is then made of why NGOs in 
particular have risen to power as civil society actors in development processes. The conclusion 
outlines both the partial reading and misreading of de Tocqueville‟s work by donors involved in 
promoting the New Policy Agenda, as well as its weaknesses, and summarizes the strengths of a 
Gramscian approach to understanding the position of the civil society sector in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. 
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2.2 The Rise to Prominence of Civil Society in the Development Discourse 
The main driving force behind the New Policy Agenda, the World Bank (2010a), defines civil 
society: 
„the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or 
others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide 
array of organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable 
organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and 
foundations.‟ 
 
The World Bank uses the term „civic engagement‟ rather than „civil society,‟ in order to include 
the actions of informal associations as well as the activities and roles of formally-constituted 
civil society organizations. 
 
A huge body of work has appeared during the 1990s on civil society and its relationship to 
development but, as Howell and Pearce (2002: 17) point out, it „has not always helped to clarify 
why civil society should be considered essential to development processes in the South.‟  
16
Edwards (2004: vi) concurs in stating that civil society has been „used to justify radically 
different ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence, and suffused with many 
questionable assumptions.‟ This assessment resonates with Allen‟s (1997: 329) view of the 
concept in the African context as „diffuse, hard to define, empirically imprecise and ideologically 
laden.‟ 
 
There are several reasons for the rise of arguments in favour of civil society as a vehicle for 
development. First, the perceived failure of previous development models – state-led 
development up to the end of the 1970s and market-led progress during the 1980s - stimulated an 
interest in civil society as the base of an alternative. Second, global political events in the 1990s, 
                                                          
16
  There are vigorous debates regarding the conceptualization of civil society within the African context (See, inter 
alia, Armstrong et al, eds, 2010, OSSREA, 2009, Pinkney, 2009, Carmody, 2007, Lund, 2006, Chan, 2002, Baylies 
and Power, 2001, Hearn, 2001, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Oloka-Onyango and Baryo, 1997).  
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notably the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the move towards liberal democracy in 
Africa and Latin America, focused attention on civil society as a counterweight to an 
overbearing state and as a means to put pressure on undemocratic governments. Third, the 
„rolling back of the state‟ under the sway of neo-liberal economic ideas, led to the view that civil 
society organizations were necessary in developing countries to fill the ensuing democratic 
deficit by providing services in the  social development arena (Lewis, 2002c). 
 
2.3 Key Civil Society Strands 
The concept of a „sphere of action‟ is commonly used to delineate the arena in which civil 
society operates. To illustrate this, overlapping circles of the same size, representing state, 
market and civil society are often drawn up indicating similar levels of power, which is usually 
misleading. In most cases, the state and the market (particularly since the rise of neo-liberalism) 
have considerably more power than civil society and therefore the overlapping circles should be 
sized to reflect this (Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 2001).  
 
Edwards (2004), goes beyond the „sphere of action‟ conception in outlining three separate but 
mutually supportive strands in the literature regarding the goals, visions and functions of civil 
society. First, a body of writing equates civil society with associational life, based around 
forming non-profit making organizations and stressing the importance of voluntary action. 
Second, an element focuses on civil society in normative terms, as promoting the „good society‟, 
with an emphasis on creating shared values, strategies and joint action to bring about desirable 
outcomes, such as poverty reduction.  A third thread in the literature centres on civil society in 
the public sphere, promoting access to, and independence for, structures of communication and 
ways to extend public deliberation. Edwards (ibid) emphasizes the importance of the division 
between those who see civil society as an independent variable and thus stress the need to build 
it directly, as is the case with the donors driving the New Policy Agenda, and those who see it as 
a by-product of other forces and try to manipulate them to build the best overall civil society. 
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2.4 The Prevailing Paradigm: the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil Society in 
Development Processes 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the French observer of US democracy, described the 
associational world in which people decide their wants and needs and ask for them through 
associations. De Tocqueville‟s ideas have been revived by important advocates of the Post-
Washington Consensus and have been influential in the debate on donor ideas regarding ways in 
which mass participation should be institutionalised within post-liberalization Tanzania. For the 
major donors, civil society is vital in fostering their key development ideas. The UNDP (2010), 
for example, states that „engagement with civil society is critical to national ownership, 
accountability, good governance, decentralization, democratization of development co-operation 
and the quantity and relevance of official development programmes.‟ This „prescriptive 
universalism‟ (Lewis, 2002a) regarding civil society as a vehicle for development has received 
support from analysts focusing on Africa. Ndegwa (1996) and Harbeson (1994), for instance, 
argue that civil society in Africa is beneficial to development and should be strengthened as a 
matter of priority. 
 
For de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b), associations are schools of democracy where open-minded 
attitudes and behaviour are learned and exercised to protect the rights of individuals. This 
resonates with the arguments put forward in the seventeenth century by John Locke on civil 
society (Locke, 1986, Dunn, 2003, Wiarda, 2003, Hardt and Negri, 2000). Associations should 
be constructed voluntarily at local, regional and national levels. Participation in such associations 
will lead to the inculcation of important civic virtues, such as tolerance and honesty, which will 
assist people in being able to put the interests of the group above that of the individual. The 
building of these civic virtues moderates public opinion and increases levels of trust and 
confidence in society.   The resulting vibrancy of a many layered civil society becomes important 
in restricting over-weaning power on the part of the state or any other particular group. 
 
De Tocquevillian ideas have been promoted by the World Bank, which provides many sources 
citing his arguments relating to civil society, on its website. See, for example, Comstock-Gay 
and Goldman (2008), Chase and Woolcock (2005), McNeil (2002), Brown and Uslaner (2002), 
Parkison (2001), Satola (1997) and Foley and Edwards (1996). A number of these (McNeil, 2002 
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and Foley and Edwards, 1996, for example) emphasize the importance of de Tocqueville‟s views 
on civil society to current development processes by starting with a direct quote from his work.  
Moreover, when advocating a leading role for civil society in development, senior World Bank 
figures have stressed the importance of de Tocqueville‟s ideas. Former President, Paul 
Wolfowitz, cites de Tocqueville‟s Democracy in America as one of the first books written about 
a developing country and „I still think … one of the best.‟ (Wolfowitz, 2006: 5). In outlining how 
de Tocqueville valued civil society and the impressive nature of associational life in America, 
which strengthened the development process, Wolfowitz  goes as far as conceptualizing civil 
society as the „building block‟ of US democracy (Wolfowitz, 2005). 
 
A reading of de Tocqueville‟s arguments concerning civil society reveals two central points 
about the way they are being used by organizations involved in trying to engender participation 
and ownership as part of the New Policy Agenda. First, the interpretation of de Tocqueville‟s 
ideas is based on a partial reading of his work, which misses important elements of the main 
arguments. Second, there is a lack of engagement with the fact that the ideas put forward by de 
Tocqueville relate to the very different circumstances pertaining to associational life in 
nineteenth century America compared to those which exist in contemporary Africa. 
 
With regard to the former point, de Tocqueville (1845b: 106) was impressed by the way 
„Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations‟ and 
admired „the extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a 
common object for the exertions of a great many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue 
it‟ (ibid). For de Tocqueville, when people are allowed to meet freely for all purposes they regard 
associations as a universal and the sole means to achieve goals. Consequently, the „art of 
association … becomes … the mother of action, studies and applied by all‟ (de Tocqueville 
1845b: 117). However, he also recognized the temporal and spatial specificity of the nature of 
associational life in the United States, pointing out that the right to association is deeply 
ingrained as it „has always existed in America‟, so that „the exercise of this privilege is now 
incorporated with the manners and customs of the people‟ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 194).  This 
argument implies the need to examine the particular historical processes that have shaped the 
development of associational life on a case by case basis. Moreover, de Tocqueville drew a 
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distinction between associational life in Europe and America, which resonates with current 
debates about the nature of civil society in Africa. In Europe associations were always to be 
„tried in conflict‟ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 196), used to „march against the enemy‟ (ibid) and their 
object „is not to convince but to fight‟ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 197). Contrastingly, since in 
America „the differences of opinion are mere differences of hue, the right of association may 
remain unrestrained without evil consequences‟ (ibid). The conception of civil society as put 
forward by the donors driving the New Policy Agenda corresponds with the American model, as 
set out by de Tocqueville, while the „European tradition‟ of civil society as an arena for conflict 
and contestation between civil society organizations themselves and between civil society 
organizations and the state over policy, is neglected.  
 
De Tocqueville (1845b: 112) argued that civic associations „will advance in number as men 
become more equal.‟ This claim raises a contradiction with regard to the economic policies 
donors are propounding and their view of the nature of associational life. Since the gap between 
rich and poor in Tanzania is at present wide under donor driven, neo-liberal policies, then, 
according to a de Tocquevillian analysis, associational life will not grow. Development 
indicators produced by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b) show that the highest earning 20% 
of the people in Tanzania have a 42.3% share of total income or consumption. The equivalent 
figure for the highest 10% of income earners is 27.0%, which is large compared to 6.6% in 
Ethiopia, 13.6% in Kenya, 14.1% in Ghana and 16.6% in Uganda (World Bank, 2009b). 
 
These figures are problematic for the donors, particularly given Tanzania‟s heavy reliance on 
foreign aid (see chapter 3). According to de Tocqueville, growing equality in society is needed 
for associational life to develop. In Tanzania the substantial share of total national income held 
by the highest 10% and 20% of earners (World Bank, 2009b), as well as the multi-ethnic 
composition of the population 
17
 make it unlikely that differences of opinion between individuals 
and groups will be merely „of hue‟. There is, thus, at best a failure to engage with important 
aspects of de Tocqueville‟s ideas concerning civil society on the part of the main donors 
                                                          
17
 Tanzania has 120 mega-ethnic groups, excluding minority groups from Asia and Europe, according to government 
figures - http://www.tanzania.go.tz/culture.html#Habitation 
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promoting the New Policy Agenda and, at worst, an ideological selectiveness on their part in 
order to provide support for a liberal theoretical framework.  
 
In addition, the IFIs stress the need for complete freedom of association in recipient countries. 
However, de Tocqueville did „not think that a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with 
an absolute right of association … and I doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it is wise to 
set no limits to freedom of association.‟ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 119).  For de Tocqueville, at 
times the right of association has to be „confined within narrow limits‟ (ibid). De Tocqueville 
never „tried to draw exactly the boundaries between political and social control … and the area in 
which the individual should be free to act of his own volition‟ (Lively, 1961: 10-11). Moreover, 
he recognized the need for free association and action to be shaped according to the particular 
needs of societies and admitted that the precise application of association and action „must vary 
with circumstances‟ (Lively, 1961: 11).  
 
Donors have drawn heavily on de Tocqueville‟s views in stressing the importance of mass 
participation by citizens, coordinated through civil society organizations, in post-liberalization 
national policy-making processes. This perspective is premised on the view that only where there 
is a democratic state in which participation by citizens in political life is valued, will civil society 
develop and be supportive of democracy. In short, a democratic state is required to create a 
democratic civil society, which in turn is necessary to sustain the state in that form (Walzer, 
2003).  „This virtuous circle is at the heart of the democratic case for civil society on the neo-
Tocquevillian model‟ (Goodhart, 2005: 7).   
 
The way this form of associational life is being engendered by donor influence on post-
liberalization national policy-making processes prioritizes the role of NGOs and marginalizes 
many other manifestations of civil society in Tanzania.
18
 It also fails to adequately account for 
the way civil society acts as a ‟public room‟ where ideological hegemony is contested, which is a  
central theme of the neglected perspectives of Gramsci (2011a, 2011b, 1994, 1977).  
 
                                                          
18  See chapter 5 for a comparison of the roles of NGOs with other types of associational life and chapter 6 
concerning the work of trade unions. 
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2.5 Countervailing Views to the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil Society in 
Development Processes: the Gramscian Perspective 
 In the nineteenth century Hegel made a pivotal contribution to the debate on civil society, 
conceptualizing the sphere as being distinct from the state and the family. For Hegel, civil 
society is not a natural condition of freedom but a historically produced sphere of life, arising 
from a multi-dimensional process. Civil society is posited as a contradictory combination of 
forces, involving confrontation between classes and groups themselves as well as continuous 
conflict between groups and classes and the state (Hegel, 2003).  Civil society movements cannot 
be idealised but demand individual empirical examination as they contain discrepant 
possibilities.  
 
Hegel idealised the (Prussian) state, positing it as the embodiment of universal interest and 
arguing that through strong law-governed rule the particular interests of civil society 
organizations are regulated in the interests of all the good of the whole society.  „In contrast with 
the spheres of … the family and civil society, the state [is] … an external necessity and their 
higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and 
dependent on it‟ (Hegel, 2003: 95). While de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) saw order emerging 
from unfettered individualism in the economic and political arenas and free competition between 
civil society groups, Hegel felt that the wants of individuals and civil society groups in such a 
system would inevitably be unequally fulfilled because of vast existing inequalities. 
 
Hegel argued that the development of a capitalist mode of production leads to the atomization of 
individual commercial interests and deepening inequality. People increasingly leave the family 
(which has provided them with moral cohesion) early to work in the capitalist system, where 
they meet a large number of individuals who are pursuing diverse interests. Civil society in such 
a system is both the problem, since it is the institutional embodiment of particular interest 
groups, and also the solution, as it fosters social integration. With strong state oversight based on 
laws and bureaucratic controls, universality „can be developed through civil society, despite the 
atomizing potential of the commercial self-interest that shapes it‟ (Howell and Pearce, 2002: 23).  
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Marx challenged Hegel‟s idealization of the state (Marx, 1970b), arguing that 
 
„contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state, at the same time the 
state reinforces certain interests in civil society and undermines others. Civil society is 
not just external to the state, rather various and even contradictory groups in civil society 
differentially penetrate the state‟ (Mamdani, 1992:17).  
 
The state does not confront civil society externally but is an arena of struggle for forces whose 
springboard is civil society. 
 
For Marx, as with Hegel, civil society is a historically contingent and not a universal concept. 
Within a capitalist mode of production, civil society is bourgeois society.  Pre-capitalist forms of 
civil society, such as guilds and estates, had a political spirit, which the onset of capitalism broke 
down, leaving individuals to participate in civil society based on self-interest rather than social or 
political functions. In a capitalist system individuals treat others as a means to an end based on 
the dominance of market forces (Marx, 1971). Civil society thus becomes an expression of the 
separation of individuals from themselves, from others and from their communities. It is „the 
chief source of human alienation‟ (Femia, 2001: 136). 
 
Marx rejected claims for the integrative power of the state and argued that unequal and self-
interested relationships permeate all its aspects under capitalism, a system which also led to „the 
dissolution of civil society into independent individuals whose relations are regulated by law‟ 
(Marx, 1971: 29). Moreover, „egoistic man is the passive, given result of the dissolution of 
society‟ (Marx, 1971: 30).  In sum, under a capitalist system, civil society is inextricably bound 
up with commercial and industrial life where the market economy reduces people to self-centred 
acquisitors, who relate to each other in contractual and instrumental terms. This leads to the 
unavoidable atomization of civil society which must, along with political society, therefore be 
dissolved. 
 
Gramsci goes beyond the classical Marxist conception of civil society, arguing that exploitative 
capitalist relations are „underpinned by a complex of moral injunctions that make these relations 
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seem right and proper to all parties in the exchange‟ (Femia, 2001:139).  People define their 
interests in terms of their own ideas and values, which imbues them with meaning. These might 
be false, class-biased and may mystify and cloud relations but we can „never detach ourselves 
from some moral perspective or other‟ (ibid). This view forms the basis of Gramsci‟s concept of 
hegemony – how a set of ideas put forward by a ruling class become entrenched - and 
explanation as to why capitalism survives even when the objective conditions for a transition to 
communism are prevalent.
19
 The concept is based on an analysis of how specific modalities and 
apparatuses of power work on subjects with particular social identities and material interests. The 
focus is on the nature of power in modern capitalist social formations where mass politics have 
developed (Sum, 2003). 
 
Gramsci moves away from an institutionalist, juridico-political and state-centric account of the 
exercise of power to examine discourse and discursive formations and the articulation of power 
and knowledge.
20
 He focuses on how hegemony is created through a multi-faceted dialectical 
relationship between consent and coercion. Moreover, Gramsci deepened the debate on civil 
society by analysing the embedding and embodying of power in everyday routines and the role 
in this of specific institutions and apparatuses. For Gramsci (2011b), it is important for subaltern 
classes to engage in a war of position in the civil society sphere by challenging the intellectual 
and moral leadership of the ruling class, which creates its hegemony. Gramsci envisaged the war 
of position as a process by which subaltern classes would continually confront the norms and 
values of the ruling class and exercise their own moral and intellectual leadership. In this way the 
consented coercion through which the ruling class maintains power can be stripped away and its 
values and norms exposed as bolstering a system in which only the minority holding power  
benefit, rather than representing universality or common sense (Gramsci, 2011b) These 
important facets of uses of power are not examined within a liberal perspective.  Thus, it is only 
by employing a Gramscian perspective that a nuanced understanding can be achieved of how 
certain NGOs have used everyday routines embodying power to embed dominance of civil 
society input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, while trade 
unions engage in routines which do not embody and embed power and are thus marginalized.  
                                                          
19
  See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of Gramsci‟s use of the concept of hegemony 
20
  See Gramsci (2001a) for a discussion of the juridical power of the state. 
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For Gramsci, in line with Marx, the base of society is made up of the prevailing mode of 
production and it has a dialectical relationship with the superstructure, although the latter is 
ultimately an expression of the former. However, while Marx (1970a) delineated the 
superstructure as comprising key societal arrangements which cement its organisation in the 
spheres of politics, law, religion, morality, ideology and traditions, Gramsci focused on a key 
division within the concept.  For Gramsci, the superstructure exists at two levels; civil society, 
which is „the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”‟ (Gramsci, 1994: 12) and 
political society or the state.  A balance occurs between direct domination by the state through 
juridical government and civil society, where there is the „hegemony of a social group over the 
entire national society, exercised through the so-called private organizations, such as the Church, 
the unions, the schools‟ (Gramsci, 1994: 67) . Civil society also comprises political parties, the 
press, publishers and voluntary associations and disseminates the ideology of the dominant class, 
ensuring its „cultural hegemony‟ (Gramsci, 2011b: 20), so that subordinate classes consent to 
their own subordination. It is in the „private realm that ruling values seem most natural and 
therefore unchangeable‟ (Jones, 2006: 32). The coercive power of the state is used to enforce 
discipline when spontaneous consent based on hegemony fails. The multifarious combination of 
dictatorship with hegemony comprises the „integral state,‟ formally defined by Gramsci (1978: 
263) as „political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion.‟  
 
Gramsci (1977: 235) argued that in modern societies, civil society had become a complex 
structure and is resistant to economic shocks, such as depressions. The power of civil society 
organizations can be significant and lead to associational groups gradually taking over so many 
societal functions that there is a „withering of the state‟. In this view, the state becomes a 
watchdog in a „regulated society‟, while still at times acting as a coercive organization when 
facing particular challenges to its authority. As the growth of civil society continues the state 
gradually reduces its authoritarian and coercive interventions.  
 
For Gramsci, hegemony in relation to civil society is a vital area of study. Gramsci emphasised 
the potentially oppositional role of civil society as a „public room‟ separate from the state and 
market where hegemony is contested. Civil society contains numerous organizations and 
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ideologies which both challenge and uphold the existing order. The cultural hegemony of the 
ruling classes and societal consensus is, thus, formed within civil society. The Gramscian 
perspective, therefore, accommodates the probability that some civil society groups will 
challenge hegemony within the existing structure of the political process and others will 
disengage and work underground to produce anti-hegemonic discourses.  Moreover, a Gramscian 
perspective accommodates the conflictual nature of relationships between civil society 
organizations, which is not the case with the dominant liberal view. For Gramsci, „there are other 
forms of oppression in civil society which are different from the exploitation of labour by capital. 
There are local, regional, racial, bureaucratic and other forms of domination in which a certain 
power is exercised and is given a material form in organisations and institutions of one kind or 
another‟ Simon (1982: 73). 
 
For the donors involved in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, this is a largely 
undesired version of civil society, since they wish to maintain the perceived dominance of 
Western economic and cultural institutions and modus operandi. They do not want to embrace a 
Gramscian view of civil society - based on a struggle for power, influence and resources – but 
instead put forward a consensual perspective (pace de Tocqueville) where a variety of 
associational groups debate and advocate policies and programmes in an amicable and tolerant 
way. Gramsci posits a dichotomy between institutions and ideology within the realm of the 
superstructure, arguing that subordinated classes should prioritise institutional organization over 
ideology in the struggle for hegemony. Crucially, to achieve hegemony a civil society group 
must „present its own aims as realizing the universal aims of the community‟ (Laclau, 2000: 50). 
 
In accordance with orthodox Marxist views, Gramsci (2011b) contends that a universalistic class 
must emerge from civil society and not from a separate sphere above, as Hegel (2003) argued. 
However, Gramsci diverges from orthodox Marxism in arguing that „the only universality that 
society can achieve is a hegemonic universality – a universality contaminated by particularity‟ 
(Laclau, 2000: 51). In contrast, orthodox Marxists argue that universality will occur through the 
subordinated class becoming fully aware of its exploitation and taking revolutionary action. 
Gramsci therefore shows that civil society is of great importance since „universal emancipation is 
achieved only through transient identification with the aims of a particular social sector … 
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requiring political mediation and relations of representation‟ (ibid). For Laclau (2000) the rise of 
global neo-liberalism - predicated on a minimal role for the state and the increasing power of the 
IFIs and other supranational organizations – means that decision-making processes must be 
examined in terms which go beyond focusing on designations such as class or ethnicity. 
Gramsci‟s notion of hegemony is thus useful since it stresses the importance of examining the 
formal determination of spaces in which groups and collective wills compete.  
 
2.6 The Rise of NGOs as Key Civil Society Actors in Development Processes 
Despite the diversity of associational life recognized by the World Bank (see section 2.2 above) 
it is evident that NGOs are regarded by the donors and national governments as the most 
important civil society actors taking part in post-liberalization national policy-making processes. 
There was a huge rise in the number, size and level of activity of development-based NGOs 
during the 1980s and the 1990s and their role has become increasingly important in developing 
countries 
21
 This is indeed the case in the context of Africa, where associational life is rich and 
varied, but the IFIs and other major bilateral donors concentrate funding and capacity building 
on formally constituted NGOs. This narrow donor driven vision of civil society is a continuation 
of a trend starting with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, leading to the „emergence of NGOs 
floating above … primary associations and GROs.  These spoke the language of the donors and 
tapped into their resource base.‟ (Nugent 2004: 384). 22 
 
Desai (2002: 495) defines NGOs as „autonomous, non-membership, relatively permanent or 
institutionalized, non-profit … intermediary organizations, staffed by professionals or the 
educated elite, which work with grassroots organizations in a supportive capacity.‟ However, as 
NGOs have risen in number and importance, definitions have become increasingly blurred and 
caught up in analytical, normative and political notions of development. There are attempts to 
                                                          
21
  See, for example, Sundar, 2010, Pinkney, 2009, Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008 eds, Lata, 2007, 
Rugendyke ed. 2007, Eade and Ligteringen eds, 2006, Edwards, 2006, 2004, Gupta, 2006 Ramphele, 2006, 
Bebbington, 2005, Van Rooy, 2004, Desai, 2002, Eade ed), 2002, Mercer, 2002a, Pearce, 2002, Shigetomi ed., 
2002, Lewis, 2001, Lewis ed., 1999, Hulme and Edwards eds,1997. 
22
 African states have also been involved in the formation of NGOs and in stimulating the activities of existing 
organizations. For example, Thomas (1987) outlines how increasing activity on the part of the „Harambee („all pull 
together‟) movement‟ in Kenya has provided a useful way of mobilizing local resources for the benefit of 
communities through events to generate funds and raise awareness of self-help strategies. Encouraged by Kenyatta 
after independence, Harambee was regarded as a way of bringing communities closer through working together on 
development projects. The government provides start-up funds for these activities (See also Widner, 1992). 
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define NGOs according to their origins, 
23
 functions, 
24
 ownership, 
25
 approach 
26
 and scale of 
operations. 
27
  There are also definitions of NGOs based on exclusion as much as inclusion.  
Fowler (1997), for example, has provided acronyms for the many types of organizations which 
are registered as NGOs but operate in a variety of self-interested ways.   
 
Setting boundaries when defining NGOs is problematic. There are debates, for example, as to 
whether business-sponsored research organizations should be classed as NGOs. In analytical 
terms they may merit such a definition, but from a normative perspective - which equates these 
organizations with acting in benign ways to bring about progress in society - defining them as 
NGOs can be contested. Some writers (Stewart, 1997, Blair, 1997, Uphoff, 1996) regard NGOs 
as being essentially market-driven organizations, which do not comprise a „third sector‟ that can 
be located as a separate entity from the state and the market. A further complicating factor 
concerns the „growing tendency for people to move back and forth between NGOs, government 
and … business‟ (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008: 6). Thus, there is a problem with 
identifying what are, and what are not, NGOs in a tight and analytically rigorous way.  
 
Hilhorst (2003: 7) attempts to overcome this problem by conceiving of the term „NGO‟ as a 
„claim-bearing label.‟ NGOs claim to be „doing good for the development of others‟ and Hilhorst 
(2003) argues that through „everyday politics‟ such organizations struggle to achieve legitimacy 
for this assertion. An analysis of NGO attempts to attain legitimacy encompasses the self-
referrals of organizations, which definitions imposing boundaries cut across. This is a useful 
conceptualization in the context of this research, since in interviews with officials from NGOs 
themselves and with trade unionists the question of the legitimacy of NGOs was a recurrent 
theme.    
 
                                                          
23  First to fourth generation NGOs have been identified by Korten (1990), for example. 
24
  A division is often made between advocacy-based NGOs and service-delivery NGOs, though this has lost much 
of its meaning as many NGOs engage in both types of work. See Goodhand (2006) and the discussion below in this 
chapter.  
25
  See Lauer (2008) and Fowler (1997) on issues of ownership relating to NGOs. 
26
  Petras and Veltmeyer (2001), for example, categorize the majority of NGOs as a neo-comprador group which 
accepts the main precepts of neo-liberalism. A minority of NGOs take a different approach in confronting neo-
liberalism and imperialism 
27 NGO operations vary from small grassroots-based projects to the large-scale international work of Big 
International NGOs (BINGOs), such as Oxfam.  
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There are several important reasons for the increase in the importance of NGOs in development 
processes. First, during the 1980s - when neo-liberals were promoting the work of de 
Tocqueville - many development practitioners, driven to a large extent by disenchantment with 
the inability of the state to address issues of poverty and inequality, were putting their case for 
NGOs to be the leading civil society actors, and to play a primary role in alternative, bottom-up, 
participatory approaches to development (see chapter 1). A notable example, at the end of the 
decade, was Edwards (1989), who, in ‘The Irrelevance of Development Studies’ stated that 
participatory approaches to development must be adopted. These should be put into practice by 
NGOs, since they have greater command of the necessary skills and attitudes necessary to do so 
than states and international organizations. For Edwards (1989: 132), NGOs are „better at 
listening and learning than either government or multilateral agencies.‟ Therefore development-
based NGOs grew in significance from the 1980s, partly on the back of the perception 
promulgated by practitioners that they demonstrate flexibility, openness to innovation and the 
ability to reach the poor through work at the grassroots level and by extension that they have the 
capability to lead an alternative vision of development to both the prevailing neo-liberal 
paradigm and state-led models.  
 
Wider political and economic forces also played a role in bringing about the current importance 
of NGOs in development. With the demise of many authoritarian regimes in Europe at the end of 
the 1980s, NGOs came to be seen as a vehicle to stimulate self-reliance among citizens in the 
newly emerging liberal democracies, thereby weaning them away from the nanny-state (Jenei 
and Kuti, 2008, Osborne et al, 2005, Toepler and Salamon, 2003). In this way NGOs became 
part of the New Aid Agenda (Fowler, 2002: 509) driven by the IFIs and leading Western 
bilateral donors, which used aid as a way to influence moves in recipient countries towards the 
creation of liberal democratic political institutions and an economic system driven by free market 
ideologies. 
28
  
 
Linked to this, a burgeoning interest across the world during the 1980s in „civil society‟ also 
played a role.  NGOs became a significant part of this „associational revolution‟ where people 
                                                          
28  The New Aid Agenda as set out by Fowler can be regarded as an integral part of the wider New Policy Agenda 
outlined and discussed in chapter 1. 
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began forming private, non- profit and voluntary organizations to pursue „objectives formerly 
unattended or left to the state‟ (Salamon, 1994: 109). This signified, in developing countries, an 
escape from the enforced immaturity of statism and a chance for individuals to reclaim 
responsibility for their lives (Salamon, 1994).  Thus, a combination of interest in, and support 
for, the work of NGOs in the development sector by practitioners, multilateral and bilateral 
donors and global citizenry led to them gaining in power and influence over the twenty years 
prior to the inception of the New Policy Agenda.   
 
As NGOs became increasingly favoured by donors at the supranational level to carry forward 
democratization, marketization and participation agendas in the 1990s they were pressured to 
scale up their activities.  A debate ensued about ways in which NGOs could scale up, and how 
this strategy could increase their ability to influence the wider systems that produce and solidify 
poverty, rather than settling for creating „small islands of success‟ (Hulme, 2008: 338). 29 Uvin et 
al (2000: 1) make the point that in overall terms scaling up for NGOs is about „expanding 
impact‟ rather than increasing size. Various arguments were made as to exactly why and how 
development-based NGOs should scale up during the 1990s (Uvin and Miller, 1994, Edwards 
and Hulme, 1992a, Chambers, 1992b, Robinson, 1992, Wils, 1992).  First, while the variation in 
their capacity has been acknowledged (Pearce, 1997), a sizeable number of NGOs in developing 
countries were too small, underfunded, understaffed and localized to seriously address 
substantive problems, such as poverty.  As Townsend et al (2002: 534) point out, many NGOs in 
developing countries worked in an environment where they were „cut off from access to 
knowledge and funding.‟ Thus, NGO actions often did not live up to their rhetoric, particularly in 
the areas of community participation, cost-effectiveness and reaching the poorest (Ubels et al 
eds, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, a significant number of NGOs were unable to effectively absorb the large amounts 
of money needed to deal with major development problems, as they lacked institutional capacity 
and skills in the areas of management and strategic planning (Clark, 1997).  In addition, many 
NGOs could not effectively address issues that had policy level causes because they did not have 
                                                          
29  The pressure on Tanzanian NGOs from external donors to scale up their activities – and how this has influenced 
their mode of participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes - is discussed in chapter 5.    
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a working relationship with the state and lacked a nuanced understanding of broader economic, 
political and social structures (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). A further problem was the low level 
of sustainability on the part of many NGOs in developing countries.  For Edwards and Hulme 
(1992a: 53) the impact of NGOs „is often transitory.‟ In Africa, there has been a problem with 
projects and programmes not continuing after the operational NGO staff ran out of finance and 
departed because of a change in funding policy and/or personnel.  
 
In response to these weaknesses, many NGOs during the 1980s began cooperating more with 
multilateral and bilateral donors in providing services than had previously been the case. NGOs 
also employed the strategy of networking to scale up and attempts to „self spread‟ local 
initiatives (Fowler, 1997, Chambers, 1992b). Receiving more support from powerful donors led 
to operational scaling up, in the forms of expanding the size of projects, programmes, budgets 
and target constituencies. 
   
The scaling up of the operations and impact of development-based NGOs gathered pace from the 
1980s. Hulme and Edwards (1997) calculated that at the end of the1950s there were 1,000 NGOs 
working in developing countries and by the start of the 1990s this had risen to 29,000.  By 2004, 
$24 billion of aid to developing countries – equivalent to over 30% of all ODA - was channelled 
through NGOs (Riddell, 2007). Furthermore, the amount of income provided for development-
based NGOs rose from approximately 1.5% of the total at the start of the 1970s to around 30% 
by the middle of the 1990s (World Bank, 2010a). According to the UNDP (2010) there are 
currently 50,000 NGOs working in developing countries, which receive over $10 billion funding 
from the IFIs - as well as American, Japanese and European governmental agencies - and affect 
the lives of two hundred and fifty million people. Turning to Africa in particular, by 1996, 30% 
of all US aid was channelled through NGOs, as part of a policy enshrined in 1992 of moving aid 
away from control by „patrimonial‟ states (Chege, 1999). Regarding the consequences of this 
enhanced role for NGOs in development processes since the 1980s, Hulme (2008: 338) argues 
that scaling up has been successful in terms of having an impact „on the systemic pressures that 
cause and reinforce poverty,‟ while making the point that there remains a lot of competition 
between NGOs, leading to duplication of work and best practice not being shared.   
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A significant factor in the scaling up of NGOs has been the increase in their advocacy work. 
While some opt entirely for one or the other, most NGOs have to choose how to balance service 
delivery and policy advocacy. As service delivery agents, NGOs provide welfare, technical, legal 
and financial services to the poor or work with community organizations in basic service and 
infrastructure provision. Advocacy is concerned with seeking social change by influencing 
attitudes, policy and practice and lobbying directly for the policy changes (Fowler, 1997).  
 
The neo-liberal attack on statism at the end of the 1970s (See chapter 1), led to a rise in the 
number of NGOs in developing countries used by governments and donor agencies as service-
delivery gap-fillers in order to support those excluded from – or marginalized within – the 
capitalist free market system (Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Robinson, 1997). NGOs working in 
this way have been categorised by Korten (1990) as „public service contractors‟ and accused of 
being co-opted by the state and donor agencies into propping up a neo-liberal agenda (Pearce, 
1997, Gary, 1996). 
30
 The role of service deliverers in such an environment has proved 
problematic for NGOs. Their work sometimes lacks compatibility and co-ordination with that of 
national development plans led by the state and is based on the „luxury‟ of selecting one or two 
issues to concentrate on and a narrow constituency with which to work (Clark, 1997: 51). 
Securing funding for their work also became an issue for NGOs (Edwards and Fowler, 2003), 
along with concerns about the long-term impact of service provision on the sustainability of 
national systems in developing countries (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Overdependence on 
external donors has led „perversely‟ to a weakening of local NGOs in developing countries, since 
they do not develop an independent financial base (Riddell, 2007: 395). This led Robinson 
(1993) to argue that influential and well-funded NGOs often concentrate resources in regions and 
sectors that are not the most important for national development, thereby contributing to the 
creation of a „patchwork quilt‟ of services with some regions not serviced by NGOs and covered 
only by weak state provision. 
 
Bratton (1989) made the point at the end of the 1980s that NGOs contribution to development 
processes might be more important in the political rather than the economic sphere. This 
argument had some influence and led to an increasing interest in the role of NGOs as promoters 
                                                          
30  The case of Tanzania in this regard, is examined in chapter 5. 
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of democratic development. Later research on Africa by Bratton and van de Walle (1998) 
contended that voluntary groups can be vehicles through which popular political demands may 
be organized and disseminated, leading to mass efforts to bring about bottom-up democracy. 
Support for this view also came from Silliman and Noble (1998: 306), who argued that „NGOs 
… enhance democracy by expanding the number and range of voices addressing government.‟ 
Moreover, for Fisher (1998: 126), bottom-up democracy stimulated by NGO advocacy has been 
successful in enough cases to create a tipping point, leading to „top-down political change‟ 
becoming possible. In overall terms, for adherents of this view, which developed during the 
1990s - and now includes the main donors involved in driving the New Policy Agenda - NGOs 
are important players in transforming development processes and have a key role to play during 
and after democratic transitions.   
  
The work of NGOs has thus become inextricably linked to the key Post-Washington Consensus 
concerns of liberal-democratic transition, increasing good governance and building social capital. 
Running advocacy campaigns requires technical and financial capacity, so many NGOs are 
unable to engage in such activities, but there is „increasing advocacy and policy assertiveness of 
a few‟ (Fowler, 2002: 512). The rise of long term and costly advocacy work, done mostly by 
large organizations, and the scaling up of development work on the part of many NGOs, has led 
to them seeking larger amounts of funding from, and forming closer relationships with, major 
multilateral and bilateral donors.  
 
While some NGOs are committed to pursuing alternatives to donor driven agendas in developing 
countries (Baan et al, 2008, Hilhorst, 2003) and to exploring self-financing strategies (Biker, 
2008, Hudock, 2001, Davis and Etchant, 2000), most now rely on donors for funds and there has 
been an increase in the number of NGOs working as public service contractors (Bebbington, 
Hickey and Mitlin, 2008). The World Bank finances civil society organizations through various 
funding mechanisms, such as the Civil Society Fund and the Development Marketplace. The 
financing of NGOs centres on particular areas, such as HIV/AIDS, where almost 49,000 
grassroots projects in Africa have been funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b). At state 
level many of the major government departments responsible for overseas development channel 
a substantial amount of their funds for programmes through NGOs. As Fowler (2002: 509) 
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states, the relationship between NGOs and donors has changed „from separation to convergence, 
and from mutual mistrust and antagonism to an asymmetric co-optive embrace.‟ 
 The World Bank is the primary financier of development projects with developing countries 
currently owing the institution about $47 billion (World Bank, 2010a).  As part of the move to 
the Post-Washington Consensus, the World Bank shifted from a focus on infrastructure to a 
stress on projects creating human and social capital (see chapter 1) as well as poverty alleviation 
under the Presidency of James Wolfensohn from 1995 to 2005 (Kagia ed., 2005, Mallaby, 2005, 
Wolfensohn, 2005). To roll out such projects, the World Bank increasingly financed civil society 
organizations. The World Bank (2010a) calculates that 10% of its central portfolio, totalling $2 
billion, goes to government-operated community-driven projects.  Moreover, there was „active 
CSO involvement‟ in 82% of World Bank-run projects in 2006, up from 21% in 1990. 31 For 
critics, participation remains mostly low-intensity (see chapter 1) in the form of consultation, 
which „is often a ritual that lends legitimacy to the policy process without creating binding 
commitments‟ (Nelson, 2002: 500). 32 
 
Overall, NGOs have become significant actors in development processes through the move from 
the Washington Consensus to Post-Washington Consensus policies. As a result their operations 
and impact have been scaled up, advocacy work linked to good governance has become an 
important part of their activities and relationships with major donors have grown closer.  As well 
as affecting the ways in which they work on the ground, these changes have also influenced 
theoretical debates regarding NGOs, which are examined in the next section. 
 
2.7 Critiques of the Liberal Conception of the Role of NGOs 
As Post-Washington Consensus policies were implemented towards the latter half of the 1990s a 
more critical literature on NGOs developed. Clarke (1998: 40) stresses the importance of 
theorizing the political impact of NGOs, since failure to do this had led to an „inadequate, 
explicitly normative interpretation of NGO ideology.‟ It had also encouraged a tendency to take 
NGOs‟ advocacy as self-evidently positive. 
 
                                                          
31  The precise meaning of „active CSO involvement‟ is not outlined by the World Bank. 
32
 The validity of such criticisms is analysed in regard to the cases of Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions is analysed 
in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
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Auto-critiques (Hearn, 2007) of the roles of  NGOs broadened during the latter half of the 1990s 
from long-standing analysts of civil society, such as Edwards and Fowler eds, (2002), Edwards 
and Hulme eds (1996, 1992) and Fowler (2000, 1997), focused on increasing legitimacy, 
capacity, accountability and sustainability within the dominant paradigm. Fowler (1997: xii) 
made the point that people working for development NGOs „seldom have the  time to reflect on 
their actions‟ and thus it is not easy to get a „fix‟ on the way NGOs perform. Subsequently there 
needs to be an emphasis on „creating virtuous spirals for sustainability‟ (Fowler, 2000: 186) 
driven by NGO leaders.  
 
Edwards (2004: 103-104), has been particularly critical of the role of the IFIs and bilateral 
donors, arguing that much civil society building since the collapse of communism in 1989 has 
been a „crude attempt to manipulate associational life in line with Western, and specifically 
North American liberal-democratic templates.‟ This has involved pre-selecting organizations that 
donors think are most important and ignoring domestic expressions of citizen action that do not 
conform to Western expectations, such as radical social movements, informal village/clan-based 
organizations or pre-political formations.  Mistrust and rivalry have evolved as fledgling civil 
society organizations compete for foreign aid. In overall terms, during the 1980s and the 1990s 
there was „neglect [by NGOs] of analysing and challenging those who would gain control of 
both discourse and practice in development‟ (Hulme (2008: 340). 
 
Along with these critiques from within, a radical attack on the role of development-based NGOs 
has developed since the latter half of the 1990s, with Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) prominent in 
putting forward counter-hegemonic theories. They contend that NGOs are a neo-comprador 
group, which - through supplying services on behalf of donor countries - are trading in domestic 
poverty in return for individual advancement. NGOs often have a negative influence on popular 
communities by directing energy to self-help projects more than social transformations. 
Moreover, when the majority of development-based NGOs discuss civil society they obscure the 
profound class divisions and struggles, as well as other forms of stratification, such as caste, that 
polarise contemporary society. 
33
 In the context of Africa, Maina (1998) argues that analysts fail 
                                                          
33  See also Petras (2003) for this view. 
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to account for the fact that a lot of civil society organizations themselves are actually divided 
along lines of class and ethnicity.  
Tandon (1996) categorises NGOs as „missionaries‟ of the neo-liberal era, a theme developed by 
Shivji (2007: vii), who argues that NGOs are not a third sector or independent of the state but are 
embedded in the neo-liberal project in Africa. For Shivji (2007) this is because most of the 
NGOs which are currently influential in Africa were founded in the neo-liberal era and are 
staffed by careerist, urban-based elites who are motivated by material gain. These organizations 
overwhelmingly receive their funding from Western donor agencies, to which they are upwardly 
accountable, at the expense of downward accountability to the poor and marginalized. Moreover, 
the mission statements of these NGOs are „vague, amorphous and meaningless‟ (Shivji, 2007: 
32).  
34
 
 
Hearn (2007: 1106-1107) has also put forward the case for taking up counter-hegemonic 
perspectives, arguing that research on African civil society organizations should draw on a  
Gramscian  perspective, given that civil society organizations in developing countries are 
dependent on external resources and patronage and in return popularize the development policy 
of donors.  This necessitates a close examination of the fluid relationship between the state and 
civil society in the struggle for hegemony.  
 
Making valid generalisations concerning the nature of the relationship between states and 
development-NGOs in Africa is difficult. Links diverge from country to country and inevitably 
change over time. Moreover, NGO connections with separate segments of the same state – 
politicians, civil servants of line ministries and the military - tend to vary. Finally these 
relationships can differ markedly across regions and localities of the same country (Hilhorst, 
2003). However, the rise of a new group of well funded NGOs in Africa during the 1990s 
35
 has 
led to accusations from governments that they are usurping state sovereignty and fomenting 
unwarranted dissent among citizens (Pinkney, 2009, Fowler, 2002).  In a number of African 
countries, governments have been critical of the NGO sector during the neo-liberal era. 
Governments have, inter alia,  accused NGO officials of forming only to benefit themselves in 
                                                          
34
 See chapter 5 for an analysis of the validity of these criticisms with regard to NGOs in Tanzania. 
35
 See chapter 5 for an analysis of how this happened in Tanzania. 
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Tanzania (Michael, 2004), being corrupt in Kenya (Chege, 1999), subverting national policies in  
South Africa (Chege, 1999) and of unwarranted meddling in domestic issues in Ethiopia 
(Norwegian Council for Africa, 2009). 
36
 
 
African governments are also aware of the significant amount of finance NGOs attract from 
Western donors, which can be used to provide services in „partnership‟ with the state (Clark, 
2002). Government authority has come under pressure in a number of African countries as a 
result of the donor driven agenda - which includes a substantive role for civil society 
organizations - and they therefore have to be strategic in regard to allowing NGOs to expand 
their activities (Manji and O‟Coill, 2002). Some governments have also tapped into the donor 
finance available for NGOs through indirectly controlling and/or using state employees to form 
and run NGOs, such as in the case of the District Development Trusts (DDT) in Tanzania 
(Mchomvu et at, 1998, Qorro, 1991. 
37
  
 
As a result of the factors outlined above, African governments have tended to deal with NGOs 
through carrot-and-stick strategies. These include granting or withholding privileges, such as 
being able to import equipment duty free (Michael, 2004).  Governments also usually insist on 
the formal registration of NGOs and Codes of Conduct, both of which have become issues of 
contention in the Tanzanian context (Lawyers Environmental Action Team, 2010, Policy Forum, 
2008b). These two forms of regulation are good examples of the way the state delineates the 
formal spaces in which civil society operates in post-liberalization Tanzania, which Gramsci 
(2011b) emphasized as vital to an understanding of how hegemony is created and maintained. 
38
  
 
Apart from dealing with potentially conflictual relationships with the state, the rising NGO sector 
in Africa faces other obstacles. The scaling-up of their activities and influence has led to 
accusations that many NGOs have become bureaucratic and top-heavy. In addition, NGO 
fundraising has been criticized for using paternalistic images and presenting ill-conceived views 
of reasons for problems in Africa.  For De Waal (1997), international humanitarian groups 
                                                          
36  See also on this point the cases of confrontational relations between the state and two development-based NGOs 
in Tanzania - Hakielimu and the Youth Partnership Countrywide -  which are examined in detail in chapter 5.  
37
  See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the District Development Trusts (DDTs). 
38
 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the registration of NGOs and the NGO Code of Conduct in post-
liberalization Tanzania. 
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contribute to difficulties rather than providing solutions, by wrongly focusing on technical, rather 
than political, issues and over-focusing on certain areas.  De Waal‟s argument in this regard 
resonates in Tanzania, where officials from the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) - a large 
grant providing body - reported during fieldwork interviews that NGOs flood them with 
applications for grants to work on HIV/AIDS projects. According to interviewees, this is because 
they have heard on the „development grapevine‟ that it is easy to get funding for work in this 
area.  Applications for grants to work on other important areas - such as malaria prevention and 
treatment - are lacking. 
39
 
 
The concentration of the Western donors on fostering forms of civil society in Africa with which 
they are familiar intensified from the mid-1980s, while other important civil society associations 
have been marginalized.  Civil society organizations focusing on women, traders, tribes, clans, 
credit provision, cooperative activities, death arrangements, culture and sports, for example, have 
been neglected or ignored by donors (Gibbon, 2001a). The examples of burial societies and 
sports clubs can be used to show how the complexities of associational life in Africa are 
underplayed and undervalued through donor insistence on concentrating funding and capacity-
building initiatives on formally constituted NGOs.  
 
REBA (2007: 1) points out that, burial societies „have become a central part of the social fabric 
in many African countries.‟ However, they feature little in the literature of the donors concerning 
civil society. Dercon et al (2008), Mapetla et al (2007), Schneider (2008) and Matobo (1998) are 
amongst other writers who have carried out work on the importance of the activities of burial 
societies in Africa, showing how these often extend considerably beyond arrangements to cater 
for the deaths of members and their families to encompass wider aspects of social and economic 
development. 
 
Moreover, there has been a considerable amount of recent research on the importance of sports 
clubs in Africa, which provide support and services for citizens extending beyond their 
ostensible remit. Armstrong and Giulianotti (2004) outline how colonial regimes in Africa used 
sport as a way of instilling „discipline‟ in subject peoples, often as part of „muscular 
                                                          
39
 See chapter 5 for a fuller examination of the work of the FCS. 
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Christianity.‟ Sports clubs formed during the colonial period have often developed complex and 
powerful leverage over many areas of life and continue to provide support and a sense of identity 
for many people.  For example, Pannenborg, (2008) - in a study of football clubs in Cameroon – 
shows how ethnic groups use football as a stepping stone to gain political and economic  
power. 
40
   
 
Lund (2006) also brings out the influence of traditional civil society associations in Africa, 
which at times compete with the state to exercise public authority. The ways in which such 
institutions act highlights the intricacies involved in understanding the concepts of legitimacy, 
belonging, citizenship and territory.  While government institutions are important in setting out 
and enforcing rules and regulations, the concept of the state is also used to depict „what we are 
not‟ by some civil society organizations. In parts of Africa state authority is vigorously 
challenged by civil society organizations, which at times have shared tactical interests. However, 
common interests between such groups fluctuate in a constant cycle of reproduction and 
transformation. Demarcating analytical lines between state and civil society obscures the fluid 
nature of relationships between the two. Public authority is exercised by bodies that come and go 
and such „institutions operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and 
private‟ (Lund, 2006: 686). 
 
To be effective, institutions must convey meaning to acts of authority through practices which 
inculcate the idea that their authority is legitimate. In Tanzania, loosely formed community 
associations repair roads and provide security by patrolling areas regarded as dangerous. They 
ask for voluntary contributions from citizens in the street and whether such demands are 
successful depends on their force, the perception on the part of the citizens as to the worth of the 
services provided and their economic status. For example, in some parts of Dar es Salaam the 
work of such „twilight institutions‟ is well regarded and compared favourably to that of the state.  
 
 
                                                          
40  Studies by Hawkey, (2010), Korr and Close (2010), Wanderi (2009), Ricci, (2008), Manzo (2007), Ndee (2007), 
Alegi (2004) and Fjeld (2000) have also demonstrated the substantial influence of sports clubs on many aspects of 
civic life in Africa. 
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When undertaking fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in 2008 I was often stopped in my local area by a 
group of men who asked for money, on the basis that they were repairing the roads and cutting 
back bushes to reduce the number of attacks by people using foliage as cover. On asking local 
Tanzanians if the group was targeting me as I was the only „mzungu‟ (see chapter 4) in the area, 
they said that this was not the case and that they contributed to this „local tax,‟ as the group „did 
a good job‟ and was better respected in the area than state authorities. In sum, this group was 
considered to be legitimate by the local population and was an effective „twilight organization‟ 
(Lund, 2006).  
 
As well as these loosely formed civil society organizations, home associations play a substantive 
role in some areas of civic life in Tanzania. These associations – often formed by members of the 
domestic diaspora - take a variety of forms and often contribute to the building of schools in 
rural home areas. Home association development activities can be consistent with national 
political policies and leaders are sometimes MPs, using these groups as a vehicle for growth in 
their local constituencies. However, home associations also present a „potential threat to the 
government‟s claim to legitimacy‟ (Jennings and Mercer, 2011: 16) through their critiques of 
state policies, which can be implicit or as direct, in some cases, as the formulation of alternative 
economic development strategy documents.  The activities of twilight organizations and home 
associations - and the complexities of their relationships with both the state and citizens - are 
ignored by the donors through their concentration on funding and nurturing a small group of 
formally constituted NGOs. 
 
For, Mbembe (2001) it is vital to examine efforts to establish new forms of legitimate order and 
to restructure forms of authority by differing groups. While some of these exertions are 
circumscribed by the state and others have no lasting impact, there are those that succeed and 
become self-sustaining through skilful strategies. Using this conception, it is possible to see how 
challenges can emerge to seemingly solid state structures and to gain insights into ways in which 
social and political life is governed because it does not make binding assumptions about the state 
and civil society. The „prevalence and persistence of twilight institutional forms … should 
encourage us to re-investigate the institution and the idea we call state‟ (Lund, 2006:  701).   
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The arguments set out above regarding the particularities of associational life in different African 
settings provide support for Mamdani‟s (1996) argument that a historically formed 
understanding of the role of civil society organizations is important. Mamdani makes the 
important point that civil society was used as a significant organizing principle under 
colonialism, which should thus be used as an analytical starting point for studies of the concept. 
The current relationship between the state and civil society organizations in Tanzania can only be 
fully apprehended through an analysis of the way ideologies, strategies and interrelationships 
have developed from the colonial era onwards. This is why the analyses of NGOs and trade 
unions (in chapters 5 and 6, respectively) focus on how the perspectives and actions of these two 
associational groups have been affected by the development of different political and economic 
formations in Tanzania. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has identified several key issues relating to the rise to prominence of civil society as 
a concept in development processes as part of the New Policy Agenda and the reasons why 
NGOs have become the associational form most favoured by donors involved in driving post-
liberalization national policy-making processes. 
 
First, weaknesses in the de Tocquevillian perspective on civil society – which is favoured by the 
IFIs - have been highlighted.   Moreover, it has been shown that donor views concerning the way 
civil society organizations participate in post-liberalization national policy-making processes -  
and its consequences - can be challenged by an analysis of arguments made by de Tocqueville 
(1845a, 1845b) himself, the weaknesses in his views notwithstanding. De Tocqueville argued 
that civil society should be developed organically and become rooted in a society in order to 
become effective. However, the World Bank and bilateral donors have focused narrowly on 
fostering NGOs as participants in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, 
neglecting other organic associational forms, which have roots in African societies.  Thus, the 
way civil society is conceptualized, theorized and fostered by the donors has led to a restricted 
base of participation by associational groups in post-liberalization national policy-making 
processes in Africa, which has contributed to weak ownership. 
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Second, according to de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) the number of CSOs in a society expands 
with growing equality and associational life is likely to be limited and based around conflict if 
inequality is enhanced. World Bank (2009b) statistics show that income inequality is growing in 
Tanzania, therefore according to the de Tocquevillian view, it is doubtful that associational life 
will expand endogenously in these circumstances. Moreover, as a result of this inequality, 
existing civil society organizations are likely to take part in confrontational activities, rather than 
harmonious debates with organs of the state, encouraging tolerance, openness and moderate 
opinion, as envisaged by the donors.  
 
Third, Gramscian arguments concerning the roles and activities of civil society organizations – 
which are neglected by the donors - have greater explanatory power than liberal views. The 
strength of Gramsci‟s notion of hegemony is the way it focuses on the formal determination of 
the spaces in which civil society groups compete, such as the way the state regulates the 
registration and conduct of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania discussed in section 2.7 above, 
rather than pre-conceived determinants of attitude, interests and behaviour. Civil society is of 
importance as the public room where hegemonic and counter-hegemonic views are put forward 
by civil society organizations, which all identify with the aims of a particular social sector.  
Framing the participation of Tanzanian civil society organizations in post-liberalization national 
policy-making processes within a Gramscian approach to civil society - concentrating on how 
the political space in which they operate is formally determined - allows a more nuanced analysis 
to emerge than is the case when using the dominant liberal theorization as a model. How the 
prevailing political spaces, in which civil society and the state contest hegemony, have been 
shaped by major shifts in the political economy of Tanzania is examined in the following 
chapter. This is instrumental to a more subtle understanding of why civil society is at present a 
very uneven playing field where NGOs have greater capacity to insert themselves into national 
policy-making processes than trade unions.   
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Chapter 3 
 
The History of Development Policies in Tanzania 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights changes in relationships between the core elements of what Gramsci 
characterized as the integral state (civil society, state institutions and ideology) in Tanzania, from 
the period of German colonialism to the present. This is done in order to illustrate how changes 
in the nature of the state crucially affected the perceptions, positions and power of trade unions. 
The focus is largely on the construction of the neo-liberal power bloc. However, in order to 
explain its precise form in Tanzania, it is first necessary to review briefly the historical contours 
of the state. Key changes in the political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, 
which have led to the marginalization of trade unions, are assessed.
41
 In the economic sphere, 
these shifts have revolved around the stress on attracting inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), accompanied by the growing informalization of the labour force. In the realm of politics, 
the transition has taken the form of the adoption of a confusing array of national policy 
instruments, all driven by the main Post-Washington Consensus issues of achieving good 
governance through  partnership between agents of development, accompanied by mass 
participation in policy-making debates, in order to bring about national ownership of them.  
 
3.2 German Colonialism 
After Chancellor Bismarck changed his attitude from indifference to pro-Colonialism in 1884, 
Germany played a leading role in the „Scramble for Africa‟ at the Berlin Conference 
(1884/1885), whence control over „German East Africa‟ was claimed as a protectorate.  This was 
„a simple assertion of her new position among the world powers‟ (Oliver and Atmore, 1994: 106) 
and thus, as Koponen (1995: 169) puts it, colonial conquest was „in essence a political action.‟ 
 
Mainland Tanganyika was shared between German and British chartered companies. German 
rule has been divided into two broad periods by Iliffe (1969); from its inception to 1906, where 
progress was slow through the hostility of native tribes, lack of funds and poor administration,   
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  A detailed historically-grounded analysis of trade unions in Tanzania is provided in chapter 6. 
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and second the „age of improvement‟ from 1907 until the outbreak of the First World War. 
Iliffe's division is based on the major reorganization of the colony which occurred after the Maji 
Maji rebellion of 1905. This started at Kilwa and spread through the south of the country, 
becoming „the most widespread resistance to colonial rule in Africa‟ (Coulson, 1985: 31). 
  
The colony used three modes of economic development: trade based on native crops, European 
plantations for crops needing technical equipment, such as sisal, and farming and ranching by 
permanent white settlers. With the European community being the most forceful and articulate, 
concessions made by the ruling administration favoured the second and third approaches. 
Economic relations between German East Africa and British East Africa were generally good. 
42
   
The onset of the First World War in 1914 signalled the end of German rule. The short period of 
German control over Tanganyika meant that development processes initiated during this time 
had not matured enough to make them „identifiable and transparent to historical analysis. Most 
progressed unevenly and were far from completed when German rule was interrupted‟ 
(Koponen, 1995: 557). Infrastructure was built (notably roads and railways) during this period 
and coffee, cotton and sisal industries became significant export sectors, primarily to the benefit 
of European plantation owners, traders and a small group of state officials. 
 
Iliffe (1969) points out that the fundamental quandary of German colonialism in Tanganyika, 
after 1906, was based on a clash between the growing power of settlers, bringing them closer to 
the machinery of territorial government and the new skills acquired by some Africans during the 
„age of improvement‟ which gave them the means to assert control over their own societies more 
effectively than had previously been the case. This group sought advantage through new modes 
of behaviour, whereby resistance was replaced by „a widespread desire to utilise Western 
techniques in order to transform African societies‟ (Iliffe, 1969: 8). For the colonizers, how to 
accommodate the aspirations of this group was problematic. The Maji Maji rebellion showed that 
a serious challenge to colonial rule in Tanganyika was possible. The rebellion had been based on 
a number of different tribal groups, which did not have a similar vision or over-arching sense of 
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  A German administrator at the time argued that, „with regard to tropical products, Germany was the teacher of 
England, while on the question of agriculture and stock-raising Germany can learn much from her English 
neighbours‟ (Brode, 1977:  26). 
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unity (Giblin and Morison, 2010), drawing on their particular forms of organization to resist the 
colonizers. While based, overall, on the political marginalization of tribes in the south of 
Tanganyika and anger at the exploitation of local labour within an extractive colonial economy 
(Koponen, 1995), the rebellion had particular local triggers. 
 
3.3  British Colonialism up to the end of the Second World War 
 In succeeding Germany as the colonial power in Tanganyika, on 1 February 1920, 
43
 the British 
were aware, through the Maji Maji rebellion, that the integral state needed to rely on ideological 
hegemony as far as possible, since coercion was a drain on state resources and the morale of its 
officers. Thus, under the forty one year period of British administration, there was a slow and 
uneven shift in state ideology, in order to allow Africans to pursue their aspirations through the 
institutionalized means of civil society. A fluid struggle for ideological hegemony ensued, as 
state and civil society both endeavoured to frame and control the forms and activities of 
associational groups in the country.     
  
As the plantations and sisal estates were in a state of disrepair, peasant production became the 
mainstay of the economy with official policy being premised on non-industrialization. 
44
 The 
ruling administration had to maintain a good relationship with the settlers. Although the 
Governor did not want them to have political power, settlers were given support, whilst, 
rhetorically, a policy of „primarily African development‟ (Iliffe, 1989: 262) was maintained. The 
British introduced a system of Indirect Rule in 1925, based on running the country through local 
chiefs, who had their own courts and were allowed to keep some of the taxes they collected. 
45
 
Acquiescence to British requirements on the part of the chiefs was required, as a way of 
maintaining the ideological hegemony of the colonial state, with the result that those adopting 
too independent a line were replaced. Since many chiefs had been killed or banished by the 
Germans, the British often created „chiefs,‟ who were young, educated and easy to influence. 
 
 
                                                          
43
  Britain took control of the „Tanganyika Territory‟ on a League of Nations Mandate. 
44
  This policy was continued under the leadership of Nyerere after independence (see section 3.4.1 below). 
45  Iliffe (1989) and Rodney (1980) argue that the imposition of indirect rule in Tanganyika led to tribalism. For a 
contrasting view see Willis (1993). 
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As it became apparent during the 1920s that rule via the chiefs was unlikely to be successful 
(Coulson, 1985), some colonial administrators argued that civil society should be used to form an 
institutionalized alliance with the educated African class as an alternative. The co-operative 
societies were suggested as an appropriate vehicle for this concord, since they operated on a 
basis close to that of the main principles of Indirect Rule; the teaching of personal responsibility 
and initiative. Although it was another thirty years before the idea was taken seriously the co-
operative societies at independence in 1961 had grown to be a powerful part of civil society in 
Tanzania, which engaged in a war of position with the colonial state, particularly around the 
issue of whether Africans could successfully set up and run commercial enterprises within a 
market economy independently. 
 
Some co-operatives were inaugurated and run by Africans from the early years of British control. 
The first of these, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters‟ Association (KNPA), was formed in 1925. 
However, the colonial administration was wary of such associations providing a challenge to 
state hegemony. Consequently government control of these societies was set up through a 
registrar, who had the power to liquidate any which did not obey the rules. 
46
 The development 
of the KNPA, thus, shows the importance to the state of using legislation to win the war of 
position in Tanganyika, which continues to the present. By 1927 the KNPA had become a 
marketing co-operative. This was significant, as crop marketing was the Tanganyikan peasant 
society‟s main connection with the larger polity and market.  Thus, the marketing system formed 
an important framework for political organization, which distinguished peasant from tribal 
societies and is a reason why „cash-crop agriculture was so important to Tanganyika‟s political 
history‟ (Iliffe, 1989: 277). The KNPA quickly became a political body led by coffee farmers, 
whose interests clashed with those of the administrators, settlers and tribal chiefs. Under settler 
pressure, the government discouraged native coffee production and encouraged the cultivation of 
food crops instead. The collapse of coffee prices in 1929, corruption scandals and replacement of 
fees by a levy (which was difficult to collect) led to the demise of the KNPA. The government 
replaced it with the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), which was seen as a „state 
institution‟ by natives and thus distrusted. It was closely controlled by the registrar of societies 
                                                          
46  Furthermore, the registrar could decide on the size of societies and employed a team of inspectors and auditors to 
check on the way they were being run.  
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and deliberately decentralised and depoliticised through the influence of central government.  
 
It was not until 1952 when the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions (VFCU), which 
became the largest co-operative society in Africa (Maghimbi, 1990), had its application for 
registration accepted that the government allowed freer formation of co-operative societies. 
47
   
The co-operatives grew during the 1950s and through this expansion, the „alliance between the 
educated and the colonial state was legitimized‟ (Coulson, 1985: 99).48  While the state regulated 
the co-operative societies closely they also provided assistance in various ways, notably price 
regulation, guaranteed markets and subsidised credit (Gibbon, 2001b). The co-operatives can 
thus be regarded as reliant on the state. However, they were active in the independence struggle, 
through promoting the expansion of cash cropping in rural areas, thereby raising confidence by 
showing that Africans could do business successfully. This challenged the ideology of the state 
that Africans were unable to participate independently within a market economy.
49
 On the basis 
of their positive role in the independence struggle and their substantial economic impact, 
officials from co-operative societies expected to play a significant and autonomous role in post-
colonial Tanzania.
50
 Instead, the state increasingly controlled their activities, since (as with trade 
unions) it was not prepared to tolerate a competing power axis, which was entrenched in key 
sectors of the economy. Using the argument that co-operative societies were run by exploitative 
middle-men, they were proscribed in 1976 and replaced with „ujamaa organizations,‟ reducing 
the forms of associational life in Tanzania able to play an independent role (Shivji, 2006).   
 
The onset of the Second World War led to an enhancement of civil society activity in Africa by 
providing a boost to the nationalist and labour movements, as the numbers of workers joining the 
labour market to provide materials for the Allies increased (Shillington, 1995). In Tanganyika, 
86,740 Africans were enlisted in the armed forces, all of whom were conscripts, from 1940 
onwards. Conscription was also used to provide labour on plantations, particularly the sisal 
                                                          
4747
  The VFCU was very successful in supplying peasants with inputs for the cotton industry and even started its 
own industrialization process (Maghimbi, 1990).  
48
  There were 188 co-operatives in 1952 with 153,000 members. By 1957 this had risen to 474 co-operatives with 
305,000 members. Two years later, 617 co-operatives had been registered, which marketed all the cotton in 
Tanganyika and increasing amounts of coffee, paddy and cashews.  
49
 Shivji (2006) outlines how co-operative societies operated successfully in the Kagera and Kilimanjaro regions 
during the 1950s. 
50
  By 1968 the Tanzanian co-operative movement was the largest in Africa and third biggest in the world measured 
by market share of agricultural exports (Maghimbi, 2010). 
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estates. As the war continued, „discontent with shortages, inflation and regimentation grew‟ 
(Iliffe, 1989: 372). Furthermore, fighting alongside the British led to the „mystique of the 
coloniser‟ (Guibernau, 1996) lessening and feelings of inferiority amongst the colonised 
consequently decreasing, as they became more conscious of the system of consented coercion 
(Gramsci, 2011) by which their subjugation was maintained. 
 
3.4 The Independence Struggle after the Second World War 
Several factors further stimulated African nationalism and the rise of civil society organizations 
after the Second World War. Key elements of associational life in Tanganyika provided 
challenges in the public room of civil society during the 1950s to the state‟s hegemonic status, as 
a rising class of educated Africans became increasingly resentful at the way colonial rule was 
holding them back. First, attempts by the ruling administration to create white settlements - along 
with evictions of Africans from their land - led to resistance. The number of white settlers rose 
from 10,648 to 20,958, in the decade after 1948 (Iliffe, 1989). The fluid nature of the 
contestation of ideological hegemony between the core elements of the integral state, outlined by 
Gramsci (see chapter two), can be seen by the way evictions galvanised opposition to colonial 
rule, organized by African political associations and trade unions. Second, agricultural policies 
were applied in a way which favoured white settlers, leading to a rise in nationalist 
consciousness and opposition from the labour movement. The disastrous groundnut scheme - 
started in 1946 and cancelled in 1951 after £49 million had been spent on it – is an example. 
Rizzo (2006) outlines how the scheme led to a struggle between its managers and state officials 
for control of the labour market. The scheme caused widespread environmental destruction and 
led to the „extinction of existing land rights‟, as farmers became „tenants of the state‟ 
(Woodhouse and Chimhowu, 2005; 186). Third, as part of their effort to win the war of position, 
the colonial state refused to allow Africans to join higher civil service levels. This exclusion 
from the upper levels of the state machinery led to unrest, as Africans were aware that, as 
Gramsci (2011b) argued, control of institutions (both in the state and civil society spheres) was 
vital to the achievement of ideological hegemony. Fourthly, the colonial state attempted to 
preserve its ideological hegemony by introducing a new system of governance in 1957, whereby 
the largely African-controlled District Councils had to report to white-dominated Provincial  
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Councils. This was contested by Africans, who saw it „as an attempt to preserve white rule‟ 
(Coulson, 1985: 13).  
 
With regard to the labour movement, Africans were galvanised by the way trade unions 
demonstrated that they could bring important parts of the economy to a halt after the war. The 
war itself had led to an improvement in the legal position of trade unions, as administrations in 
British colonies were ordered from London to regulate labour relations. The British government 
passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, regulating the provision of economic 
assistance to colonies, which stated that „no territory might receive aid under its provisions 
unless it had in force legislation protecting the rights of trade unions‟ (Ikiara, 1988: 2).  
 
Buoyed by this legislation the few existing trade unions became more predisposed to take 
organized strike action than was the case before the war. A general strike took place in 1947 
51
  
and three years later a dock strike in Dar es Salaam 
52
 caused concern amongst the ruling 
administration, as it illustrated the ability of labour to organize effectively. Despite forcibly 
disbanding the Dock Workers Union after the strike (Iliffe, 1975), the action helped to make the 
colonial administration aware of the inevitability of building alliances with educated Africans 
through the institutionalized means of indigenous civil society organizations in order to maintain 
ideological hegemony. The Trade Union Ordinance of 1951 formalized the position of labour 
organizations in the country (Bienefeld, 1979). In 1953 
53
 the government accepted the 
application for registration by the African Commercial Employees Association (ACEA), which 
stimulated the formation and development of other labour organizations in the country (Coulson, 
1985). As Gramsci argued, compromises and alliances are needed on the part of civil society 
organizations in building counter-hegemonic discourses. Thus, the state attempt to build an 
alliance of sorts (under its own control as far as possible) with trade unions by allowing greater 
freedom of registration during the 1950s ultimately was counter-productive.  Contrary to its 
intentions, it led to the trade unions building institutional capacity, as membership rose, and to 
the formation of a an increasingly effective counter-hegemonic alliance with the nationalist 
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  See chapter 6 for details. 
52  See chapter 6 for details of the course of the Dock Strike and its aftermath. 
53
   This was one year after the registration of the VFCU had opened the way for a large growth in the co-operative 
movement. 
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political movement. 
 
Contemporaneously to this growth of the co-operative movement and trade unions, civil society 
in the political sphere received a fillip from a group of nationalists, who radicalized the 
Tanganyikan African Association (TAA). The TAA was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as 
the „African Association‟ and was open to Africans of any status and religion in an attempt to 
avoid tribalism and parochialism. At its 1946 annual conference, the association produced the 
„first coherent demand that the colonial territory of Tanganyika should become an independent 
nation state‟ (Iliffe, 1989: 453). In 1948 it was renamed the Tanganyika African Association. 
Julius Nyerere became the association‟s President in 1953 and successfully led a campaign to 
turn it into a political party. The TAA formally became the Tanganyikan African National Union 
(TANU) on 7 July 1954. It was officially recognized as the first political party in Tanganyika 
three months later. Under the leadership of Nyerere, TANU engaged in a war of position with the 
state, challenging the hegemony of British rule. Nyerere (1976: 29) fought to end colonial 
„interference with African customs‟ and to instil a sense of pride in them on the part of 
Tanzanians. Tanzanian associational groups, such as dance societies, credit associations and 
clan-based groups were encouraged and supported (see chapter 2).     
 
The British were aware that they were losing ground in the war of position as a result of these 
actions by TANU, and responded with obstructive legislation (Hubbard, 2011). The control of 
key superstructure institutions, notably the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, remained 
a substantive weapon with regard to maintaining the ideological hegemony of the colonial state. 
In 1954 the Societies Ordinance was put into place, which required all public organizations to be 
registered and to supply the registrar with a list of members and a copy of the constitution. The 
creation of the Office of the Registrar has left a lasting legacy, since it led to tight top-down state 
control of NGOs. The Code of Conduct for NGOs drawn up after 2000 remains a source of 
conflict between the state and associational groups, which regard it as overly restrictive (see 
chapter 5). Furthermore, a similar governing body for trade unions was founded, which has 
continued to exercise similar powers through to the present (See chapter 6). In 1955 an 
amendment to the Penal Code made it an offence „to print, publish … or make any statement 
likely to raise discontent amongst any inhabitants of the Territory‟ (Pratt, 1978: 37). This 
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substantively restricted the content of TANU pronouncements and publications. 
 
The British also founded a rival political party to TANU in February 1956, based on white 
settlers and chiefs sympathetic to colonial rule; the United Tanganyika Party (UTP). In 
Gramscian terms, this was an attempt to maintain the institutional power of the ruling bloc, from 
which the ideology of the colonial state could be disseminated and hegemony consequently 
maintained. Franchise was then set on the basis of completion of secondary education and an 
income of 3,000 shillings per year. When Tanganyika‟s first elections were held in 1958, the 
UTP believed the restricted franchise made it certain that they would win. However, TANU had 
enrolled 200,000 members by this time, making it „a major political force‟ (Pratt, 1978: 35). 
Nyerere organized votes for European and Asian candidates who were sympathetic to the aims of 
the organization. As a result, TANU sympathisers won all but one of the seats contested and the 
UTP collapsed soon after (Nugent, 2004).  
 
The challenge to TANU from the UTP was a major reason for TANU increasing its links with 
the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) - which had been founded in October 1955. 
54
 The 
TANU leadership was well aware that to win the war of position, alliances and compromises had 
to be made with as many organizations promulgating counter-hegemonic perspectives as 
possible, thus forming a durable historic bloc (Gramsci, 2011 and see chapter 1). Thus, the two 
organizations were also drawn closer together by TANU‟s commitment to help the labour 
movement improve the terms and conditions of workers after independence in return for union 
support in the anti-colonial struggle. In this subsequently broken promise lies the bitterness of 
many Tanzanian trade unionists to this day.  
 
By the end of the 1950s, most senior trade union officials were also members of TANU. While 
TANU and the trade union movement were united in pursuit of uhuru (freedom) there was a 
difference in the way the concept was perceived; for TANU uhuru meant self-determination and 
the freedom to develop the interests of the people of Tanganyika as a whole, whereas the trade 
unions envisaged the concept in narrower terms, centred on the Africanization of the economy, 
higher salaries and an end to discrimination in workplaces (Matiko, 1968). Thus, while there was 
                                                          
54  See chapter 6 for details. 
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an alliance between the trade union movement and TANU, both maintained their own agendas. 
 
In December 1959 the British conceded that a majority of ministers needed to be elected as 
members of parliament and a general election was held in August 1960. TANU won a landslide 
victory, taking 70 out of the 71 seats which were contested. Nyerere became chief minister and 
pressed for independence by the end of 1961, which met with agreement from the British. Thus, 
the victory of the nationalists had been „driven primarily by civil society groups‟ (Matlosa, 2004: 
79), yet they were quickly suppressed and/or subsumed within the organs of the ruling party after 
independence.  
 
3.4  Independence: From the One Party State to Liberalization of the Economy  
Tanganyika formally became independent on 9 December 1961. Following a coup d‟état, 
Zanzibar merged with the Tanganyikan mainland to form the United Republic of Tanzania on 26 
April 1964. In the first half of the 1960s Tanzania formally adopted socialist policies (Nyerere, 
1967) in its attempts to forge a nation out of territory, citizens out of subjects and a people from a 
heterogeneous population (Jennings, 2007). However, the country was heavily dependent on 
external financing in pursuing its development goals. By 1965 foreign aid made up 44% of the 
national budget, which left the state vulnerable to policy influence from external donors.   
 
The „Republican constitution‟ was put into place in 1962 to replace the existing „Westminster 
model‟ (Shivji, 1986). In the same year all land was nationalized under the Rent Restriction Act 
(1962) and a tribunal was created to set „fair‟ rents (Bukuku, 1993). An interim constitution was 
drawn up in 1964, following the union between the Tanganyikan mainland and Zanzibar. One 
year later a new „One-Party State‟ constitution formalized the rule of TANU over the Union and 
the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar. Nyerere argued that the newly independent country 
could not afford the luxury of competing political parties playing power games, which would be 
at the expense of putting into practice a concerted plan for national development (Dowden, 
2009). The same rationale was used for the suppression of independent civil society 
organizations, including trade unions. 
55
 Nyerere (1976) used the discourse of national liberation 
to argue that all interest groups, classes and efforts needed to be subordinated to the struggle to 
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 This point is examined in detail in chapters 5 and 6. 
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overcome the iniquitous legacies of colonial repression. When trade unions pressed for 
substantive improvements in the terms and conditions of members soon after independence, they 
were accused of being selfish representatives of a labour aristocracy and suppressed to the point 
where they became quasi-governmental organizations (see chapter 6 for a detailed analysis). 
 
Tanzania‟s development was to be led by a „state-for-all‟ (Havnevik, 2010a), which would 
engender a broad societal concord concerning the direction of major nation-building policies. 
Thus, unlike Gramsci (2011b), Nyerere believed that the state could achieve hegemonic 
universality (see chapter 2) and, therefore, direct the development of all economic, political and 
social groups, through consensus-based policies. He was, however, also committed to inculcating 
a participatory culture, whereby Tanzanian citizens, particularly the peasantry, could articulate 
their needs and wants, to which the state would be responsive. This commitment inevitably led to 
tension over how far the state was prepared to forgo its developmentalist role and allow a 
pluralist political system, including advocacy and provision of services by civil society.      
 
Nyerere was well aware of the fact that relying on external donors for finance meant it was 
impossible for Tanzania to formulate autonomous domestic or foreign policies. He argued that 
dependence on external donors weakened and distorted national development efforts, particularly 
since it „comes much later than one expected and not always in the form it is wanted‟ (Nyerere, 
1976: 319). The reliance on foreign finance provided an impetus for the setting out of the Arusha 
Declaration on 5 February 1967, which fundamentally changed the direction of Tanzania‟s 
development polices. The Arusha Declaration repudiated capitalism and stated that collective 
ownership of means of production was necessary for the successful development of Tanzania.  
The declaration led to the nationalization of firms in key economic sectors and entailed the state 
taking majority shareholdings in subsidiaries of multinational firms, as well as most of the sisal 
plantations. However, there was no emphasis on the need for central control of the economy or 
industrialization. Nyerere (1967) prioritized the development of kilimo (agriculture), focusing on 
improving the lives of smallholder peasants. Yet, Nyerere rejected class struggle as the basis of 
African socialism and instead regarded its foundation as being „the extended family system‟ 
(Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003: 62). The slavish following of any doctrine was rejected, with 
Nyerere  (1968: 1) arguing that in a „socialist society it is the socialist state of mind, and not the 
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rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for 
each other‟s welfare.‟  
 
Rist (2005) identifies five major principles within the Arusha Declaration. First, self-reliance is 
stressed, which entails de-linking (following Baran and Sweezy, 1966, Amin, 1990) from the 
international capitalist economy in order to attain the freedom to put in place autonomous 
domestic and foreign policies. Second, autarky is rejected and delinking in this context can be 
regarded as close to Amin's (1990: 62) definition of the concept as the pursuit of „rational criteria 
for economic options founded on a law of value on a national basis with popular relevance, 
independent of such criteria of economic rationality as flow from the dominance of the capitalist 
law of value operating on a world scale.‟ Third, money is rejected as a driving force in 
development. The need for a psycho-political change is set out whereby individuals develop the 
self-confidence to relate to the economy in ways not based around the need to make money. 
Fourth, measures should be taken to stop exploitation of one group of the population by another 
and to promote conditions of social equality. Finally, the replication of all foreign economic and 
political models must be avoided. African values and traditions should form the basis of 
aspirations and organization. 
 
Tanzania had two main advantages with regard to getting such a radical national development 
plan accepted by the people. First, the country was relatively homogeneous socially; 80% lived 
in rural areas and none of the one hundred and twenty ethnic groups had dominance. Moreover, 
Swahili was a common language of communication (Roy-Campbell, 1999). Second, Nyerere 
commanded respect from all sectors of the population. Gramsci (2011b) argued that leaders who 
do not enjoy the confidence of regional and local institutions, and who do not labour rigorously 
to make their policies accessible to non-intellectuals, are likely to have them ignored or 
sabotaged. This was far from the case with Nyerere, who worked hard to ensure that his views 
could be understood by peasants and the urban working class. Known as „mwalimu‟ (teacher), 
Nyerere was a „persistently innovative thinker‟ (Davidson, 1987: 330) and Tanzanians never 
doubted that he was „a leader of unquestionable integrity, who, whatever his policy errors, was 
profoundly committed to their welfare‟ (Pratt, 1999: 138). 
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The concept of ujamaa was used by Nyerere as the basis of his plan to satisfy the basic needs 
and aspirations of the peasantry. Ujamaa is often translated into English as „collectivization of 
production.‟ However, Bryceson (2010: 73) points out that the concept has a wider meaning, 
symbolizing „the national collective, unity of purpose, and cherished way of life.‟ In this sense, 
Nyerere used „ujamaa‟ fundamentally to build hegemonic universality for his vision of 
Tanzania‟s development trajectory. Villagization began in autumn 1967. Nyerere at first tried to 
get peasants to form „ujamaa villages‟ through free will. However, with only two million people 
– out of a total population of 16.9 million - adopting the scheme by 1973, Nyerere turned to the 
coercive functions of the integral state in the form of „Operation Planned Villages,‟ which 
speeded up the process. In 1975, the initiative encompassed nine million people and by 1977 13 
million people were residing in 7,684 ujamaa villages. That meant 70% of Tanzanians had 
moved into these villages in three years. As well as his own charismatic authority over the 
organs of state, Nyerere was able to draw on the influential support of important superstructure 
institutions, notably the controlling bodies of the protestant and catholic churches, in pursuing 
ujamaa (Ludwig, 1999, Jennings, 2008b).  
 
Flawed state economic policies were clearly a major reason for the lack of success of ujamaa 
(Sender and Smith, 1986). A contradiction that militated against the success of the initiative was 
the focus on African traditions as its bedrock at the same time as peasants were being taken away 
from their ancestral lands and exhorted to employ unknown and untried modern agricultural 
practices (Rist, 2005). For example, peasants developed a „parasitic‟ relationship to the newly 
introduced machinery (Hyden, 1980). They would use machines but abandoned them as soon as 
problems occurred, through lack of training in maintenance. Thus, ujamaa led to the alienation 
of peasants „from their cultural and social realities‟ (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003: 61). Moreover, 
Nyerere did not foresee that ujamaa would not appeal to rural leaders since it „blocked their own 
social ascent and personal enrichment‟ (Rist, 2005: 133). Consequently, rural elites started to 
appropriate the ujamaa villages in pursuit of their own interests or „undermined collective work‟ 
(Davidson, 1987: 332). 
 
Ujamaa as a „populist‟ initiative (Campbell and Stein, 1991, Sender and Smith, 1986) remains a 
controversial vision of development. For Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003: 78), there is a need to go 
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beyond ideologically driven „binary frameworks‟ of either romanticizing the initiative or 
regarding it solely as an economic disaster. Ujamaa should be examined as a development 
strategy, seeking social equity and distributive justice based on self-reliance. In this regard, 
Jennings (2003: 184) points out that Tanzanian self-help groups during the 1960s engaged in „a 
massive movement of community action …, operating increasingly outside the direct control of 
the state and implementing schemes largely defined by the community.‟ These important aspects 
of ujamaa, showing that ideological hegemony is always contested and modified, have been 
obscured by the emphasis on its economic dimensions. However, Nyerere admitted that the 
Arusha Declaration and ujamaa did not lead to Tanzania becoming self-reliant or socialist. For 
example, in Iringa in the early 1970s, 9% of farmers owned 53% of the land and 96% of all 
capital equipment (Davidson, 1987). 
56
 
 
A further issue that arose through the policies of ujamaa remains pertinent in contemporary 
Tanzania. The policies were kept going by a number of Western development agencies, which 
were keen to see the success of Tanzania‟s non-capitalist path. Thus, Tanzania received 60% of 
its budget from foreign aid to support ujamaa policies. 
57
 Moreover, through the 1970s, over 
70% of the education budget was funded by external donors (Campbell, 1991). This created a 
system in Tanzania of foreign „domination through giving‟ (Rist, 2005: 134).  
 
Overall, ujamaa policies failed because it proved impossible to reconcile the tension between „an 
overt ideology stressing popular participation and a more covert reality of strong, highly 
centralized bureaucratic control‟ (Townsend, 1998: 266). Nyerere‟s government moved 
decisively during the 1970s to control development processes and popular participation was 
reduced to fulfilling legal requirements, rather than a matter of „pride, community spirit or local 
custom‟ (Jennings, 2007: 92). Civil society was, from this period, given little formal policy space 
within which it could challenge the state‟s hegemony (see chapters 5 and 6 for details, regarding 
NGOs and trade unions, respectively). 
 
 
                                                          
56  Moreover, Due (1980; 99) found maize yields to be low and input costs high in Iringa from 1973 to 1976, 
„resulting in average net returns per village which were highly negative.‟ 
57
 See also chapter 6 for an analysis of how NGOs, such as Oxfam, aided the imposition of ujamaa policies. 
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In 1977 TANU joined with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM - „the Party of the Revolution.‟ CCM was quickly proclaimed the only legal political 
party. Tanzania faced substantive economic problems during the latter part of the 1970s through 
inflation and a decline in export crops.  Per capita GDP growth rates averaged 0.2% between 
1976 and 1978 and this declined to -2.5% from 1979 to 1984 (Ndulu, 1987). Corruption on the 
part of state officials was also a problem at this time through „an over-regulated economy, with 
scarcities in officially allocated commodities and a rapid erosion in the real value of official 
salaries‟ (Wangwe and Van Arkadie, 2000: 86). In addition, rising oil prices and war with 
Uganda contributed to the failure of Nyerere‟s vision for Tanzania. Overall, „rural producers, 
urban workers, and upper income earners were all worse off at the end of the 1970s than they 
had been at the beginning‟ (Coulson, 1985: 199).   
 
With the increasing dominance of a neo-liberal policy environment at the IFIs from the end of 
the 1970s and „economic decline‟ (Gonza, 2008: 8) apparent in Tanzania, the government gave 
way to external and internal pressures to soften statist policies and to allow the private sector to 
play a greater role as an agent of development.  Tanzania launched its own „National Economic 
Survival Plan‟ (NESP), which failed to have a positive impact on the economy. Consequently, 
bilateral donors made their continued support conditional on an agreement being reached with 
the IMF (Harrison, 2001). The increasing pressure on Tanzania to accept IMF policies in return 
for assistance was an influence on Nyerere‟s decision to step down as President, to be replaced 
by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985.  However, Nyerere remained as chair of the party and argued 
against accepting the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) proposed by the IFIs.  In contrast, 
Mwinyi was in favour of accepting the SAP, leading to a „crisis of ideological hegemony in 
Tanzania‟ (Campbell and Stein, 1991: 3).  
 
3.5 The Post-liberalization Period 
The Tanzanian government formally agreed to the imposition of a SAP in 1986, leading to levels 
of aid – which had subsided due to Nyerere‟s resistance to neo-liberal reforms - being raised.  
The signing of the SAP marks the official turn in Tanzania towards accepting economic solutions 
„from without‟ (Rusimbi, 2003).  Three years later an enhanced SAP (ESAP) was signed, 
signalling the deepening of neo-liberal reforms and the abandonment of economic nationalism in 
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return for external funds (Harrison, 2001). Tanzania also faced donor demands to adopt the 
second main plank of the New Policy agenda, liberal multi-party democracy (Vener, 1996). In 
response to this pressure, the Political Parties Act, 1992 was brought into force, which allowed 
for the registration of multiple political parties (Olaleye, 2006). While on the surface, this 
indicates the rapidity with which the economic and political policies promulgated by external 
donors became hegemonic in Tanzania following the end of the Nyerere regime, in reality the 
pace of change was slow and uneven during the 1990s, quickening noticeably from 2000. For 
trade unions, both the economic and political aspects of this New Policy Agenda have led to their 
marginalization as the neo-liberal power bloc in Tanzania, comprising external donors, the state 
and „new (largely foreign) investors.‟ have excluded them from the realm of civil society as far 
as possible. 
 
Regarding political aspects, although there were no direct correlations between fluctuations in 
aid disbursements and moves towards multi-party democracy, the perception of such a link on 
the part of the Tanzanian leadership was significant in influencing the political transition to 
multi-partyism which occurred in 1992. The very existence of donor policy stating that aid 
transfers were contingent on recipient moves towards democratization was enough to stimulate 
political reform without concrete actions (Vener, 2000). However, implementation of a number 
of the agreed neo-liberal reforms developed slowly during the early 1990s and the timetable for 
reform set by political power-holders became so convoluted that a „blocked transition‟ (Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1998) occurred. Consequently, in 1994, donors suspended aid to Tanzania, 
citing corruption and tax collection failure as the primary reasons (Bigsten et al, 2001), which  
exacerbated the financial turmoil that had sparked the political crisis (Holtom, 2005). The state 
and labour at this time had similar interests, since only with a forceful and independent 
government and well organized workers‟ associations were there likely to be effective resistance 
to the action of the IFIs (Chambua, 1997). However, mutual distrust stopped them from working 
together to provide a united policy front in response to the donors‟ actions. The state gave 
precedence to improving its relationship with the donor community, with the interests of labour 
in Tanzania a much lesser concern. 
58
 This was hardly surprising as an outcome, since over the 
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  The economic and political crises in 1994 led to the first strike organized at national level by the Trade Union 
Congress of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
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previous three decades aid dependence had become „part and parcel of the national economic 
culture‟ (Rugumamu, 1997: 10). 
 
 From 1970 to 1980 the real value of ODA to Tanzania had quintupled 
59
 making the country 
„one of the largest aid recipients‟ (Svendsen, 1986: 70). Subsequently, net ODA as the ratio of 
GDP rose from 13.5% during the period 1981-1985 to 34.7% for the period 1986-1990 (Agrawal 
et al 1993). Thus, Nyerere‟s efforts to break Tanzania‟s reliance on external financing, through 
the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa policies, had clearly failed. Acceptance of IFI-driven 
adjustment policies led to the external debt burden, which had been substantive from 
independence (see section 3.4 above), increasing even further. The World Bank (2009b) provides 
figures showing ODA as a percentage of GNI in Tanzania starting from 1988. The figures from 
1988 to 1995 - when the influential Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) on aid to Tanzania 
was published – show the high level of aid dependency (see Table 3.1 below). For Mshana 
(2003: 113), such figures reflect a key macro-level problem that „Tanzania depends too much on 
foreign aid and foreign ideas instead of relying on local ideas and resources.‟ 
 
Table 3.1 ODA as a Percentage of GNI in Tanzania 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
ODA as 
% of GNI 
20.5 21.4 28.6 22.5 30.2 23.1 22.0 16.9 
Source: World Bank (2009b) 
 
The Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) argued that lack of serious attention to reforms in 
Tanzania was caused by weak government ownership of the process. Being aware that economic 
reforms have always been heavily influenced by political considerations in Tanzania (Jennings, 
2001), donors promoted change by promising increased aid in return for reform, supporting 
reformers through the provision of training courses and dominating economic analyses of the 
crisis, which they couched within a neo-liberal framework  (Holtom, 2005). This control of 
formal policy space did much to make the neo-liberal discourse hegemonic in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. The Helleiner Report pointed in particular to the link between the high transaction 
costs of aid and low government ownership. With so many donors employing different missions, 
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  It was between $50 and 60 million in 1970 and reached $670 million by 1980 (Svendsen, 1986). 
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procedures and practices, the Tanzanian government was spending a lot of time and money on 
preparing reports and holding meetings. Consequently, Helleiner et al (1995: 19) emphasized the 
need for aid from individual donors to be „harmonized along the lines of common policies and 
strategies.‟ A Consultative Group (CG) of „high-level … experts‟ (UNDO, 2003: 292) was 
formed in 1997 to oversee the implementation of sixteen steps for action set out in the Helleiner 
Report to improve the performance of aid.  
 
Benjamin Mkapa came into office as president in November 1995 – after CCM had won a 
resounding election victory in the first multi-party elections held in Tanzania for over 30 years - 
and prioritized restoring amicable relationships with external donors. Consequently, an 
agreement between the government and the donor community concerning aid modalities was 
reached in January 1997. The guiding principle was set as „ownership and leadership by 
Tanzania in policy and development cooperation‟ (Wangwe, 2002: vii). On the donor side, the 
call for harmonization of aid policies was then enshrined in the 1998 Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) overview support for Tanzania, which became the core of new modalities of 
aid and the means by which multi-lateralization was to be achieved. 
 
The move to a multi-party system in Tanzania legitimized CCM rule at national level, at least 
until the aftermath of the 2010 national elections. In 2005, Mkapa‟s successor as the leader of 
CCM, Jakaya Kikwete, garnered 80.3% of the vote when victorious in the presidential elections. 
This figure declined to 62.8% when Kikwete won again in the 2010 elections. However, as a 
party, CCM captured only marginally fewer seats (258 out of 343 in total) in winning the 2010 
national parliamentary elections than they did in 2005 (264 out of 324) (URT, 2010, NEC, 
2011). Nevertheless, challenges to CCM‟s hegemony have arisen in particular regions from 
opposition parties are emerging. The largest opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na 
Maendeleo (CHADEMA), has much support in the Mwanza and Arusha areas and deaths 
occurred following demonstrations organized by the party, to protest against the rising cost of 
living, in January 2011 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011). The legitimacy of CCM rule could 
increasingly be challenged, particularly if the high inflation rates of the past few years 
60
 are 
                                                          
60
  Inflation rates have been 10.1% (2008), 7.4% (2009) and 7.7% (2010). Source: World Bank – Tanzania Country 
Data Profile. 
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maintained while most of the rising GDP since 2000 continues to be appropriated by foreign 
investors and a minority of Tanzanians, who have good connections to the ruling party (Cooksey 
and Kelsall, 2011). Little trickle-down of wealth 
61
 generated by increasing exports in the post-
liberalization to the vast majority of the population has occurred. 
62
 However, CCM has always 
mobilized successfully to restore unity when its hegemony has been challenged in the past 
(Havnevik, 2010b) and the party has far greater organizational power than any other, making 
radical political change, driven by civil society, unlikely in the short to medium term.   
 
The state itself claims to be „developmental‟ (Leftwich, 2008) in the post-liberalization period 
(URT, 2009c), which entails navigating the progress of the country towards the achievement of 
goals set in national policy instruments (see below for an overview of these instruments). 
However, the state should also „acknowledge and promote the private sector as a key (author‟s 
emphasis) partner in national development (URT, 2009c: 181). The state‟s views in this regard 
tally closely with the main policy prescriptions of the Post-Washington Consensus. In reality, 
MPs at local constituency level tend to form patrimonial relationships with constituents and have 
to spend money and/or get them control of projects to ensure their compliance (Gould and 
Ojanen, 2005). 
63
  A „transnational policy technocracy‟ (Gould and Ojanen, 2005) sets out policy 
guidelines that lead to implementation in the regions with a high level of oversight from local 
MPs. This encourages rent-seeking behaviour on the part of MPs, despite a donor-inspired anti-
corruption drive in the country (Cooksey, 2011a, Cooksey, 2010, Fjeldstad, 2003, Harrison, 
2001).  Therefore, a power bloc of supranational organizations and the state create and uphold 
neo-liberal hegemony. Moreover, continuity with previous periods of political economy is 
maintained as political power remains based on personal relationships and social networks to a 
great extent. Such relationships can involve corruption in the form of pay-offs by CCM at the 
centre to various factions within the ruling party in order to ensure their support. 
64
 The strong 
independent institutional capacity of CCM at regional level across the country and the fact that 
patron-client networks have similar levels of bargaining power has helped to „maintain political 
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  See chapter 2 for figures on income distribution in Tanzania. 
62
 See below for a discussion of economic developments in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
63
  See chapter 5 for an overview of how MPs use District Development Trusts (DDTs) as one important way to 
foster patrimonial relationships with constituents. 
64
 Large-scale corruption has been associated with state officials involved in the privatization of mining, electricity 
and water enterprises in Tanzania since 2005.    
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stability by lowering the costs of factional transfers‟ (Khan and Gray 2006: 50). 65 Kelsall and 
Cooksey (2011) argue that this decentralized nature of rent seeking within CCM, whereby 
particular cadres act independently, is unsustainable and will damage collective interests in the 
long-term. In overall terms, corruption in Tanzania, which continues „to characterize central and 
local government,‟ is a major impediment to the success of all development policies (Cooksey 
(2010: 189) and the post-liberalization period has witnessed „systemic waste and looting‟ 
(Cooksey, 2011a: 82) by the state.    
Despite the pervasive nature of corruption in the country, the labour movement has done little 
work on the phenomenon. Their own institutional structures and procedures, at federation and 
individual trade union levels, lack transparency (see chapter 6) and senior officials have been 
suspended and/or dismissed over corruption allegations in the last five years. The lack of 
attention paid to economic and political corruption by the labour movement since liberalization 
was raised by many trade unionists during fieldwork interviews and is a contributory factor to 
the lack of legitimacy of trade unions in the eyes of many of its own officials, rank-and-file 
members and staff working for NGOs (see chapters 6 for details).  
 
To drive development, CCM has overseen the adoption of „home-grown‟ policy documents and 
programmes in the post-liberalization period, premised on mass citizen participation, from which 
it was argued that higher levels of national ownership would emerge than has been the case in 
the past. This, sometimes confusingly, has resulted in the drawing up of several linked national 
policy instruments. In 1995, the government appointed „a group of experts to formulate a policy 
document‟ which would serve as a „guide for the development effort‟ (Mallya, 2000: 1). This 
resulted in the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025, which became operational from 1999 
and is necessary because (URT, 1999: 1) -  
 
the people of Tanzania, led by their government, recognized the need to prepare a 
New National Development Vision which will guide economic and social 
development efforts up to the year 2025. The objective…is to awaken, co-ordinate 
and direct the people‟s efforts, minds and our national resources towards those core 
sectors that will enable us to attain our development goals. 
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  See also Gray and Khan (2010) on this issue. 
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Essentially, TDV 2025 lays out the overall development framework and long-term social and 
development goals. In addition, the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) came into 
operation in 1997, aiming to provide „guidance to all stakeholders in identifying, formulating, 
implementing and evaluating their poverty‟ (URT, 1997: 1).  A third national policy instrument - 
the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) (URT, 2000b: 1) - was set out in 2000. This is „a 
Government initiative aimed at restoring local ownership and leadership, as well as promoting 
partnership in designing and executing development programmes. It is also about good 
governance, transparency, accountability and capacity building and effectiveness of aid.‟ In 
overall terms, TAS (which became the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) in 2006) is 
the operational framework within which the government manages all the major donor resources 
it receives. All of these initiatives put a stress on the mantras of the Post-Washington Consensus 
- partnership, good governance, participation and ownership. They also prioritize the setting and 
meeting quantifiable targets, necessitating a high degree of proficiency amongst staff involved in 
the areas of monitoring and evaluation. Such skills are, for the most part, lacking among trade 
unionists, which is a further reason for their marginalization in post-liberalization period. 
66
   
 
Alongside the formulation of a number of national development policy instruments, a policy of 
decentralization has been adopted by the government, which entails fostering efficiency and 
entrepreneurship at the local level (Pallotti, 2008). Decentralization has been championed by the 
World Bank, in particular, which has adopted the policy in its own operations. To this end, the 
Tanzania country director was transferred from Washington DC to Dar es Salaam at the end of 
the 1990s. The country director is a person known to be „open to new ideas.‟ 67 Since then the 
World Bank has engaged in „a big push to be more transparent than it used to be‟ and has „tried 
to provide a window on its world for the Tanzanian people.‟ 68 
 
One of the main objectives of the country director has been to open up the World Bank in 
Tanzania to discussion and criticism through finding „new ways of communicating with civil 
society organizations and the media‟ (Interview with World Bank official). An important way of 
doing this has been through working more closely with, and learning from, bilateral donors. To 
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  See chapter 6 for further details. 
67  Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005 
68
  Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005  
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this end, an official from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) has been 
seconded to work at the Dar es Salaam Country Office. DANIDA seconds a number of staff 
members to country offices where the Danish Embassy believes „the World Bank is progressive 
and receptive to new ideas.‟ 69 For DANIDA, the aim is to have „more Danish influence on 
World Bank policies, through the side door.‟ 70 DANIDA also perceives the secondment of its 
officials to the World Bank to be useful because often the Bank is unable to think like a bilateral 
donor.  Thus, these placements are beneficial, as they allow seconded DANIDA staff put forward 
ideas that the World Bank would not otherwise contemplate.
71
 The DANIDA initiative 
exemplifies the World Bank‟s harmonious view of state change in Tanzania, based on 
inculcating ideological hegemony through a convergence of interests between development 
agencies and the desire to promote a complementary relationship between an accountable and 
transparent state, which encourages the active participation of its citizens in forming national 
development plans, and a market economy.  
 
In regard to maintaining neo-liberal hegemony, the state also needs to pay substantial attention to 
its relationships with bilateral donors. Bilateral donors are major providers of aid, to a large 
extent because they concur with the IFIs in regarding the country as a „model performer,‟ willing 
to implement Post-Washington Consensus policies with some vigour. 
72
 In 2008, Tanzania 
received $2, 331, 000 billion in ODA, of which $1, 375, 290 billion (59%)) was from bilateral 
donors. Regarding members of the DAC, in 2008 Tanzania was the primary recipient of aid from 
Norway ($121 million), Sweden ($117 million), Denmark ($105 million) and Finland ($40 
million). The country was also one of the top ten recipients of ODA from the Japanese ($396 
million), the British ($243 million), the Dutch ($122 million) and the Irish ($59 million), as well 
as receiving $207 million from the USA (OECD, 2010a, OECDb).   
 
Bilateral donors have also been influential in creating alternative national development plans for 
Tanzania since 2000. These include the Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 (Japan Development 
Institute, 2010) backed by Japan, South Korea‟s „Initiative for Africa‟s Development‟ started in 
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  Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005 
70
  Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005 
71
  One of the main initiatives set up by the World Bank in Tanzania as a result of DANIDA influence – the „Coffee 
Morning Discussions‟ – is examined in chapter 5. 
72  See chapter 1 for details of why the IFIs regard Tanzania as a „model performer.‟ 
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2006, which cites Tanzania as being „one of the core development partners of Korea‟s 
international cooperation‟ (Koo, 2008: x) and Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za 
Wanyonge Tanzania (MKURABITA)  - „the Programme To Formalise the Property and 
Business of the Poor in Tanzania‟(URT, 2007e)  – which draws on the ideas of Hernando de 
Soto (De Soto, 2001) and receives a substantive amount of support from Norwegian aid (Sundet, 
2008). When these initiatives are added to that of the PRSP, the NPES, Vision 2025 and the 
TAS, there are seven major national level policy instruments in operation in Tanzania (see Table 
3.2 below). This puts the government under a substantial amount of „ownership stress.‟ 
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Table 3.2 Tanzanian National Policy Instruments 
Policy Instrument Time Horizon/Partners Main objectives 
MKUKUTA III 2010-2015/IFIs and major Western 
bilateral donors 
Reducing income poverty, 
sustaining macroeconomic stability, 
developing the private, export and 
sectors. Enhancing human 
capabilities in health, education and 
social well-being. Reducing 
vulnerabilities. Protecting the 
environment. Symbiotic relationship 
with Vision 2025 and the NPES. 
Tanzania Vision 2025 1999-2025/Tanzanian government-
run 
Long term national development 
vision based on attaining 1. High 
quality livelihoods 2. Peace, stability 
and national unity 3. Good 
governance 4. A well-educated 
society 5. A competitive economy 
capable of producing sustainable 
growth and shared benefits. 
National Poverty Eradication 
Strategy 
1997-2025/Tanzanian government-
run  
Long term national strategy for 
poverty elimination. Guiding 
framework for co-ordinating and 
supervising policies to reduce 
absolute poverty. Linked to Vision 
2025.  
Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) 
- became Joint Assistance Strategy 
for Tanzania (JAST) 
TAS: 1997-2005 
JAST: 2006-ongoing/Tanzanian 
government-run 
Operational framework for 
managing donor resources, including 
aid modality. 
MKURABITA 2004-ongoing in 4 phases/ Strategy for opening up the formal 
market economy to those excluded 
from it, Focus on formalisation of 
property land rights and businesses.   
Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 2005-2020/Japan  Strategy for fostering 
competitiveness in global markets 
and promoting exports through 
creation on Special Economic 
Zones. Linked to MKUKUTA. 
Korea Initiative for African 
Development (KIAD): Tanzania  
2006-ongoing/South Korea Strategy based on capacity building 
– focusing on agriculture, fisheries, 
health and communications. 
Sharing experiences of Korea‟s 
development model 
 
Overall, the willingness of the Tanzanian government to embrace robustly the main political 
precepts of the New Policy Agenda, as part of a liberal positive-sum approach to state change 
(pace De Tocqueville, 1845a, 1845b), is a key reason for its post-liberalization „success‟ 
according to IFIs. 
73
 However, for trade unions, these major political changes have been largely 
detrimental. Analysis of the national policy instruments reveals that trade unions are not included 
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 See also chapter 1 for an overview of why the IFIs consider Tanzania to be a post-liberalization success story. 
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in the post-liberalization configuration of „civil society‟ in Tanzania. The role of labour 
organizations is not accommodated in any of the seven national policy instruments summarized 
above, with the exception of the second PRSP document. Trade unions were not included at all 
as civil society representatives in the first PRSP (1999-2004). Following a concerted campaign 
by the national federation (the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania), trade unions did play a 
peripheral role in PRSP II, although fieldwork findings show that trade unionists regard 
themselves as outsiders in the PRSP process and unable to bring about debates on key issues 
concerning labour (see chapter 7 for details).   The fact that these national policy instruments 
include analyses of key labour-related issues, such as employment creation, formalizing 
businesses and increasing competitiveness in export sectors, yet fail to even mention a role for 
trade unions, shows the extent to which the labour movement has been excluded from civil 
society, as it has been constituted practically and rhetorically, in the post-liberalization period.   
 
Turning to the economic elements of the New Policy Agenda, the SAP was introduced in three 
phases. The first of these centred on trade liberalization. During the second phase the focus 
moved to the deregulation of Foreign Direct Investment, while the third period of adjustment 
primarily addressed parastatal and civil service reform (Pallotti, 2008).  Structural adjustment led 
to annual GDP growth from 1986 to 1994 of 4% on average and a small improvement in 
agricultural production during the second half of the 1980s. 
74
 However, increases in the levels of 
exports were not substantive. Fluctuating prices for commodities on the world market affected 
Tanzanian farmers. For example, between 1983 and 1988 the price of tea obtained by farmers in 
Iringa fell on world markets by 3% (TADREG, 1994). Moreover, the Balance of Payments 
deteriorated and there was an economic slowdown after 1994 because of the closure or running 
down of parastatals prior to sale or liquidation, an increase in credit costs and failure to compete 
with foreign imports, as protection was removed. Overall, the modest economic gains of the 
1980s were followed by decline during the 1990s (Chambua, 1997). From 2000 onwards, as 
inward FDI increased, GDP growth has averaged more then 5 per cent per year. The figure was 
6.5 per cent for 2010, although this needs to be set against an inflation rate of 8.9 per cent for the 
same year (Global Finance, 2011). 
75
 Despite this high inflation rate, the World Bank (2010e: 1) 
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  The accuracy of these figures is open to question. Jerven (2010: 286) points out that data showing economic 
growth rates for Tanzania „have large statistical errors for the late 1980s.‟  
75
  The World Bank figure is 7.7%. See footnote 15 above. 
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praises Tanzania for its sound „macroeconomic policies, market oriented reforms and debt relief 
[which] have provided a conducive environment for Tanzania‟s steady economic growth.‟    
 
However, the fact that much of Tanzania‟s GDP growth since 2000 has been based on inward 
FDI is problematic for the labour movement, since new investors are perceived by trade 
unionists as overwhelmingly anti-trade union. 
76
 According to Ngowi (2002), between 1985 and 
2001 there were a total of 854 officially approved FDI projects in Tanzania and from 1986-1991 
inward FDI averaged only $2 million per year in value. Nevertheless, mainly through the 
increasing amount of privatization of SOEs and changes in investment laws during the 1990s, 
Tanzania became the seventh largest destination for inward FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa by the 
end of the decade. In 1997, the National Investment Act was passed, providing concessionary 
terms for foreign investors, notably in the area of tax rates. By 1999, inward FDI had increased 
to $17 million and by 2004 the figure had reached $249 million, making Tanzania one of 
„Africa‟s best performing countries in terms of … attracting foreign direct investment‟ (MIGA, 
2007: 6). 
 
Gibbon (1999: 17) outlines how large-scale FDI in Tanzania since the second half of the 1980s 
has occurred mostly in the „classic colonial/neo-colonial sector of exportable raw materials.‟ 
Regarding ownership, the Africanization of the Tanzanian economy that began after 
independence with the creation of nationalized enterprises is being reversed. For Gibbon (1999: 
17), „the colonial/neo-colonial pattern is again reasserting itself‟ with former corporate owners 
featuring prominently as investors.  One of the first foreign acquisitions after liberalization of 
trade and investment occurred was the takeover by Lonhro of the Mifundi Tea Plantations, which 
it lost in 1978 through nationalization. The World Bank (MIGA, 2007) takes a different view, 
arguing that inward FDI is diversified, since it encompasses mining (39 per cent), manufacturing 
(22 per cent), tourism (13 per cent) and agriculture (7 per cent). This is a questionable analysis, 
given that foreign investment in mining alone equals the percentage of the only other three 
sectors cited when added together.   
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  See chapter 6 for details. 
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Gold mining, run by large Foreign Mining Companies (FMC), has been vital to Tanzania‟s rising 
GDP figures since 2000. Exports of gold increased in value from $121 million in 2000 to $1,076 
million in 2009 (Cooksey, 2011b). The narrowness of Tanzania‟s export base, contrary to the 
claim of the World Bank (MIGA, 2007), cited above, is shown by the fact that in 2009, gold 
represented the value of more than one third (34.75%) of total exports (Bank of Tanzania, 2011). 
The FMCs have received a generally less than welcoming reception from the Tanzanian public, 
linked to the discourse of economic nationalism promulgated during the Nyerere era, which still 
resonates with many people in the country. 
77
 Nyerere was not prepared to let FMCs dominate 
mining in the country with the result that under his regime „Tanzania‟s mining wealth remained 
buried securely for the future‟ (Bryceson, 2010: 72).The arguments for and against the FMCs, in 
terms of their ability to substantially aid the development process are complex (see Cooksey, 
2011b). Industrial relations in the gold mining industry are fractious and, in interviews, officials 
from the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) provided details of 
numerous breaches of labour laws by the FMCs. They argued that the state had been reluctant to 
deal with such matters and clearly sided with capital (in the form of the FMC owners) against 
labour (in the form of Tanzanian miners) in all mining disputes, because of the large amount 
gold mining contributes to the country‟s GDP (see chapter 6 for a detailed analysis). The 
powerlessness of TAMICO in the face of hostility from major foreign investors, along with the 
state, exemplifies the marginalization of trade unions in the post-liberalization era in Tanzania, 
where the interests of capital are prioritized above those of labour.  
 
For the labour movement, a major issue concerning privatization of enterprises leading to a rise 
in inward FDI, is the large numbers of workers being dismissed, leading to a fall in  
membership and consequently influence. 
78
  In addition, the labour-force has been negatively 
affected by the removal of state subsidies as part of neo-liberal policy prescriptions, which has 
contributed to the rising prices of accommodation, fuel and social services. With regard to the 
latter, between 1977 and 1991, government expenditure on health declined from 7.2% of total 
government spending to 4.9% (Rusimbi, 2003). Moreover, privatization has negatively affected 
institutionalized forms of employee participation, notably the Worker‟s Committees, which had 
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  See Shivji (2006) for the argument against FMCs in Tanzania. 
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 See chapter 6 for details of the changes in trade union membership patterns in the post-liberalization era.  
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existed in Tanzania since 1952, with the aim of involving labour in decisions concerning the 
management of enterprises (Chambua, 1997). 
79
 Since they lack a legal basis in the newly 
created private sector, foreign and/or domestic managers are not obliged to continue with such 
committees (Chambua, 1997, Galarraga and Gogue, 1997). Trade unions have therefore lost an 
important channel of communication with management in many enterprises since liberalization 
and the neo-liberal power bloc has one less significant form of challenge to its ideological 
hegemony.  
 
A further significant consequence of the imposition of neo-liberal policies in Tanzania has been 
the increasing informalization of the economy (Wuyts, 2001).  It is estimated that 34% of 
households in Tanzania are engaged in informal sector activities and this figure rises to 55% of 
households in Dar es Salaam (Becker, 2004). Trade liberalization has led to a large rise in 
foreign imports entering the country in the commodities sector, including „massive importation 
of beer and clothes‟ (Ngowi, 2002: 9). This has reduced competition as local firms lack the skills 
and capacity to compete with imported goods and have to downsize or close. 
80
 Consequently, 
there has been a decrease in the formal wage labour sector, including stagnation in the 
production of traditional export crops, such as coffee, tea, cashew nuts, cotton and tobacco. In 
response, households have come to depend more on „multiple, diversified and spatially extended 
livelihood strategies, where wages are in part subsidised through other forms of economic 
security‟ (Wuyts, 2001: 435). 
 
 The informal sector is dynamic and some of its activities have led to the formation of civil 
society organizations, such as co-operatives and savings societies, which allow actors to organize 
their financial assets (Seppala, 2008) and increase their knowledge of markets (Muller, 2005).  
However, despite its diverse forms (War on Want. 2006), a common feature of the informal 
economy is that it provides little job security for workers, who are not protected by labour 
legislation, have no contracts of employment and are subject to intimidation and extortion from 
officials of the state, such as police officers. Even in sectors, such as public transport, where a 
state monopoly led to consistent shortages of buses prior to liberalization of the economy, 
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  See chapter 6 for further details of the role of Worker‟s Committees in Tanzania. 
80  See chapter 6 for further details and figures regarding retrenchment of workers in Tanzania following the onset of 
the structural adjustment period. 
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privatization has not led to unambiguous improvements for workers or consumers. Exploitative 
labour relations have characterized the privatized daladala (mini-bus) sector, in the form of long 
working days and little security of employment being imposed on a mass of casual workers 
(Rizzo, 2002). Moreover, many daladalas remain extremely crowded and poorly maintained. 
The privatization of the water industry has also been problematic in Tanzania (ICSID, 2008).  
Privatization led to erratic provision and high charges for water, culminating in an acrimonious 
dispute between the government and the new foreign investors in the sector (Rice, 2008, 2007). 
As a result, the number of informal vendors has risen considerably and regulation of this type of 
provision is non-existent (Bayliss, forthcoming). 
 
However, the trade union movement has done little, beyond the level of rhetoric, to engage with 
workers in the informal sector. A few unions (TUICO, COTWU(T) and CHODAWU, for 
example) have supported the informal sector, mostly by assisting in setting up associations. 
However, the national federation of trade unions (TUCTA) has formulated no overall strategy to 
engage with the informal sector and in overall terms union work in this area lacks coordination, 
planning and financial backing (Fischer, 2011). When it is considered that around one third of 
Tanzanian households - and more than a half of those in Dar es Salaam – engage in informal 
economic activities, the failure of trade unions to provide this sector of the labour force with any 
substantive representation has been a significant factor contributing to their marginalization in 
the post-liberalization period. 
81
 
 
Overall, the post-liberalization period has seen a measure of macro-economic stability emerge in 
Tanzania from the viewpoint of the IFIs and the state, which together uphold neo-liberal 
hegemony. Inward FDI, particularly in the mining sector, has been the main driver of increased 
GDP growth rates since 2000. However, trickle down to the mass of the population is not 
occurring, to a large degree because the main growth sector – mining – have provided relatively 
few employment opportunities and lack linkages to the rest of the economy (see chapter 2). The 
trade union movement has been unable to exert any substantive influence on the government, 
external donors or new investors to improve the terms and conditions of the work-force in the 
formal sector. Moreover, it has failed to engage with, and organize, the increasing numbers of 
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  This issue is covered in detail in chapter 6. 
92 
 
Tanzanian workers in the informal sector.     
 
3.7 Summary 
Colonial economic policies (German and British) created an export-led economy in Tanzania, 
which benefitted a minority of largely foreign producers, traders and state officials. It left the 
country dependent on external finance; from the colonial centre to develop politically and from 
foreign investors and buyers to progress economically. In post-colonial Tanzania, a concerted 
attempt, under the left-wing populist regime of Julius Nyerere, to break the political and 
economic dependence of the country on external agents, failed. By the end of the 1960s the 
government took control of development processes, tacitly acknowledging that they „could not 
be both state directed and popularly initiated‟ (Jennings, 2003: 185). Only the rhetoric of self-
reliance continued within development plans. After Nyerere stepped down in 1985, the 
Tanzanian government has, largely through donor pressure, adopted neo-liberal economic 
policies, along with a move to multi-party liberal democracy. The implementation of these 
policies gathered pace from the 2000s to the extent that Tanzania has become one of the 
„developmental stars‟ of Africa in the view of the IFIs, whereby key actors from the ruling 
administration have internalized the main precepts of the New Policy Agenda and little donor 
oversight is needed to ensure the hegemony of neo-liberalism. However, a „developmental state‟ 
in Tanzania is lacking. The ruling party, CCM, is engaged in systemic rent- seeking at national 
and regional levels and patronage politics is the norm. For trade unions, the major shifts in the 
political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period have led to their marginalization. 
The state prioritizes the interests of capital over labour, based on two main premises. First, 
Tanzania continues to rely substantively on external financing, much of which comes from the 
IFIs, which promulgate neo-liberal economic policies. Second, the rise in GDP during the 2000s 
is largely due to inward FDI, concentrated on a small number of economic sectors, the most 
important of which is mining. The privatization of SOEs during the 1990s also led to the entry of 
new domestic entrepreneurs as well as foreign „new investors.‟ Neither of these groups 
welcomes a substantive role for organized labour in the economy and both have engaged in 
aggressive and obstructive tactics in dealing with trade unions. For these reasons, neo-liberal 
policies have become hegemonic in Tanzania over the past twenty years. Hegemony is, however, 
always contested (Gramsci, 2011) and the ways in which trade unions and NGOs in the post-
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liberalization period have contested the new policy spaces that have opened up, forms a major 
part of the following three fieldwork-based chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
4.1  Methodological Approach 
In this chapter the research design and methods are outlined and the main aims of the study are 
discussed, focusing on the processes involved in data collection.  The methodology was designed 
to bring out an effective analysis of the key issues, leading to the drawing of tenable answers to 
the research questions, based on an examination of data collected during fieldwork. The 
methodology was predicated on reflecting the voices of participants, in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of their views concerning issues affecting civil society organizations in Tanzania.  
Thus, the methodology was essentially qualitative and comparative, with a degree of 
triangulation (Jick, 1979) through the quantification of some of the responses of interviewees.  
 
Brockington and Sullivan (2003: 57) emphasise that qualitative research „seeks to understand the 
world through interacting with, empathising with and interpreting the actions and perceptions of 
its actors‟. The use of qualitative methods can help to „understand more fully the nature of the 
problems that social policies had to address and to appraise those policies once implemented‟ 
(Ritchie, 2006: 25-26). Chambers (2008: 107) argues that the principal strengths of qualitative 
approaches are „depth of insight and … being open to the unexpected‟.  Qualitative approaches 
allow flexibility in providing responses, and can contribute to the provision of a full overall 
picture when findings are triangulated effectively with quantitative data. They were, therefore, 
used in this research as a way to avoid producing a „fuzzy quantitative snapshot‟ (Oya, 2002: 
132), which can be the case with some cross-sectional surveys.  
 
The research also takes a comparative study approach by analysing the interface between present 
and past with regard to Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions. The institutional structures, 
capacities, ideologies and modus operandi of Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions are historically 
derived.  For this reason the fieldwork-based chapters on the participation of NGOs and  trade 
unions in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania draw on an analysis 
of significant aspects of their historical development, couched within a political-economy 
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perspective, focusing on processes lying behind changes in their position and behaviour. As 
Schriewer (1999) points out, this type of analysis is useful in allowing temporal comparison of 
the processes, organizational models and social relations that exist in a society (see chapter 3).    
 
The key research tools employed were semi-structured interviews and participant observation 
over three fieldwork sessions, spanning a three year period, in order to go beyond unhistorical 
knowledge of NGO and trade union officials and their activities as represented statistically, and 
to capture something of the „array of relationships, changes, anecdotes and histories which 
should not be overlooked‟ (Oya, 2002: 132). 
4.2  Preliminary Fieldwork Issues 
In preparation for the fieldwork a list of NGOs playing a major role in national policy-making 
processes in post-liberalization Tanzania was obtained and contact made with officials from 
some of them. This led to a snowball effect, as these officials made available the details of other 
NGOs playing an active role in national policy-making debates. Initial contacts at NGOs also 
provided details of open monthly discussion meetings arranged by civil society organizations in 
Dar es Salaam (known as „Breakfast Meetings‟, as they start at 7.30am) and attended by 
representatives of large and influential NGOs in the country.  
 
It was more problematic to contact trade unions than NGOs as their offices have, in the main, 
little modern technology. A list of registered trade unions compiled by the Office of the Registrar 
of Trade Unions at the Ministry of Labour was obtained. This was a useful starting point and 
again led to a snowball effect with initial contacts providing details of other trade unions that 
were difficult to track down. Thus, contacts made before the fieldwork provided a strong base 
from which to meet all of the participants identified as „key‟ to the research. 
 
4.3.  Fieldwork Experience 
As the research was carried out on a part-time basis, fitting in adequate time for fieldwork was 
problematic. Three fieldwork sessions were undertaken of six months, three months and one 
month. During the first and longest fieldwork period, voluntary work for an NGO was time-
consuming, but beneficial overall with regard to the gathering of data. This allowed participant 
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observation to take place, which provided insights into all aspects of the work of a Tanzanian 
NGO. Furthermore, Tanzanian colleagues at the organization became key informants, giving 
useful advice about how best to obtain interviews with officials from NGOs and trade unions and 
how to make the most of them with regard to effectively managing their expectations of a 
researcher from Britain. 
82
 The best advice received in this regard was that if selected 
interviewees did not respond to emails or phone calls, it would be acceptable to go directly to 
their places of work, announce myself and then wait.  This modus operandi led to meetings with 
NGO and trade union officials on every occasion when someone did not respond to emails and 
phone calls.  
 
Interviews were always conducted initially at places of work in an informal and relaxed 
atmosphere.  All interviews were transcribed long-hand and no tape-recordings were made. This 
decision was taken after advice from Tanzanians that interviewees were likely to be guarded in 
their responses if they were being recorded, due to many years of strong state control in Tanzania 
under colonialism and after independence, when dissenting views were not regarded with a great 
deal of tolerance. It was an arduous task but it proved a useful modus operandi, requiring hard 
concentration on the words of the interviewees. Writing up the transcripts in the evenings after 
the interviews allowed further reflection on the issues raised. All participants were asked a 
checklist of questions which formed a „flexible guide‟ (Chambers, 2008: 78). 83  However, the 
interviews could also be situational with regard to the directions in which interviewees wanted to 
take the answers to the various questions and the time they wanted to spend on particular topics.  
 
 The empirical data obtained during the interviews were complemented by analysis of relevant 
primary documents produced by the organizations for which the respondents worked. 
Interviewees were generous in providing access to such materials, which were particularly 
valuable in analysing NGO and trade union written input to national policy-making processes 
and ascertaining membership numbers for Tanzanian trade unions. 
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  This point is discussed in more detail below in Section 46 below.  
83
  The checklists of questions are set out in Appendices 4.4 and 4.5 at the end of the thesis. 
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4.4  The Selection of Research Sites and Population Samples  
As the main premises of almost all the chosen participants are in Dar es Salaam, selecting 
research sites was not unduly problematic. All the NGOs which had been selected as participants 
have head offices in Dar es Salaam, with two Arusha-based exceptions. Moreover, the Trade 
Union Congress of Tanzania headquarters is in Dar es Salaam, as are the principal offices of all 
individual trade unions, with one exception. 
 
In order to obtain the fullest possible answers to the main research questions, a purposive 
sample, where the units are selected „because they have particular features or characteristics 
which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes which the 
researcher wishes to study‟ (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2006: 78), was selected. Purposive 
sampling was most relevant for this study, since the research questions centre on addressing 
issues concerning two types of civil society organizations in Tanzania, which were pre-selected 
for comparison. Thus, purposive samples were selected from the categories of civil society 
organizations chosen as case studies – NGOs and trade unions.  
 
With regard to the former category, the „Macro Group,‟ which coordinates NGO input to the 
PRSP process was used as a purposive sample. This group discusses and provides input into all 
aspects of civil society participation in national policy-making processes in an institutionalized 
setting which ensures regular meetings with the government. It comprises thirteen NGOs and the 
sample consisted of interviewing senior officials   from nine of the group. 
84
 It was not possible 
to contact four of the group for logistical reasons. In their place, senior officials from four other 
influential NGOs which are playing an active part in national policy-making processes, but are 
not members of the Macro Group, were selected for interview (see chapter 5). While a purposive 
sample requires „subjective judgement‟ (Overten and van Diermen, 2003: 43) and is not based on 
probability, in this research the selection criterion was clear; the significant participation of these 
NGOs with regard to participating in national policy-making processes.  
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 „Senior official‟ at NGOs is defined as any position conferring substantive control over policy and/or budget. In 
the majority of cases this was the Head of the Programme under varying titles, depending on the organization – 
Executive Director, Country Programme Officer, Executive Secretary, for example.    
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Concerning trade unions, those selected for interview were:  
1. The General Secretary.  
2. The Deputy General Secretary. 
3. Senior officials from all five departments of the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania 
(TUCTA) head office. 
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4.  Senior officials from all the state registered trade unions affiliated to TUCTA.   
5. Senior officials from all of the state registered trade unions not affiliated to TUCTA. 
 
 This covered all the major office holders of the national federation and a senior official from 
every individual trade union in Tanzania, with the exception of the Tanzanian Agricultural 
Workers Union (TAWU), a small and inactive organization. The sample therefore covered the 
arguments of officials from all unions, whether or not affiliated to the national federation. 
4.5  Research Instruments 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as a key research instrument since „the overpowering 
positive feature of the interview is the richness and vividness of the material it turns up‟ 
(Gillham, 2000: 10). An important aspect of managing an interview is the establishment of an 
initial rapport with participants, enabling them to feel at ease and are, thus, more likely to 
respond openly and fully to questions. Concerning this research, several factors played a role in 
creating a bond.   First, working for a development-based organization over a four year period 
provided common experiences with participant NGO officials. Similarly, working for a 
Tanzanian NGO while doing the main period of fieldwork was valuable. In addition, raising 
issues relating to Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions during introductions and discussing them 
knowledgeably was beneficial in establishing a rapport.  
 
Ruane (2005) outlines the need for researchers to use probes, verbal mirroring and silence 
effectively when conducting interviews. Probes, as follow-up techniques used to encourage the 
respondent to clarify and elaborate, can be implicit, such as a quizzical look or explicit in the 
form of a direct request to state more. These devices were not needed to a great extent during the 
research, as the participants were motivated to discuss the interview questions. They were 
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 „Senior official‟ at trade unions is defined as General Secretary, Deputy General Secretary or Head of Department.  
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employed mostly when asking questions about civil society relations with the state, which 
produced hesitation in a number of respondents. The use of explicit probes in these cases did 
lead to respondents lengthening their answers. Verbal mirroring in the form of succinct and non-
evaluative paraphrasing of what interviewees had just said was worthwhile. It provided a chance 
for respondents to think through their utterances and sometimes modify them. It was also 
motivating for interviewees, as it emphasized the importance of their role. Allowing silences 
proved beneficial when conducting interviews. This gave respondents time to think through 
issues and they often then produced interesting insights into the topics under discussion. As 
Ruane (2005: 154) points, out, „silences can be a spring board into important topics of 
conversation.‟ 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality were further issues which arose in relation to the interviews.  
During the interview part of the research all participants were informed that the information 
provided would be treated with confidentiality and their anonymity guaranteed. Time was spent 
at the start of interviews explaining the position of the researcher, the purposes of the research 
and why they had been chosen as participants. It was made clear that this was independent 
research, which was not being carried out on behalf of the government, multilateral or bilateral 
donors.  . 
 
Observation 
Both participant observation, involving immersion into many aspects of the lives of participants, 
and structured observation, allowing the recording and analysis of behaviour and interactions as 
they occurred (Ritchie, 2006), were used. It was important to find ways to observe and interact 
effectively both as a participant observer and when engaging in observation only.  Originally the 
fieldwork plan had been based on only observation but when engaging with NGOs, 
circumstances led to participant observation being an effective method to employ.   
 
The decision to do voluntary work for an NGO during the first fieldwork period was based on 
the view that participant observation would add richness and depth as a research tool to the other 
methods which had been selected. This provided insights into the work of a local organization on 
a day to day basis. Almost all the staff were Tanzanian, so participant observation increased 
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awareness, not just into working practices, but also attitudes to the NGO sector. Differences 
between the elite Dar es Salaam-based NGOs playing a major role in national policy processes 
and the smaller organization I worked for became apparent on mixing with officials from the 
former category. During that period power cuts were usually from 7.00 until 19.00 in Dar es 
Salaam, making a lot of work impossible, as the NGO focused on using information technology 
to provide education.  Large NGOs were not affected by this as the donors provided enough 
finance for them to buy generators. The power cuts were, however, beneficial to the research as 
they provided an opportunity to discuss with colleagues their ideas and attitudes concerning the 
work of NGOs in Tanzania. Work duties involved writing funding proposals, giving 
presentations on development issues, providing content for the website and contributing articles 
to the NGO newsletter. These tasks necessitated working with management, IT and 
administration staff, giving an appreciation of different sides of the work of the NGO. 
 
Going to the „Breakfast Meetings‟ led to an increased understanding about other open events 
organised by, and aimed at, NGOs. This networking provided insights into the relatively closed 
world of the large and well-funded group of NGOs. Networking also led to awareness that the 
World Bank was starting a  „Coffee Morning Discussions‟ initiative (see chapter 5) to improve 
perceptions on the part of different stakeholders in the country about their transparency and 
accountability. These were open events on different aspects of the World Bank‟s policies to 
which civil society organizations were invited, through an online process, which tended to 
exclude the many associations without internet facilities. 
 
Attendance at the „Coffee Morning Discussions‟ imitative showed the value of participant 
observation.  Dialogue with staff from other NGOs attending the meeting developed more 
meaningfully when they became aware that I was working for an NGO and doing some research 
compared to the way I was received before starting the NGO work when I was perceived as just 
a researcher. NGO staff talked freely about issues such as the government‟s confrontational 
reaction to criticism by the education-based NGO, Hakielimu (see chapter 5 for details), and 
what it meant for all of „us‟ working in the NGO sector and the general day to day travails 
involved in working for an NGO in Dar es Salaam. Discussion of the two main research 
questions at such meetings provided information and insights that were complementary to the 
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data accrued from the semi-structured interviews. 
 
In overall terms, as a participant observer, insights into key aspects of the work of a small NGO 
in Dar es Salaam, led to a lot of contacts being made with staff from the NGO sector and to 
invitations to take part in meetings and other events aimed at NGOs. It also provided an 
understanding in unstructured settings of attitudes towards the ways in which NGOs are involved 
in national policy-making processes.  
 
Most of the research relating to trade unions was done solely as an observer, with the exception 
of being a discussant at one TUCTA meeting. All trade union participants were open during 
meetings and interviews. One factor influencing this may have been that trade unions have been 
marginalized in national policy making processes in Tanzania and had been involved in largely 
adversarial relationships with the government, employers – particularly „new investors‟ – and the 
World Bank. Thus, they responded positively to somebody being interested in their work.   
 
Observation was helpful in answering the second main research question, in particular, as it 
provided knowledge of the paucity of resources at most unions and the difficulties staff 
consequently faced in producing documents and using email. This contrasted markedly with the 
situation of most of the NGOs interviewed, which were relatively well-resourced. The almost 
daily power cuts also had a negative impact on the work of trade unions, since they did not 
possess generators. Thus, it was obvious from this observation that trade unions would have 
difficulty in receiving communications about national policy making processes and in preparing 
and circulating documents to members asking for their views. 
 
Document Analysis 
Document analysis was important to the study and involved examination of unpublished primary 
materials from multilateral and bilateral donors, the government and civil society organizations. 
The most important of these were consultancy reports, documents outlining plans for policy 
reforms within institutions, internal memoranda on institutional restructuring and statistical 
records relating to memberships. It also entailed studying secondary data in the form of 
publications by the government and civil society organizations on various aspects of economic, 
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political and social development in Tanzania. 
86
 
  
 The benefits of using secondary data in this research correspond largely to the general 
advantages of its application set out by Blaxter et al (2006: 171);  collection of large amounts of 
primary data is difficult, time-consuming and costly; if relevant data already exists it is logical to 
make use of it; it can act as a complement to primary data assembled; it can confirm, modify or 
contradict primary findings; it allows a focus on analysis and interpretation; research should 
build on what has already been done where this is relevant and finally more data is collected than 
is ever used, so it is best to gather as much as possible of what already exists.  
 
Key documents relating to national policy making processes in Tanzania were analysed in order 
to provide information relevant to the research questions. Government documents on national 
policy-making processes were relatively easy to obtain, largely because of the donor stress on 
setting quantitative targets for all aspects of poverty reduction and on monitoring and evaluation. 
The World Bank had therefore funded the production of government documents (in hard copy 
and electronic form) on aspects of economic, political and social life in Tanzania, which are 
published in Swahili and English, and are available free from the Vice President‟s Office. The 
statistics, facts and arguments made in key government and civil society documents used in the 
research were effective in constructing an overview of levels of economic and social 
development in Tanzania and particularly helpful in understanding into aspects of national 
policy-making processes.  
 
These documents were particularly significant in providing data showing which civil society 
organizations are regarded as important in national policy making processes and which less so by 
the government. For example, statistics on, and discussion of, trade unions are conspicuous by 
their absence. The civil society-produced materials also assisted in providing an answer to the 
first main research question by showing areas of disagreement between NGOs and the 
government and how organizations in the former sector felt it was best to frame the issues. For 
example, an examination of Hakielimu‟s, „Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings 
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  These documents are listed in Appendix 4.7 at the end of the thesis. 
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from Government Reviews (2005)‟, allowed  insights into the sensitivity of state-civil society 
relations in Tanzania by providing an example of what the government regards as unwarranted 
criticisms of its policies. 
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Table 4.1 Description of Survey 
Geographical area of coverage Dar es Salaam 
Number of respondents 75 Respondents in Total 
Core Respondents – Purposively Sampled 
14 Officials from 9/13 NGOs in PRSP Macro Group  
6 Officials from NGOs taking part in national policy-
making processes but not part of Macro Group 
9 Officials from TUCTA Head Office (General 
Secretary and Deputy General Secretary (2)  Covering 
4/4 Departments 
19 Officials from 14/14 TUCTA Affiliated TUs 
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9 Officials from 6/7 Non-TUCTA Affiliated TUs  
2 Officials from Office of the Registrar of Trade 
Unions, Ministry of Labour 
Other Respondents 
3 Officials from other NGOs 
5 Officials from Supranational Organizations 
2 Officials from Bilateral Donors 
4 Academics 
2 „Others‟ 
Subjects of Study Multiple Integrated political-economic features of 
policy-making, state-civil society relations, state-
supranational organizations relations, civil society-
supranational organizations relations 
Frequency of enumeration 1-5 visits per respondent. 
Data collection methods Interviews (semi-structured) = 90% 
Participant Observation and Observation = 10% 
 
4.6  The Role of the Researcher 
Bryman (2001) sets out four key ethical principles with regard to research. First the research 
should involve no harm to the participants. Second, participants should give informed consent 
that they wish to take part in the research. Third, the privacy of participants must not be invaded. 
Fourth, participants should not be deceived. While recognizing that it is not possible to set out 
clear boundaries for all of these principles, a systematic attempt was made to observe them in the 
context of this research. Anonymity and confidentiality were provided with regard to all 
participants.  Names of NGOs, trade unions, government Ministries and departments, donors and 
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   See chapter 5 for details. 
88
  TUs = Trade Unions. 
104 
 
academic institutions have been set out but individual participants not named, unless they gave 
explicit consent. It was important to name institutions because they have very different ways and  
levels of participating in national policy-making processes and/or attitudes towards it, which 
have policy implications. 
 
As the Social Research Association (2003: 28) points out, „the principle of informed consent is 
necessarily vague, since it depends for its interpretation on unstated assumptions about the 
amount of information and the nature of consent required to constitute acceptable practice. All 
participants were given information about the research in as clear a way as possible and this was 
based on a careful assessment of what information was likely to be material to an actor‟s 
willingness or unwillingness to take part. In this research, all the main aspects of the study were 
explained and as much time as individuals wanted was provided for them to ask questions and/or 
make comments before deciding whether or not to take part in interviews. With regard to 
privacy, it was made explicit to participants that they could move the topics in directions they 
preferred and avoid any issue as they felt fit. No participant stated that they felt a question was 
too private and since all of the participants had an employment role that involved oversight of 
departments and/or individuals, they were used to setting boundaries and being assertive. 
  
The extent to which a researcher can be, and should be, close to participants in a study always 
presents a dilemma. Scheyvens and Storey (2003) are among writers who have highlighted the 
potentially exploitative nature of research, particularly in developing countries. Terms such as 
„new academic tourism‟ (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 194), „rural development tourism‟ 
(Chambers, 2008: 25) and „research travelers‟ (Clifford, 1997: 67) have been used in this regard. 
It is not possible to evade the issue of „otherness‟ when doing research, whatever the nationality, 
ethnicity, age, gender, level of education and social class of the researcher. It was stated that the 
research would be made available to all participants, and that they were welcome to discuss 
matters or request information and help at any time during and after the fieldwork periods. 
 
 Chambers (2008, 2005, 2004) has argued, along with others (Johnson and Mayoux, 1998, for 
example), that research should empower participants. Concerning this research, all participants 
were asked if they needed any professional help, making it clear that this could not be 
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guaranteed. Most NGO officials said that it was important to highlight issues concerning their 
participation in national policy-making processes and doing so would be a way to assist them. 
Trade union officials tended to ask for help with capacity building. As a result, potential sources 
of funding for labour organizations were gathered from the internet and the ILO offices in Dar es 
Salaam and the issue was discussed with an academic at the University of Dar es Salaam who 
had been involved in running courses for trade unions. The information on funding was then sent 
to all the trade unions which took part in the study and some of them subsequently made 
successful funding applications to run programmes. 
 
All participants were told that the research was only for academic purposes and would not be 
passed on to, or published through, the government or any donors involved in national policy-
making processes.   The nature of the study and the role of the researcher were fully outlined to 
all participants, followed by the setting out of discussion topics and an explanation of how they 
related to the research questions.   
 
It is impossible not to make cultural inferences when doing research and researchers need to be 
aware of their positionality regarding race, ethnicity, age, gender, and social and economic class, 
since these aspects can influence the data that is provided by participants, as well as the way it is 
collected and interpreted (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). The importance of these factors shows 
that research is „presentational,‟ as well as having technical, methodological and experiential 
elements (Roberts, 2007).  
 
In the light of this point, field notes were taken every day, recording the process of data 
collection, including informal conversations and other interactions with participants. A daily 
diary was also written, describing and analysing issues that emerged from day-to-day 
experiences, which aided reflection on the overall progress of the fieldwork. This allowed 
sharper insights into the lives of participants than would have been the case if a mechanical 
following of the research plan had occurred, without considered thought about how interactions 
were affecting relationships and the amount and type of data collected.  Taking field notes and 
keeping a diary allowed a focus on the interpretations and meanings of the participants and was 
fruitful in „asserting the authentic voice of the subjects under study‟ (Stephens, 2009: 97). 
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Cultural considerations inevitably arose during the fieldwork sessions through the position of the 
researcher as a foreigner and in particular being white and English. White people are called 
„mzungu‟, in Tanzania, and meanings attached to the word are complex (Baaz, 2005, Mbele, 
2005, Fanon, 2001). For Fanon (2001), colonialism to a large extent led to the „mzungu‟ being 
perceived by many Africans as superior to them and the term being associated with virtues, such 
as honesty, intelligence and punctuality. However, as Mbele (2005) points out, it can also be 
applied to both white and black people in a negative way - to denote arrogance or delusions of 
grandeur, for example. Baaz (2005) further examines the complexity of meanings involved in the 
use of „mzungu‟ in the context of aid work. For Baaz, overall perceptions by Africans of the 
superiority of the „mzungu‟ as a result of colonialism have become fragmented and noticeable 
differences in meaning when using the word can be discerned, which are dependent on, inter alia, 
the age, level of education and economic power of the speaker. 
 
Although Baaz‟s views concerning the complexity of meanings attached to the use of mzungu 
are nuanced, Fanon‟s analysis still has a degree of explanatory power in the light of the 
fieldwork experience. For example, Tanzanian colleagues told me that obtaining appointments 
with staff at the World Bank and the UNDP, as well as with high ranking trade union officials, 
could be  problematic, but not for you „because you are a mzungu,‟ which proved correct. This 
raises the question of the extent to which „courtesy bias‟ (Leon et al, 2007, Hines, 1993, Jones, 
1983) may have influenced responses in interviews and during discussions which occurred as 
part of participant observation. Clearly, interactions with respondents involve issues of power 
and control, since „working with people brings out power relations in a very immediate way‟ 
(Woodhouse, 1998: 127). As the interviewer I had put broad boundaries around how information 
should be collected and used. The informants in turn made decisions as to how much information 
they wanted to disclose.  
 
The techniques discussed above - using probes, mirroring and silences – were effective in 
eliciting information, checking that the meaning intended by the participants was accurately 
recorded. However, judging what interviewees did not disclose because of courtesy bias and/or 
affective factors, such as race, gender and social class, is difficult. The interviewees were almost 
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all people with power in the workplace, who were confident and used to debate. Most of them 
asked further questions after the nature of the research and its purposes were outlined.   
 
Since the interviews were semi-structured and it was made clear that respondents could avoid 
and/or bring up any issues they wanted, there were elements of freedom, control and 
collaboration on their part concerning the ways in which they provided answers. As Woodhouse 
(1998: 145) argues, „establishing a collaborative content is important, whether or not the 
methods used are specifically labelled “participatory.”‟ 
 
The time and trouble that participants took to accommodate requests for interviews was 
humbling. It is pointed out in the Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research (British 
Educational Research Association, 2004) that „researchers must recognise concerns relating to 
the “bureaucratic burden” of much research, especially survey research, and must seek to 
minimise the impact of their research on the normal working and workload of participants‟.  
Despite having busy working lives and many other issues to deal with, respondents went out of 
their way to be constructive as participants in the research and a number engaged in follow-up 
contacts. 
 
The fieldwork was conducted in English, which along with Swahili, is an official language in 
Tanzania. This did not present problems as all the participants within the sample groups spoke 
the language fluently. Despite their joint status as official languages, Swahili is „the local lingua 
franca and national language‟, while „English is the predominant language of higher learning and 
to a certain extent of official and commercial business‟ (Mkilifi, 1972: 197). There are 
complexities involved in situating the status of Swahili and English in Tanzania (Blommaert, 
2005, Mazrui, 1997), but, in general, fluency in the latter is regarded by many Tanzanians as a 
sign of status and a high level of education. Since government documents are produced in 
English and Swahili, as is the case with most of the materials published by civil society 
organizations, a full-time research assistant was not needed. Key informants provided 
translations from Swahili to English where necessary. 
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As with all social science research, this study has to address the issues of generalizability, 
reliability and validity. For, Blaxter et al (2006:  221), generalizability is „whether your findings 
are likely to have broader applicability beyond the focus of your study‟. Reliability refers to 
consistency of research processes and exists when a piece of research, carried out several times, 
yields the same results. Validity concerns „whether your methods, approaches and techniques 
actually related to, or measure, the issues you have been exploring‟ (ibid). That is, research 
should be based on methods, techniques and instruments that are trustworthy. The analysis and 
findings from the data collected should be verifiable by other researchers using the same 
methods and it should be made clear how far the findings from the population sample can be 
applied to wider cases or populations. 
  
Generalizability can be tested with regard to this research by carrying out similar studies of NGO 
and trade union participation in national policy-making processes in Tanzania or other countries. 
At present, almost seventy countries have produced PRSPs. Reliability can also be checked, 
since the population samples still exist and the same research instruments – interviews, 
observation and document analysis – can be utilised by other researchers. Finally, with regard to 
validity, the triangulation of appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods has been employed 
to establish the credibility of the research findings. 
 
4.7  Procedures of Data Analysis 
The data gathered were processed in the following way: 
1. Raw quantitative data from interviews were assigned frequency values using 
Excel spreadsheets. 
2.  Tables and figures were constructed to organise and examine components of the 
quantitative data obtained from the interviews. 
3.  Interview notes, which had been written out in clear handwriting on the same day 
as the notes had been originally made, were typed up after fieldwork sessions and 
stored in electronic and hard copy forms. The typed transcripts were scrutinized in 
order to sort out data relevant and irrelevant to the research. The relevant data 
were coded manually according to categorizations established on the basis of the 
core themes of the research. 
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4.  The coded data were printed out and refined in order to categorize information in 
a concentrated way. From here, interpretation was used in highlighting key points 
and issues under the same „thick descriptive‟ (Geertz, 1973) categories for NGOs 
and trade unions – Priorities in Discourses and Key Relationships. 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter outlined the rationale for the methodology used in the research and examined issues 
concerning the process of data collection. It also contained self-reflective sections on 
undertaking the field research and data analysis involved in this project. Moreover, how the data 
collected were then processed for analysis, in order to provide insights into answering the 
research questions, was discussed. The methodology was reviewed to show how it contributed to 
the provision of effective answers to the main research questions. 
 
The methodology discussed in this chapter was used in the analysis of civil society in Tanzania, 
based on the three periods of fieldwork outlined above, which is discussed in the following three 
chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on the contestation of policy space by NGOs in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. How a small group of NGOs have come to dominate the civil society sector is a key 
area of analysis. In chapter 6 the main research question is addressed. That is, how and why have 
trade unions been excluded from the reconfiguration of „civil society‟ in post-liberalization 
Tanzania? This requires an examination of whether trade unions are currently representatives of 
a labour aristocracy in the formal sector, rather than the workforce as a whole and the extent to 
which trade unions could and should adopt 'social movement unionism‟ in order to strengthen  
their voice in post-liberalization national policy-making processes Chapter 7 contain an outline 
and analysis of how have trade unions and NGOs been included in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP) process and with what outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The NGO Sector in Tanzania 
 
5.1 Overview of the Development of NGOs in Tanzania 
In this chapter, central issues regarding the conceptualization and theorization of civil society, 
which were examined in chapter 3, are framed within the historical development of NGOs in 
Tanzania, starting from the period of British colonialism. This is followed by a discussion of 
fieldwork findings. 
89
 The historical grounding of the development of NGOs shows that their 
room for manoeuvre as part of civil society was limited in the war of position under colonial rule 
and during control by the one-party state after independence. Throughout these periods, the key 
aspects of the integral state - ideological hegemony supported by coercion (Gramsci, 1978) - 
were used to close down spaces where policies and ideologies could be contested by civil 
society. The state maintained tight control of key superstructure institutions, notably the 
judiciary, the legislature, the executive, the military and the church, thereby dominating the war 
of position in civil society with potential or actual opponents. As a result, NGOs had few 
opportunities to formulate and promulgate counter-hegemonic discourses. In the post-
liberalization period, civil society has been reconfigured, with a small group of large, urban-
based NGOs rising to power, largely through the funding and patronage of multilateral and 
bilateral donors, which pressured the state to relinquish its dominant position as an agent of 
development in favour of a prominent role for market forces. As the market-led model was 
unable to meet the social and economic needs of the population, NGOs became both service-
providers to fill in the gaps and standard bearers of the newly configured civil society, which 
donors were keen to make a key part of the socio-political landscape in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. The state was reluctant to allow NGOs a significant role in providing services and in 
national policy-making processes, but had little choice but to acquiesce, given their indebtedness 
to the donors and the need to fill in shortfalls in the provision of social services to the mass of 
citizens. Other forms of civil society in Tanzania that have legitimacy with citizens have been 
marginalized, whilst the donors have instead championed a small number of elite urban-based 
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  The fieldwork findings are based primarily on interviews with officials from NGOs that have taken part in 
national policy-making processes in the post-liberalization period, as well as participant observation and document 
analysis. See chapter 4 for details of the methodology used. 
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NGOs, staffed by well-educated professionals with whom they share the dominant development 
discourse. This group, therefore, has some leverage vis-à-vis the state, regarding input to 
national-policy making processes. However, the state has used legal-bureaucratic means in the 
form of legislation, codes of conduct and the creation of an oversight body, to circumscribe the 
remit of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania. These means have served to ensure that the work 
of NGOs is largely apolitical and confined to the social sphere. The state claims these legal-
bureaucratic measures embody the national interest, represented more widely by neo-liberal 
policies in the economic sector linked to  multi-party liberal democracy and an apolitical civil 
society, which shares the concerns of the state in forming policies and programmes. In short, 
these policies and programmes are portrayed by the state as „common sense‟ (Gramsci, 2011). In 
the context of this neo-liberal hegemony, a small number of NGOs have formed counter-
hegemonic discourses. However, in doing so, these organizations face the powerful accusation 
that they are acting against the national interest and common sense.  In addition, these counter-
hegemonic discourses are not based on a concerted strategy or vision and fail to involve sizeable 
grassroots campaigns. Thus, they do not constitute a substantive challenge to the hegemony of 
the state at present.  
 
5.2 Tanzanian NGOs during the period of British Colonialism 
The formation and activities of NGOs were tightly constrained by the colonial authorities in 
Tanzania. Kiondo (1992) records the founding of nineteen NGOs under colonial rule and revises 
this down to just eleven in a later piece of work (Kiondo, 1993). The few active NGOs were 
mostly national chapters of existing British associations, providing social services, such as the 
Tanzania Society for the Blind. The other main type of NGO operating in Tanzania at this time 
was based on bourgeois economic interests, notably the Tanganyikan Farmers Association 
(TFA), a membership requirement of which was ownership of at least five acres of developed 
land or a number of livestock. Race and ethnicity were fault lines for NGO membership during 
this period. The TFA and other influential NGOs, such as the Dar es Salaam Round Table, were 
dominated by Asians. The majority of Africans lacked the economic means to join such 
organizations and instead developed associations based on adapting to life in urban areas, 
notably burial societies, loans associations, faith-based organizations and groups centred on 
regions of the country (Tripp, 1992). 
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The independence struggle stimulated increasing activity in the civil society sector, which 
engaged in a concerted struggle for ideological hegemony with the state, based on the Tanzanian 
African National Union (TANU) in the political arena, 
90
 the cooperative movement in the 
agricultural sector  
91
  and a growing labour movement, organized by the Tanganyikan 
Federation of Labour (TFL). 
92
  NGOs were not active during this period, although some 
Parents‟ Associations and Youth Leagues took part in associational life from the 1940s onwards 
(Kiondo, 1993). However, Gibbon (2001: 822) shows how other elements of civil society did 
pose a threat to state hegemony. Chieftaincies in northern Tanzania during the colonial era 
contained a kaleidoscope of associational life, including lineages, clans, age-sets, credit groups 
(upatu), sports clubs, dance societies, faith-based organizations and courts of elders. Above this, 
at tribal level, were some large rural-based civil society associations, notably cooperative unions 
and tribal unions, along with more informal „non-compliance movements.‟ All of these groups 
contested state hegemony to some degree. The anti-colonial activities of non-compliance 
movements were directed mainly against land use regulations, taxes, alienation of land and the 
racial composition of local councils.  Tribal unions took part in actions contesting the regulations 
opposed by the non-compliance movements but also were concerned with wider issues of 
„development‟, such as educational provision. The struggles of the large non-compliance 
movements did have links to similar protests by more locally-based peasant groups and with the 
work of some TANU branches. 
 
5.3 Tanzanian NGOs from Independence to the New Policy Agenda 
Following independence in 1961, the Tanzanian state rapidly became a hegemon, through firmly 
imposed policies (see chapter 3), supported by the international donor community and influential 
foreign NGOs, which led to a situation where independent associational life was limited during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. From 1961 to 1978 only seventeen new NGOs were registered, through 
the Societies Act, in the country (Kiondo, 1993). The use of the 1954 Societies Act to register 
NGOs remained a vital legal-bureaucratic means of state control over which elements of civil 
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  See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of TANU. 
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  See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of Co-operative Societies. 
92
  See chapter 6 for an overview of the development of the TFL. 
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society could exist and in what form after independence. 
93
 The fact that registration of any NGO 
could be refused because it was „in the opinion of the registrar, undesirable‟ (URT, 1954) and 
that an existing organization could be de-registered if its actions were prejudicial to „good 
government‟ (URT, 1954), gave the state substantive power and control over civil society. With 
the dissolution of the TFL in 1964, state control became pervasive and associational life „at the 
national level was effectively crippled‟ (Tripp, 2000: 197).This control of civil society by the one 
party state from 1965 was instrumental in narrowing and overseeing who could participate in the 
political life of Tanzania, and how. For Shivji (1991: 85), the „destruction of autonomous 
organized expression of the differences in civil society is the first profound effect of the 
monopoly of politics by the state-party.‟ Tanzania became a closed society „where the members 
of the public are spectators and rumour-mongers rather than actors and commentators‟ (Shivji, 
1991: 86). The Arusha Declaration of 1967 (see chapter 3) led to state structures gradually 
replacing the major voluntary associations operating in the rural areas, notably the co-operative 
societies, which were banned in 1976. Within a further year, remaining civil society 
organizations of substance, such as the Dar es Salaam Student Association (DUSO), were 
brought under state control.  Worsening economic conditions during the 1970s (see chapter 3) 
were a major influence on the state‟s decision to further tighten its control over development 
activities. This led to a „removal of space for independent activity‟ (Jennings, 2007:  92-93). 
Thus, while the charismatic leadership of Nyerere was important in maintaining the authority of 
the ruling party (as it rolled out its developmental vision for Tanzania) in the forms of the Arusha 
Declaration and ujamaa (see chapter 3), the coercive element of the integral state was also used 
effectively and rapidly after independence to limit the autonomy of civil society. 
 
Although service provision in areas like health and education was uneven during this period, a 
high level of foreign donor funding and support for government policies were significant in 
upholding the hegemony of the state. The IFIs and leading bilateral donors were at this time keen 
to support what they perceived as „progressive non-communist development models‟ (Kiondo, 
1993: 166). Tanzania received the highest level of official development assistance in Africa from 
1977 to 1979, the majority being in grant form, which made it easy for the government to 
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  See chapter 3 for a discussion of the lasting significance of the Societies Act. 
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leverage. 
94
 In addition, the ideologies of foreign NGOs during the ujamaa period limited the 
ability of civil society to operate autonomously. Jennings (2008a, 2001) shows how Oxfam 
supported the ujamaa programme on ideological grounds, and operations such as the Chunya 
Integrated Development Project, were created overtly to assist in its implementation. In doing so, 
Oxfam, as well as other foreign NGOs, became „surrogates of the state‟ and „part of a process 
that withdrew power and representation from the grass roots‟ (Jennings, 2001: 131).  Thus, 
assistance from external donors and foreign civil society organizations was useful to the state in 
winning the war of position in Tanzanian civil society. 
 
However, with the adoption of neo-liberalism on the part of the IFIs from the end of the 1970s, 
Tanzania‟s statist policies came under pressure, given the large dependence of the government 
on external financing.  The government‟s acceptance of a SAP in 1986 (see chapter 3) changed 
the dynamic between the state and civil society in Tanzania. Under the SAP, externally driven 
neo-liberal policies replaced statism and the ideology of ujamaa was rolled back. This resulted in 
NGOs gaining space in which to provide a challenge to state hegemony, should they so wish.  As 
the democratic deficit, brought about by the newly-imposed market-driven model, became 
apparent during the 1980s, NGOs increasingly filled in the gaps by providing social services. 
NGOs were seen by the major donors as more efficient, less bureaucratic and less corrupt than 
the state sector. This led to increasing numbers of NGOs entering the development arena in 
Tanzania, with forty one registered between 1980 and 1990 (Kiondo, 1992). The doubling of the 
social service sector NGOs registering during the 1980s in comparison to the 1970s reflected the 
„tremendous erosion of government capacity in social service provision‟ (Kiondo, 1993: 171).   
 
The failure of state dirigisme to provide adequate social services was a significant factor leading 
to the creation of a special category of NGO, District Development Trusts (DDTs), from the late 
1970s, which were granted powers by the official District Councils and permitted to raise 
revenues through local taxes and crops. DDTs mainly provided services in the areas of 
education, health and infrastructure (Mchomvu et al, 1998).  Foreign NGOs and donor agencies 
helped fund the activities of DDTs, which were often set up by political and business elites in 
urban areas.  Many DDTs had national political figures as patrons, who could leverage funding 
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  See chapter 3 for an overview of, and figures for, ODA to Tanzania. 
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and state resources and in return guarantee loyalty to the government and increase their support 
from constituents. Thus, the government approved of these organizations and more than two 
hundred came into existence (Nugent, 2004). For Qorro (1991), DDTs represented not just the 
need for NGOs to fill in the democratic deficit but also enabled the people running them to be 
registered and approved by the state when they could not legally be placed within the ambit of 
official government bodies, such as the District Councils. In this way DDTs started to run many 
secondary schools from the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of state secondary 
schools rose from eighty three to one hundred and thirty five, whereas secondary schools run by 
non-state actors rose significantly faster; from seventy one to one hundred and ninety five 
(Lugalla, 1993). In this way, state hegemony was bolstered in the face of the increasing power of 
donor-driven neo-liberal policies in Tanzania, which included an enlarged role for an 
„independent‟ civil society sector. The state felt threatened by this expansion of civil society and 
reacted with various strategies as part of the war of position, including co-option of civil society. 
In the case of the DDTs, it was successful. 
 
The challenge to state hegemony from the enlarging NGO sector during the 1980s has led to 
attempts at classification of different types of NGOs operating in the country. Shivji (1991) 
identifies four categories of NGOs according to their socio-political alignment that emerged 
during this period; government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), foreign NGOs (FONGOs), local 
NGOs (LONGOs) - the majority of which were foreign funded (FFUNGOs) - and People‟s 
Organizations (POs). The rise of GONGOs is related to the recognition of the government that 
NGOs were attracting a substantial amount of foreign funding. This stimulated efforts on the part 
of the Tanzanian government to maintain hegemony by coordinating, monitoring and evaluating 
the work of NGOs, in order to obtain access to donor financing, establish patron-client 
relationships with intended beneficiaries of the work of NGOs and provide a local power base 
for individual politicians, who could claim credit for successful work by the NGO with their 
constituents (Kiondo, 1993).  Prominent GONGOs were quasi-governmental mass organizations, 
such as the Women‟s Movement (Umoja wa Wanawake), which had been co-opted by the ruling 
party as part of the move to an all-encompassing statism after independence. FONGOs are 
mostly Tanzanian branches of Big International NGOs (BINGOs) and function to channel 
external donor financing into the operation of local initiatives or support for the existing work of 
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indigenous NGOs. LONGOs are closely related to FONGOs in comprising local NGOs, formed 
and funded largely or wholly through international donor financing. FONGOs and LONGOs 
have in common a socio-political alignment to BINGOs. People‟s Organizations (POs) are often 
grassroots groups, which are self-financing or use international funding only as a supplement to 
their own fund-raising strategies. Some POs have confronted government policies and stood up 
for the interests of those being oppressed, such as the Tanzania Environmental Society (TESO), 
which fought against government confiscation of public land in Arusha.  Government 
antagonism towards POs which challenged state hegemony by criticizing their policies was 
ameliorated during the 1980s by the need to have as many development agents as possible 
supplementing the increasingly beleaguered state provision. Thus, with regard to the war of 
position, the state gave strategic ground to civil society, by allowing some NGO criticism of its 
policies, through a need to ensure that external donors would continue to fund non-state actors, 
which would engage in service delivery where gaps existed in public sector provision. 
 
Overall, the number and the activities of NGOs increased markedly in Tanzania from the 1970s, 
as the IFI-influenced move to neo-liberal policies led to the rolling back of state activities. While 
the government was forced to acquiesce to the ideology of neo-liberalism, largely through its 
financial dependence on external donors (see chapter 3), it used the coercive aspect of the 
integral state in an effort to uphold its hegemony in the face of actual and potential opposition 
from civil society. This centred on the continued use of the Societies Act, which the state had 
used effectively to circumscribe the activities of NGOs since its enactment in 1954. As well as 
allowing the registrar to refuse applications for registration and to de-register existing 
organizations (see above in this section), the act also required all NGOs to supply the registrar 
with a list of officers and members, as well as a copy of the constitution. This allowed the state 
to monitor individuals and organizations working in „sensitive‟ sectors carefully. „Sensitive‟ 
sectors included all advocacy work, human rights and organizations working in areas where 
CCM had dedicated wings of the party; notably gender and youth. Therefore, while the state‟s 
position as the dominant agent of development was threatened by the increase in NGO activity 
from the 1970s up to liberalization in the mid-1980s, it employed legal-bureaucratic means plus 
co-option of important elements of civil society, as in the case of the DDTs, as effective weapons 
in the war of position. 
117 
 
5.4 NGOs in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
Tanzanian government statistics (URT, 1995) show that while only twenty five NGOs were 
registered in the country between 1986 and 1990, the figure increased to six hundred and four 
registrations between 1990 and 1995. Influential NGOs became concentrated in urban areas and 
in the main were „established by educated elites who have the knowledge and contacts to start an 
NGO successfully‟ Mercer (1999: 249). The state, in keeping with historical tradition, reacted to 
this challenge to its hegemony by using legislation as a weapon in the war of position, therefore, 
obstructing through legal-bureaucratic means the „gradual shift of power and prestige away from 
the bureaucracy to the civil society‟ (Mwapachu, 1998: xviii). 
 
Research on NGO growth, activities and ideologies from 1990 to the present reveals several key 
aspects. First, the donor-driven nature of NGO work is apparent, with upward accountability to 
funders, through reliance on external finance, being more important than downward 
accountability to intended beneficiaries. Second, the new NGO sector is not organic in the sense 
of associations being created in response to the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens (Pender, 
2005, Shivji, 2004). NGOs were scaled up in Tanzania from the 1990s, largely through the 
patronage of external donors, which provided most of the funding for this expansion. Third, the 
majority of the most influential NGOs in Tanzania are urban based and run by well educated, 
middle class professionals. Fourth, NGOs tend not to have grand visions of how Tanzanian 
society should be configured in economic, political and social terms. There is a concentration 
instead on day-to-day activities (Mushi, forthcoming, Shivji, 2004).  
 
The influence of donors and the difficulties involved in forming and maintaining effective NGOs 
outside urban areas are illustrated by the struggles to create organizations representing the 
concerns of pastoralists in Tanzania. The prioritization of donor interests above those of the 
pastoralists themselves and the need for good connections with state actors in order for NGOs to 
operate effectively is shown by the studies of Plastow (2005), Igoe (2003) and Cameron (2001).  
Cameron (2001) outlines how the Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization 
(PINGOs) Forum, founded in 1994 became over-laden with structures, driven by donor 
priorities, and was captured by a particular faction, leading to the withdrawal of external funding 
in 1999.  Igoe (2003: 881) demonstrates that external aid from the international donors „actually 
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undermined the formation of civil society in pastoralist communities.‟ Too much time was spent 
on activities involving upward accountability to donors.  Despite the rhetoric of „partnership‟ and 
„local ownership‟ of programmes, the old top down relationship between northern donors and 
local NGOs remains largely unchanged. For Plastow (2005: 1), substantive change is only likely 
to be achieved if a range of powerful actors can be brought on board to lobby for the interests of 
pastoralists, allies found within the government and empirical evidence to support arguments is 
produced. This scenario requires time, money and a variety of technical skills on the part of 
pastoralist groups, which are currently lacking. 
 
Furthermore, Mercer (2002b: 124), drawing on a study of village-based women‟s groups on 
Mount Kilimanjaro, points to the romanticizing of the concepts of participation and the 
empowerment of local communities in much Western development literature and the failure to 
take account of the way „local social, cultural, political and economic conditions influence 
people‟s agendas and motivations for getting involved.‟ Women‟s groups were used to 
consolidate the interests of certain individuals and to attain status rather than through a desire for 
empowerment. This exemplifies the need for historically-grounded studies of civil society, which 
take into account the way power has been created and maintained by particular groups of people 
in communities. The attempts by donors to map development concepts (in this case, a 
participatory approach) onto projects and programmes without knowledge of how the local 
political economy has been shaped historically is a major reason for their failure. 
 
A more positive view of the influence of Tanzanian civil society in the post-liberalization period 
can be gained from the way that land and sexual harassment policies were changed as a result of 
concerted efforts by NGOs. Consequently, the enactment of the Sexual Offences Special 
Provisions Act (1998) and the Land Act (1999) „are the most significant achievement of the 
activities of civil organizations‟ (Mallya, 2001: 27). Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
NGO sector and the government during the 1990s, can be characterized as a series of 
„peformative rituals‟ (Mercer, 2003) which legitimized continued economic liberalization 
policies and the discourse of good governance, based on partnership and participatory 
development. For Kelsall (2002: 598), this period saw the „building of an ersatz, air-conditioned 
civil society‟ in Tanzania by donors keen to fund NGOs, following structural adjustment and the 
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move to multi-party politics. Little challenge to state hegemony emerged from this newly created 
sector. 
 
The onset of the PRSP process (see chapter 7) in October 1999 led to changes in the 
composition, power dynamics and trajectories of the NGO sector in Tanzania, with FFUNGOs 
and FONGOs coming to the fore and, through donor influence, a new umbrella group, the Policy 
Forum, created, in order to coordinate NGO work.  Donor influence has also led to advocacy 
work becoming more prominent than had previously been the case (Gould and Ojanen, 2005, 
Pender, 2005) and an attempt to modernize and professionalize a group of influential urban-
based NGOs, through capacity building and the use of Information Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). The state‟s response to these challenges to its hegemony from civil society 
has again been to use legislation and regulation of the policy space available to the NGO sector.  
First, a formal policy with regard to NGO work in the country was created. Second, in 2002, new 
legislation covering the work of NGOs - the Non-Governmental Organizations Act (No. 24) 
(URT, 2002b) - was enacted. Third, a coordination body – the National Council for NGOs 
(NACONGO) (URT, 20101) – was set up.  These three new fronts in the war of position show 
how the government has fought to maintain its hegemony in the post-liberalization period 
through using the coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral state. 
 
Upholding its position as a hegemon in post-liberalization Tanzania is complicated for the state 
by the increasing influence of transnational actors, particularly the IFIs. The IFIs (and to a lesser 
extent, bilateral donors) drive the ideology and policy directions of both the state and civil 
society. Multilateral and bilateral donors have provided substantive funding and support for 
NGOs in Tanzania since liberalization. For example, Mercer (2005, 2004) outlines how donors 
have funded and promoted ICTs in Tanzania since 2000 as a way of strengthening civil society 
by attempting to broaden participation in development debates, disseminate information to a 
wide audience and foster alliances. While this has stimulated some networking among well-
resourced NGOs, only a small number of FONGOS and FFUNGOS have access to ICT 
amenities, and the Internet is far from being an inclusive development tool. These findings can 
be supported by the fact that only six per cent of the population has access to electricity (African 
Rural Energy Enterprise Development (AREED), 2010). Thus, any potential challenge to state 
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hegemony from NGOs using modern communication technologies is extremely narrowly-based. 
ICTs are used for exchanges of information between this small group of elite NGOs, such as 
notices concerning the schedules of the „Breakfast Meetings‟ between NGOs (see chapter 4). 
They are also used to upload national policy instrument documents for comment and discussion, 
such as the PRSP. Policy Forum, 2010, has for example, the third phase PRSP document (2010-
2015) on its website (URT, 2010b). However, ICTs are not used to instigate grassroots 
campaigns and, since ninety four per cent of people in the country have no access to electricity 
they are anything but a vehicle with which to engage the mass of the Tanzanian population. The 
improvement of ICTs at the small number of elite urban-based NGOs can, thus, be seen as the 
provision of another trapping, along with air-conditioning and land cruisers. It has not been 
useful, however, in formulating and sustaining counter-hegemonic discourses.   
 
Moreover, Gould and Ojanen (2005) show how a donor-driven emphasis on advocacy work by 
NGOs emerged at the end of the 1990s with the establishment of dedicated positions in major 
organizations that had hitherto concentrated on service delivery. This was a significant shift, 
since, at the start of the new millennium, few Tanzanian NGOs had developed the capacity to 
engage in „policy analysis and advocacy‟ in ways that applied „any real pressure on the 
government‟ (Evans and Ngalewa, 2003: 251). DFID commissioned research on civil society in 
Tanzania in 2000 (Alloo, 2000, Dangor and Nadison, 2000), which highlighted the importance of 
advocacy work. However, donor efforts to fund and support advocacy work, as a way of 
inculcating a stronger challenge from civil society to state hegemony in post-liberalization 
Tanzania has been problematic. The main obstacle to the development of advocacy work among 
Tanzanian NGOs is the prevailing belief on the part of state institutions and civil society 
organizations themselves that it is „political,‟ whereas „true‟ civil society activities should be 
apolitical. 
95
 This viewpoint, influenced by years of state hegemony during colonialism and the 
post-independence period of one-party rule, is limiting, given that by its very nature advocacy 
involves recommending or supporting a particular cause or policy, making it necessarily 
political. The state‟s use of legal-bureaucratic means since 2000 to capture the terms and 
conditions by which NGOs operate (in the form of the creation of an NGO policy, an NGO Act 
of Parliament and NACONGO as a coordinating body) has allowed the state to take itself out of 
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  See below section 5.5 for details relating to this point from the fieldwork interviews with NGO officials.. 
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the equation regarding political and ideological discourses. The state claims that these legal-
bureaucratic measures are not based on a political ideology but simply represent the best practice 
in terms of framing the form civil society should take and the parameters of its activities in the 
post-liberalization era. Thus, the measures are based on common sense (Gramsci, 2011) and to 
contest them is not to engage in political debate but to go against the national interest. Given the 
power of the state‟s perspective in this regard, it is not surprising that few counter-hegemonic 
discourses have been created through advocacy work on the part of Tanzanian NGOs in the post-
liberalization period.  
 
NACONGO set up an „NGO Code of Conduct‟ (TANGO, 2010, Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002b, 
2002c, 2002d) also called „NGO Code of Ethics‟ (Policy Forum, 2008b), the main aim of which 
is „to establish core values and principles that shall guide the conduct and operations of all NGOs 
working in Tanzania‟ (Policy Forum, 2008b: 1). The code focuses on the technical aspects of 
NGO work - governance, accountability, financial transparency, human resources, 
communication and information sharing - and the relationship between NGOs and other 
stakeholders. NACONGO is working on developing rewards for NGOs which comply with the 
code and sanctions for organizations breaking it, primarily to pre-empt state enforcement, which 
would imply „weak ownership‟ on the part of NGOs (Policy Forum, 2008b: 2). Ensuring 
compliance with the code in this way indicates that NACONGO has internalized the donor-
driven liberal view of the role of civil society organizations in Tanzania, which is based on 
achieving consensus through amicable debates between a variety of associational groups and the 
state. The point made by writers such as Cramer (2002) 
96
 that „ownership‟ is likely to involve 
conflicting positions and actions among both civil society and state organizations (which would 
mean having to fundamentally rethink the liberal-consensus model) is not taken into 
consideration.  
 
5.5        NGOs in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings 
The „privatization of the notion of public interest‟ (Kamet, 2002: 156) 97 under neo-liberalism, 
leading to the concentration of power and resources, is evident in the way NGOs participate in 
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  See chapter 1. 
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  See also Kamat (2004) on this point. 
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the Tanzanian PRSP, the national policy instrument introduced in 1999 and since strongly 
supported ideologically and financially by the IFIs. 
98
  In post-liberalization Tanzania, the state 
has been forced by donor pressure to allow the public interest to be debated and determined in 
the private sphere by citizens operating through the institutionalized means of civil society 
organizations. The state, in response, has applied common sense legal-bureaucratic measures to 
regulate civil society, which it claims are technical common-sense measure, representing the 
national interest. According to this donor-driven perspective, the views of Tanzanian citizens are, 
pace deTocqueville, formulated through free and fair debate, involving mass participation. In 
reality, „civil society,‟ as a designated sector taking part in PRSP process, is dominated by just a 
small number of influential NGOs. A core group of thirteen NGOs are involved as members of 
the macro working group. The process by which NGOs became part of the macro working group 
is not transparent but it is clear that all members are from the elite, urban-based NGOs, staffed 
by well-educated professionals. This group also comprises representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance, sectoral ministries, the donor community, research institutes, the President‟s Office, 
Regional Administration and Local Government (PORALG) and the Local Government Reform 
Programme (Alonso and Utz, 2004). There are also sub-groups of NGOs which work on 
particular areas of development: Agriculture; Rural Development and Water; Governance; 
Education; Health; HIV/AIDS; Roads and Regions/Other Groups. Nine NGOs from the macro 
working group, along with four non-members, were selected for interview, as a purposive sample 
(see chapter 4). Regarding the four non-members of the macro working group, Tanzania 
Education Network (TEN/MET) was chosen, as it is an influential umbrella organization (see 
discussion below in this section). Second, Oxfam Tanzania was selected, as it played an active 
role in supporting the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) as a coordinator of 
NGO input to the first PRSP (1999-2004). 
99
 PACT Tanzania was interviewed, as it is a well 
resourced and influential NGO, financed primarily by USAID. Finally, Youth Partnership 
Countryside (YPC) was selected, as the organization had been involved in a serious dispute with 
the government in the recent past, under its previous name, leading to it being deregistered. The 
key findings are summarized under two themes; NGO Priorities in Discourses and Key NGO 
Relationships. 
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  See chapter 7 for a detailed analysis of civil society participation in the PRSP process. 
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  Source: Interview with former Oxfam Country Director, 10 November, 2005 
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The annual budgets of a number of the Macro Group of NGOs are considerable, providing them 
with a capacity far beyond that of trade unions and other forms of associational life in  
Tanzania. 
100
 The budgets of the two most influential think tanks in the country – REPOA and 
ESRF – are substantive at $251,656 and $342,624 respectively. The size of these budgets can be 
judged from a comparison with total state revenues in 2009, which were $4.3 billion. Most of 
this funding comes from external donor agencies, which are named as financial supporters in the 
accounts sections of annual reports, although the specific amounts of donations are, in the main, 
not recorded. Thus, the donors are expending a substantive amount of finance on just a few 
NGOs, as a major part of their effort to build a „new‟ civil society in their own image. The heavy 
reliance on external funding has been used by the state as evidence that the „new‟ NGOs, which 
dominate civil society in the post-liberalization period, are pawns of, and mouthpieces for, the 
major international donor agencies, rather than organizations which have developed organically 
to respond to perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens.  
 
Table 5.1  Budget Analysis of NGOs Interviewed 
 
Name of NGO Budget (in US dollars) 
Policy Forum 598,928 (2008) 
TGNP Not supplied – Grant of 197,872 provided by 
Norwegian Embassy (2007) 
TEN/MET 250 (2008) 
TACOSODE Not supplied 
ESRF 251, 656 (2010) 
REPOA 342, 624 (2009) 
LHRC Not supplied 
Oxfam Tanzania 1,141 (2008) 
Hakielimu 2,498 (2009) 
SCF Tanzania 13,264 in „Restricted Funds‟ category 
11,561 in grant from the CEF (2008) 
ActionAid Tanzania 4,413 (2005) 
PACT Tanzania 12,350 (2008) 
YPC Not supplied 
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Table 5.2  Website Analysis of NGOs which are part of the Macro Working Group 
 
NGO Mission 
Statement 
Statement of 
Vision/Core 
Values 
Annual 
Reports 
Published 
Main 
Donors 
Stated 
Advocacy 
Emphasis 
Major 
Content 
in 
Kiswahili 
Legal and Human 
Rights Centre (LHRC) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
HakiElimu Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania Social and 
Economic Trust 
(TASOET) 
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N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hakikazi Catalyst Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania Agriculture 
Development 
Research Group 
(TADREG) 
102
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tanzania Gender 
Networking 
Programme (TGNP) 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Care International Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania Association 
of NGOs (TANGO) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Save the Children 
Fund (SCF) 
Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania  Council for 
Social Development 
(TACOSODE) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
ActionAid Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic and Social 
Research Foundation 
(ESRF) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The contrast between the resources of NGOs and Tanzanian trade unions 
103
 is striking. All the 
NGOs interviewed have websites, which are regularly maintained and updated. This can be 
contrasted with the fact that only the largest individual trade union – the Tanzania Teacher‟s 
Union (TTU) - has a website, and even this barely functions.  Moreover, all the NGOs 
interviewed produce their own publications, ranging from academic textbooks to reports and 
newsletters. With regard to trade unions, only two out of twenty one produce regular 
publications.  
 
NGO Priorities in Discourses 
The issues highlighted as priorities for NGOs focus first on legitimacy and then on capacity. The 
legitimacy of development-based NGOs as representatives of poor and marginalized groups has 
been much debated (Steffek et al, 2010, Baan et al, 2008, Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2003, Riddell, 
2007, Hilhorst, 2003, Pearce, 2002, Hudock, 2001, Hashemi and Hassan, 1999, Clark, 1997).  
For Steffek et al (2010: 105) the legitimacy of any CSO is based on putting the „participation of, 
and accountability to, its members, supporters and beneficiaries centre stage.‟ More specifically, 
legitimacy should be evaluated according to levels of participation, inclusion, responsiveness, 
transparency and independence. However, Steffek et al (2010) do not set out any ways to 
measure these five dimensions of legitimacy. None of the other analyses of legitimacy cited 
above provide a means of measuring the concept. Legitimacy in the context of the fieldwork 
findings section centres on how NGO officials themselves, in qualitative terms, view the 
participation of, and accountability to, intended beneficiaries. It also addresses the issue of how 
legitimate, as representatives of the poor and marginalized in Tanzania, NGO officials perceive 
themselves to be in the eyes of officials from other branches of civil society and the state, as well 
as the wider public.    
 
Legitimacy Issues 
There is considerable variance amongst NGOs as to how far their focus should be on building 
upward legitimacy, with the government and the donors, and to what extent their stress should be 
on creating downward legitimacy with the intended beneficiaries.  The latter emphasis is closely 
related to a point raised by a number of interviewees; the need to build a positive profile not just 
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with intended beneficiaries but also the general public in Tanzania. This is inextricably linked to 
the perception of Tanzanian NGO officials that civil society is a „new sector‟. Civil society is 
regarded by the vast majority of NGO officials interviewed as starting with the new policy 
agenda. Most interviewees specifically stated that the civil society sector in Tanzania is only ten 
– fifteen years old. It was notable that interviewees did not recognize the current configuration of 
civil society as having any continuities with its form during the colonial era or under the post-
independence one-party state. This was shown by the way interviewees did not state that civil 
society organizations are different in their current forms and ideologies to those existing in the 
past, but instead put forward the unequivocal view that civil society is a „new sector in 
Tanzania.‟ 
 
Such views must be seen in the light of the fact that all but one of the thirteen NGOs interviewed 
had been formed after 1990 and are part of the donors‟ desire to create an associational life, 
based on the free and fair exchange of ideas. The ideas put forward by NGOs will consequently 
make a significant contribution to the formation of policies based on the mass participation of the 
citizens and consequently a perception of ownership of national policy instruments.  Almost all 
the interviewees felt that their organizations had no profile whatsoever with members of the 
public. Where they were recognized, this was largely in a negative way; as well-paid careerists, 
operating primarily in order to tap into foreign donor and government finance or simply as 
corrupt organizations, which solicit funds for their own use. „Careerist‟ was used by a number of 
interviewees, from both NGOs and trade unions (see chapter 6) to describe the way they believe 
NGO staff are perceived by the public in Tanzania. The phrase „briefcase NGOs‟ was used a 
number of times during interviews, when respondents were asked about the way their 
organizations are regarded by the public. The term has become known in Tanzania through 
media popularization. In response to negative perceptions of their work several leading NGOs 
had designed a billboard campaign in Dar es Salaam with the aim of fostering more positive 
views on the part of citizens. The billboards featured pictures showing different aspects of the 
work of NGOs which all had the same heading „NGOs are Good‟ printed in Swahili and English. 
No monitoring and evaluation of the campaign or follow-up work was set up and interviewees 
felt that it was difficult to accurately gauge any affects of the campaign. 
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For almost every interviewee, the power of external donors to influence the Tanzanian NGO 
movement in the post-liberalization period is summed up by the leading role they played in the 
creation of Policy Forum as an apex organization, despite the fact that two NGO umbrella groups 
already existed. One of them, TACOSODE, was set up in 1965 as a joint government-civil 
society initiative. TACOSODE‟s main functions are to foster cooperation between NGOs and the 
government, represent NGOs at national level, to link NGOs at local, national and regional levels 
and to act as a clearing house for donors.  The organization has three hundred members and 
facilitates the provision of funds from international donors to grassroots organizations.  As well 
as TACOSODE, the donors could have chosen to build the capacity of the Tanzanian 
Association of NGOs (TANGO), „the largest and oldest NGO umbrella organization in 
Tanzania,‟ according to an official interviewed, as a lead umbrella organization for the sector. 
TANGO was formed in 1988 and now has seven hundred members. 
104
 Some NGOs are 
members by proxy; as they belong to networks that have joined TANGO.  Thus, according to an 
interviewee from TANGO, every NGO in Tanzania is linked to the organization in some way. 
TANGO runs three main programmes; policy advocacy, capacity building and information 
dissemination, which are all interrelated.  
 
None of the interviewees could give a certain answer as to why external donors (principally Care 
International) had moved to set up the Policy Forum, when TACOSODE and TANGO already 
existed. It was suggested by several interviewees that TACOSODE was based on service 
delivery and the BINGOs wanted an umbrella group centred on advocacy work. However, if this 
is the case, then TANGO would have been a suitable choice, as it works exclusively on advocacy 
issues. Given the prior existence of these two experienced NGO umbrella organizations, the 
decision of the donors to expend a lot of energy and finance on creating another umbrella 
association, points to the desire to create a „new‟ Tanzanian civil society in their own image.  For 
interviewees the creation, through the influence of external donors, of Policy Forum as its 
preferred apex organization has led to confusing and contradictory structures and relationships in 
the NGO sector, which weakens its legitimacy. The founding of Policy Forum illustrates the 
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  Since TACOSODE used to be a quasi-governmental organization, it is not considered by interviewees to be an 
older NGO umbrella group than TANGO.  This is an example of why the civil society sector in Tanzania is 
considered to be „new‟ by officials from NGOs interviewed. 
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point that, while civil society is able to counter state hegemony more vigorously than in any 
previous period of Tanzanian history, the form of this contestation is shaped substantively by 
external donors, driving their (mis)interpretation of a de Tocquevillian view of civil society (see 
chapter 2), and not by the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens. It also highlights the fact that 
the war of position in Tanzania for hegemony, involves not just the state and civil society, but 
also important actors at the transnational level. These actors are primarily the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and bilateral donors, which are framing a neo-liberal economic 
order and multi-party liberal democracy, along with a corresponding re-organization of civil 
society in line with their interpretation of de- Tocquevillian ideas. These donor-propelled shifts 
in the political economy of Tanzania are being repeated across the developing world as part of a 
move to make neo-liberalism hegemonic globally (Cox, 1983). 
 
Along with the attempts of external donors to influence the composition and modus operandi of 
the NGO sector, the government‟s use of legal-bureaucratic means move to maintain hegemony 
was cited by every interviewee as being of concern.  NACONGO, created and empowered by an 
Act of Parliament to coordinate and provide policy guidelines for the role of NGOs in Tanzania, 
was seen in an overwhelmingly negative light by interviewees; „it is not working,‟ as one put it, 
summing up the general view. Many interviewees argued that the role of NACONGO clashes 
with that of the Policy Forum and the foundation of the former is an attempt by the government 
to undermine the influence of the latter. The formation of NACONGO is also clearly seen as a 
threat to other umbrella NGO organizations.  For example, officials at TACOSODE were 
worried that they could be banned in the future, as the state might rule that only one NGO 
coordinating body should be allowed. Structured power dynamics play a significant role in 
making NACONGO an influential organization; several interviewees argued that their 
organizations prefer to cooperate with Policy Forum in principle but regard having connections 
with NACONGO as a useful conduit to obtain information on what is happening with regard to 
NGOs within the ambit of the state. Thus, they maintain cordial relations with NACONGO, as 
doing so may provide them with access to information useful in contesting the war of position. 
 
This perceived clash between the work of NACONGO and the Policy Forum illustrates the 
weakness of the de Tocquevillian vision of civil society being promulgated by the donors in 
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post-liberalization Tanzania. Rather than seeing an open and tolerant debate involving 
NACONGO and Policy Forum, aimed at fostering a constructive relationship between the key 
elements of the integral state, respondents regarded the two organizations as representing 
opposite sides in the war of position involving the state and civil society. NACONGO is 
regarded overwhelmingly as representing the interests of the state in restricting the power of 
NGOs to work autonomously. NGO officials interviewed pointed out that they had not been 
asked to take part in the formation of NACONGO. Thus, they regarded the organization as being 
an unwarranted external imposition on their work, which had been created in an undemocratic 
way. In addition, all the interviewees felt uneasy about relations with NACONGO, as they 
believed it had overseen the creation of an overly restrictive NGO Act in 2002. This view was 
unanimous among interviewees, despite the fact that pressure from NGOs forced key 
amendments to the 2002 NGO Act, notably having the need for annual registration deleted, 
which was inhibiting the founding and growth of associations. For the interviewees, NACONGO 
is there to ensure an unwarranted degree of oversight of their work and to make sure their 
activities remain largely apolitical. Their views, in this regard, show that the donors de 
Tocquevillian vision of state-civil society relations, based on openness, tolerance and trust, is far 
from reality in post-liberalization Tanzania. In fact, the polarized way in which interviewees 
perceived the positions of, and relationship between, NACONGO and the Policy Forum shows 
that a war of position is being fought. The majority of interviewees cited the history of coercive 
control by the Registrar of Societies over NGOs (see chapter 3 and section 5.4 above in this 
chapter) and the Registrar of Trade Unions over labour organizations (see chapter 6) as a 
significant cause of their misgivings about the position of NACONGO. Thus, most interviewees 
contended that the state was fighting to maintain hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania in the 
face of rising civil society power, by using coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral 
state in the form of an NGO policy, new legislation concerning NGOs and, above all the creation 
of NACONGO, as a supervisory body. 
  
A further issue raised by interviewees concerning legitimacy was how far the minority of well 
funded and powerful NGOs are able to represent effectively the views of small NGOs outside 
urban centres. Part of the remit of the Policy Forum is the gathering and presenting the views of 
grassroots organizations nationwide.  When interviewed, a Policy Forum official outlined how 
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hard it was for them to represent the views of grassroots organizations. The large geographical 
size of Tanzania (see figure and map at the end of chapter 1) makes it impossible for Policy 
Forum staff to visit many NGOs. Other forms of contact are also difficult, as the vast majority of 
small NGOs outside urban centres have no websites and do not use email regularly, if at all. The 
Policy Forum also reported difficulties in making telephone contact with such organizations. 
There is thus a problem with the argument that an umbrella organization is able to put forward 
the views of members effectively, so that a wide range of opinions from civil society groups in 
Tanzania are represented in national policy-making processes. This donor-driven perspective 
fails to take into account how demographic factors and the lack of communications infrastructure 
in the country hinder civil society participation in national policy-making processes. 
 
A final major concern, regarding legitimacy, for NGO officials when interviewed was the use of 
the growing amount of data on poverty reduction. One interviewee summed up the general 
perspective in stating that „the information is geared to donors and written in a way only they can 
understand.‟ The data was presented in ways that are intelligible to the intended beneficiaries, 
according to all respondents.  The technical approach to poverty reduction, which is fundamental 
to all national policy instruments in post-liberalization Tanzania (see chapter 3), thus, hinders the 
understanding of issues on the part of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in the 
country. By extension, it stops them from participating in an informed way. This lack of capacity 
on the part of intended beneficiaries, leads to their inability to participate meaningfully in 
national policy-making processes, which, therefore, lack legitimacy, according to almost every 
NGO official interviewed. Furthermore, interviews revealed that NGO officials regard the 
donors and the government as having little interest in making the conceptual framework and the 
data used in national policy-making processes intelligible to the most vulnerable groups in 
Tanzania. Instead they were regarded as having mainly technical concerns, centred around the 
effective collection, storage and presentation of data on poverty alleviation. Interviewees also 
argued that the state refused to discuss neo-liberal macroeconomic fundamentals with NGOs. 
Thus, even for the minority of individuals who could understand the technicalities relating to 
data collection and presentation, there was little room for meaningful debate around statistics on 
different aspects of poverty in Tanzania. Overall, interviewees were concerned that intended 
beneficiaries had little chance of participating meaningfully in national policy-making processes. 
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Thus, the interviews revealed that mass participation on the part of Tanzanian citizens, and by 
extension ownership of national policy-making processes, was largely absent.  
 
Capacity Issues 
Although an overall vision and strategy on the part of NGOs had not been formed, poverty 
alleviation was identified as the central issue concerning their work by the majority of NGO 
officials interviewed, in line with the donor discourse. Work in this area often focused on 
awareness-raising campaigns, which take place under various names, (Civic Education in the 
case of the Policy Forum and YPC and Civic Awareness with regard to PACT, for example). 
However, a small minority of organizations, notably TGNP and Hakielimu, have attempted to 
formulate a more fundamental challenge to the donor-driven focus on poverty alleviation.   
The lack of both financial and technical capacity, hampering the finding of effective ways to 
reduce poverty, were significant themes running through the interviews. Funding was a concern 
for many NGOs, with lack of financial capacity regarded as a major impediment to meaningful 
participation in national policy-making processes. Moreover, the need for NGOs to get access to 
relevant information and data that would inform their arguments was also regarded as important.  
Thus, both financial and technical capacity-building for NGOs were significant issues for 
interviewees and the perceived lack of detailed attention to these issues on the part of donors was 
also raised as a matter of concern. For example, when interviewed, a TGNP official outlined how 
she had been approached by a representative from one of the donors involved in national policy-
making processes who wanted to provide help in „capacity building.‟ The TGNP official replied 
by asking the representative to give an assessment of TGNP‟s current „capacity.‟ When the 
representative was unable to do so, the TGNP official asked why they wanted to do „capacity 
building‟ work when they did not know the current capacity of TGNP, to which the answer was 
silence. 
 
Despite the confrontations with the state in post-liberalization Tanzania experienced by 
Hakielimu and YPC, some NGOs saw their role in de Tocquevillian terms, as an equal 
partnership with the donors and the state. Respondents from these organizations rejected the 
argument that they were likely to be aggressively confronted or co-opted by the state, if they 
challenged its hegemony. These NGOs were principally from the small number close to the 
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government and the donors.  Interviewees from these well-resourced organizations discussed 
national policy-making processes primarily in terms of how to gather and assess data efficiently. 
They also argued that it is important for NGOs to work as partners of the government on all 
aspects of national policy-making processes. Therefore, a minority of NGOs in post-
liberalization Tanzania have accepted the premise that state can accommodate the views of civil 
society and encompass a universal form of hegemony, which represents the national interest. The 
views of interviewees from these organizations were not shared by all NGOs officials. However, 
the majority of respondents have internalized the donor discourse in post-liberalization Tanzania, 
in regarding their role vis-à-vis the state as that of watchdog combined with partner. They saw no 
contradictions between these two positions. This perspective can be juxtaposed with the 
criticisms of NACONGO, the NGO Act of 2002 and the new NGO Policy by the majority of the 
interviewees, which showed contradictory tendencies in their views. That is, while these legal-
bureaucratic measures were seen as an attempt to capture the terms and conditions by which civil 
society participates in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, 
interviewees, nevertheless, believed that „partnership‟ with the state was possible. Such a view is 
clearly beneficial to the state in maintaining hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
 
Thus, there is an uncritical assumption on the part of officials interviewed that NGOs can, pace 
de Tocqueville, be both watchdogs and partners in the creation of national policy instruments. 
Resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise from the co-existence of these two roles in the war of 
position is not debated in any thoroughgoing way among NGOs. This was a reason for the 
frustration of an interviewee from TANGO, who had not been able to engender such a discussion 
among NGOs taking part in national-policy making processes. 
105
 Most interviewees argued that 
the „new‟ NGO sector „needs time‟ to build up its constituencies and to set out a clear vision and 
strategy, while admitting that their organizations had not made substantial progress in either of 
these areas. However, a minority of NGOs have attempted to develop counter-hegemonic 
discourses. An example in this regard is the „Open Sheraton‟ meetings run weekly by the 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP). 
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NGO Counter-hegemonic Discourses 
 
Case Study One – The ‘Open Sheraton’ Meetings 
The „Open Sheraton‟ Meetings are organized by TGNP and held weekly throughout the year in 
the open air outside the office of the organization in Mabibo, a working class area of Dar es 
Salaam.  The term „Open Sheraton‟ is a mocking reference to the fact that the donors and many 
FONGOs in Tanzania always hold conferences and other meetings in five star hotels. The 
meetings are held to identify the issues that most affect the lives of members of the public and 
from there to generate activism to bring about changes.  Through these meetings TGNP have 
tried to involve poor and marginalized individuals and groups in national policy-making 
processes by awareness-raising and trying to give them a voice. It is important to TGNP how 
much national policy-making processes allow space for the voices of the people and how the 
stated needs of the people are met by the „owners‟ of the process.  
 
The meetings are based on the principle of inclusivity. Facilities and support are available for the 
disabled. Moreover, as the meetings are held in Swahili, the facilitator always asks at the start if 
anyone present is not fluent in the language. If that is the case, translators are assigned to such 
people and they are encouraged to contribute. Meetings last for several hours and attendance is 
on average two to three hundred.  People are invited to the meetings by fly posting and word of 
mouth. This contrasts with the format of online invitations used by donors and FONGOs, which 
exclude the many people who are technologically disconnected (see section 5.4 above).  The 
sensitivity of state-civil society relations can be judged by the dispute over the provision of 
refreshments at these meetings. One free soda per person is given out at each meeting, which has 
led to criticism from the government that participants are being induced to attend. The meetings 
have been running for ten years and TGNP has published the results of some of the themes (see, 
for example, Mbilinyi et al (Eds), 2003). People have also taken ideas raised at the meetings and 
put them into theatre and other performances.   
 
Concerning the organization, chairs are arranged in banks on three sides with the fourth left for 
the facilitator, who stands next to a whiteboard. The facilitator engages with people as they 
arrive, asking questions and starting small discussions. A presenter, who has been invited by 
TGNP to give a talk on a topic, works with the facilitator. The meetings have drawn criticism 
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from the government for fomenting dissent amongst people. World Bank officials in Dar es 
Salaam have been invited to attend but declined on the grounds that Mabibo is not a safe area. 
Topics on economic, political and social themes are debated at meetings, such as participating in 
the democratic process, making politicians accountable to their constituents, the role of the 
media in society, housing issues, the provision of water and other utilities and problems with 
transport.  
 
With a view to avoiding compartmentalized thinking, topics discussed at meetings are linked; 
participating in the political process and the role of the media, for example. A stress is put on the 
use of the philosophy of praxis, whereby reflection and debate on issues are followed up by 
actions, which in turn leads to further consideration of the outcomes, which can heighten 
people‟s consciousness of their social position within the sphere of civil society (Gramsci, 2011).  
Volunteers try out the strategies (how best to make candidates respond effectively to questions 
from the public at campaign meetings, for example) and report back on whether they worked. 
Following reflections on activism, tasks are set out on the whiteboard for particular individuals 
to undertake during the week. The fact that the government has challenged their legitimacy on 
the grounds that one free drink is provided to participants per meeting gives an indication that 
some degree of success has been achieved in engendering counter-hegemonic discourses. These 
meetings have led to grassroots campaigns relating to, inter alia, accountability of public servants 
to citizens, education provision, infrastructure improvements, gender issues and the role of the 
media. However, despite the effective use of praxis to refine objectives and actions, such 
campaigns have not generated a coherent and cohesive challenge to state hegemony. Numbers 
involved in the grassroots campaigns are small and consequently the counter-hegemonic 
discourses generated through the Open Sheraton meetings provide little systematic challenge to 
state power. 
 
Key NGO Relationships 
It is clear from the interviewees that the most important relationship for NGOs is with the 
government, as it has the power to circumscribe, and even eliminate, their work, followed by the 
donors, as they provide funding and support. Relationships with other NGOs, civil society 
organizations and intended beneficiaries were considered of lesser importance by the 
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interviewees . Overall, the focus of Tanzanian NGOs involved in national policy-making 
processes is on upward accountability to the government and the donors. 
National policy-making processes are regarded by all interviewees as top-down and driven by 
donors and the government. The current development discourse buzzwords of „partnership‟, 
„ownership‟ and „participation‟ were regarded as being confined largely to rhetoric by all the 
interviewees. However, it was also recognized that the stress on these concepts had opened up 
new possibilities in the war of position between civil society and the state. Interviewees 
overwhelmingly believed that new policy spaces for NGOs had been created through the donor-
driven stress on participation, ownership and partnership. Nevertheless, NGOs had not 
considered how to contest these new spaces in any detailed and strategic way, with two 
exceptions.  
 
First, an interviewee at TANGO outlined how his organization was forming a new strategy as a 
result of NGO participation in national policy-making processes, based explicitly on narrowing 
its focus to an analysis of two „key questions‟: 
1. What type of space is the government allowing NGOs? 
2. How is the government encouraging NGOs to move into that space?  
 
The interviewee had a high level of formal education and was well aware of conceptual issues 
concerning the role of NGOs as agents of development, as well as the practical problems 
involved in forming effective working relationships with the state and donor agencies. He was 
particularly concerned about the lack of strategic planning capacity and overall vision of the 
NGO sector in the light of an agenda on the part of donor agencies to make NGOs the standard 
bearers of a Tanzanian civil society based on a consensual, pluralist perspective. Second, an 
interviewee at Hakielimu outlined how the organization had analysed strategically ways of 
contesting the new policy space created by participation in national policy-making processes. He 
felt that civil society was contesting issues on terms dictated by the donors and needed to find 
innovative ways of challenging state hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. This required 
new ways of thinking and needed to be based on thoroughgoing independent research, which the 
NGO was prioritizing. As with the respondent at TANGO, the interviewee at Hakielimu had an 
understanding of overarching conceptual debates regarding the role of NGOs as agents of 
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development and was acutely aware of the problems involved in forming effective working 
relationships with the state in Tanzania, as Hakielimu was at that time engaged in a serious 
dispute with the government. 
106
  These two interviewees were committed to the cause of NGOs 
and well-read in the areas of development theory and practice. Their high levels of commitment 
and knowledge of development issues were clearly significant factors in stimulating a move to 
formulate overall strategies regarding the contestation of policy space. However, neither had 
been able to engender a concerted counter-hegemonic vision at the institutional level and both 
felt that this was hard to accomplish, since their organizations concentrated primarily on 
operational practicalities. For this reason, as well as the history of subjugation of civil society by 
the state in Tanzania, both interviewees doubted the ability of Tanzanian NGOs to provide 
substantive counter-hegemonic discourses in the short to medium term. 
 
NGO - State Relations in Tanzania 
The current relationship between NGOs and the state is substantively influenced by the history of 
the war of position between the state and opposing political forces, waged though civil society in 
Tanzania (see chapter 3). This has resulted in the government taking a top-down attitude to 
NGOs in the post-liberalization period, rather than regarding them as „partners‟, in line with the 
donors de-Tocquevillian vision of state-civil society relations in Tanzania. This can be seen most 
clearly in the way the state confronts NGOs which are critical of its policies. For almost every 
interviewee these conflicts were incontrovertible proof that the government is not prepared to 
tolerate substantive criticisms of its policies and thus no „partnership‟ relationship between 
NGOs and the state exists, despite donor-driven efforts to create this through national policy-
making processes.  
 
The dispute between the government and leading education-sector NGO, Hakielimu was raised 
by every interviewee as a matter of concern. 
107
  Many interviewees also put forward the fact that 
other NGOs apart from Hakielimu have clashed with the government, notably Youth Partnership 
Countrywide (YPC) (which is also examined as a case study), the Lawyers‟ Environmental 
Action Team (LEAT) and the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC).  As a result, a number 
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of NGOs in the post-liberalization period have formed defensive survival strategies in the war of 
position with the state. These include widening the constituency and/or support base, bringing on 
board powerful people, who the government may be reluctant to confront, such as high-ranking 
members of the clergy,  and using the media, particularly non-Tanzanian outlets, to „shout very 
loudly‟ if they are threatened. Moreover, a few NGOs had addressed these issues by engaging in 
publicity campaigns and increasing the number of regions in which they were active in order to 
widen their constituencies and support bases. The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), for 
example, has increased its work in remote rural areas and provides free clinics for poor and 
marginalized groups, advising them on their legal and human rights, as well as assisting them 
with particular cases.  
 
Furthermore, the LHRC has drawn up a list of important and influential people it aims to recruit 
in honorary and/or senior advisory roles if the attitude of the government towards civil society 
organizations becomes more hostile. Those on the list include senior figures from the clergy and 
District Commissioners. All the figures on the list have good offices with some senior 
government officials and could, therefore, use patronage to defend LHRC against attacks and/or 
restrictions on its work.  Thus, the LHRC is combining top-down and bottom-up approaches in 
its war of position with the state.  Many interviewees were, however, concerned about using the 
media, pointing to cases in the post-liberalization period where newspapers had been closed 
down temporarily by the government after publishing material deemed „inappropriate‟ and to a 
journalist who was jailed for one year after writing an article about hunger in the Songea region, 
which annoyed government officials. A number of interviewees also felt that using foreign media 
to highlight their causes was risky, as it left them open to charges of being unpatriotic and 
forming alliances with donors and other outsiders in the pursuit of money and status.  Indeed, 
these charges were levelled at Hakielimu in its clash with the Tanzanian government.  
 
Overall, the interviews revealed that the strategies used by Tanzanian NGOs in their war of 
position with the state are defensive and used primarily to ensure the survival of organizations at 
an individual level. This overriding concern with the level of the individual organization means 
that there is little chance of a historic bloc of disparate forms of civil society forming in Tanzania 
in the short term which could gain the consent of significant strata of the population and 
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systematically challenge neo-liberal hegemony. 
 
Case Study Two - The Clash between Hakielimu and the State 
The government threatened to de-register Hakielimu following its criticism in 2005 of the 
Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Under section 17 of the Societies Ordinance 
(URT, 1954), an organization must cease all activities immediately upon receiving notice from 
the Registrar that its registration has been cancelled. Hakielimu is well-financed, mainly by 
Western donors. Through its strong funding base the organization is able to employ highly-
qualified staff, who are able to do independent research and produce publications with high 
production values (See, for example Hakielimu, 2005b). It is also able to run a well-equipped 
office and has modern motor vehicles at its disposal. In short, it has the trappings which, as 
outlined in the chapter 3, are seen by critics of the „new‟ NGOs in Africa as the main reason 
people want to work in the sector. 
The state used various arguments against Hakielimu in its war of position. It claimed that 
Hakielimu‟s analysis of PEDP (Hakielimu, 2005b) was biased; overstating criticisms of 
education policy and underplaying its successes. It also argued that Hakielimu was dominated by 
an individual and therefore an undemocratic „one-man show.‟  It further contended that 
Hakielimu acted primarily in the interests of its Western funders, that  it aimed mainly for self-
publicity, since its television advertisements featured schoolchildren wearing Hakielimu t-shirts 
and shouting „Hakielimu‟, and that it misrepresented problems in schools by showing a spelling 
mistake on a blackboard on the front cover of one of its publications that is not typical of 
Tanzanian primary schoolchildren in general but one that occurs largely amongst pupils in a part 
of the country where the dialect makes it hard for them to distinguish „r‟ from ‟l‟.  108 According 
to a minister, the government ban was for „disparaging the image and ridiculing the education 
ministry, education officers and teachers‟ (Yunus, 2005). Another government officer involved 
stated that the ban was because Hakielimu focused on shortcomings in the education sector and 
ignored recorded achievements (Lipili, 2005). Hakielimu counter-argued that it had been largely 
positive about PEDP in its literature and had been constructive in identifying certain areas where 
improvements could be made. Hakielimu also claimed to have self-censored its report in an 
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attempt to avoid being overly critical of the government. The debate was prominent in the media, 
occupying the front page of many national newspapers for some time and strong views on both 
sides were expressed in letters and articles in the inside pages. The focus of the debate ranged 
from the legalistic (whether the law used to ban Hakielimu from working in educational 
institutions actually remains in existence) to a wider analysis of the appropriate roles for the state 
and NGOs. 
 
Discourse analysis of the PEDP Report (Hakielimu, 2005b) shows the sensitive nature of state-
civil society relations in Tanzania.  The report is based largely on an examination of government 
documents relating to the status of PEDP, which has four main components; enrolment 
expansion, quality improvement, capacity building and strengthening institutional arrangements. 
The report starts by highlighting general issues common to social science research in most 
circumstances, such as „inconsistency of data‟ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 2). In the report‟s specific 
„conclusions‟ section, the first paragraph of seven lines summarizes the successes, citing six 
particular aspects that are „all clear achievements of PEDP‟ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 18). The 
following two paragraphs, comprising ten full lines in total, set out the need for more classrooms, 
more teachers and more textbooks, as well as stressing that the quality of education should be 
improved. Concerning proposed ways forward, it is stated that „distressingly, many issues raised 
and recommendations made in the [government] reviews appear to be neglected‟ (Hakielimu, 
2005b: 18). The report concludes by outlining seven action points which need to be prioritized if 
PEDP is to fully achieve its goals.  
 
Polarization occurred in the conflict with, on the one hand, the President supporting the Minister 
of Education‟s attacks on Hakielimu, whilst on the other, most of the leading NGO sector and the 
main Western donors coming together to defend the organization.  That civil society 
participation in national policy-making processes is donor-driven can be seen from the 
discussion amongst multilateral and bilateral donors as to what line to take in the dispute. Some 
of the donors favoured writing to the government in support of Hakielimu but this was rejected 
on the grounds that it would be likely to produce a backlash against the organization and the 
wider NGO community. The Acting World Bank Country Director was „dismayed by the ban‟ 
and argued that what „has happened should not be happening at all in this country right now, 
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where democracy and accountability is taking root‟ (Lipili, 2005).  
 
Despite such support for Hakielimu, the government sent a circular to every educational 
institution in the country telling them not to have any dealings with the NGO and to take down 
any materials from them displayed on their walls. Experienced figures from the Tanzanian NGO 
sector interviewed as part of this research were worried about the possible outcome, both for 
Hakielimu and for the future of NGOs in general in the country. They pointed out that the 
government‟s dispute with Hakielimu was not the first such occurrence during the post-
liberalization period. Baraza La Wanawake (BAWATA)/National Women‟s Council was de-
registered in 1997, after the government accused the organization of operating as a political 
party. The dispute centred on government claims that BAWATA was being „too political‟ and 
challenging the work done by its own women‟s wing. The government‟s action against 
BAWATA sent „a message to all NGOs that they potentially can be deregistered at any time if 
they do not support the government positions‟ (Nahala, 1997: 4).  
 
Case Study Three - The Clash between the National Youth Council and the State 
Another NGO which was deregistered by the government now operates under the name of Youth 
Partnership Countrywide (YPC), formerly the National Youth Council (NYC).  The NYC was 
threatened with closure by the government several times, on the grounds that its activities were 
„too political‟ (pace the Baraza La Wanawake case) and challenged the work done by the ruling 
party‟s own youth wing.  This is an example of the state‟s move to de-politicize civil society in 
post-liberalization Tanzania in order to negate challenges to its hegemony. The state presents 
legislation and policies, as well as the work of NACONGO, as being effective technical 
measures which represent the common interests of all citizens. Contestation of this legislation 
and these policies by groups such as BAWATA and the NYC are then attacked as going against 
the national interest. The activities of the NYC led to confrontations with the police at their 
conferences in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam, leading to both being brought to a premature end.  
The breaking up of the Zanzibar conference in 2001 by the police was particularly sensitive, 
since there was an international presence. The dispute between the government and the NYC 
came to a head at the  2002 NYC Annual Conference in Mwanza on the „Role of Youth in 
Democracy Building‟, which was attended by around 1,000 people.  The government considered 
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the agenda of the Conference to be „threatening‟ and afterwards deregistered the NYC for 
„failing to submit proper accounts.‟ The deep level of concern on the part of the government 
about counter-hegemonic discourses from civil society can be seen through events surrounding 
the Mwanza Conference. Five members of the NYC‟s organising committee had booked a bus to 
take themselves and other delegates from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza but, on going to catch the 
vehicle, were told that it was no longer available. Moreover, food ordered for the conference was 
not delivered and management at the University of Mwanza, where conference delegates were 
staying, refused to let delegates cook their own food in the canteen. It later transpired that the 
food supplier had been told not to support the conference delegates by providing them with food.  
The fact that the state is able to use catchall phrases to describe the work of NGOs such as the 
National Youth Council (as well as Baraka la Wanawake) as „too political‟ and „threatening,‟ 
without providing further detailed evidence, shows how sensitive it is to perceived challenges to 
its hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. These cases demonstrate that the idea of 
partnership between the state and NGOs (driven by the de Tocquevillian notion of civil society 
on the part of donors) has no basis in reality and is part of an attempt to map idealized Western 
ideologies, practices and structures onto Tanzania with no attempt to understand and 
accommodate previous periods of political economy in the country. 
 
NGO -World Bank Relations in Tanzania 
Many of the larger NGOs in Tanzania are critical of the World Bank, which is aware of this, and 
has made it a priority to build better relations with civil society in the post-liberalization  
period. 
109
 To this end, the World Bank ran a series of meetings on key aspects of its work in 
Tanzania, aimed at „opening a development dialogue with the press and CSOs.‟ The meetings 
(named Coffee Morning Discussions) were held at the World Bank‟s Dar es Salaam office. The 
venue was chosen partly as a way of familiarizing Tanzanian citizens with the building and thus 
breaking down perceptions that the organization is faceless and remote. For the Country 
Director, it is important that Tanzanians recognize that „the World Bank is not one individual, 
one entity or one voice.‟ 110  
 
Case Study 4 – NGOs and the World Bank’s Coffee Morning Discussions 
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The Communications Team at the World Bank decided on the theme for the Coffee Morning 
Discussions, although the state had some input. The topics for the initial series, reflecting 
„priority concerns‟ for Tanzania, were economic growth, the marine environment, education and 
rural development linked to the Tanzania Social Action Fund. 
 
The session on education provides an example of how the meetings are structured and the way 
participation takes place. The education session was run by a World Bank education specialist, 
whose presentation centred on which levels and types of education should form the focus of 
policy, how education can help to alleviate poverty and how it can be used to increase female 
empowerment and well-being. In terms of achieving the World Bank‟s objective of breaking 
down barriers with civil society, the meeting failed completely. First, notice of the meeting was 
sent out electronically, so many small organizations, without computers, received no invitation. 
Second, the meeting was held at 9.00 in the morning on a weekday, which meant that many of 
the staff at small CSOs would not have been able to afford to take time off to attend even if they 
had known about it and were interested in the issues being discussed. Most of those attending 
were from large and well-funded NGOs based in Dar es Salaam and a lively debate ensued. 
However, it was a discussion in English between representatives of the self-referential and self-
perpetuating development community. The narrow civil society base in attendance was 
illustrated by a point made from the floor, expressing disquiet concerning the fact that 
representatives of the Tanzania Teacher‟s Union (TTU), the largest trade union in the country, 
had not been invited to a meeting on education. World Bank officials could not provide reasons 
why the TTU had not been invited, providing another indication that trade unions have been 
excluded from civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
 
The essence of the presentation was (in line with the World Bank‟s stress on human capital 
theory, outlined in chapter 1) that major changes are needed in the education sector in Tanzania. 
First, greater provision of technical and vocational education is required, as „there are currently 
too many philosophy and history graduates.‟ Second, too much of the education budget is spent 
on funding Masters and PhD students, whose subjects are „out of line with Tanzania‟s education 
needs.‟ This led to a discussant asking whether the World Bank wanted Tanzania to have less 
people with Masters and PhDs in order to ensure that the country has to continue to rely on 
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expensive Western consultants to tell us how to run our education policies. The reply was 
silence. Another discussant then asked whether the World Bank wants Tanzania to have less 
philosophy and history graduates so people from Western countries „can explain our past to us 
and provide us with frameworks for thinking about and organizing our society.‟ The reply was 
again silence. 
 
The presentation on the role of rural development, focusing on women, was different in format 
and tone. It took place on Rural Women‟s Day in Tanzania (15 October) and was combined with 
an overview of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), which meant the structure was 
unwieldy and the focus unclear. TASAF is a part of the donor-driven agenda for development in 
Tanzania and a controversial initiative. The Fund has $120 million available, which is provided 
jointly by the World Bank and the government, to disburse on social projects.  The majority of 
attendees were again officials from well resourced NGOs based in Dar es Salaam. However, 
twelve representatives from rural women‟s groups were also present to showcase their produce. 
The PowerPoint presentation was made in English and translated into Swahili, as the 
representatives of rural women‟s groups had little command of the former language. 111  In 
contrast to the presentation on education, questions and debate did not flow naturally from the 
floor. The disjointed nature of the presentation and its tortuous progress (as there had to be 
continual stoppages for translations) dampened enthusiasm. Moreover, the representatives from 
rural women‟s groups were ill at ease in the environs of the World Bank meeting room, and 
stood uncomfortably around the back walls with their fruit, vegetables, textiles and chickens in 
cages. A discussant questioned the value of the meeting, on the grounds that the poor only have 
labour as an asset and are thus too busy to attend. The presenter replied by stating that TASAF 
does provide jobs for the „very poor‟ by creating public works projects and offering employment 
on these schemes at wages which are 10-20% below the (unspecified) market rate. This attracts 
only the most impoverished people, as others are not willing to work for such a low wage.  Thus, 
according to the presenter, it is the poorest that benefit from TASAF. 
 
Whatever the wider aims of the meeting, the representatives of the rural women‟s groups were 
                                                          
111
  See Blommaert (2005) and the discussion in chapter 4 of the status of Swahili and English in Tanzania in 
relation to social class and level of education.    
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objectified. They were treated as „objects‟ who had been identified by development professionals 
as „poor‟ people worthy of assistance, rather than „subjects‟ who have nuanced understanding of 
their positions, which they can explain in their own time and way. None of the representatives 
from the rural women‟s groups addressed the meeting. The overriding concern of the meeting 
was to set out the benefits of the TASAF and link it to the virtues of wider aspects of the neo-
liberal and good governance agendas in the country; individual enterprise, partnership and 
participation. The representatives from rural women‟s groups had been brought to the meeting to 
provide tangible evidence that the „poor‟ benefit from TASAF. However, their agency was 
subsumed within the structural requirements of the World Bank, concerning the format and 
agenda of the meeting, as well as the mode of participation. None of the women attending were 
able to make points about the scheme or any other aspect of their lives. 
 
The extent to which the World Bank is concerned with controlling development processes in 
Tanzania is shown by the fact that the External Affairs Department (EAD) in Washington DC 
monitors the „Coffee Morning Discussions.‟ All feedback on the meetings is tracked by a team at 
the Tanzania Country Office, which then informs the EAD.  Any negative coverage of the coffee 
mornings results in the World Bank calling those responsible for a „discussion.‟ From these 
contacts the World Bank often finds the negative coverage was a result of the issues „not being 
understood properly‟ by the media in question. 112 This view gives the lie to the stated aim of the 
donors to accept wider debates on development issues, including policy heterodoxy, as part of 
the move to a Post-Washington „Consensus‟.  
 
5.6 Summary 
The rise to prominence of NGOs is linked to macroeconomic and political processes in Tanzania 
going back to the 1980s when donors pressured the country to roll back the state and bring in a 
market driven model. The ensuing democratic deficit in the 1990s led to NGOs being fostered by 
major donors as service-providing gap fillers and evidence of the existence of a vibrant 
associational life, as part of the new policy agenda. It also led to donors influencing the 
Tanzanian government to include NGOs in national policy-making processes as the vanguard of 
civil society.  The donors prioritize the participation of NGOs in national policy-making 
                                                          
112
  Source: Interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005 
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processes, as they fit in with their own understandings of, and visions for, civil society. 
Important elements of associational life have been left out of national policy-making processes. 
Tanzanian associational groups which have histories of participation in the sphere of civil 
society, such as trade unions, burial societies, sports clubs, credit associations, tribal and clan-
based organizations, have been marginalized. The adoption of a Gramscian perspective provides 
insights into the importance of civil society in Tanzania as a public room where counter-
hegemonic views are being put forward by a small number of NGOs, such as TGNP. Through 
the use of a Gramscian perspective in the case of Tanzania it is possible to gain insights into how 
NGOs are applying ideologies and strategies which both uphold and confront the prevailing 
order. Thus, hegemony is being formed in a fluid way as part of a continuous war of position 
involving the state and both supportive and oppositional civil society groups. Current counter-
hegemonic discourses within the NGO sector could gain momentum and provide a greater 
challenge to the dominant neo-liberal discourse than is currently the case and new ideologies and 
strategies may emerge. These possibilities can be encompassed within a Gramscian framework, 
but not the liberal de Tocquevillian view (rooted in a narrow and consensual vision of the 
relationship between state and civil society) whereby a win-win scenario is the pre-determined 
outcome of participation in debates on national policies. However, at present counter-hegemonic 
discourses from NGOs are very limited, as organizations are constrained by the state‟s use of 
legal-bureaucratic means and concentrate on the practical provision of services, rather than 
focusing on wider strategies and visions for the sector.  
 
The small number of NGOs which play a leading part in national policy-making processes have 
the power, through external donor support, to make the state engage with their arguments. 
However, the views of these organizations do not systematically question and counter state 
hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania for several reasons. First, macroeconomic policies are 
excluded from discussions taking place within the format of national policy instruments. As a 
result, NGO work tends to focus on the social sphere of development, notably health and 
education issues. Second, NGOs are fearful of the state‟s reaction to criticism of its policies, 
particularly in the light of what happened to Baraza la Wanawake, Youth Partnership 
Countrywide and Hakielimu during disputes with the state. Their work, therefore, tends to be 
apolitical. Third, the majority of NGOs taking part in national policy-making processes reject the 
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need to engage in a war of position with the state and instead frame their role within the 
conventional liberal discourse on civil society, based on free and open debate between NGOs 
and the state with policy outcomes reflecting a partnership between the core elements of the 
integral state. In contrast to NGOs, the labour movement has faced continual struggles to have 
any voice in national policy-making processes. Why trade unions, as membership organizations 
with a history of struggle against colonialism and, thus, roots in Tanzanian society, have been 
marginalized, and what this means for national policy-making processes, is examined in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 Trade Unions in Tanzania 
 
6.1     Introduction 
In this chapter a detailed analytical and empirical examination is made of how Tanzanian trade 
unions have participated in national policy-making processes, from the 1930s to the present and 
the reasons for their relative marginalization in the post-liberalization period are evaluated. The 
assessment of the current situation of trade unions in Tanzania is based on fieldwork interviews 
carried out with senior officials in the Tanzanian trade union movement, as well as observation 
and document assessment. 
113
 First, the theorization of trade unions is outlined, focusing on the 
point that it is unlikely, in the short or medium term, that the labour movement in Tanzania will 
adopt social movement unionism and thereby form a historic bloc with other civil society 
organizations in confronting neo-liberal hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. This is due to 
the lack of systematic contacts between trade unions and other elements of civil society, caused 
to a significant degree by suspicions on the part of the latter that the thinking of the labour 
movement remains rooted in the pre-liberalization era, when it was subsumed within the ambit of 
the state. The labour aristocracy debate is then assessed, as it furnishes a framework for 
analysing the validity of arguments that the Tanzanian trade union movement is unlikely to form 
counter-hegemonic discourses because it acts for an elite minority of workers in the formal 
sector, and thus lacks legitimacy as a representative of the poor in national policy-making 
processes. Fieldwork findings reveal that in the case of Tanzania the aristocracy thesis is overly 
determinist and cannot account for the heterogeneity of the attitudes and actions of trade unions 
in the post-liberalization period.  Subsequently, the historical development of trade unionism in 
Tanzania is outlined. As with NGOs (see chapter 5), the main elements of the integral state - 
ideological hegemony supported by coercion (Gramsci, 1978) -  were used to limit spaces where 
policies and ideologies could be contested by trade unions during the colonial period and after 
independence. From 1961 until the early 1990s the state dominated the labour movement to the 
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 See chapter 4 for details of the methodology used. 
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extent that it was virtually impossible for trade unions to develop counter-hegemonic discourses. 
Two main weapons were used by the state in this war of position; repressive legal-bureaucratic 
measures and the discourse of national liberation, centred on the argument that the perceived 
needs of trade unions had to be subordinated to the overarching struggle to overcome the 
legacies of colonial repression. The state vigorously put forward the perspective that the national 
liberation struggle was of much greater importance than the sectional interests of trade unions. In 
the post-liberalization period, trade unions have regained the freedom of association that was 
taken away from them by the state soon after independence. However, the state‟s exclusion of 
trade unions from national policy-making processes and its continued employment of coercive 
control by legal-bureaucratic measures has pushed the labour movement to the margins of civil 
society in the post-liberalization period. In response, unions have used strikes and other forms of 
industrial action as tactics in the war of position. Nevertheless, lack of capacity (financial, 
technical and institutional) and ideological vision on the part of the trade unions has led to the 
labour movement being unable to form a systematic and effective counter-hegemonic discourse 
to that of neo-liberalism, which is driven energetically by key integral state actors in alliance 
with external donors.  
 
6.2  Theorizing Trade Unions 
Hyman (2001) identifies three main types of trade unionism. 
114
 First, business unionism, 
focused on trade unions largely accepting the existing relations of market power and embracing 
the discourse of „flexible‟ working practices and „partnership‟ between capital and labour, 
leading to an emphasis on representing the interests of members mainly through collective 
bargaining. Second, revolutionary unionism, which stresses the representation of the working 
class through militant anti-capitalist opposition. Third, some trade unions have moved towards 
social movement unionism (Bezuidenhout, 2002), which is a strategy where „labour goes beyond 
the workplace … to form links with communities … while also working space through 
networking place to place within the same global corporation‟ (Webster, Lambert and 
Bezuidenhout, 2008: 160).   For trade unions in Africa, adopting any of these three approaches 
clearly and consistently is problematic, since an interregnum exists in the labour movement 
                                                          
114  Other analysts take a broader approach. Poole (1981) outlines five main schools of thought concerning the 
theorization of trade unions:  First, the ethical or moral school.  Second, the revolutionary approach. Third, the 
conservative position. Fourth, the economic Implications school. Fifth, the political perspective. 
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marked by disorder, disorientation and dislocation, following the wave of economic 
liberalization which occurred across the continent from the late 1980s onwards (Von Holdt, 
2003). This situation is reflected in contrasting views of the current state of, and possibilities for, 
trade unions. Thomas (1995a, 1995b), Lambert (2002) and Baskin (2000) are among those who 
tend towards pessimism regarding the ability of African labour organizations to bring about 
substantive change in industrial relations and the condition of the workers. However, the 
analyses of Kraus (2007a, 2007b), Kester (2007) and Kester and Sidibe (1997) take a more 
positive view in regard to these two key issues.  
 
Thomas (1995b) contends that despite the spread of privatization in Africa and consequent 
dismissals of public sector workers, trade union membership remains concentrated in the state 
sector. Moreover, there has been a decrease in earnings and an absence of job creation in Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa. These factors have „destroyed any possibility of the 
trade union movement‟s acting as a stable institution in labour-market development and 
transformation‟ (Thomas, 1995b: 239). Furthermore, Lambert (2002: 186) argues that labour 
organizations are characterized by organizational decline. While some individual unions and 
federations have attacked the negative effects of global neo-liberalism on workers, these efforts 
lack rigour and have not had any „significant impact or attract [ed) citizens into their ranks‟. For 
Baskin (2000: 54), to be successful a labour movement requires „the capacity to service its 
members and promote their interests‟ and a more centralized and structured collective bargaining 
environment than currently exists in Africa.  
 
In contrast, Kester (2007: 3) argues that trade unions in Africa are very important in campaigning 
for institutional democracy based on balancing ownership with other social concerns and are 
„ideally placed to contribute to the democratization of the economy.‟  In addition, Kraus (2007a) 
points out that unions in many African countries played key roles in organizing protests and 
strikes during the 1980s and 1990s which were significant in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. 
Through such actions unions also created political space which other CSOs could use to confront 
monolithic states. These actions have continued in a number of countries as neoliberal policies 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Furthermore, trade unions are the largest organizations that 
represent the working class in Africa. Von Holdt (2003: 304) argues that in South Africa there 
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has been a move from „militant resistance of workers excluded both politically and in the 
workplace, to a new form of unionism characterized by participation and engagement with both 
the state and management.‟ This has led to contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty in forming 
strategies, which has weakened solidarity and cohesion in the movement. Contrasting pressures 
brought about by competitive globalization and the ongoing attempts at political and economic 
change by Western donors have led to erratic responses by unions, covering „quiescence, 
defensive strategies, wildcat militancy, and attempts at proactive engagement with 
reconstruction‟ (Von Holdt, 2003: 306). 
  
For Jose (2002: 1), trade unions worldwide have constantly adapted in the face of globalization 
over the past three decades, combining strategies for changing labour into non-competing social 
groups. Trade unions thus „occupy a unique position as purveyors of social cohesion in all 
societies‟. However, union enlargement has been slowed by the upsurge in individual company-
unions which „represent highly skilled workers effectively but insulate them from a sense of 
collective identity or solidarity amongst workers‟ (Jose, 2002: 6). Unions have been forced to 
adapt to the political ramifications of globalization by addressing the needs of constituents who 
they have not traditionally represented systematically. The most important of these groups are 
the increasing numbers of casualized labour, women and youth. Globalization is forcing trade 
unions increasingly to compete to represent these (as well as their traditional) constituents, which 
necessitates changing their modus operandi and structures. As this research shows, NGOs have 
become service-providing competitors to trade unions in Tanzania. 
115
 Trade unions also face the 
problem that their traditional platforms for representation increasingly do not match the 
structures of the new investors in developing countries. These are often multi-national companies 
which prefer to deal only with national or international union bodies and ignore the branch and 
district levels (Kester, 2007).  
 
The arguments of writers such as Van Holdt (2003) that new forms of unionism are emerging in 
Africa, characterized by constructive engagement with the state and management as „partners,‟ 
raise important issues. One of these is whether trade unions adopting such a position have 
become representatives of a labour aristocracy in the form of a small group of relatively well 
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paid formal sector workers who have survived the mass dismissals precipitated by SAPs, while 
the majority of the workforce are poor, landless rural labourers or  engaged in precarious 
informal sector activities. 
 
6.3 The Labour Aristocracy Debate 
The term „labour aristocracy‟ has been interpreted in various ways during different time periods. 
Its origins have been traced by Lapides (1987) to usage by William Thompson in 1827 of the 
term „aristocracy of trades,‟ based on exclusivity. His views influenced Marx and Engels, who 
employed the phrase in writings from 1850 onwards. In 1885, Engels (1999: 321) described a 
sector of the English proletariat as having greatly improved their position since 1848, being on 
very good terms with their employers and comprising an „aristocracy among the working class‟, 
who had attained a relatively comfortable position that they regarded as permanent. 
116
 Lenin 
(1996) developed the theory of the labour aristocracy, attributing the emergence of an elite group 
of workers in imperialist countries to the „super-profits‟ made through exploiting colonies. These 
profits allowed employers to buy off labour leaders with high levels of earnings and job security, 
thus gaining their support for capital and ensuring that labour would follow a reformist path. 
Working class opportunism and the labour aristocracy were particularly marked in Great Britain, 
since the country achieved a dominant position in the world market for decades, before being 
challenged by rival powers. For Lenin (ibid: 110) the effects of this monopoly were such that a 
„section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois … [and a] section of the proletariat permits 
itself to be led by men sold to, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie.‟ Later versions of the labour 
aristocracy thesis (Elbaum and Seltzer, 2004, for example) focus on the monopolist exploitation  
by multi-national companies in certain economic sectors that allows them to make huge profits, 
some of which are used to provide a small group of privileged workers with secure jobs based on 
high levels of earnings and benefits. These workers constitute an aristocracy of labour and their 
existence is dependent on the super-exploitation of workers in competitive sectors of the 
advanced capitalist economies. Designating which criteria should be used to ascertain 
membership of the labour aristocracy is complicated. Hobsbawn (1976) outlines six pertinent 
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  In a different interpretation of the origins of the concept, Peace (1975) argues that the colonial authorities were 
the first to use and discuss „the labour aristocracy‟, based on a concern that early wage earners in the colonies could 
use their position to force up their earnings by collective actions.  
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factors, the most significant of which is the level of earnings of a worker. 
117
 Post (2006) also 
emphasizes the importance of the level of earnings in the labour aristocracy thesis, which he 
summarizes as based on the view that well paid workers are more conformist and politically 
conservative than those receiving low levels of remuneration. 
 
A problem in forming a convincing labour aristocracy thesis lies in the tension between structure 
and agency. The labour aristocracy are identified as a high stratum of the working class, which 
can be partly delineated structurally by the terms and conditions of their work, centred on their 
receipt of relatively large wages and benefits. However, they are also partly located by their 
attitudes and their reputation with other social classes as „respectable‟ and „trustworthy‟ people. 
Thus, their „structural class position is imbued with certain behavioural patterns‟ (Parpart, 1982: 
1).  These two key elements involved in determining which groups can be classed as a labour 
aristocracy inevitably co-exist and interrelate in complex and fluid ways, making objective 
definition difficult. Katz (1976), for example, outlines how white miners in South Africa at the 
turn of the twentieth century can be classed as a labour aristocracy partly because of the high 
wages they earned but also due to the fact that they refused to do menial work, were 
unsympathetic to, and discriminated against, unskilled workers, and had „notions of gentility 
which were reflected in their lifestyle‟ (Katz, 1976: 8). 118  
 
In Africa the labour aristocracy thesis has been put forward to explain the lack of revolutionary 
consciousness on the part of workers by radical left-wing analysts in the main but also by 
liberals, such as Berg and Butler (1964), who argue that economic and political power structures 
in Africa have been centralized by states since independence and are weighted overwhelmingly 
towards capital, making revolutionary action on the part of the working class difficult.  The 
radical perspective draws on Fanon (2001), who regarded African wage labourers as lacking the 
will to take up revolutionary paths, though he did recognize the power of trade unions in urban 
centres to mount effective direct actions. 
119
 Overall, the waged labour force in Africa after 
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  The five other five factors identified by Hobsbawn (1976) are; first, the regularity of wages paid as well as levels 
of social security. Second, the terms and conditions of employment, including the amount of respect afforded the 
worker by superiors. Third, the way the worker interacts with the social levels both above and below. Fourth, the 
worker‟s overall standard of living. Fifth, the prospects for advancement of the worker and his/her offspring. 
118
  This example also indicates that race can be a factor in labour aristocracy debates. 
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  See below for examples of such actions by trade unions in Tanzania during the colonial period. 
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independence from colonial rule has become „the most favoured section of the population, and 
represent the most comfortably off section of the people‟ (Fanon, 2001: 97).  
 
Arrighi and Saul (1973) produced an influential analysis from the radical perspective, premised 
on their identification of a small class, created under colonialism, which stabilized after 
independence, developing specialized skills and relatively strong bargaining power. „These 
workers enjoy incomes three or more times higher than those of unskilled labourers and together 
with the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and expatriate 
concerns, constitute what we call the labour aristocracy of tropical Africa‟ (Arrighi and Saul, 
1973: 149). 
 
The labour aristocracy thesis in the African context has been subjected to criticism from a 
number of sources. Jeffries (1975: 275) argues that in Ghana a number of the marginalized urban 
masses looked to the unionized working class as „their spokesmen rather than as a purely self-
interested labour aristocracy.‟ Parpart (1982: 16) contends that „the labor aristocracy thesis has 
little predictive value for understanding the behaviour of the upper stratum on the [Zambian] 
copperbelt.‟ Miners vary their behaviour and tactics according to what they perceive to be the 
best ways to gain advantages in the struggle with capital. Peace (1975), argues that the Arrighi-
Saul thesis fails to account for the way in which incremental earnings to workers in African 
urban centres actively promote closer economic and political ties between the labour force and 
non-wage earners.  For Peace (ibid), wage earners in Nigeria express generalized grievances as a 
consequence of perceived social injustice and have not developed sectional interests. Moreover, 
the Arrighi-Saul model needs to pay more attention to both the scale and the methods of 
exploitation of the labour aristocrats used by capitalists in the urban areas. For Peace, the level of 
surplus extraction in Nigeria is so great in these areas that it promotes a common identity 
between wage labourers and the marginalized rural majority, rather than distance.  
 
Saul (1975: 308) accepts the thrust of Peace‟s points and argues that the African working class 
must not be prematurely labelled and concentration must occur on „the processes which are at 
work in specific African settings. This means identifying, analytically, the objective conditions 
under which a more conservative or a more radical stance towards the neo-colonial situation is 
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likely to be adopted by the working class.'  Consequently, it is important to study the particular 
historical development of the trade union movement in order to adequately assess the 
explanatory power of the labour aristocracy thesis in the context of Tanzania. The legitimacy 
(based on their claims to represent labour) and the capacity (to set out ideologies and to organize 
actions) of the Tanzanian trade union movement have been shaped by a long process of 
development under different periods of political economy.  
 
6.4  The Trade Union Movement in Tanzania from the Origins to Independence 
Trade unions started to organize in Tanzania in 1931 as a result of unrest among African workers 
reacting to alienation from traditional cultural practices, low wages and poor living conditions. 
120
 Unions were legally recognized by the Trade Union Ordinance of 1932, which enshrined the 
principle of freedom of association. The need for effective labour organizations to represent 
workers during the 1930s and 1940s is illustrated by Cooper (1996: 326), who points out that 
„wages in East Africa generally made it impossible for workers to separate themselves from the 
rural economy.‟ Wage labourers needed the hidden subsidy from subsistence in order to be able 
to survive. 
 
Much of the labour unrest in Tanzania in the 1940s and the early 1950s centred on the dock 
industry. A serious dock strike took place in Dar es Salaam in 1943 with the state deploying 
troops. 
121
 This led to one hundred and forty two arrests but also to the setting up of a tribunal, 
which raised the wages of full-time dockers (Coulson, 1985). Further strikes over terms and 
conditions towards the end of the 1940s met with a hard-line state response, since leaders would 
not bow to the demands made of them and dockers occupied an important strategic position in an 
export-oriented economy (Barker et al 1986: 47).   By 1947, the dock industry was unionized 
with a working class leadership, which initiated a general strike in September 1947. While the 
strike broke down after just over a fortnight in Dar es Salaam it continued to spread throughout 
the country. This led to the formation of a labour tribunal, which introduced a pay increase of 
between forty and fifty per cent.  Moreover, channels of communication were set up between 
representative organs of capital and labour primarily to ensure that „grievances could be dealt 
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  Hundreds of workers died in 1930, for example, in the Lupa goldfields, as a result of scurvy (Rodney, 1972). 
121
  There were precedents. For example, dockers went on strike in Tanga in 1937 over poor terms and conditions of 
employment. 
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with before they reached explosive levels‟ (Bienefeld, 1979: 557). However, another dock strike 
occurred in 1950, during which the use of casual labour precipitated rioting, leading to the deaths 
of at least two people. 
122
  
 
This violence and a more general fear of expanded trade union activity in Tanzania led to a shift 
on the part of the state in its war of position. Legal-bureaucratic measures (cf. NGOs, examined 
in chapter 5) were enhanced to control the formation of, and the work of, existing trade unions. 
The Dockers Union was first to feel the effects of this change, when it was dissolved by a High 
Court order in 1950 for not conducting itself responsibly. For Iliffe (1975: 69) this not only 
ended the Dockers Union but also „a whole period of labour history in Tanzania.‟ One year later 
the Trade Union Ordinance was enacted, which formalized and regulated the position of labour 
organizations in the country. The Ordinance required all trade unions to register with the state, 
thereby facilitating greater knowledge of, and control over, their officials and work. However, as 
is the case in post-liberalization Tanzania, the state was influenced by transnational actors, in its 
struggle with oppositional civil society forces. The British government based in London was the 
most influential of these actors. It passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, requiring 
all colonies to enact laws enshrining the rights of trade unions, as a condition of the provision of 
economic aid (see chapter 3). The state, therefore, had to be seen to be acting in accordance with 
this directive. Thus, while the Trade Union Ordinance was primarily a way for the state to 
control the formation and the remit of labour associations, such organizations were able to use 
the legislation to gain formal status in the civil society sphere. Thus, the registration of the 
African Commercial Employees Association (ACEA) in 1953 (see also chapter 3) provided a 
springboard for the foundation of a number of other trade unions.  
 
Challenges to state hegemony were also influenced by transnational actors. A visit to Tanganyika 
by Tom Mboya, the Head of the Kenyan Federation of Labour, in 1955, constituted an impetus 
to the formation of the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL) on 7 October of the same year, 
at a Dar es Salaam conference. Julius Nyerere, the President of TANU, addressed the conference 
and a full time General Secretary, Mr Kawawa was elected. The TFL was charged with two main 
                                                          
122
  The state even used the feared Motorised Unit (MU) of the military „against striking workers … during the 1950 
dockworkers strike‟ (Shivji, 1990: 19). 
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tasks; to organize and place workers in relevant affiliate unions and to amalgamate all small craft 
unions which shared a similarity of purpose into larger industrial unions (Kitine, 1976).  The 
TFL‟s work during the latter half of the 1950s was largely economistic in nature. However, the 
organization‟s attempts to improve terms and conditions of employment met with little success, 
since power resided with the state and capital. One of the main ways in which the state 
maintained hegemony in the face of challenges from the TFL was the direct transference of key 
features of the British model of trade unionism to Tanganyika. This led to the British national 
structure, rules for leaders and the rank-and-file members and bargaining methods being imposed 
on the federation via the Tanganyika Department of Labour (Friedland, 1969), which were 
difficult for trade union officials to understand. While these structural measures ensured that 
senior trade union officials struggled to operate effectively on behalf of labour, individual actions 
by workers provided a significant challenge to the interests of capital and the state in certain 
sectors of the economy.  For example, on the economically important sisal plantations, 
„absenteeism, strikes, property destruction and the organised evasion of taxes‟ (Bolton, 1978: 
176) showed that workers were conscious of being exploited by management. The state 
responded with further legal-bureaucratic measures. For example, it refused to let the 
Tanganyikan Sisal Plantation Workers Union (TSPWU) form on a national basis, restricting it to 
the status of a provincial organization, which was inaugurated in March 1956. By April 1958 the 
union had only three representatives on the Central Joint Council, a statutory body covering the 
sisal industry, while twenty four members were employer controlled (Bolton, 1978). 
 
6.5  National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA)   
The advent of independence on 9 December 1961 led to almost total defeat for trade unions in 
their war of position with the state. 
123
  TFL leaders pressed the state for greater autonomy, 
which was rejected, leading to a series of strikes during 1962. The state reacted by passing a law 
requiring all trade unions to affiliate to the TFL if they wanted to retain legal status, thus 
facilitating close  supervision. It also passed legislation making strikes almost impossible without 
the permission of the Ministry of Labour (Mwakyembe, 1986, Shivji, 1986). The Preventative 
Detention Act of 1962 also presaged the emasculation of the trade union movement. This act 
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  Ananaba (1979) points out that this was the case in many African countries following independence from 
colonial rule. 
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allowed unlimited detention at the President‟s discretion of anyone acting in a manner prejudicial 
to state security. The fact that the first person to be detained under the act was the then President 
of the TFL, Victor Mkello, showed that „the government was looking for an opportunity to snuff 
out the trade union movement‟ (Kapinga, 1986: 89). The final incident which led to the state 
dissolving the TFL was a mutiny by soldiers demanding the Africanization of the Officers Corps.  
The TFL issued a statement in support of improved pay and conditions for the rebels, which 
infuriated the state, and ensured that „its fate was sealed‟ (Rupiya, Lwehabura and Le Roux, 
2006: 77). Trade unionists were accused by the state of being involved in an attempted coup and 
over two hundred of them subsequently arrested. As well as legal-bureaucratic means in the 
forms of detention and new legislation, the state used dispersal tactics to dissipate the power of 
the trade unions. Some „difficult‟ trade union leaders were given diplomatic posts abroad. Thus, 
the effective use of a combination of coercive aspects of the integral state, „marked the end of 
trade union autonomy‟ in Tanzania (Kitindi, 1999: 56).  The formation by the state of the 
National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) to replace the TFL occurred in February 1964. 
The state tightly controlled NUTA and prevented the organization acting in ways inimical to its 
interests. Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) could only be struck between the 
government and NUTA, and individual trade unions could not even exist as separate legal 
entities outside NUTA. These measures made it almost impossible for trade unions to challenge 
state hegemony. 
 
Rank-and-file union members did little in the face of the emasculation of the movement after 
independence. This was due to a lack of contact between the grassroots union membership and 
the leadership. For Bienefeld (1972: 24), no „better illustration of the isolation of the trade union 
leadership from their members can be found than the bald fact that the arrest of the bulk of the 
trade union leadership brought no response.‟ Effective opposition to state control and the 
interests of capital had often been based on the actions of workers at individual places of 
employment. There is continuity between the nature of these actions and ones that are occurring 
in contemporary Tanzania. In 2011, the ITUC (2011: 2) reported that „workers tend to stage 
illegal wildcat strikes and walkouts.‟ Most disputes centred on the particular nature of the work 
and workers‟ responses to their situations. Thus, as Iliffe (1975: 119) points out, to view the 
actions of Tanzanian trade unions „solely “from the top” is to miss the dynamic that powers the 
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movement.‟ Bolton (1978: 199) argues that by the 1950s sisal workers acted in solidarity with 
one another on particular plantations but, despite union efforts to quicken a sense of 
consciousness in workers, they were not, at the time when NUTA was inaugurated, „ready to act 
as a united labour force in opposition to the employer class‟ and „not yet committed to national 
class action.‟ Thus, trade union leaders in Tanzania during the 1960s lost the war of position with 
the state not only through the latter‟s use of repressive legal-bureaucratic measures, but also 
because they failed to form the basis for a historic bloc of oppositional groups by building a 
close relationship with their own rank-and-file members. They had few contacts with the rank-
and-file trade unionists and were not responsive to members‟ needs. In Gramscian terms, trade 
union leaders were a „caste‟ of reformist bureaucrats, who did not have the interests of the 
workers at heart (Gramsci, 1919). .These two issues remain salient with regard to the current 
situation of the labour movement (see below in this section and the fieldwork findings section, 
for details). 
 
The state also used the discourse of national liberation effectively in maintaining hegemony in 
the face of challenges from trade unions after independence. TANU operated an effective divide 
and rule policy in resisting trade union pay claims, which stifled the 'revolution of rising 
expectations' (Tumbo, 1969: 30), on the part of workers. They did this by invoking the need for 
self-sacrifice on the part of all civil society organizations, including trade unions, in order to 
achieve true national liberation from the repressive legacies of colonialism. It was stressed by the 
ruling party that the majority of employees in the country were poor agricultural workers, who 
had no comparable voice to trade unions to stand up for their interests. For example, at the 
Second Annual Conference of NUTA in 1967, Nyerere argued that unionized workers were 
improving their terms and conditions of employment at the expense of impoverished farmers, 
which was insupportable (Nyerere, 1976, Matiko, 1968). Thus, whenever trade unions made 
substantial claims on behalf of their members, the argument that they were egotistical 
representatives of a labour aristocracy was used against them as a powerful weapon by the state 
as part of its war of position. 
 
In practice, NUTA did not represent workers‟ interests. None of its leaders were chosen by 
workers and its structures and objectives were defined by the legislature. At plant level NUTA 
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provided for the existence of Workers Committees but these were often close to management and 
commanded little respect from the shop floor. Critics (as is the case in contemporary Tanzania) 
accused the state of making deals with foreign capital on terms favourable to the investors and 
their own officials and argued that NUTA‟s primary roles were to 'discipline and control 
workers... [and to] serve the interests of the ruling class' (Rwechungura, 1976: 51).  NUTA was 
forced continually to confront the paradox of the government‟s efforts to „serve both the interests 
of its population and those of foreign capital‟ (Bienefeld, 1977: 33). Thus, under NUTA, the 
state used trade unions to discipline the working class and in return granted leaders at the centre 
tangible benefits in the form of regular salaries, reasonably well-equipped offices and status. 
Consequently, working class opposition to state hegemony was neutered by tactics which led to 
the labour movement conceding a large amount of ground in the war of position.  
 
Nevertheless, the publication by the state of Mwongozo (TANU Guidelines) in 1971 led to a 
period where workers were able to exercise a degree of power vis-à-vis management. Mwongozo 
contained clauses stipulating the need to eradicate corruption and waste and stated that party 
officials and managers should set good examples to others through their lifestyles. Clause 15 of 
Mwongozo stated that „there must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and 
those they lead‟ (Davidson, 1987: 332). These were used by workers to instigate actions against 
the abuse of the trappings of management power, which again resonates with contemporary 
events in Tanzania, where there is anger about the way wealth is paraded and power used by 
managers working for „new [often foreign] investors‟ in the country (see chapter 3). Between the 
publication of Mwongozo in February 1971 and September 1973, Davidson (1987) records thirty 
one strikes occurring, which „strained relations between management and workers in enterprises‟ 
(Mihyo, 1979: 270). Of these actions, the dispute at the Mount Carmel rubber plant from 1972 to 
1973 (Tarimo, 1977, Mihyo, 1975) was decisive in making the government move against 
Mwongozo‟s adoption as a „workers charter.‟ 124 This was because the Tanganyika Development 
Finance Company (TDFL) was an investor in the Mount Carmel factory and British, German and 
Dutch development corporations were TDFL shareholders. Thus, a clash with the TDFL meant 
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  Other significant industrial actions during this period included strikes at the Sungura Textiles plant in 1972, 
(Chachage and Chachage, 2005, Mihyo, 1975), the British American Tobacco factory in 1973 (Musoke, 1978) and 
the Kioo Soft Drinks Company from 1974 to 1975 (Msuku, 1976), which all centred on worker anger at 
management extravagance and misuse of resources. 
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opposing powerful capitalist countries, which the state was not prepared to risk.  
 
In the months following the end of the Mount Carmel dispute, therefore, the Tanzanian state 
moved to take control of factories away from workers. This showed clearly the limits to the 
participatory culture in Tanzania, to which Nyerere (1976) was committed. He wanted the people 
to articulate their needs through channels to which the state had to respond. However, Nyerere 
also recognized that raising economic productivity was paramount and the introduction of 
Mwongozo had led to a situation where this was put at risk. Nyerere (1976: 315) had made it 
clear that both the workers and NUTA must not „allow industrial disputes of any kind to 
jeopardize production.‟ Thus, in the aftermath of the Mount Carmel conflict, official permission 
from TANU was made necessary before any industrial dispute could take place and workers‟ 
representatives deemed „militant‟ were sacked and in some cases imprisoned (Bienefeld, 1979). 
It became evident that workers „would not control their factories and they would have little or no 
power over the Tanzanian state‟ (Coulson, 1985: 289). As Davidson (1987) argues, the attempt 
through Mwongozo to build a party of mass participation against the power of state bureaucrats 
was a fraught process, illustrating the difficulty of bringing about systemic change within and 
against an established neo-colonial culture and structure. 
 
6.6 Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) 
As a result of the formal merger between the ruling parties on the Tanzanian mainland and 
Zanzibar (Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) respectively) in 1977, 
the state decided to form a new trade union federation to represent the whole republic. To this 
end they disestablished NUTA and created Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) in 
1979. Nyerere oversaw the appointment of trade union leaders and was able to exclude and 
therefore silence potential dissenters to state policies. Under JUWATA trade unions were subject 
to even greater state control than had been the case with NUTA. JUWATA was forced to operate 
under CCM's constitution, whereas NUTA had at least worked under its own. The General 
Secretary of JUWATA was also the Minister of Labour and a labyrinthine system of regulations 
made strikes impossible.  In these ways, the state gave the labour movement no room to 
manoeuvre in the war of position and trade unions lacked any opportunity to form a counter-
hegemonic discourse.  JUWATA, like NUTA, was placed in the untenable position of trying to 
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defend the interests of both the state and labour. An example of the contradictory nature of 
JUWATA‟s position occurred from 1979 to 1980 when the union brokered an annual bonus of 
TZS 6,720 to the Bank of Tanzania workers which the government subsequently reduced to TZS 
2,500 for „economic and unavoidable reasons‟ (Duma 1990: 186). In the ensuing dispute 
JUWATA supported the workers claims for the original amount at branch level but at the same 
time argued in favour of the government‟s reduction at its Head Office. The government position 
inevitably prevailed. 
 
6.7 Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) period 
125
 from the mid-1980s was difficult for the 
labour movement in Tanzania, since the IFIs were „openly hostile to trade union organizations‟ 
(Chambua, 1997: 309). Trade union membership was concentrated in the state sector, where, by 
the time the third phase of the SAP had taken effect during the second half of the 1990s, 
dismissals had been substantive. Between 1993 and 1997 the public sector payroll was cut by 
twenty seven per cent from 355,000 to 260,000 (World Bank, 2000). Mistrust between the state 
and representatives of labour remained during the SAP period with the state worried by the 
prospect of a strong and independent union movement that could form a sustainable counter-
hegemonic discourse in response to the policies being promulgated. Trade unions were by-
passed in discussions on policy formation and SAPs were constructed and put into practice in a 
way which excluded the „vast majority of the population (the urban poor, public servants and 
rural dwellers) from decision-making processes‟ (Rusimbi, 2003: 102).  
 
Interviews conducted as part of this research show that state acceptance of structural adjustment 
in Tanzania provided trade unions, almost inadvertently, with a counter-hegemonic discourse, 
since they became regarded by members and the wider citizenry as guardians of welfarism. 
Therefore, while unions provided opposition to SAPs partly to protect their own corporate 
interests in SOEs, they also voiced popular anxiety about the future of social services. For 
example, in interviews, leaders of the larger trade unions stressed how they had argued that 
sectors such as water, health and education, should never be privatized, as they were concerned 
with public goods, equitable access to which must be seen as a human right for all Tanzanians. 
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  See chapter 3 – section 3.5, for an overview of the period of SAPs in Tanzania. 
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126
 This struck a chord with the Tanzanian public, who, ironically, had heard similar arguments 
for years from state officials and Nyerere himself. However, although the Tanzanian labour 
movement did mount protests against the negative effects of structural adjustment on workers, it 
failed to address three vital issues. First, it did not systematically put forward alternative policies 
to SAPs. Second, it failed to develop detailed analyses of the relationship between multiparty 
liberal democracy and economic development in the country. Third, it was slow to adopt a 
participatory approach towards rank-and-file union members. These failures stemmed 
fundamentally from lack of capacity and vision on the part of the labour movement and meant 
that a chance to form a counter-hegemonic discourse, which had the potential to carry with it the 
mood of the public, was lost. 
 
At the 1991 JUWATA Annual Congress, workers called for more freedom for trade union 
activities and separation from the state. This pressure influenced the creation of the Tanzanian 
Trade Union Act of 1991, which contained a provision allowing trade unions to be formed 
individually and separately from the structures of the federation, leading to the creation of the 
Organization of Tanzanian Trade Unions (OTTU) in 1992. All members of JUWATA 
automatically became members of OTTU and newly-formed trade unions were required to 
affiliate to OTTU. 
127
  OTTU was, however, allowed to have its own constitution and was free 
from direct political control by the government. This meant that more policy space opened up 
than had existed previously in the post-independence period and trade unionists were able to 
work towards the creation of 'free' trade unions, which could choose whether to affiliate to 
OTTU. From 1992 until 1995 ten sector-based trade unions drew up constitutions, held their own 
elections and were formally registered. However, the state‟s use of legal-bureaucratic methods as 
a weapon in the war of position remained significant; both the struggle to be recognized as a 
trade union and the registration process were made cumbersome. 
128
 Despite these measures 
OTTU organized a short-lived general strike in 1994. While the federation made a solid case for 
the need to improve the terms of conditions of employment for the majority of workers, the 
economic crisis in Tanzania at the time meant that there were no funds available to finance the 
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  The old guard leaders of TUGHE and TALGWU expressed this view with particular conviction. 
127
 This contravened the right to Freedom of Association set out in United Nations Conventions and caused friction 
between the government and the Western donors, as it was not in line with the „New Policy Agenda.‟ 
128
  For example, the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) was formed on 1 November 1993 only after a long struggle, 
culminating in strikes by teachers (Michael, 2001). 
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demands without printing more money. 
129
  This was the first major action at a national level 
organized by the trade union movement since One Party rule was established in 1965. At its 
1995 Congress OTTU changed its name to the Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions 
(TFTU). However, the TFTU had an unclear status because under the provisions of the OTTU 
Act, OTTU was the only lawfully recognized Trade Union Federation (Kitindi, 1999, 
Mukandala, 1999).   
 
Tanzania‟s adoption of multi-party liberal democracy led to national elections being held in 
1995. This development indicated a significant shift in the war of position, driven to a large 
extent by transnational actors trying to inculcate Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) policies in 
Tanzania. The PWC stresses the need to pay more attention to the sequencing of reforms than the 
original Washington Consensus (see chapter 1) and emphasizes the need to build durable and 
effective institutions before wider reforms, such as privatization, can be put in place (Stiglitz, 
2010, Stiglitz, 2002, Burki and Perry, 1998). However, in the case of Tanzania, the donors 
required the state to act in haste to bring in legislation based on the PWC reforms. Donor 
agencies pressed, in particular, for freedom of association to be allowed in Tanzania, as a key 
plank of the wider move towards embracing liberal democracy. As a result, the state came under 
pressure to rescind the OTTU Act, but had little time to conduct research on a replacement. 
Thus, the promulgation in 1998 of new trade union legislation was rushed.  While the reforms, in 
general, and the new law, in particular, led to the state losing some ground to the labour 
movement in the war of position, the results were confusing and contradictory, with two trade 
union federations operating, both of which had an unclear legal status. 
 
The Trade Union Act 1998 (URT, 1998) came into force on 1 July 2000, replacing the 1991 
OTTU Act, and formally recognized freedom of association on the part of trade unions. 
130
 Thus, 
it signified a formal split between the labour movement and the state (Chambua, 2002a). and 
marked a new phase of trade unionism in Tanzania. 
131
 The 1998 act was incorporated into the 
Labour and Industrial Relations Act (2004) and defined unions in Tanzania as „any combination, 
either temporary or permanent, of 20 or more employees … the principle purposes of which is 
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  Source: Interview with Professor Samuel Chambua, 2006. 
130
  Both the OTTU and the TFTU were de-registered as federations as part of the Trade Union Act 1998. 
131
  See Table 6.1 below for a summary of all the phases of trade unionism in Tanzania. 
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the regulation of the relations between employers and employees‟ (URT, 1998: 4).  This piece of 
legislation marked an important shift in the labour movement‟s war of position with the state. 
Under its terms, workers were allowed, for the first time in more than thirty five years in 
Tanzania, to organize trade unions which had their own constitutions, rules and elections. 
However, other aspects of the legislation showed that the state was able to continue its history of 
using legal-bureaucratic measures to maintain hegemony in Tanzania. For example, the law 
requires trade unions to register with the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions (ORTU), which 
is part of the Ministry of Labour, within one month of formation, in order to acquire legal status.  
The ORTU has been criticized for possessing excessive powers (ICFTU, 2011), particularly 
concerning its freedom to register (and de-register) trade unions (see the fieldwork findings 
section below for details). The powers of the Registrar of the ORTU are wide-ranging and not 
dissimilar to those possessed by the Registrar of Societies, who oversaw the registration and 
operations of NGOs from 1954 until changes in legislation during the post-liberalization period 
(see chapter 5 for details). 
 
As well as altering the relationship between the labour movement and the state, the law also led 
to a substantial change for trade unions in terms of their relations with transnational actors. 
Individual trade unions and federations gained the right under the 1998 act to affiliate with, or be 
a member of, any consultative body registered inside or outside Tanzania.  In the pre-
liberalization period, the state used legal-bureaucratic measures to prevent trade unions from 
affiliating with influential organizations based outside Tanzania, such as the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU), both of which had resources available to assist labour movements in developing 
countries. Here, the state used the discourse of national liberation 
132
 effectively as a tactic 
against the trade unions in the war of position. It achieved this by arguing that reliance on outside 
financial support would leave unions in a dependent position, leading to pressure on them to 
implement policies and actions which could jeopardize the national liberation struggle, which 
was of paramount importance (Musoke 1978).  
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  See also section 6.1 above for details of how this discourse was employed. 
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However, although the labour movement gained the freedom under the 1998 Trade Union Act to 
access foreign funding and support for their work in the post-liberalization era, little has been 
forthcoming in practice, with the notable exception of assistance from the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA). 
133
 Since 2000, DANIDA has given technical and financial 
support with the aim of making TUCTA a „fully functioning organization.‟ 134 DANIDA works 
with all the trade unions affiliated to TUCTA as part of its overall remit to improve the labour 
market in Tanzania through its Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS) (DANIDA, 2002). 
Starting in 2000, Phase 1 (BSPS I) of DANIDA‟s work focused on revision of the labour laws 
and lasted three years. During Phase 2 (BSPS II), work on reforming the main central 
organizations of TUCTA took centre stage for a five year period. From 1 July 2008, DANIDA 
moved to the third phase (BSPS III) of its work, focusing on the technical capacity-building of 
unions in the regions. By the  completion of BSPS III, „the trade unions of Tanzania mainland 
affiliated with TUCTA will be able to provide effective services to their members in Collective 
Bargaining Agreements and dispute settlement and effectively advocate the interests of the 
members in bi- and tripartite and international forums‟ (Hansen, 2008b: 3). BPS III also aims to 
bring about greater social dialogue involving representatives of labour, capital and the state and 
to develop corporate social responsibility. BPS III is, therefore, premised on the business 
unionism approach to labour movements. In overall terms, assistance aims to build up physical 
and communications infrastructure of the trade union movement along with more efficient 
service delivery than currently exists. These objectives are not proving easy to accomplish, with 
achievements from the end of one DANIDA planning-retreat in 2008 (focused on increasing the 
effectiveness of inter-departmental cooperation at TUCTA‟s head office) to the start of another, 
summarized by an official as „minimal‟ (Hansen, 2008a; 1). According to DANIDA officials 
interviewed as part of this research, trade union departments at the federation head office lack the 
technical capacity and vision to cooperate effectively in driving the movement forward. There is 
little cohesion between departments, which do not keep each other systematically informed of 
their projects, programmes or policies. This fundamental lack of co-ordination among trade 
union departments at the federation‟s head office is a significant reason for the failure of the 
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 Support from transnational organizations for particular projects involving Tanzanian trade unions has come from 
LO-TCO (Sweden), LO-Norway, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, The Canadian Labour Federation and ICFTU-AFRO, 
LO/FTF Council (Denmark), the Danish Union of Teachers and the Danish General Workers Union.  
134
  Source: Interview with DANIDA official, 2008. 
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labour movement to form a counter-hegemonic discourse in the post-liberalization period. 
Table 6.1 Phases of Trade Unionism in Tanzania  
Period Dates Freedom of Association – 
Individual Trade Unions 
Freedom of Association – Trade 
Union Federations 
Separate Trade Union 
Constitution 
Pre-independence (from 
TU Ordinance 1932) 
1932-
1961 
Yes Yes – Tanganyikan Federation of 
Labour (TFL) 
Yes 
Early period of 
independence (TU 
Amendment Act, 1962) 
1962-
1964 
Yes No – only United Federation allowed 
by state 
Yes 
National Union of 
Tanganyikan Workers 
(NUTA) Act, 1964 
1964-
1979 
No – unions could not exist as 
separate legal entities outside 
NUTA 
No – only NUTA (state - controlled) 
allowed 
Yes 
Jumuiya ya 
Wafanyakazi wa 
Tanzania (JUWATA) 
Act, 1979  
1979-
1991 
No – unions could not exist as 
separate legal entities outside 
JUWATA 
No – only JUWATA (state-controlled) 
allowed 
No – JUWATA 
forced to operate 
under constitution of 
ruling party - CCM 
Organization of 
Tanzanian Trade Unions 
Act (OTTU), 1991 
1991-
1998 
Yes – provision in 
1991Tanzanian Trade Union 
Act (No.20) allowed unions to 
be formed outside OTTU  
No/Yes – Only OTTU allowed 1991-
1995. At 1995 union elections, new 
federation created – Tanzanian 
Federation of Free Trade Unions 
(TFTU). This had no legal recognition 
Yes 
Trade Unions Act, 1998 1998-
Present 
Yes Yes – Trade Union Congress of 
Tanzania (TUCTA) 
Yes 
Source: McQuinn (2011) 
 
All trade unions were dissolved following the enactment of the 1998 Trade Union law, and had 
to re-apply for membership of the new federation – the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania 
(TUCTA). The old trade unions successfully applied to join TUCTA and the „old guard‟ leaders 
mostly remained in place. 
135
 However, some freshly created unions emerged with „new guard‟ 
leaders.  
136
 A number of these unions attempted to form a separate federation, which they 
proposed to name the Tanzania Federation of Labour, after the organization which existed prior 
to independence. This attempt to form an alternative power centre to TUCTA continues to the 
present and is the source of rancour and division within the movement (see the examination of 
the proposed May Day strike in 2010 below in this section). 
 
The TUCTA headquarters in Dar es Salaam contains the offices of its main departments and 
eight out of its fourteen affiliate unions. TUCTA also has a college at Mbeya which runs courses 
on labour-related issues but lacks the financial and technical capacity to operate it effectively 
                                                          
135
 „Old guard‟ refers to union leader who held positions of power in the movement prior to the substantive changes 
which occurred with the advent of liberalization at the end of the 1980s. 
136
  „New guard‟ refers to both to senior union officials at TUCTA and leaders of individual trade unions appointed 
after the changes which occurred in the labour movement caused by the advent liberalization at the end of the 1980s. 
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(Chambua, 2002b). In overall terms, TUCTA has the task of reorganizing and leading the trade 
union movement in the post-liberalization era. This primarily involves the re-setting of 
relationships with the state and representatives of capital to form a tripartite arrangement in 
which the interests of labour are addressed. It also necessitates finding ways to serve the needs of 
workers in dealings with the influential external donors operating in Tanzania and the foreign 
new investors who are particularly important in the mining sector of the economy (see chapter 
3). 
TUCTA is headed by a General Secretary, supported by a Deputy General Secretary, who is 
responsible for the day to day operations of the organization and cooperation between 
departments. The work of the General Secretary is more externally oriented. The organization 
has four main departments – Economics and Research, Education, Gender and Youth Issues and 
Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS. Of the twenty one trade unions in 
Tanzania registered by the Office of the Registrar (as at April 2011), fourteen are affiliated to 
TUCTA.  TUCTA has been offered a free website by the ICFTU and has a domain space, but 
lacks the finance to set up and maintain the site. It does not produce a regular journal or 
newsletter. Heads of department have computers and email addresses, though communication 
has been hampered in recent years by regular power cuts.  
Currently, according to officials at TUCTA Head Office, one third of workers in the formal 
sector are unionized and the total trade union membership is around 800,000. 
137
 However, the 
membership figures obtained from those interviews (provided from membership lists which are 
submitted to the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions and from the documents and personal 
knowledge of senior union officials) show a total trade union membership of 352,458, which is 
447,542 less than the TUCTA estimate. 
138
 According to the latest Integrated Labour Force 
Survey (URT, 2007a) the total labour force in Tanzania is 20.6 million, of which 15,759,000 
(76.5%) are involved in agriculture and 4,841,000 (23.5%) in industry or services. This means 
that from the figures obtained as part of this research, 1.71% of the total workforce is unionized. 
Breaking the figures down further provides deeper insights into the density of trade union 
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  See also TUCTA (2004b) for trade union membership profiles and figures. 
138
 The findings for this research on total trade union membership are closer to the number of 407,000 provided in 
2003 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003c) than they are to TUCTA figures.  
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membership. Of the 76.5% (17,759,000) who comprise the agricultural sector, 67.2% 
(11,934,048) work on their own farms or shambas and thus have little incentive to join a trade 
union. Only 18.4% (3,267,656) of the agricultural sector are paid employees and, thus, have a 
substantial potential interest in joining a trade union. All twenty one unions in Tanzania draw 
members from the industry or services sectors, with the exception of the Tanzania Plantation and 
Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU) and the very small Tanzania Agroforestry Workers 
Union (TAWU), which have a combined membership of 26,482.  Taking the combined figures 
for TPAWU and TAWU as representing unionized workers in agriculture in relation to the total 
number of wage labourers (3,267,656) in the sector, then 8.7% are unionized. Subtracting the 
memberships of TPAWU and TAWU from the total number of trade unionists in the country, 
produces a figure of 325,976 wage labourers in the nineteen unions covering the industrial and 
service sectors.  This equates to a union membership of 6.73% in the industrial and services 
sectors. Thus, findings from this research show that there is a significant percentage of unionized 
workers in both the formal industrial and service sectors and amongst wage labourers in the 
agricultural sphere. These findings (based on a total trade union membership of 352,458) are 
summarized in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2 Level of Unionization in the Tanzanian Labour Force 
 Number Percentage 
unionized 
No. of trade unions representing 
workers in these sectors 
Total labour force 20,600,000 1.71 21 
Total labour force in 
agricultural sector 
15,759,000 0.17 2 
Total wage labourers in 
agricultural sector 
3,267,656 8.7 2 
Total labour force in 
industry and services  
4,841000 6.73 19 
Sources: URT, (2007a), McQuinn, (2011) 
As Figure 6.1 below shows, the trade union membership in Tanzania is concentrated, with 
75.86% of the total belonging to just four unions – the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) - 
157,000 (44.54% of the total); the Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU) – 
37,493 (10.64%), the Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) – 37,022 
(10.5%) and the Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE) – 35,868 
(10.18%). This means that there are seventeen other unions, which make up only 24.14% of the 
total membership between them. Therefore, the outcome of the 1998 Trade Union Act has been, 
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somewhat paradoxically, both the proliferation of trade unions and the concentration of 
membership. 
 
Figure 6.1  Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Concentration 
Tanzania Teachers 
Union (TTU)  
157,000
Tanzania Local 
Government 
Workers Union 
(TALGWU) 37,493
Tanzania Union of 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Workers (TUICO) 
37,022
Tanzania Union of 
Government and 
Health Employees 
(TUGHE) 35,868
Other Trade Unions 
(x17) 85,075
  
Source: McQuinn (2011) 
139
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139
  See appendix 6.3 for details of the membership numbers of every trade union in Tanzania. 
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Of the four biggest unions, the TTU is by far the largest, partly through the stress placed on the 
importance of education, and hence the widespread building of schools and training of teachers, 
under the Nyerere regime from the 1960s onwards, when union membership was compulsory. 
The TTU has also increased its numbers as a result of the Post-Washington Consensus emphasis 
on human capital, 
140
 which has led to rises in funding for education from donors and, 
consequently, to the training of new teachers, who the TTU have recruited into the union with a 
considerable degree of success. The TTU has modern and well- equipped premises in Dar es 
Salaam. It has been involved in regular disputes with the state in the post-liberalization period, 
particularly over back payments of salaries and expenses owed to teachers. The second and 
fourth biggest unions, TALGWU and TUGHE, are made up of civil servants and frontline 
workers from the health sector. While their numbers declined as a consequence of the dismissals 
which followed the imposition of SAPs (see chapter 3), they retain larger memberships than 
most of the existing unions, have experienced leaderships and offices in the TUCTA 
Headquarters. They are, therefore, close to the national leadership of the labour movement. 
Consequently, the bulk of trade union membership in Tanzania is white collar, with the 
exception of the third biggest union, TUICO, which draws its members from the industrial and 
commercial sectors. TUICO has an active leadership and produces newsletters on important 
issues for members.    
Concerning the remaining seventeen organizations, TPAWU, which has the fifth largest 
membership of 26,461, is a dynamic organization. One of its officials contributes to international 
newsletters on health and safety concerns in the cut flower industry, which the state has targeted 
as an important sector to develop. Major problems for TPAWU officials are the dispersed nature 
of the membership, which makes it difficult to maintain clarity and cohesion in the union and the 
casualization of the workforce, which has occurred since liberalization. 
141
 Beneath TPAWU in 
size, come a group of five unions, which are medium-sized in the context of the Tanzanian 
labour movement, with memberships of between 5,000 and 15,000. Three of these unions, the 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU), the Tanzanian 
Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) and the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
                                                          
140
  See chapter 1 for a discussion of the importance of human capital as part of the Post-Washington Consensus and, 
in particular, the work of Rose, (2006, 2003) and Fine and Rose (2001) on the topic. 
141
  See Fischer (2011) for figures.  
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(TAMICO), are involved in complex struggles to protect members‟ interests in the face of 
assertive entry into the sectors in which they operate by largely foreign new investors in 
Tanzania. Officials from all three unions feel strongly that the state sides markedly with the 
interests of new investors and provides little practical help or support for their members or 
leaders. This is linked to a rising nationalist discourse in the trade union movement, stimulated 
by the refusal of the state to make transparent the details of contracts it has signed from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards with major foreign investors, particularly in the mining, 
tourism and transport sectors. Another member of this medium sized group, the Researchers, 
Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU) contains a large number of highly qualified 
members, many of whom are lecturers at universities 
 
The remaining eleven unions, making up more than half of the total number registered, are small, 
having less than 3,000 members each. From this group, some significant issues can be 
highlighted. The Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees (TUPSE) operates in a sector 
which is growing rapidly in the country and has attracted considerable foreign investment. Many 
members of TUPSE are engaged in guarding the new businesses in the country, mostly in the 
telecommunications, mining and tourism sectors. Officials expressed great concern at the 
aggressively anti-union stance of employers in this sector and at the lack of support from the 
state in dealing with issues arising from this attitude.  The Telecommunications Workers Union 
of Tanzania (TEWUTA) operates in a sector which is one of the „success stories‟ of economic 
development in the country. However, the union has been involved in disputes with employers 
over privatization in the sector, as well as the terms and conditions under which members work. 
Officials from the Tanzania Pilots Union argued that investment in areas such as expanding 
training for pilots and routes flown was inadequate. They set these arguments in the context of 
much-publicized state plans to bring about growth in the tourism industry. For a TPU official, 
the fact that the organization had never been invited to discuss schemes for the expansion of the 
airlines in Tanzania, showed that the state is not serious about its own plans to develop the 
tourism industry and produces plans for the sector mainly because it is a favourite of the IFIs, 
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Irrespective of the sizes of the twenty one trade unions registered in Tanzania, they lack 
institutional and financial capacity, with the important exception of the TTU. Where almost all 
the NGOs taking part in national policy-making processes have functioning websites, to which 
content is regularly added, the TTU is the only union to have such a facility, although it contains 
little information and is not updated. Only three unions have a Research and Economics 
Department and two, an Education/Training Department. Thus, unions lack the capacity to 
provide members systematically with relevant information and arguments concerning their 
interests, which could help in raising the consciousness needed to gain support for a counter-
hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism. Moreover, trade unions lack creativity in countering neo-
liberal hegemony compared to other forms of associational life, such as NGOs. For example, 
Hakielimu (2005) produced a booklet entitled „Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji?‟ („Great 
Policies… but Implementation?‟), featuring a satirical series of cartoons mocking the 
contradictions in development initiatives in the country and the disconnect between policy and 
practice. The cartoons (two of which are reproduced below in Figures 6.2 and 6.3) drew much 
debate in the media and among the public, as well as trenchant criticism from the state. No trade 
unions have engaged in such imaginative ways to engender a counter-hegemonic discourse. 
 
Despite the labour movement‟s lack of capacity and vision in the post-liberalization era, both 
TUCTA and individual trade unions have organized strikes and other forms of industrial action, 
particularly from the latter half of the 2000s. However, the „excessive restrictions‟ (ITUC, 2011: 
1) embodied in the legal-bureaucratic measures created and enforced by the state make 
successful industrial action hard to achieve. While trade unions in the post-liberalization period 
have regained freedom of association, laws, regulations and the powers of regulatory bodies 
continue to constrain their activities to a significant degree. As in previous periods of political 
economy, strikes are difficult to mount, as they are only permitted as a „last resort‟ after a 
mandatory thirty day mediation period has passed.  
 
A proposed indefinite general strike, organized by TUCTA, and scheduled to start on May Day 
2010, was the biggest action taken in the post-liberalization era.  TUCTA called the strike to 
protest against the failure of the state to increase wages, including the minimum wage, and to 
reduce income tax rates. All the major TUCTA-affiliated unions, covering the private and public 
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sectors, supported the planned action. In response, the state invoked stipulations contained in its 
legal-bureaucratic measures relating to labour issues, to claim the proposed action was illegal 
and threatened TUCTA officials with court action, if they did not cal off the action. In April 
2010, senior state officials argued that the compulsory mediation process was ongoing and, thus, 
TUCTA had no legal right to call for a strike. This position was then articulated by President 
Kikwete in his monthly address to the nation and by officials from the Confederation of 
Tanzanian Industries (CTI) and the Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE). The ATE 
argued that employers should sue striking workers in order to recover any losses incurred as a 
result of their actions. Various other state and quasi-state bodies then became involved, making 
the processes complex and time consuming. The decision as to whether the mandatory mediation 
period had closed, and the strike consequently legal, was then referred to the Labour Division of 
the High Court of Tanzania (LDHCT). The conclusion of the court would be based on whether 
the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) (a body set up under section 12 of the 
2004 labour law, and confusingly called an „independent government institution‟ by the state) 
considered that negotiations between TUCTA, representatives of capital and the state had been 
exhausted and if the federation had followed the other legal steps necessary before a strike could 
be called. In addition, the Labour, Economic and Social Council (LESCO) (also formed under 
the 2004 labour law) and composed of representatives of the state, capital and labour, organized 
mediation meetings in the run up to the proposed strike day. The decision of the LDHCT was not 
needed in the end, as TUCTA called off the strike after Kikwete made a further speech forcefully 
reiterating the point that the action was illegal. The traditional May Day parade went ahead but 
in a form different to any before in two respects. First, TUCTA itself broke with precedent by 
not inviting the Head of State to speak at their parade. Second, Non TUCTA-affiliated unions, 
showed their intention to move power away from the national federation, by organizing their 
own celebrations for the first time.  
 
Analyzing the action in overall terms, it is clear that the state‟s use of legal-bureaucratic 
measures gave it huge power. The labour movement was locked into complex and restrictive 
processes in trying to mount a strike. Added to this were attacks, widely reported in the media, 
on the labour movement‟s actions from senior state officials and representatives of capital. 
Despite high levels of unemployment and widespread poverty (see chapter 3 for details) which 
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led to sympathy for union demands amongst much of the population, TUCTA was unable to 
seriously challenge state hegemony during the period of the proposed strike. With regard to trade 
union theory, TUCTA officials clearly did not want to pursue a revolutionary unionism path by 
exhorting workers to engage in militant anti-capitalist direct actions. They were ideologically at 
odds with such a position 
142
 and it would have produced a hostile response from the 
government, which would certainly have used the coercive aspects of the integral state to 
confront such actions. TUCTA also eschewed following a social movement unionism 
perspective, by forming alliances with other forms of associational life, in mounting the action. 
This revealed the lack of serious contacts trade unions have with other types of civil society 
organization in Tanzania (see below section 6.9 for further analysis of this point and figure 6.3, 
summarizing reasons for mutual distrust between trade unions and NGOs). Instead they were 
forced into a default business unionism approach, based on technical arguments concerning both 
the terms and conditions of employment of rank-and-file members and the legal processes 
relating to industrial action. TUCTA officials admitted that it was hard for them to understand 
the new laws and regulations relating to labour that have been introduced in the post-
liberalization period, which hampered the effectiveness of the industrial action.  
143
 Moreover, 
they found dealing with recently created bodies (LESCO and the CMA, in particular), time-
consuming and difficult.  
 
The example of the aborted general strike in 2010 reveals two central points about the labour 
movement in Tanzania in the post-liberalization era. First, TUCTA officials lack a concerted 
vision, along with strategies, for the labour movement. Second, most trade unionists lack detailed 
understanding of the legal-bureaucratic framework relating to labour which has been imposed by 
the state since liberalization. They are, therefore, contesting the war of position from a weak 
knowledge base concerning the technical mechanisms of control over labour which currently 
pertain and they have not developed a grounded counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism. 
Gramsci (2011b) (in arguing for labour organizations to take a revolutionary unionism approach)  
made the point that trade union officials tend to become focused on the technicalities concerning 
legal-bureaucratic issues, when involved in labour disputes. In doing so, they form similar 
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  Source: Personal communication from trade union officials . 
143
  Source: Interviews with senior TUCTA officials. 
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overall perspectives to those of representatives of capital and the state, with the result that 
arguments centre on details within a mutually accepted discourse. This leads to the leadership of 
the mass of workers by authoritarian pressure from senior trade union officials, resulting in 
inertia within labour movements (Gramsci, 1919). Given the complexities involved in mounting 
industrial action in contemporary Tanzania, highlighted by the failure of the 2010 general strike, 
there is a case for arguing that the labour movement should adopt a social movement unionism 
approach if it wants to enhance its effectiveness. This would, for example, provide opportunities 
for union officials to form alliances with NGOs, such as the Legal and Human Rights Centres 
(LHRC) and the Lawyers Environmental Action Trust (LEAT). Both of these NGOs are active 
and can offer legal expertise on labour issues, thus, enabling both a broader form of opposition to 
the state and deeper knowledge for union officials of technicalities. This may be a more effective 
way for trade unions to take part in labour disputes than the current mode, which involves acting 
alone and contesting technicalities, which were framed by state bodies. However, following 
Kikwete‟s victory in the 2010 presidential elections (see chapter 3 for details), there has been a 
rapprochement between CCM and the labour movement and an adoption of the discourse of 
business unionism by TUCTA. Kikwete held a series of meetings with senior TUCTA officials, 
beginning in April 2011, based around the slogan, „let bygones be bygones.‟ Following the 
meetings, TUCTA leaders stated that they now regarded the government as one of their „social 
partners‟ with which they could work constructively, without, however, compromising the 
interests of workers. 
144
 This showed that TUCTA as an institution had internalized the discourse 
of business unionism, as it was unusual for the organization to make a formal statement at the 
highest level using the term „social partners‟ to refer to the government. 
 
Another way in which the trade union movement could build alliances is through formal links 
with opposition political parties. In interviews, TUCTA officials revealed that this option has 
become a serious consideration, but is clearly problematic for several reasons. First, many 
interviewees (TUCTA officials at head office as well as leaders of TUCTA-affiliated and non 
TUCTA-affiliated unions) expressed disquiet about the labour movement linking itself formally 
to any political party, so soon after emerging from a period of control by CCM, which lasted 
more than thirty years. A number of interviewees argued that CCM would use this as a weapon 
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  Source: Personal communication (April, 2011). 
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in the war of position to accuse the trade union movement of partisanship. It was pointed out that 
when TUCTA proposed to formally name their preferred candidate for the 2010 presidential 
elections, this was exactly how they were criticized in response by state officials. The acting 
permanent secretary at the President‟s Office, for example, argued that this action by TUCTA 
violated the code of conduct applying to civil servants. In addition, he stated that TUCTA should 
be protecting the interests of workers and that it was unethical for the organization to influence 
its members as to which political party and leader they should vote for. 
145
 Both the acting 
permanent secretary and later ministers then made the attack on TUCTA‟s acting general 
secretary personal and called for him to leave the labour movement and join the presidential race 
if he was serious about becoming involved in politics. 
146
 Second, a number of old guard leaders 
have connections with CCM leaders which go back to the pre-liberalization period. An element 
of patronage remains in these relationships and, consequently, these leaders resist a formal move 
to support opposition political parties. Third, it is not clear that any opposition political parties 
have policies concerning labour issues that are substantively different to those of CCM. Thus, the 
labour movement would not be allying themselves with a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse 
by forming an alliance with opposition parties. 
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  Source: Interviews with TUCTA officials and This Day (14 August 2010). 
146
  Source: This Day (15 August 2010) 
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Figure 6.2  Hakielimu Cartoon: At the Health Centre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation - Cartoon on left 
Teacher (with crutch) – „I have health insurance.‟ 
The Receptionist replies – „That‟s nothing to do with us. Pay 5,000 in cash or no service.‟ 
Sign on front of the reception desk – „Money first.‟ 
 
Cartoon on right 
Sign above the serving hatch „Medicine.‟ 
Sign below the serving hatch „Give thanks for whatever you get.‟ 
 
Person giving the medicine through the hatch – „Take these few, the rest you will have to buy 
somewhere else.‟ 
Teacher „I have to walk seven kilometres just to get some Panadol.‟ 
 
Caption pointing to the teacher‟s trousers – „Empty pockets.‟ 
Aside from small creature -  
„If this is the situation, then how is having health insurance going to help us‟? 
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Figure 6.3  Hakielimu Cartoon: At the School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation  
 
Teacher (on the table) – „When will this situation for teachers end? We are tired.‟  
 
Announcement on radio (under the table) – „The government has just released one billion 
Tanzanian shillings for the refurbishment of Dar es Salaam bank …‟  
 
Aside from small creature -  
„Bah! It is better being under a mango tree than living in this situation.‟ 
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6.9  Trade Unions in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings 
The key findings are summarized under two main themes; Trade Union Priorities in Discourses 
and Key Trade Union Relationships. With regard to the former, the issues highlighted as 
priorities for trade unions are divided into three sub-categories: first, structuring, resources and 
mergers, second, economic issues and third, political issues. The points raised within these 
separate categories are interrelated and overlap in places. However, separation into sub-
categories is useful in providing a clear structure for all the findings. 
 
Structuring, Resources and Mergers 
For senior TUCTA Officials the need for capacity-building is the main priority of the labour 
movement. It was stated forcefully by the vast majority of interviewees that technical and 
financial capacity must be built if the trade union movement is to have an influence on 
economic, political and social policies affecting the lives of workers. Poor technological 
resources, particularly a lack of their own websites, seriously hamper communications between 
and within unions. Email contact is difficult due to low rates of computer ownership and power 
cuts. These structural problems are, for a considerable number of interviewees, compounded by 
issues of agency. Several of the new guard senior officials argued that many old guard union 
leaders look to the past and find it hard to keep up to date with emerging realities of importance 
to the labour movement, particularly the growing casualization of the labour force, gender issues, 
the „brain drain‟ from Tanzania 147 and the consequences of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS 
amongst workers and their dependents. For one such official, „trade unionists don‟t read.‟ They 
have papers and documents from conferences but these are just badges of status to be displayed 
in their offices. They do not engage substantively with important issues or keep up to date with 
new ideas. Overall, „they want routine things.‟ Several other officials at TUCTA-affiliated 
unions argued that the thinking and actions of the federation‟s old guard leadership are rooted in 
the pre-liberalization period. One official outlined how collecting dues through the top-down 
check-off system introduced after independence,  where two per cent of the wages of all union 
members are deducted at source, has led to a situation where union leaders do not know „the art, 
                                                          
147
  Well qualified and experienced union members are emigrating from Tanzania and their abilities are thus lost to 
the movement. Exact numbers are hard to ascertain given the clandestine nature of some of this emigration. See 
Naud (2010) and UNCTAD (2007) for general overviews of the „brain drain‟ from Africa and Lucas (2006) for an 
analysis which includes a discussion of issues concerning the „brain drain‟ from Tanzania. 
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tactics, methods and techniques of organizing, persuading and soliciting for membership.‟ For 
this official the check off system has led to the leadership lacking „the most crucial trade union 
asset - negotiating skills.‟ Moreover, for a number of interviewees, the lack of skills in these 
areas on the part of union leaders is not being addressed. TUCTA has failed to establish a 
centralized collective bargaining centre/unit, which would train officials in the skills necessary to 
negotiate effectively and serve as a repository of knowledge and materials. Other interviewees 
pointed out that the TUCTA old guard fails to use experienced and well educated unionists from 
individual trade unions when negotiating CBAs through an „egocentric‟ desire to hold on to the 
machinery of power.  old guard union leaders were also criticized by a considerable number of 
interviewees for lacking „creativity,‟ „commitment‟ and „tenacity‟ in addressing key issues 
relating to the labour movement. These views reveal a clear frustration on the part of TUCTA 
officials appointed after 1998 with the old guard amongst the leadership. 
 
Issues of structure and agency also combine to make the work of trade unions ineffective in the 
regions, according to most interviewees. Many respondents made the point that Tanzania is a 
large country with poor infrastructure and inadequate communications outside urban areas, 
making it hard to work in the regions. In addition, it was argued by a significant number of 
interviewees that trade union officials at branch level have few resources, are not effectively 
trained and cannot read documents relating to national policy-making processes well because 
their command of English is limited. They are in need of capacity-building initiatives run from 
trade union head offices, which are not forthcoming.  Many interviewees contended that a 
vicious circle has developed, characterized by a lack of commitment to branches outside Dar es 
Salam on the part of TUCTA which creates resentment about paying fees to an „unresponsive 
centre‟ on the part of regional union offices. This leads to apathy and inertia at regional offices, 
which in turn makes the federation at the centre reluctant to set up and fund initiatives outside 
Dar es Salaam. There has been a failure on the part of TUCTA to „institutionalize a spirit of 
teamwork between the centre and regions‟ was the summary of a senior TUCTA-affiliated trade 
union official. Overall there is a „dire lack of communication both vertical and horizontal‟ was 
how one trade union official summarized issues concerning internal relationships within the trade 
union movement.  
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A difficulty relating to both capacity and legitimacy raised by a large number of interviewees is 
the inability of unions, through lack of finance and qualified personnel, to conduct 
thoroughgoing independent research into important areas, leading to their arguments being 
dismissed by the state and employers as not proven. Several interviewees pointed out that 
although the saying in Tanzania, „no research no right to speak‟ is well known, 148 unions do 
hardly any analysis of  labour issues or monitoring and evaluation of key trends relating to 
employment, which could be used to support their positions in debates with state officials, 
representatives of capital and other civil society organizations. Thus, both the leadership and the 
rank-and-file members of most unions have little detailed knowledge of issues, and consequently 
are only able to discuss them in very broad terms. The RAAWU membership has been identified 
by TUCTA officials at head office, as containing people who have the skills to do rigorous 
independent research, which could put the labour movement in a much stronger position to 
create a counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism than is currently the case.  However, due 
to lack of finance, effective planning and a concerted will, such research has not been 
undertaken. This is an example of the disconnect between the theory and the practice of trade 
unions in post-liberalization Tanzania, which is hindering the effectiveness of the labour 
movement. 
 
Mergers 
Mergers between trade unions are seen as desirable by senior TUCTA officials, mainly because 
small trade unions do not provide adequate services to their members. The fact that more than 
half of Tanzanian trade unions have less than 3,000 members is a major reason for calls from 
TUCTA officials for mergers in order to create large organizations, capable of representing the 
interests of labour vis-à-vis capital and the state effectively. For one official, „mergers are vital if 
trade unions are to become more efficient and to work in a more focused way and get their issues 
settled quicker and better than is currently the case.‟ However, another new guard TUCTA 
official, argued that such views remain at the level of rhetoric and in practice the old guard 
leaders are „power-mongers‟ who have made no concrete moves towards mergers. This research 
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  For example, the phrase was used by Anne Makinda in December 2010, during an interview she gave after 
becoming the Speaker of Parliament (East African, 2010) 
Available at - http://allafrica.com/stories/201012201456.html 
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corroborated this claim in finding that no practical steps regarding mergers have been 
documented.  
 
A senior TUCTA outlined the argument against mergers, which is related to the fact that the 
work of Tanzanian trade unions was subsumed within a monolithic state system for more than 
thirty years after independence. Through the 1998 Trade Union Act, unions became independent 
again and are understandably „keen to guard this freedom.‟ For this official, therefore, it is better 
to keep unions individually independent and to develop an overall solidarity movement which 
will provide strong mutual support for trade unions.  The majority, however, disagreed with this 
perspective, arguing that the small trade unions do not have the capability „to service their 
members or deliver anything to them.‟  
 
It was clear from the interviews with officials from TUCTA-affiliated trade unions that mergers 
were a divisive issue. For some (27%), mergers are necessary as they will make trade union work 
more effective and will stop small unions dividing the movement by fighting over recruitment of 
members. Disputes over demarcation of membership were cited as serious issues by a number of 
interviewees. Interviews revealed that there are tensions between TUGHE and TALGWU 
regarding which of the two unions employees of district health authorities should join. Moreover, 
both TAMICO and TUICO lay membership claims to workers in the cement and woodwork 
industries. A further example of such a dispute is the clash between the TTU and RAAWU over 
which union teachers in vocational education centres should join. These intra-union conflicts 
have demoralized members according to many interviewees and led to the perception on the part 
of the public that labour organizations are more interested in power and money than providing 
effective services for their members. Other points put forward by interviewees were that small 
trade unions should merge as they are not financially viable (30%) and have low visibility (20%). 
These views are typified by the claim of one official that there are „dead unions‟ in Tanzania and 
mergers would lead to the dynamic officials in the movement emerging to head bigger, and thus 
more effective, unions. Moreover, an official at TUGHE argued that mergers are a good idea as 
having many individual trade unions plays into the hands of the employers who then use a divide 
and rule policy that „lessens solidarity in the trade union movement as a whole.‟ 
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In contrast, the mainly small unions formed as a result of the enshrining of freedom of 
association under the 1998 Trade Union Act, argued strongly against mergers. For them, mergers 
would be undemocratic, as the rank-and-file are against such a move. In addition, the new unions 
need time to consolidate their work and build activities and memberships. It was also stated that 
rather than mergers leading to dynamic officials coming to the forefront, in fact old guard leaders 
would use their networks of power and patronage to gain control of these large unions and run 
them in the same top-down unaccountable way as they did under the monolithic system.  
Debates over mergers were not solely based on whether unions were formed pre or post-1998. 
Two pre-1998 unions (TTU and RAAWU) are currently holding talks with a view to a merger. 
TTU officials are aware that they have to overcome the fears of RAAWU officials that „their 
members will be used to undertake research and to present papers where necessary but would not 
be included in the democratic structures and processes of the union.‟  RAAWU officials were 
worried that the TTU officials would dominate the upper echelons of a merged union and 
concentrate on issues concerning primary and secondary education, at the expense of tertiary 
level concerns, which are the focus of their own membership. This example highlights the 
general worry on the part of TUCTA-affiliated trade unionists of whether smaller unions would 
have the interests of their members represented effectively in larger merged unions. 
 
For non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the issue of mergers is a sensitive and complicated one, 
which divided opinion equally. The arguments in favour were based on the fact that mergers will 
lead to larger trade unions which will thus have more power in dealing with employers and the 
government. However, mergers were recognized as being impossible at present for non-TUCTA 
affiliated unions, as they are not allowed to merge with TUCTA-affiliated trade unions. The case 
against mergers was based on the argument that non-TUCTA affiliated unions had been created 
as breakaways from what members perceived to be poorly functioning larger unions and thus 
demanded a separate organization which would be receptive to their concerns. Clearly 
fragmentation of the movement is a danger given the current structure and condition of trade 
unions.   
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Economic Issues 
Privatization was cited as the root cause of trade union problems by almost all officials during 
interviews. One official summed up the general concern about privatization in stating that the 
„new private sector in Tanzania is mostly anti-union and tries to negotiate with the individual. 
Because of poverty, workers are easily bought by employers.‟ All the officials interviewed 
expressed disquiet at the aggressive attitudes of employers in the private sector towards 
employees and the failure of the government to address the matter. Senior TUCTA officials 
overwhelmingly argued that they should have a voice in all labour market issues since these 
contribute to poverty reduction and are troubled that this is not happening at present. They were 
particularly worried about the „unwarranted‟ attention paid to privatization, while there is much 
less focus on employment creation, the quality of work, labour standards, child labour, wages 
policies and occupational health and safety. 
 
The casualization of labour 
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 as a result of trade liberalization leading to an increase in cheap 
manufactured imports and the harmful employment strategies of the new investors are other  
important topics of concern for the trade unions. It was pointed out, for example, that contracts in 
the hotel industry are short-term and must be renewed annually. This discourages workers from 
joining a trade union and leads to casualization of the workforce, which is a deliberate strategy 
aimed at achieving more profit through use of cheap labour. This practice has slashed the 
membership of the Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU) 
and consequently weakened its power to operate effectively. Trade union officials also argued 
that the claims of donors that the government‟s restructuring of the economy would lead to 
redeployment of workers who lost their jobs in SOEs are false. This is due to the capital 
intensive nature of the jobs created by the new investors in Tanzania which has led to only a few 
workers being re-employed after losing their jobs.   
 
For officials at individual TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the priorities outlined in interviews are 
closely interrelated – privatization (stressed by 80% of officials interviewed), the need for 
capacity-building (80%), high levels of unemployment (60%), lack of finance (47%) and 
inability to reach members in the regions (33%). A further priority in the discourse of trade 
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 See Wuyts (2001), discussed in Chapter 3. 
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unions is the „vicious circle‟ which lowers capacity and legitimacy. Many officials made the 
point that privatization has led to unemployment, precipitating a fall in membership, which 
means less finance comes into the unions and leads to diminished capacity to operate effectively, 
thus lowering legitimacy of the union in the eyes of members. For some TUCTA-affiliated trade 
unions the fall in membership has reached crisis proportions. For example, the Tanzanian Union 
of Journalists (TUJ) was described as „a dying union‟ by its General Secretary and has less than 
two hundred members.  
 
For officials of non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions the major priorities were the same as those 
cited by officials at TUCTA and individual TUCTA affiliated unions – the need for both 
technical and financial capacity-building and the attitude of management in privatized industries. 
These problems were emphasised by the officials of all six of the non-TUCTA affiliated trade 
unionists interviewed. All non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions only draw members from the 
private sector, as state sector workers were placed in unions under government direction as part 
of the monolithic post-colonial trade union system and were automatically re-enrolled as 
members when these unions re-registered as independent organizations after the 1998 Trade 
Union Act. Officials at non-affiliated unions regard private enterprises as under the control of 
anti-union management. Ship owners were cited as particularly exploitative employers, who act 
as a cartel to keep wages down and are aggressively anti-union; „Every day they try to kill us [the 
trade union]‟ was the view of one official who had regular dealings with management in the 
shipping industry.  
 
Moreover, union officials struggled with the problem that workers in privatized enterprises „do 
not see the point of joining a trade union,‟ to quote one interviewee. This is a central point 
concerning legitimacy. Many officials interviewed stated that employees in the private sector 
knew little about the work of trade unions or regarded them as part of the state, because of the 
way they were organized under the one-party state, and thus were unconvinced about joining. A 
further factor militating against becoming a union member was fear on the part of employees in 
the private sector that they would be victimised or dismissed by employers.  
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An important related point made by several officials interviewed is most trade unions continue to 
follow the check off system by taking 2% of members‟ salaries in dues, which is „exorbitant‟ for 
the majority, who are not well paid.   The 2004 Employment and Labour Relations Act specifies 
that trade unions have the freedom to set union dues at any rates they wish, but, as one 
interviewee pointed out, „many, if not all unions, continue to take 2% of salaries, which is a 
major reason for non-members  shying away from joining trade unions,‟  
 
Political Issues 
The view that trade unionists are a labour aristocracy (Engels, 1999, Lenin, 1996, Elbaum and 
Seltzer, 2004, Fanon, 2001, Arrighi and Saul, 1973, Saul, 1975) and thus lack legitimacy in 
national policy-making processes as representatives of the poor, was refuted by many 
interviewees. TTU officials cited the study they had organized and funded with Hakielimu by 
Sumra (2004), which found that teachers had a low status largely because of the poor salaries 
paid to them. A teacher on Grade A at that time earned TZS 70,000 a month and for Sumra 
(2004: 33) even a 100% increase on this would „put the salary at only 150,000, which seems to 
be the bare minimum to live in at least a little comfort.‟ Sumra (2004: 12) also found that 
teaching is increasingly „viewed as a last resort, when other options have failed‟, which has 
lowered the status of teachers in their own eyes as well as those of Tanzanian citizens who are 
not part of the profession. Bearing in mind the arguments of Katz (1976) that a labour aristocracy 
is created from both structure (where good terms and conditions of employment are important) 
and agency (based on the perception of the labour group by others in society and by the group 
itself) then members of the TTU are anything but a labour aristocracy. Teaching is regarded by 
many Tanzanian citizens as a „last resort, low status and low-paid job‟ (Towse et al, 2002: 637).  
 
Interviews also revealed that unions containing well educated and/or relatively highly paid 
members recognize commonalities with labour as a whole in Tanzania and have taken part in 
actions that are not solely based on the immediate concerns of members. The TTU, for example, 
played an active role in the fight to have school fees abolished at primary level and to make the 
state address the quality of education, rather than concentrating on increasing enrolments, 
numbers of teachers in training and the construction of school infrastructure. In addition, 
officials from the Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union (TAFICAWU) cited a 
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government document on wage rates in the fishing industry for 2006 (URT, 2006) which 
imposed a salary increase from the original settlement between employers and TAFICAWU of 
15%. The raised salaries ranged from TZS 59,064 per month (which was below the minimum 
wage at the time of TZS 62,000 per month) for a deck boy to TZS 79,675 for a bosun. These 
salaries can be seen in the light of Suma‟s argument two years earlier that TZS 70,000 per month 
as a salary for teachers hardly amounted to a living wage. 
 
Moreover, TEWUTA, whose members are relatively well-paid workers in the 
telecommunications sector, have been active in anti-privatization campaigns and the struggle 
against the „anti-union‟ stance of the new employers, who have responded by dividing 
telecommunications workers into separate categories of „unionizable‟ and „non-unionizable‟.  As 
Gramsci (1977) argued, such actions by civil society groups are important in increasing their 
organizational ability, which in turn raises consciousness levels and hence the possibility of 
forming and developing wider counter-hegemonic discourses. Dissenting ideologies and actions 
can emerge from groups of workers with relatively good terms and conditions of employment, 
depending on the particular political-economy conditions prevailing in a country. Thus, on the 
evidence of the interviews conducted with trade union officials, the labour aristocracy thesis is 
overly determinist in arguing that the more well paid the workers are, the less they will formulate 
and/or engage with counter-hegemonic discourses.  
 
Unpublished trade union research cited by interviewees was also used to support criticisms of the 
labour aristocracy thesis. This reveals that one wage labourer in the formal sector in Tanzania 
supports between six and twenty family members, many of whom are self-employed rural poor. 
Moreover, a number of vulnerable, low income workers in the informal sector are either former 
union members, who lost their jobs as a result of privatization or relatives of current union 
members. Thus, as one TUCTA official put it, „workers and peasants interests are closely 
interrelated.‟ Even groups of workers that have obtained relatively good terms and conditions of 
employment, such as telecommunications workers, do not exhibit attitudes and patterns of 
behaviour associated with the labour aristocracy and have not allied themselves with capital 
and/or the state to a great extent.   
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Criticism of the labour aristocracy thesis on the grounds that it needs to pay more attention to 
both the scale and the methods of exploitation of the „labour aristocrats‟ (Peace, 1975) resonates 
in the context of Tanzania. In the mines run by foreign new investors in Tanzania, where, 
although wages are relatively high 
150
 compared to workers in agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, industrial relations have been largely confrontational.  TAMICO has been engaged in 
continual disputes on behalf of its members, contesting the policies and actions of foreign 
investors and the state, which the union claims, allies itself with the interests of management. 
Miners have varied their behaviour and tactics in the struggle with management. There are 
currently more than twenty cases before the Arbitration Commission concerning disputes 
between Barrick, the Canadian mining enterprise, which runs some of the largest mines in the 
country, and ex-employees. The level of surplus extraction in the mining sector is large, which 
has been a major cause of acrimonious labour relations, characterized by disputes over 
recognition of unions, strikes, dismissals and legal claims by workers against employers. 
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  For 
example, a strike in 2007 at the Bulyankulu Gold Mine run by Barrick, centred on the huge 
disparity in wages between Tanzanian and foreign workers. It was claimed in interviews that 
Tanzanian miners received a minimum wage of TZS 200,000 per month while foreign workers 
earned TZS 24 million per month. 
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Finally regarding the labour aristocracy debate, a number of trade union officials argued that 
there is a considerable presence among agricultural self-producers and those working in the 
informal sector of former trade unionists, as well as family members of current trade unionists. 
This creates a sense of common identity among these groups.  Overall, the interviews with trade 
unionists conducted for this research confirm the validity of Post‟s (2006) argument that the 
labour aristocracy thesis is not theoretically rigorous or supported by empirical evidence and that 
careful individual studies are needed, focusing on the objective relations pertaining between 
labour and capital, if meaningful analyses are to emerge.  
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  The national minimum wage in Tanzania is TZS104, 000 per month.  In 2007 Tanzanian mine workers received 
a minimum of TZS 200,000 per month (Source – TAMICO officials). The National Poverty Line (set in 2007) is 
TZS 13,998 per month (Policy Forum, 2008a). In 2007, 37.6% of all rural households were living below this line.  
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  Source: Interviews with TAMICO and CHODAWU officials from 2005 – 2008. 
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  Source: Interviews with TAMICO officials, 5 September, 2008. 
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However, while not acting on behalf of a labour aristocracy, trade unions in Tanzania take part in 
national policy-making debates within the hegemonic discourse. This form of participation 
betokens a fundamental acceptance of the prevailing neo-liberal order. Thus, trade unions, which 
make a claim to be of, and for, the working class, can only be of, and for, it up to the point of a 
political challenge to the integral state.   The trade union movement has failed to provide such a 
challenge and, therefore, has to operate on terrain laid out by the integral state, particularly the 
ideological terrain. Unless the labour movement can formulate a concerted counter-hegemonic 
discourse it will continue to operate on the basis of economism, whereby debates focus narrowly 
on improving the terms and conditions of workers within an accepted hegemonic neo-liberal 
order.  
 
Key Trade Union Relationships 
Trade unions have traditionally operated in a tripartite system in Tanzania, where their key 
relationships are with the state and Employers Associations. However, the neo-liberal era has 
witnessed the rise of other major development agents, which affect the work of trade unions. The 
most significant of these are NGOs and new investors in the privatized economy. Relationships 
with these two groups have thus become increasingly important for trade unions, with the latter 
rivalling Employers Associations as major representatives of the interests of capital. The findings 
show juxtaposition between the attitudes of old guard trade union officials and those of the new 
guard towards new investors and NGOs. Recently appointed TUCTA officials were more ready 
to accept these groups as „social partners‟ rather than the old guard, who categorize them as 
adversaries. 
 
Senior officials at TUCTA were understandably circumspect when discussing trade union 
relations with the state. For such officials, the state always sides with the interests of capital in 
general, not just the employers associations in the post-liberalization era. Capitalists work in 
tandem with the state to „force through laws which are favourable to businesses and are at the 
expense of workers‟ was the way one TUCTA official put it. All the old guard TUCTA officials 
saw the state as wanting to control unions in the interests of capital rather than negotiate with 
them fairly. They cited the many years of union emasculation by the state after independence as 
a strong influence on this view. These officials all argue that the state had not changed its attitude 
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to unions following 1998 and paid only lip service to their views, while allowing new investors 
to dictate the terms of their entry into the Tanzanian labour market. For old guard TUCTA 
officials, these state attitudes make the work of the Employers Association and new investors 
easy, as it knows the state sides with capital against labour in disputes. 
 
New guard TUCTA officials were less equivocal in their opinion of employers associations and 
employers in general. One such official stated that trade unions are learning to see employers as 
„social partners‟ and to take part in „social dialogue‟, rather than regarding them as exploiters. 
This view has been put forward as the most constructive way for unions to envisage their 
relationship with representatives of capital at one of the annual courses run by the Office of the 
Registrar, showing that the state is actively promoting a business unionism approach in post-
liberalization Tanzania. The fact that, at head office, some of the new guard officials interviewed 
have internalized the discourse of business unionism was revealed by their acceptance of the 
concept of the state and employers  as „social partners‟ of workers. One interviewee stated that 
the trade union movement must not just engage, but „proactively initiate meaningful dialogue 
with the state and employers as social partners.‟ Thus, such leaders are operating within the 
hegemonic discourse, thereby strengthening the core elements of the integral state. By the same 
token the chances of a substantive challenge to state hegemony emerging from the rank-and-file 
are weakened, since they absorb only a hegemonic discourse from their union leaders rather than 
an ideological challenge to the discourse of neo-liberalism. 
 
The most commonly expressed view from officials at TUCTA-affiliated unions concerning trade 
union relations with the state was that the President talks positively about the rights of workers 
153
 and about the role of trade unions, but these exhortations do not move beyond the rhetorical 
and there has been no discernible improvements in the position of labour since he came to 
power. As the interviews progressed, many officials tended to become more open and expressed 
the view that the state is too close to the new investors and has done little to assist workers.  
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  For example, the President has made direct calls to employers to increase salaries in low paid sectors, such as 
textiles (The Citizen, 2006) but claimed that TUCTA‟s demands concerning the raising of the minimum wage in 
2010 were unrealistic and impossible to meet. 
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The relationship between development NGOs and trade unions in general has been characterized 
by a large measure of distrust (Leather, 2005, Spooner, 2004). In the case of Tanzania, the 
interviews revealed that NGOs are regarded with a mixture of suspicion and envy by trade union 
officials, who perceive an increasing „NGOization‟ of development work, which is cutting into 
areas where the labour movement has traditionally been active.  
 
The most commonly made point was that both donors and the state favour NGOs over trade 
unions. None of the interviewees made distinctions between types of NGOs.  Although Baraza 
La Wanawake, Hakielimu and the National Youth Council had all been deregistered (or 
threatened with deregistration) as NGOs by the state following disputes, 
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 NGOs were 
invariably perceived as a homogenous group which had harmonious relationships with the state 
and international donor agencies.  It was also argued by the vast majority of interviewees that 
NGOs are more fashionable and popular than trade unions, that NGOs duplicate the work of 
trade unions, that NGOs have better contacts than trade unions and that NGOs are upwardly 
accountable to donors, while trade unions are downwardly accountable to members. With regard 
to NGO duplication of trade union work, an official argued that there is a danger that the 
situation in Tanzania might replicate that in Kenya, where NGOs have been encroaching on the 
work of labour organizations with no mandate but some success. NGOs have been quite 
successful in working to protect the rights of domestic servants, for example, while trade unions 
argue that they are more legitimate as representatives of this group. Another trade union official 
pointed out that Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) has campaigned vigorously 
for the rights of women in the workplace, the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) has 
fought for basic employment rights for workers and the Savings and Credit Co-operative 
Organization (SACCOS) has addressed legal issues concerning children, the disabled and the 
elderly. Such activities have led to a loss of space for the labour movement, which trade unions 
are becoming increasingly aware of, as more NGOs obtain finance to run high profile 
programmes in the areas of child labour and HIV/AIDS, while funding proposals for such work 
from trade unions are rejected. 
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TRAWU officials, for example, pointed out that they had specialist knowledge of how 
HIV/AIDS was spread along railway routes and was leading to a high incidence of the disease 
amongst their members. Despite making this clear in funding proposals to different donor groups 
their applications had been rejected. At the same time, NGOs with little specialist knowledge of 
key issues concerning HIV/AIDS in Tanzania had received funding from the same donors to run 
projects and programmes. However, one trade union official made the point that no trade union 
had set up its own internal unit to address issues relating to HIV/AIDS, despite considerable 
losses of trade union members to the disease. This official argued that trade unions would stand 
more chance of both getting funds to address issues concerning HIV/AIDS amongst members 
and using them effectively if they started their own work in the area, rather than looking 
immediately for help from donors. This would also lead to union leaders getting more respect 
from rank-and-file members, who regard the many donor-funded projects and programmes in 
Tanzania as gravy trains for local budget holders, who run projects with negligible transparency 
and accountability. 
 
Another issue clouding the relationship between trade unions and NGOs outlined by TUCTA 
officials is state ring-fencing of funds for „civil society development‟ and then giving it only to 
NGOs. Trade unions were told they were not eligible to apply for these funds. TUCTA officials 
pointed out that the refusal of funding prevented capacity-building on the part of the labour 
movement and, thus, hindered their ability to challenge state hegemony. Through its control of 
funding mechanisms the state is able to manipulate civil society into a form it finds acceptable. 
In this way, legal-bureaucratic measures are employed to strengthen the integral state and to 
weaken opportunities for a counter-hegemonic discourse to be formulated by trade unions. 
Moreover, control over funding mechanisms in this way shows the close connections between 
the state, civil society and ideology. Through its power over finance, needed by associational 
groups to operate meaningfully in post-liberalization Tanzania, the state is able to reformulate 
which groups are included in civil society, and which excluded. The exclusion of trade unions\by 
the state as an organization eligible to apply for funds from a tranche set up in the post-
liberalization period with the specific aim of „developing‟ civil society reveals their 
marginalization within a hegemonic discourse driven by the ideology of neo-liberalism.. 
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TUCTA-affiliated trade unions do little work with NGOs. Only one trade union works regularly 
with NGOs. TPAWU works with NGOs in the UK, Holland and Germany on issues concerning 
pesticide control, the cut flower industry and Occupational Health and Safety. The Head of 
Research, Planning and Credit at TPAWU contributes to the sector publication (GOHNET) and 
argues that other trade unions should take this route and involve trained people in a wide variety 
of activities. CHODAWU had worked with a local NGO on a child labour project that was 
praised by officials as a „good partner.‟ The problem with the project from the union point of 
view was its sustainability; a limited budget and time period for the project meant that the 
children who were taken from their places of work and reintegrated into the school system were 
not going to be supported until they had finished at primary level. The only way to make the 
project sustainable was to get more funding but applications were refused. Moreover, the TTU 
has done joint research with Hakielimu. 
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 The work of TPAWU, CHODAWU and the TTU 
with NGOs is unusual. Most TUCTA-affiliated trade unions work occasionally with NGOs 
(53%) or never (33%). Many officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions were negative in their 
attitude to NGOs and did not show interest in learning how to raise funds by replicating their 
strategies, despite the fact that almost half of all the interviewees from the labour movement 
argued that „NGOs are better at raising funds than trade unions.‟  
 
Donors are regarded by TUCTA-affiliated trade union officials as preferring NGOs to trade 
unions. This point was made by officials at the TTU, who saw different sides of NGO work. The 
efforts of Hakielimu in highlighting education issues in the country were praised but it was also 
argued that NGOs lack popular accountability, in contrast to trade unions. Moreover, NGOs are 
seen as more aggressive than trade unions in their work and in pursuing relationships with other 
key agents of development, notably the state. An official from the General Secretary of TUICO 
captured the views of many trade unionists in asserting that „NGOs chase donors much more 
widely and aggressively than trade unions.‟ Corruption in the NGO sector and the prevalence of 
„briefcase NGOs,‟ in particular, was also an issue raised by a number of trade union officials, 
one of whom contended that many „NGOs do not work. The leaders get funds from donors … 
but they do not use them in the regions. They keep the funds for themselves.‟  
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  The two organizations collaborated to do research, leading to the publication of „The Living and Working 
Conditions of Teachers in Tanzania‟ (Sumra, 2004).  
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Non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have very few contacts with NGOs. Eighty three per cent of 
interviewees from non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions reported that their union had never 
worked with an NGO. Officials at one of the largest non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions argued 
that NGOs have no membership and are included in national debates through „making more 
noise‟ than trade unions.  
 
A different view was put forward by one of the new guard TUCTA officials interviewed, who 
was concerned about the suspicion many trade unionists have about NGOs and argued that the 
unions must actively forge links with them to strengthen the overall work of the civil society 
sector in Tanzania. Such connections are important for this official, as trade unions can use them 
to learn how NGOs act effectively in pursuance of their own interests when working with 
international donors and state officials, as well as using the media to their advantage and 
pursuing funding sources efficiently. A related argument was made by another official in an 
interview, who pointed out that trade unions wrongly have not forged links with, or learnt skills 
from, the influential professional associations in the country. 
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NGOs are attractive potentially as partners for trade unions wishing to move to a social 
movement unionism strategy, through their financial capacity and closeness to the donors and the 
state. However, the findings from this research indicate that mutual suspicion between NGO and 
trade union officials makes close collaboration problematic. The main reasons for this mutual 
suspicion are summarized in Table 6.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
156
  Influential professional associations include notably the University of Dar es Salaam Staff Association 
(UDASA), the professional association of teachers, Kitaaluma cha Walimu Tanzania (CHAKIWATA) and the 
Tanzania Registered Nurses Association (TARENA).  
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Table 6.3 Barriers to Effective NGO-Trade Union Collaboration in Tanzania 
Issue NGO Perception of Trade 
Unions 
Trade Union Perception of 
NGOs 
Accountability Narrow accountability base – to 
members only. Do not represent 
the rank-and-file effectively. 
Poor methods of communication 
with members. Top down ethos. 
No popular accountability, thus 
no democratic mandate. Not 
membership organizations. 
Impose themselves on 
constituencies Focus on upward 
accountability to donors. 
Transparency Do not make information and 
accounts readily available to 
members. 
Produce reports and accounts for 
donors but not for intended 
beneficiaries. 
Roots in Tanzanian Society Historically linked closely to the 
state. Have alienated the workers 
as a result. Still living in the past 
era of the One Party State. 
No roots in Tanzanian society, so 
do not understand their 
constituencies.  
Corruption Lack of transparency and top 
down way of operating make 
corruption likely and difficult to 
detect. 
Endemic corruption in NGO 
sector – many „briefcase‟ NGOs. 
NGO and state sectors 
inextricably interlinked. Thus, 
rent seeking a major motivation 
for forming NGOs. 
Modus Operandi Reactive, bureaucratic, inflexible. Aggressive, insensitive, overly 
self-confident. 
Participation Unwilling to share ideas with 
other CSOs. 
Participate largely in work with 
donors and the state. 
Funding Limited, as it comes mainly from 
members. 
From international donors, so 
NGO orientation and 
accountability upward. 
Source: McQuinn (2011) 
 
Trade unions feel frustrated that „new [mainly foreign} investors treat them and the workers with 
contempt. However, they are being exhorted by the donors and the state to adopt a business 
unionism approach, based on treating the new investors as social partners with whom they can 
engage in a mutually beneficial social dialogue, as part of embracing the new policy agenda. The 
role of new investors in Tanzania is perceived as threatening by the majority of both old guard 
and new guard TUCTA officials. The flouting of national laws by new investors was a 
significant factor contributing to this view, whilst the provision of poor working conditions and 
loss of jobs through the capital intensive nature of work provided were also of major concern. 
For one senior official at TUCTA the Tanzanian state has „signalled to foreign investors that they 
could forgo the labour movement‟. The state is aware that the mass dismissals of workers that 
followed the imposition of SAPs led to a rise in unemployment in Tanzania, culminating in more 
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crime and social instability and, thus, threatened state credibility. Consequently, there is little 
political will to confront „new foreign investors‟ which ignore labour legislation, such as 
minimum wage rates. A TUCTA official summed up this point by stating that labour „laws are 
relaxed and not enforced for fear of FDI being withdrawn by these new investors.‟ 
 
Officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have an overwhelmingly negative view of the role of 
new investors in Tanzania. Ironically, it is perceived by many interviewees that new investors 
create unemployment, through providing mostly capital intensive work and using foreign 
managers and technicians. It is also argued that new investors provide poor working conditions 
for employees, that their operations lack transparency and that they are anti-union. TAMICO had 
the most negative views of new investors in the mining sector, with Barrick being singled out as 
a particularly bad employer in its provision of working conditions and its attitude to trade unions. 
„Every time TAMICO gets into a position to form a CBA, Barrick terminates the agreement‟ was 
how one TAMICO official summed up dealings with the company. Labour disputes are also 
common at other gold mines. On 19 May 2011, just after Kikwete had spoken out against 
exploitation of mineworkers in his May Day speech, two TAMICO leaders working at the Geita 
Gold Mine were suspended. TAMICO, and then TUCTA officials at head office, claimed the 
suspension was a result of their work in trying to recruit union members. They were supported in 
this claim by evidence from a report on conditions at the mine compiled by the Legal and Human 
Rights Centre.  
 
The situation at the Geita Gold Mine highlighted a significant wider issue for trade unions in 
post-liberalization Tanzania. First, it was an NGO which compiled the report on conditions at the 
mine. A major problem for trade unions is their own lack of detailed evidence-based research on 
new investors. On one hand, lack of transparency on the part of both state and the new investors 
is an issue. Though the different percentages of royalties received by the Tanzanian state for 
various types of minerals extracted by foreign investors are known, full details of the terms and 
conditions of contracts negotiated between the state and foreign enterprises are not put into the 
public domain or made accessible to trade union officials. On the other hand unions lack the 
financial and organizational ability at present to undertake research on the terms and conditions 
whereby new investors enter key sectors of the Tanzanian economy (notably, mining and 
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tourism). Such research would be very useful as the basis of potential challenges to the state and 
the donor positions on the impacts of new investors on the labour force in Tanzania. Interviewees 
criticized the new investors in Tanzania on several key grounds; excessive subcontracting of 
work, which is leading to the casualization of the workforce, failing to honour negotiated CBAs 
and giving jobs to Tanzanian nationals on significantly worse terms and conditions of 
employment than those contained in contracts awarded to foreigners with equivalent skills and 
qualifications. However, unions have done little, if any, recent specific research themselves on 
any of these key areas and thus have no quantifiable evidence to support their views. Moreover, 
the fact that TAMICO, and subsequently TUCTA, had to rely on a study by an NGO (LHRC) in 
putting their case over suspended members provided concrete evidence of how a concerted move 
to adopt a social movement unionism approach could make the work of trade unions more 
effective in the post-liberalization era. 
 
A nationalist discourse ran strongly through the interviews, grounded in opposition to perceived 
exploitation of Tanzanian labour and resources by new foreign investors in lucrative sectors of 
the economy, particularly mining. The wisdom of Nyerere‟s (1976) argument that minerals 
should be left untouched until they could be used for the benefit of all Tanzanians was constantly 
cited by interviewees. The rise of this discourse on the part of the labour movement is 
problematic for the donors, the state and representatives of capital. This research showed that the 
donors, the state and the new investors in Tanzania clearly want trade unions to embrace a 
business unionism approach, since this neutralises their ability to deploy nationalist vocabulary 
within a counter-hegemonic political discourse. By deploying such a tactic trade unions threaten 
to transcend the state‟s monopoly of the discourse of national liberation in Tanzania. The 
argument on the part of trade unions that they are the guardians of national assets and the 
interests of workers, while the state is prioritising the interests of foreign capitalists, who are 
appropriating national assets and exploiting Tanzanian labour, provides the basis of a substantive 
counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy. Furthermore, this nationalist discourse 
clearly strikes a chord with the wider citizenry in Tanzania. In contrast, the endorsement of a 
business unionism approach would locate the labour movement in post-liberalization Tanzania 
firmly within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse.  Thus, the adoption by the Tanzanian labour 
movement of a business unionism or a social movement unionism approach is a vital  
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issue. 
157
 While some of the new guard officials at TUCTA head office and at individual trade 
unions used the discourse of business unionism in interviews (for example, by referring to the 
state and employers as „social partners‟), a majority indicated that social movement unionism is 
the best direction for the labour movement. While interviewees did not use the term „social 
movement unionism‟ explicitly during interviews, a considerable number stated that pursuing 
union strategies in conjunction with other civil society organizations should be an important part 
of the work of the Tanzanian labour movement. 
 
As part of tentative steps towards forming a social movement unionism strategy, trade unions are 
starting to ally themselves with marginalized groups in the economy, particularly workers in the 
informal sector, women and youth. All the senior officials at TUCTA stressed in interviews the 
importance of working with these three groups and TUCTA agreed from 2008 to elect a delegate 
from the Youth Wing onto the National Executive. The Gender and Youth Department was 
started at TUCTA in 1986 and gathered a great deal of baseline data on the position of women in 
the labour force. Using this data to highlight women‟s issues was difficult during the late 1980s 
and the 1990s as TUCTA was male-dominated and, according to an official from the Gender and 
Youth Department, „men laughed when women‟s issues were raised at union meetings.‟ The 
same official outlined how the situation has improved from 2000 onwards and now all trade 
unions have an official gender policy and three unions (TTU, TPAWU and RAAWU)  have a 
budget allocation for women‟s issues. TUCTA has set a target with no time limit for 30% of the 
total trade union membership to be female.  
 
However, these moves cannot be seen as originating from trade unions. Instead they reflect 
donor-driven mainstreaming of gender and youth issues across civil society and the Tanzanian 
state.  Despite the top-down nature of the way these issues have been pushed up the agenda, 
adopting a Gramscian framework provides insights into the way trade unions could adopt them 
to form counter-hegemonic discourses. A central point of the Gramscian analysis (Gramsci, 
1994, 1977) is that the struggle for hegemony is fluid, with both the state and civil society 
organizations (albeit from different positions of structural power) able to seize on changing 
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  This is not to exclude the possibility that the labour movement could adopt a revolutionary unionism approach at 
some stage in the future. However, during the interviews, such an approach was not considered either possible or 
desirable by any of the respondents. 
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processes or new initiatives and promulgate versions of them as realizing the aims of universal 
benefit for society. There is, from this perspective, the chance for gender or youth issues to 
become a focus for counter-hegemonic discourses. 
 
These measures on the part of trade unions towards embracing social movement unionism have 
important implications for their mode of participation in national policy-making processes. 
Social movement unionism is predicated on substantive collaboration between trade unions and 
other civil society organizations, which is not occurring in Tanzania at present. The interviews 
reveal the opposite to be the case. That is, trade unionists in general regard other types of civil 
society organizations, particularly NGOs, with suspicion and do little collaborative work with 
them. Thus, there is a clear disconnect between the stated aim of moving towards social 
movement unionism and the current state of the relationship between trade unions and other civil 
society organizations in Tanzania.  
 
6.10     Summary 
This chapter highlighted significant theoretical, structural and ideological problems facing 
Tanzanian trade unions, which have negatively affected their participation in national policy-
making processes, and led to the marginalization in post-liberalization Tanzania. Unless unions 
can draw on their experience under colonialism of social movement unionism (when they 
worked successfully with TANU and the co-operative movement) 
158
  they are unlikely to be 
able to effectively fight state and corporate reorganization of labour in the post-liberalization 
period. The research shows that unions are caught in a contradictory situation, where an 
increasing number of union officials are advocating the need for a move towards the adoption of 
social movement unionism, but at the same time are distrustful of having close relationships with 
other civil society organizations and lack a sense of common purpose with them. In addition, 
trade unions are viewed with suspicion by other civil society groups, due to their close 
association with the state in pre-liberalization Tanzania. Thus, the chances of trade unions being 
instrumental in the formation of a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which could provide a 
substantive challenge to the prevailing neo-liberal order are slight at present. While the fieldwork 
for this research revealed that trade unions do represent a relatively small percentage of the total 
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  See chapter 3 for details. 
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labour force, it is difficult to sustain the labour aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzania. The 
attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show a heterogeneity which casts doubt on the validity 
of the labour aristocracy thesis. The research showed that it is important to examine the objective 
conditions which make a certain stance towards capital likely to be adopted by the workforce. 
The most important of the structural problems facing trade unions is insufficient capacity, which, 
in turn, leads to a lack of legitimacy. The majority of interviewees made the point that the 
shortage of financial capacity in the trade union movement is severely restricting the ability of 
officials to build technical and institutional capability. The IFIs and the state regard labour 
organizations as a disruptive presence in national policy-making processes and, consequently, 
attempt to erode their legitimacy. Furthermore, trade unionists are concerned that their 
legitimacy is being compromised by lack of downward accountability. That is, they have 
ineffective contact with the rank-and-file membership and are, thus, unable to represent their 
concerns effectively. 
 
In addition to the recognition of structural problems, there is a concern on the part of many trade 
unionists about the lack of a coherent ideology in the movement. While trade unions in the post-
liberalization era have protested against the negative effects on workers of neo-liberal economic 
policies, a considerable number of officials argue that the movement needs to work out an 
ideology based on an overall vision of the role of the labour movement in Tanzanian society, 
rather than being reactive and taking predominantly piecemeal actions, as is currently the case. 
These findings reveal the strength of the Gramscian perspective on the nature of civil society-
state relations, wherein the struggle for hegemony is fluid and contingent on the visions, 
capacities and motivations of associational groups, such as trade unions. These key factors in 
turn shape possibilities for such groups to promulgate counter-hegemonic views to those of the 
prevailing neo-liberal power bloc. Struggles organized by unions, even on a piecemeal basis, can 
be important in developing the consciousness, the resolve and the organizational ability 
necessary to formulate and then sustain a counter-hegemonic discourse. Thus, the abortive 
general strike organized by TUCTA in 2010, TAMICO-organized industrial action in the 
Bulyankulu Gold Mine, anti-privatization struggles, co-ordinated by TEWUTA, in the 
telecommunications sector and conflict between the state and the TPU over strategies to develop 
the tourism sector show that a wider vision on the part of trade unions, regarding their role, is 
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starting to emerge in Tanzania following the shocks to the labour movement resulting from the 
profound structural changes it has undergone in the neo-liberal era. These actions could lead to 
trade unionists, and the wider citizenry, becoming more aware of alternatives to neo-liberal 
hegemony.   
 
Regarding theoretical debates, the fieldwork findings showed that the prevailing liberal 
conception of civil society (see chapter 2 for details), predicated on a consensus model, whereby 
relations between associational groups and the state are regarded as harmonious, has little 
explanatory strength in Tanzania. The actions of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania 
highlighted the strengths of analysing civil society within a Gramscian framework, since it 
allows insights into how some trade union actions and ideologies are confronting the prevailing 
order. While trade unions lack an overall vision, and have not systematically set out a counter-
hegemonic discourse to the dominant neo-liberal perspective driven by the donors and the core 
elements of the integral state, it is possible that new strategies and increasing organizational 
ability will emerge from their practical struggles and actions. An important aspect of the 
Gramscian view is that institutional organization is more important than ideology in the struggle 
for hegemony. 
159
 Therefore, the more actions are co-ordinated by individual trade unions and/or 
the national federation, the greater the possibility for the labour movement to develop and to 
effectively present the „particularity‟ of its counter-hegemonic views as beneficial for Tanzanian 
society as a whole and the more its organizational ability will increase. However, power 
currently lies overwhelmingly with capital vis-à-vis labour in Tanzania and, therefore, the 
development of new strategies and actions by unions are thus of paramount importance.  
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  See chapter 2 for details. 
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Chapter 7  
NGOs, Trade Unions and the PRSP Process in Tanzania 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the ways in which NGOs and trade unions have taken part in the 
Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, from its inception in 1999 until the 
end of its second phase in 2010, in order to illustrate wider and deeper issues relating to the 
participation of civil society organizations in the post-liberalization era. An overview of PRSPs 
is provided to highlight the key role for civil society organizations, which is stressed by the 
donors driving the process. This is followed by a summary of supportive (World Bank, 2010d, 
for example) and critical (Harrison, 2010a, for example) perspectives on PRSPs in terms of their 
ability to reduce poverty and stimulate viable development trajectories. An assessment is 
subsequently made of the Tanzanian PRSP, drawing on key background events and issues which 
contextualize the current engagement of NGOs and trade unions in the process. Fieldwork 
findings, based on interviews with NGO and trade union officials (as well as the Registrar of 
Trade Unions at the Ministry of Labour), are then discussed. The analysis focuses in detail on the 
processes and ideologies through which a small number of NGOs have come to occupy cardinal 
positions within the PRSP matrix, while trade unions have been largely excluded. Obtaining 
positions of strategic significance in superstructure institutions is vital to winning the war of 
position (Gramsci, 2011). Institutions of strategic importance can be used as a fountain-head by 
civil society organizations from which to present ideologies as representing the universal societal 
good. This is why gaining control of key institutions and policy instruments is, for oppositional 
civil society groups, more important in winning the war of position than the quality or detail of 
the ideology they promulgate (Gramsci, 2011). It is only by exercising „intellectual and moral 
leadership‟ (Gramsci, 2011) as part of a historic bloc that oppositional groups can win the war of 
position and become capable of establishing a new ideological settlement.  Thus, the Tanzanian 
PRSP, as a key policy instrument for the state and the donors, was selected as a case study 
regarding the ways in which civil society groups contest strategic policy spaces. Concerning the 
former, Tanzania became one of the first countries to complete the requisite steps under the 
PRSP process enabling the country to obtain substantive debt relief and a further tranche of 
203 
 
official development assistance. 
160
 Regarding the latter, the PRSP process has become the 
touchstone for the harmonization of aid to the extent that by 2003 it provided the „policy 
framework for all donors‟ (DAC, 2003: 7).  The PRSP receives more financial as well as other 
forms of support from external donors than any other national policy instrument in Tanzania. 
161
 
A fast-track PRSP for Tanzania was endorsed by the IFIs in 2000 with a second generation 
initiative, known by its Swahili acronym, MKUKUTA, put into operation in 2005. 
162
 Currently 
(2011), Tanzania‟s third generation PRSP (URT, 2010b) is being rolled out. Thus, in the short to 
medium term, the initiative is likely to remain a key driver of economic and social policies at 
national level.  The fieldwork findings revealed that NGOs have not used their position of 
dominance as civil society representatives within the PRSP process to formulate counter-
hegemonic discourses. Their views are disseminated largely within a framework created and 
controlled by the core elements of the integral state in alliance with the donors. Regarding trade 
unions, the IFIs at first ignored them and then carefully managed their mode of participation in 
the PRSP process, in general. The state mirrored this strategy concerning the way trade unions 
have taken part in the Tanzanian PRSP process. However, agency has been a significant factor 
regarding trade union participation, in that a small number of officials from the labour movement 
have made articulate and forceful contributions to debates concerning PRSP issues. These 
contributions were not part of a formulated trade union strategy and have been managed by the 
state and the donors in ways that minimize the opportunities for them to be developed into 
counter-hegemonic discourses. Given the substantive amount of control exercised over the PRSP 
process by the state and the donors, it is unlikely that NGOs or trade unions could use positions 
of strategic importance within its structures to formulate a sustainable counter-hegemonic 
discourse.           
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  See chapter 3 for details.. 
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  See chapter 3 for details. 
162
  The first PRSP (1999-2004) was called PRSP I. The second PRSP (2005-2010) was given the Swahili name - 
Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini- and is most commonly known by the acronym MKUKUTA. 
It is translated into English as National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).  The third PRSP 
(2010-2015) is called MKUKUTA II or NSGRP II.  State documents in English sometimes use MKUKUTA and on 
other occasions NSGRP. MKUZA is the Swahili acronym for the PRSP on Zanzibar - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi 
na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar. 
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7.2 Overview of the Role of Civil Society in the PRSP Process 
Since their origin in 1999, the key development actors driving the liberalization process in 
Tanzania (the World Bank, the IMF and major bilateral donors), have acknowledged PRSPs as 
the requisite policy framework within which to deliver assistance and to deal with recipient 
states. 
163
  PRSPs replaced Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) as the required statement of 
recipient state objectives for purposes of adjustment lending by the IMF and concessional credits 
from the World Bank. Moreover, bilateral donors have increasingly set up or rearranged Country 
Programmes with reference to PRSPs. DFID (2003: 3), for example, tries to „align its own 
country programmes with PRS[P]s and to influence other donors to do the same.‟ Civil society 
organizations have also paid significant attention to PRSPs, producing summaries (Bretton 
Woods Project, 2003), critiques (Oxfam, 2004, Rowden and Irama (ActionAid), 2004, O‟Malley, 
(Save the Children) 2004, Malaluan and Guttal, (Focus on the Global South), 2003) and 
websites, such as „PRSP-Watch‟ (VENRO). 
  
 According to the IFIs, PRSPs should be country-driven to promote national ownership and 
comprehensive in terms of analysing poverty. They also need to be based on partnerships formed 
through coordinated mass participation of stakeholders (which entails a substantive role for civil 
society), results-oriented and long-term in their approach to poverty reduction (IMF, 2010: 1).  
The World Bank (2010d) states that there is no blueprint for a PRSP and the individual 
circumstances of each country must be recognised. However, IFI prescription is apparent through 
the listing, by the World Bank, of four key steps to be taken in the process of drawing up a 
PRSP.  First, there should be a full description of the participatory process used. Second, an 
outline of the ways in which poverty has been diagnosed, recognising the multidimensional 
nature of the concept, should be set out. Third, clearly presented and costed priorities for 
macroeconomic, structural and social policies are necessary, so that „wish lists‟ are avoided. 
Finally, it is important to create appropriate targets, indicators and systems for monitoring and 
evaluating progress (Booth, 2005, Booth and Lucas, 2002). Thus, PRSPs (which according to the 
World Bank (2010d) should be drawn up every three to five years) require recipient states to 
follow certain procedural steps rather than accepting specific policies. This aims to create a 
greater commitment to poverty reduction than was the case with previous forms of conditional 
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  Recipient states have been renamed as „partners‟ in the PRSP process. 
205 
 
lending. In sum, PRSPs represent a move from „policy conditionality‟ to „process conditionality‟ 
(Booth, 2003a, Killick, 2004, Morrissey, 2005).  
 
The move from SAPs 
164
 to PRSPs reflects the broader shift from the policies of the Washington 
Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus in the latter half of the 1990s (see chapter 
1 for details). 
165
   This raises the question of the extent to which the PRSP process commits 
participating states to new and/or different methods of governance, as is claimed by the IFIs. 
Much has been written on what PRSPs are supposed to achieve with regard to poverty reduction 
and national development and about the way civil society organizations should be included in the 
process (in general and technicist terms) from the point of view of the donors (IMF, 2010, 2004, 
World Bank, 2010a, 2010b, 2005b, 2004b). Such views put a stress on the core concepts of the 
donor discourse – partnership, ownership, participation, capacity building, dialogue and good 
governance.  For example, with regard to its relationships with civil society, the World Bank 
(2005a: 51) concentrates on increasing dialogue and consultations with the trade union 
movement, „including technical level meetings on policy issues of mutual interest, such as … 
PRSPs.‟ Critiques have tended to focus on wide conceptualizations of the process (Craig and 
Porter, 2006, 2003, Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2005, Booth, 2003a, Stewart and Wang, 2003) 
and structural and systemic obstacles to effective participation and ownership on the part of civil 
society, such as donor refusal to allow debate on macroeconomic policies and shortage of time to 
engage meaningfully with the main issues (Dewachter, 2007, Oxfam, 2004, Whaites, 2000). 
These broad-based conceptions of the mechanisms of the PRSP process have led to well-argued 
perspectives emerging on the inclusion of associational groups. (Gould, 2005, for example shows 
how civil society has been instrumentalized).  However, in depth studies of what is happening in 
particular countries with regard to the inclusion and exclusion in the PRSP process of certain 
types of civil society organizations, focusing on their perspectives, are lacking (Fraser, 2005).   
 
Much of the debate on PRSPs centres on what effects the linking of participation and ownership 
are having on economic, political and social policies in recipient countries, since the focus on 
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  See chapters 3, 5 and 6 for an analysis of the effects of SAPs on  Tanzania, economically, politically and 
socially. 
165
  See, inter alia, Serra, Spiegel and Stiglitz, 2008, Stiglitz 2008, Williamson, 2008, Fine, 2006, van Waeyenberge, 
2006 for examinations of key aspects of the shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington 
Consensus. 
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these two concepts is cited by the IFIs as evidence of an advancement on the one-size-fits-all 
neo-liberal policies which characterized the preceding period of SAPs (World Bank, 2010d, 
IMF, 2010, Wilks and Lefrancois, 2002). The way participation and ownership are connected in 
the PRSP process with regard to the involvement of civil society is pertinent, since -   
 
„the importance attached to country ownership and civil society participation, and the  
attention given to the voices of the poor, have all been met with enthusiasm as important 
steps in improving the design and implementation of policies needed to accelerate 
development and reduce poverty‟ (UNCTAD, 2002: 57).  
 
Since participation and ownership are the core concepts behind the donor vision for the PRSP 
process, the initiative is an important testing ground, within which their limits, as imposed by 
external donors (as drivers) and states (as owners), can be analysed. Whether or not the stress on 
country ownership and mass participation of stakeholders in PRSP processes can be regarded as 
indicating a long-term change in policy orientation on the part of the IMF and the World Bank, 
and a willingness to accept policy heterodoxy from recipient countries, has become a matter of 
contention (Harrison, 2010a, Dewachter, 2007, Craig and Porter, 2006, 2003, Gould, 2005, 
Fraser, 2005, Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2005, Gottschalk, 2004, Booth, 2003a, Stewart and 
Wang, 2003, Whaites, 2000). An examination of the reasons for the implementation of PRSPs 
sheds some light on this debate. First, the PRSP initiative emerged out of the need for new 
instruments to justify the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, aimed at debt 
reduction. To qualify for HIPC, recipient countries must draw up a PRSP, outlining how they 
intend to fight poverty, as well as the goals, priorities and instruments involved. Second, 
evidence pointed to poor poverty-reduction outcomes in many aid-dependent countries prior to 
1999. Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederson (2003: 285) state that even „the most 
convinced advocates of foreign aid have had to acknowledge that the results have often been 
disappointing and have not at all lived up to expectations.‟ Aid dependency had become 
institutionalised through high volumes, with Tanzania being a case in point (See the analysis in 
chapter 3 and Engel, Erdmann and Mehler eds, 2006). 
166
 Aid had also led to the loss of public 
planning and implementation capacity because of the dominance of a project-based model 
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  A number of writers have outlined how the institutionalization of aid dependency is a major cause of the 
ineffectiveness of aid in Africa (See, for example, Gumede, 2009, Glennie, 2008). 
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(which failed)  as it diverted attention away from the processes of development management in 
the recipient country and incentives for officials to spend time on reforming strategic thinking at 
the centre were undermined (White and Dijkstra, 2003). Moreover, the dominance of project aid 
fitted easily into the prevailing system of patron-client relations and helped to fuel it 
institutionally (Moyo, 2010, Easterly, 2006, Bauer, 1976). The recognition of these factors led to 
greater analysis during the 1990s of how to make the national policy context conducive to aid 
effectiveness (De Renzio and Krafchik, 2008, Brautigam and Knack, 2004, Van de Walle, Ball 
and Ramachandran (eds), 2003). Research in this area influenced donor moves toward sector-
wide approaches (Brown et al, 2001, Foster, 2000) and „partnership general budgetary support‟ 
(PGBS) during the late 1990s, where a relationship based on cooperation between donors and 
recipients can be „contrasted with the imposed conditionality of the structural adjustment era‟ 
(Dom, 2007: 1). Third, PRSPs were created in response to the increasing amount of evidence that 
emerged during the 1990s showing the limits of conventional conditionalities, particularly those 
associated with SAPs, in levering positive change (Stein, 2008, Killick, 2002, Leandro et al., 
1999, Mohan, Brown, Millward and Zack-Williams, 1999, Hussain and Faruqee (eds), 1994, 
Mahjoub (ed.), 1990). Stein (2008: 4) outlined how the consequences of SAPs in Africa were 
„terrible‟ in both economic and social terms, evidenced by an increase in absolute and relative 
poverty and a decline in average life expectancy from fifty to forty six between 1980 and 2003.  
Influenced by such trenchant criticisms of  SAPs, „poverty reduction‟ per se became an 
increasing part of the World Bank agenda during the 1990s and led to a focus, in particular,  on 
the „social dimensions of adjustment‟ (World Bank, 1993, Hutchful, 1994, Jayarajah, Brown and 
Sen, 1996). Fourth, PRSPs came into being in part through recognition of the weaknesses 
involved in the common practice prior to 1999 of regarding poverty reduction as a special 
activity, which was added to existing programmes, requiring particular structures and activities. 
The resulting focus of poverty reduction policies was on project funding rather than processes of 
public resource allocation through the national exchequer. Thus, there was no connection to the 
macro-economic framework and a lack of an institutional link with the budget or overall 
management of public expenditure (Booth, 2003a).  
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7.3 Conceptualizing Civil Society Participation in the PRSP Process 
Booth (2003a) sets out a typology of PRSPs 
167
 with  supporters, such as the IFIs, at one end of a 
spectrum (who downplay the structural obstacles to improvement possibilities in Africa via 
domestic politics) and radical sceptics at the other extreme, who regard PRSPs as SAPs with 
superficial changes (Standing, 2000, for example). The radical sceptics include Craig and Porter 
(2003: 57), who contend that „much of PRSP seems little more than re-labelling, often performed 
somewhat cynically.‟ Forms of participation can be regarded as technologies of control since 
they mystify power relations, depoliticize negotiations and therefore secure IFI control of 
outcomes (see also Gould and Ojanen, 2005 on this point). 
168
  Booth (2003a) himself adopts a 
third position, regarding PRSPs as a „non-trivial‟ change informing the delivery of poverty 
support. 
169
 They proffer an opportunity to address critical problems and in particular provide a 
chance to stop aid conditionalities creating a situation where recipient states are undermined.  
 
In respect of the role of civil society, PRSP supporters, such as the IFIs, see this in de 
Tocquevillian terms (see chapter 2 for details). That is, the PRSP process allows a variety of 
forms of associational life to participate freely, through stimulating and amicable debates, which 
lead to the views of the wider citizenry being recognized and incorporated into national policies 
by a responsive state. Radical sceptics dismiss this perspective as having little basis in reality. 
For them, a small number of NGOs dominate civil society input to the PRSP process. These are 
elite, urban-based organizations, which are unrepresentative of the views of the majority of 
associational groups (See, for example, Craig and Porter, 2006). According to the third way 
position adopted by Booth (2003), civil society actors have the opportunity to use PRSPs as a 
vehicle to move away from a situation where there is a generalized and internationalized 
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  See also Fraser (2005), who delineates four main perspectives on PRSPs. First, that they are a sham and a public 
relations exercise. Second, they are leading to substantive possibilities for policy change. However,  the limited 
alterations to PRSP policies compared to those previously adopted show states have learned that international 
economic realities offer few choices other than to embrace liberal democracy and free market reforms. Third, PRSP 
participation offers possibilities to transform relations between donors and recipients, so the focus should be on the 
processes of participation. Fourth, participation in PRSP processes does not result in gradual empowerment, because 
of the underlying principles of the concept itself, rather than through any processes of implementation. 
168
  In a variation of the radical sceptic view, Stewart and Wang (2003) set out a moral hazard position regarding 
PRSPs, whereby if recipients ‟own‟ poverty reduction strategies and there is little progress in alleviating poverty, 
they, including the indigenous civil society organizations which took part in the process, can be blamed and donors 
largely absolved. 
169
  Booth‟s position is supported by other contributors to Booth, D  (2003a)  (ed.) Fighting Poverty In Africa: Are 
PRSPs Making a Difference?   
209 
 
responsibility for fighting poverty to a position where there is a more specific and local 
accountability, opening up the possibilities for these agents to play a substantive role in 
contesting policy spaces.     
 
7.4 Measuring Civil Society Participation in, and Ownership of, the PRSP Process 
 
Measuring Civil Society Participation 
There is a stress on outcomes with regard to measuring civil society participation in PRSPs. „In 
planning a participatory process, it is important to keep in mind that the outcome-based 
approaches that are initiated and the institutional arrangements that support them can have an 
enduring influence over policymaking and implementation‟ (World Bank, 2004b: 237). The type 
of outcomes which emerge from civil society input is an important part of the debate about the 
strengths and weaknesses of participatory approaches in the context of the PRSP process. McGee 
(2002) regards PRSPs as the acid test for southern states‟ commitment to participation and 
ownership. A key aspect of this test is whether civil society organizations regard the forms and 
levels of participation afforded them as providing an opportunity to promulgate a counter-
hegemonic discourse to that of neo-liberalism. 
 
The key donor documents for assessing levels of participation in the PRSP process are the Joint 
Staff Assessments (JSAs) of the World Bank and the IMF. They „act as a signalling device for 
the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank that the strategy produced by the state 
provides a sound basis for providing concessional assistance‟ (ODI, 2005: 3). The way 
participation is evaluated in the JSAs has been much criticised. Independent reviews by the IMF 
(IEO, 2004) and the World Bank (OED, 2004) did not find any procedures for assessing levels of 
participation  set out in advance and stated that it was unclear as to whether different PRSPs 
were being assessed using the same criteria. JSAs were also critiqued for being essentially 
„insider documents‟, despite the fact that one of their stated objectives is to inform stakeholders 
in the PRSP process and the general public. Finally, the JSAs are attacked for portraying 
participation in PRSPs in an overly favourable light, using broad terms of praise. This is the case 
with regard to JSAs of the Tanzanian PRSP. The IEO, (2004) and OED (2004) reports ranked 
levels of „Ownership and Participation‟ the least transparent and accountable sphere of 
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assessment in the JSAs. The World Bank provides „guidelines‟ for analysing participation. These 
are based on answering four questions, outlined in Figure 7.1, below. 
 
Figure 7.1 JSA Guidelines for Assessing Participation in the PRSP 
Does the PRSP describe the participatory processes that the state conducted to design and to 
build ownership for the strategy? 
Does the PRSP summarize major issues raised during the participatory process and the 
impacts of the process on the content of the strategy? How has the participatory process 
evolved over time? 
How closely is the PRSP related to any other current state document that set forth national or 
sectoral development plans and/or budgets? 
What are the plans for public dissemination of the PRSP? 
Source: IMF and World Bank (2001: 20) 
 
With regard to qualitative aspects of the participatory process, JSAs rank this from 1-5, with 1 
being „poor‟, 3 „moderate‟ and 5 „good‟. Moreover, a yes-no answer is required to the question, 
„was participation mentioned as one of the strong points of the PRSP process?‟ 
 
As Thomas (2004), points out, a problem with the JSA Guidelines is that there is a built-in 
prejudice towards approval. The questions focus on the quality of the description of participatory 
processes involved in formulating a PRSP, not on an assessment of the processes themselves. If 
the quality of participatory approaches were examined it would be harder to get approval from 
the Executive Boards of the IFIs than simply requiring an adequate description of the processes.   
Furthermore, Dewatcher (2005: 30) found that the criteria used in compiling different JSAs were 
not clear, comparable or verifiable. These inconsistencies „contribute to the fuzziness and 
possible euphemisms that are instrumental in rating all PRSPs as acceptable.‟ 
 
 The typology for assessing civil society participation in the PRSP process provided by Tikare et 
al. (2004) in the World Bank‟s „PRSP Sourcebook‟ is also open to criticism for being vague. 
Only three „Country Types‟ are set out with regard to the status of participation and the 
descriptions are so broad as to provide little explanatory power. 
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Figure 7.2 Assessing the Current Status of Participation: A Typology 
 Country Type A Country Type B Country Type C 
Civil society Organized civil society and local 
state structures exist and 
participate in state processes and 
implementation. 
Some organized civil 
society groups exist, 
and participation in 
state processes is limited. 
Limited civil 
society 
organization. 
Source: Tikare et al. (2004: 249) 
 
In sum, civil society participation in PRSP processes is not measured robustly or consistently. 
The ways in which civil society participation are assessed both in the World Bank‟s participation 
sourcebook and in the JSAs are marked by a lack of analytical rigour and transparency. Since 
participation is inextricably linked to ownership in the PRSP process, there have also been 
various attempts to measure levels of the latter concept (Johnson and Wasty 1993, Killick 1997, 
World Bank 2004b). However, as Entwistle and Cavassini (2005) point out, since the 
operationalization of ownership as a concept is difficult, the level of participation on the part of 
stakeholders in the PRSP process is often used as a proxy.  
 
Measuring Civil Society Ownership 
As Weeks et al. (2002: 72) point out, „no single policy was more associated with transferring 
ownership to aid recipients than the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.‟ The dynamic nature of 
ownership means that levels and types of ownership are constantly changing in countries taking 
part in the PRSP process. However, it is unlikely that countries receiving aid will be allowed to 
assume ownership of national policies if these run counter to the agenda of donors. Donors need 
to show domestic constituencies that they are using assistance effectively. This is a problem if 
donors and recipients have different views on policies and their capacity for implementation. 
Hayman (2003: 53), focusing on Eritrea, provides support for this analysis, arguing that „the 
donor community is ruled by its own agenda and is clearly not ready to concede the necessary 
control to allow real recipient ownership.‟ Moreover, in a wider study, Nkombo (2008: 6) 
concluded that „ownership in most African countries is still very poor.‟  
 
There is a need to address a fundamental contradiction concerning the way ownership and 
participation are applied in the PRSP process. Ownership is chosen as a concept by external 
donors which they claim is necessary if effective anti-poverty strategies are to be put in place and 
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can be proved by a high level of participation in drawing up the policies. However, both of these 
concepts are introduced by the donors as a priori, containing merits in terms of leading to the 
alleviation of poverty, and the recipient countries have no chance to reject them (as unsuitable 
for their particular political and socio-economic environment) based on the history of 
development in that country. They are not allowed to state that ownership itself is a concept 
being imposed on them by external actors which they reject as being inappropriate in a context-
specific environment. Ownership can thus be regarded as a „super-conditionality‟ (Weeks et al., 
2002) determining the parameters of participation for all actors taking part in the PRSP process. 
 
With regard to practical ways to measure ownership, Weeks et al. (2002) take a matrix approach, 
which they use to measure ownership qualitatively. The matrix has three dimensions; the range 
of owners, the stages of the project cycle and the type of aid instrument or modality used. The 
matrix (set out below in Table 7.1) is used to summarise the activity assessment of the 
stakeholders (including those in the civil society sphere) during the various stages of the project 
cycle. The summaries can be updated as the process moves on, which takes account of its 
dynamic nature.  No numeric values are used. 
 
Table 7.1 Basic Ownership Matrix 
 Stages of Project Cycle 
Owners Identification Selection Formulation Implementation Evaluation 
Partner state      
NGOs      
Beneficiaries      
Other groups….      
Source: Weeks et al. (2002) 
 
Lerche, Pincus and Weeks (2003) also adopt a qualitative approach in assessing whether the 
PRSP process adds value to existing poverty reduction strategies, which is set out below in Table 
7.2, using India as a case study. 
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Table 7.2 Did the PRSP Process Add Value to Poverty Reduction Strategies? 
 Necessary Condition Sufficient Conditions 
Country A more poverty focused 
policy framework? 
Nationally-owned 
and country-driven, 
including 
participation and 
awareness? 
Integrated into 
the national 
planning 
framework? 
Consistent 
with 
capacity to 
implement? 
Overall 
conclusion 
India No – long-standing 
experience in poverty-
reduction strategies 
Yes and Yes – long-
standing practice of 
state 
Yes – national 
plan and PRSP 
are the same. 
The latter 
derivative of the 
former 
Yes – much 
stronger at 
national 
than state 
level 
No value 
added 
Source: Lerche, Pincus and Weeks (2003) 
 
Providing summary answers to key questions in matrix form, (Weeks et al., 2002 and Lerche, 
Pincus and Weeks, 2003) may be worthwhile in assessing levels of ownership and could be 
triangulated with measurement of independent variables as formulated by Johnson and Wasty 
(1993) and developed further by Killick (1997) and the World Bank (2004b). However, since the 
formal inception of PRSPs in September 1999, the IFIs have not used the classification scheme 
devised by Johnson and Wasty to measure levels of ownership. Instead they measure the concept 
by employing broad rankings (from 1-5), assessing participation as a proxy for ownership, based 
on methods which lack rigour and transparency. Furthermore, in utilizing this method, the IFIs 
fail to take into account the fact that the trajectories of socio-economic and political processes 
over time are context-specific and, consequently, the way participation and ownership play out in 
particular countries is likely to be very different. Thus, the method employed by the IFIs of 
assigning broad numeric values in assessing levels of civil society participation in PRSP 
processes, which also acts as a proxy measurement of the degree of ownership, is virtually 
meaningless.  
 
7.5 The Tanzanian PRSP Process 
Tanzania is one of thirty four sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (out of a total of forty seven) 
that have PRSPs, leaving less than that number (thirty three) in operation throughout the rest of 
the world (World Bank, 2010a). A major aspect of the Tanzanian PRSP at its inception in 1999, 
in line with the initiative across SSA, was the attempt to instil the institutions, procedures and 
norms of multiparty liberal democracy, as part of the World Bank‟s good governance agenda, 
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which included a substantive role for civil society organizations 
170
 (Harrison, 2010a, 2004a, 
2004b, Zack-Williams and Harrison, 2009, Girdwood, 2007, Fukuda-Parr and Ponzio, 2002, 
Nelson, 2000). Civil society in Tanzania was characterized as weak because of state intolerance 
towards oversight and criticism of its policies on the part of associational groups (see chapter 3 
for details). Thus, a key aspect of the PRSP process in Tanzania was the attempt to open up the 
policy-making process to the mass participation of citizens in the institutionalised context of civil 
society organizations, leading to increased accountability on the part of the state. The Tanzanian 
PRSP has been regarded as a success by the IFIs and a number of independent analysts. For 
example, Holtom (2007: 245) argues that the PRSP process has led to Tanzania securing aid and 
debt-relief and has engendered a stronger state-donor partnership than existed during the 1990s, 
which is to be „celebrated‟, as it has led to macroeconomic stability and economic growth. 
However, such analyses fail to encompass in any detail the way the participation of civil society 
in the initiative has occurred  and do not assess the way the processes were viewed from the 
perspectives of civil society organizations, such as NGOs and trade unions, themselves.  The 
fieldwork, thus, focused on these two areas.  
 
7.6 NGO Engagement in the PRSP Process 
The PRSP I process (1999 to 2004) for NGOs, involved the managed participation of a small 
number of organizations, which were invited to take part in „zonal workshops‟ where 
consultations took place with state officials.  With regard to Cluster 1 (Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty), little civil society input was allowed on key issues (notably macroeconomic policy 
fundamentals) which were set by the state and beyond substantive discussion. NGO input was 
thus concentrated on Clusters 2 and 3 (Quality of Life and Social Well Being and Governance 
and Accountability, respectively). 
 
The President‟s Office produced the first budget guidelines for the PRSP, but costing was not 
done for the implementation phase. 
171
  REPOA (an organization with a track record as a 
specialist research organization on poverty issues) was given the position of secretariat for civil 
                                                          
170  See chapter 1 for an analysis s of the origins of the good governance agenda in the general context of a shift 
from the policies of the Washington Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus.  
171
  Officials from ESRF (one of two major „think tank‟ NGOs in Tanzania, along with REPOA) was selected by the 
state to do the costing  post facto. 
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society input, while also contributing ideas as an individual NGO as to what should be included 
in the PRSP.  Moreover a small number of umbrella NGOs were commissioned and funded by 
the Vice President‟s Office (VPO), which is the state department responsible for co-ordinating 
the PRSP process, to canvass the views of their member organizations. At the start of the PRSP I 
process, the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) was championed by Oxfam 
as the lead association for NGO input. As Oxfam moved to a focus on how to get its own 
programmes put into practice on the ground, the organization became less interested in the PRSP 
process and provided a reduced amount of support for TCDD, which, consequently, lost its 
importance as a coordinating body. This is an indication of the need, on the part of Tanzanian 
NGOs, for financing and support from foreign donors if they are to have the capacity to take part 
in national policy-making processes effectively. It also indicates the weakness of the de 
Tocquevillian vision, which informs the perspective of the donors, regarding civil society. 
Contrary to this vision, which is based on a wide variety of civil society organizations taking part 
freely in debates, Tanzanian associational groups lack the capacity to engage in an important and 
influential national policy instrument, such as the PRSP, without the patronage of foreign donors. 
Other international donors then moved to set up a Tanzanian apex organization, the Policy 
Forum, to oversee NGO input to the PRSP process, which became operational in November 
2001. The interviews showed that a considerable amount of finance was used, and effort 
expended, by donors (Care International, in particular) to create the Policy Forum (now often 
called PF), as an umbrella organization which could coordinate the ideas and policies of all 
Tanzanian NGOs.  
 
The Policy Forum worked alongside other NGO umbrella organizations - Tanzania Council for 
Social Development (TACOSDE), Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) and Tanzania 
Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) - in coordinating the NGO input (Policy Forum, 
2002a). The state and the donors used the documents provided through the co-ordinating work of 
the umbrella NGOs to claim that civil society input to the PRSP I process was extensive. The 
Policy Forum and TGNP set out policies and programmes in formal written submissions to the 
VPO, many of which were incorporated verbatim into the PRSP document sent to the IFIs in 
Washington for approval. However, in interviews, officials from the NGOs concerned outlined 
how this meant little, since strategies for the implementation of the proposed policies and 
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programmes were not created.  Officials from the NGOs which made the submissions felt that 
the state used them primarily to gain credibility with the IFIs concerning the „participatory 
nature‟ of the PRSP process. 172 In reality, the lack of time allowed for NGO input and the failure 
to provide any institutionalised means for NGOs to take part in the implementation stage meant 
that the PRSP I process was far from participatory. The entire participatory process was 
completed in just six months.  A key feature of this process were the discussions between NGOs 
and state officials at zonal workshops, which lasted one month (May 2000) with only around 
fifty NGOs participating. Moreover, little time was available to follow up on the work started as 
a result of issues raised at those meetings. Thus, NGO input was made in constrained 
circumstances, which did not allow well-researched and clearly thought out positions to be 
formulated.  Nevertheless, a full PRSP was approved by the IFIs in December 2000, leading to 
debt relief and a new tranche of loans being granted as part of HIPC. Clearly these two factors 
were the state‟s highest priority in regard to desired outcomes from the PRSP I process.  
 
At the end of the PRSP I process a large-scale evaluation took place.  This was led by the VPO 
and took one year.  The review featured pre-designed questionnaires in newspapers for people to 
comment on what they wanted to be improved in Tanzania.  An NGO was commissioned to 
analyse the replies to the 30,000 questionnaires. Summaries of the replies were put into a 
booklet, which is available free from the VPO. However, the feedback from these questionnaires 
was not incorporated into the PRSP I process, as it was only analysed after the documents had 
been finalized. This is evident from the fact that the key PRSP I documents remained completely 
unaltered from the first draft to the final version and, therefore, could not have incorporated any 
of the findings from the survey. 
173
 Several interviewees provided documents which showed that 
much of the content of Clusters 2 and 3 of PRSP I had been taken directly from the Policy Forum 
submissions, which made the document „seem more like a wish list‟ than an actionable strategic 
plan.  According to an interviewee from Policy Forum, NGO input, in the form of written 
submissions, was significant in Clusters 2 and 3, but only from the few organizations with good 
connections to the drafters. This reveals that the Policy Forum itself was well aware that it was 
unable to fulfil the mandate of the state by canvassing the views of a large number of grassroots 
                                                          
172
  Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials (2005 and 2006), who all made this point. 
173
  Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials (2005 and 2006), who all made this point. 
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associational groups, given the time and resources at its disposal. For another interviewee, who 
was the executive director of a well-funded organization, there `was little to get excited about, as 
macroeconomic policy was dictated from the top‟ and civil society influence on this key area 
(Cluster 1) relating to poverty reduction was, consequently „negligible.‟  The majority of 
interviewees pointed out that NGOs were frustrated at being regarded primarily as service 
delivery gap fillers in the social sector by the state and the donors. This was manifest from their 
exclusion from any debates of fundamental importance to the development of the country, 
notably those regarding macroeconomic policies. The state‟s refusal to allow civil society 
organizations to debate macroeconomic policy within the setting of the PRSP process was an 
effective strategy as part of the war of position. Through this strategy, the state was able to 
substantially limit a challenge to its hegemony. 
 
A small number of interviewees argued that the PRSP I process merely provided a framework to 
„manage the donors.‟ That is, the Tanzanian state adopted it and played along with it as a way of 
guaranteeing funds from donors, while, in reality, it was not committed to implementation and, 
therefore, did not take civil society participation seriously. In short, the state just ticked the boxes 
required by the donors to meet the minimum standards of civil society participation within the 
hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. This finding provides a challenge in some respects to the 
arguments of Holtom (2007), Harrison (2005) and Gould and Ojanen (2003) 
174
 that governance 
reforms have been accepted and internalized by powerful state officials, particularly within the 
Ministry of Finance. Whether Tanzanian state officials in positions of policy-making power are 
„true believers‟ in the new policy agenda or simply „managing the donors,‟ has significance. If 
they are true believers, the reforms are likely to remain in place for some time, whatever the 
policy outcomes. However, if the „managing the donors‟ perspective put forward by some NGO 
officials in this research has validity, the reforms may be amended substantively or abandoned 
rapidly in the face of negative results.  
 
Overall, the interviews showed that all NGOs regarded participation in PRSP I as rushed and 
heavily managed by the state, in order to get the document accepted by the IFIs and, hence, 
obtain a debt relief package under HIPC as quickly as possible.  All the NGO officials 
                                                          
174
 See chapter 4 for details. 
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interviewed pointed out that the limited timelines for civil society participation set by the state 
and the lack of an effective and concerted vision on the part of NGOs meant that (even in Dar es 
Salaam and Arusha) only a few large organizations could take part in the process in ways 
overwhelmingly dictated by the state.  A few interviewees argued that the majority of NGO 
officials participating were content that they had been included at all and even felt flattered at 
being asked to play a role in discussing the formation of national policies. They were not 
concerned to look deeply at whether their mode of participation was meaningful in terms of 
getting the needs of their members or constituencies addressed. Thus, the NGO sector was 
successfully co-opted by the state through its use of a low-intensity „participation-as-
consultation‟ model (see chapter 1 for an analysis of different models of participation). It was 
clear to the vast majority of interviewees that the state wanted the NGO participation to focus on 
the social sector and, in particular, on non-income variables in the areas of health, education and 
water. Where NGOs were involved in income-based sectors affecting the poor, this was „not 
substantive‟ through weak capacity and vision, in the words of one NGO official interviewed, 
who played an active role in the process. That is, NGOs did not present well-researched papers 
outlining a counter-hegemonic discourse. They lacked both information on income-based sectors 
and a collaborative vision, which could have been used as the basis from which to formulate 
alternatives to the neo-liberal discourse. However, there was a division between the views of Big 
International NGOs (BINGOs) and local organizations regarding this issue, as illustrated by the 
claim of interviewees from Oxfam that the officials from local NGOs „did not know how to 
participate, so we recruited in-house experts to show them how to engage in policy dialogue.‟ 
From this example, it can be seen that Oxfam uncritically regarded the donor-set modus operandi 
of the PRSP process as completely appropriate and believed that Tanzanian NGOs which were 
unfamiliar with this mode were lacking. This revealed the BINGOs, as well as the state and 
donors, work within a dominant discourse, which also entails an accepted method of operating. 
Organizations unfamiliar with this orthodoxy, thus, require „training.‟ 
 
The majority of the interviewees felt that the second PRSP (MKUKUTA), which was rolled out 
from 2005, had involved more state consultation with NGOs. Therefore, the quantity of NGO 
participation increased. However, many interviewees pointed out that who exactly participates in 
development processes, and in what ways, are key factors in terms of influencing outcomes, 
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rather than the overall number of civil society organizations which are engaged. In this regard, 
most interviewees argued that while MKUKUTA was based on a more participatory process than 
PRSP I, since there was a greater amount of civil society involvement, qualification is needed, as 
NGOs remained relatively disorganized and did not engage effectively. Few NGOs interviewed 
had analysed the type and level of NGO participation in the PRSP process in depth and worked 
out a strategy for their own organization, or one based on systematic collaboration with other 
NGOs or other forms of civil society, regarding how to participate and with what objectives.  
Moreover, many interviewees pointed out that the majority of NGO officials involved in 
MKUKUTA do not know the issues facing the mass of people at the grassroots anyway, 
irrespective of their lack of ability to formulate effective strategies per se. Given this lack of 
coherence and cohesion in the NGO sector, it was impossible for them to formulate a sustainable 
counter-hegemonic discourse and there was no substantive move towards the formation of a 
historic bloc of oppositional groups, which could challenge the rule of the state. 
 
An example of the need for the Tanzanian NGO sector to review participation strategies was 
provided by an interviewee from TANGO. Representatives of NGOs went to the capital city, 
Dodoma to discuss with parliamentarians how to participate more effectively in the PRSP 
process. They were told by MPs that they would be better off back in Dar es Salaam spending 
time with the technocrats who draw up budgets for the civil society sector, as they have 
significant power and it would thus be more productive for NGOs to enter discussions with them 
than to be in Dodoma with ordinary MPs, who have little influence on matters relating to NGOs.  
For the interviewee, this typified the fact that NGOs tend to participate in the PRSP process 
without researching and planning how to maximize their effectiveness. A considerable amount of 
time and money was spent on the Dodoma meeting. For this interviewee, NGOs need a 
concerted strategy to be effective. The failure to target Dar es Salaam-based state technocrats and 
instead to wrongly focus on Dodoma parliamentarians was an example of the inadequate 
strategies that typify NGO participation in MKUKUTA. What participation in the PRSP process 
means for NGOs (and the state) remain uncertain. For this interviewee, the key challenge for 
NGOs is how to make participation effective. For many NGOs in Tanzania, having been invited 
to meetings means they have „participated‟ and it is disappointing to see that this is the limit of 
NGO expectations.  NGOs have no clear perspective regarding what participation should and 
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should not mean. A lot of the NGO arguments are based on blaming the state for creating a lack 
of serious participation on the part of CSOs.  There is a need for NGOs themselves to understand 
issues relating to participation at a deeper level than is the case at present. It is also necessary to 
go beyond complaining about donor and state constraints on NGO participation in the 
MKUKUTA process and to develop a vision and strategy for the sector, rather than waiting for 
an agenda to be set and then adjusted „from above,‟ as happens at present.  
 
This interviewee was the only one who formally outlined the need for Tanzanian NGOs to 
formulate a clear and sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse. Moreover, this perspective 
recognizes the importance of Gramsci‟s (2011) argument that to be successful, oppositional 
groups must exercise „intellectual and moral leadership,‟ since, without these elements, the 
achievement of hegemony is impossible. It is not enough for such a group merely to criticize the 
key tenets of state hegemony. A historic bloc of civil society groups needs to present its aims as 
representing the universal good of the society in question if it is to successfully challenge state 
hegemony. This involves using a variety of means, including publications, demonstrations, 
meetings and the media to persuade other classes and groups to accept their moral, social and 
political values. At present, NGO taking part in MKUKUTA do not use these methods but are 
overwhelmingly reactive, rather than proactive, to the way the state has constituted the process 
and the ensuing strategies, targets and policies. A number of interviewees made the point that 
this situation has occurred to some extent as a result of MKUKUTA being externally imposed 
and put into practice with the intention of obtaining short-term results. Consequently, it was 
argued that NGOs are not reflecting on their participation in the MKUKUTA process and their 
focus is too much on piecemeal criticisms of the state. Therefore, NGOs need to collaborate in 
creating and sustaining a counter-hegemonic vision. In this regard, a number of interviewees 
made the point that the state itself does not know how to use MKUKUTA mechanisms and 
channels concerning participation on the part of civil society organizations, to a large extent as a 
result of the initiative being externally imposed. Thus, NGOs had an opportunity to take 
advantage of this uncertainty on the part of the state about the nature of participation, by putting 
forward a coherent and cohesive counter-hegemonic discourse. The fact that they have not done 
so is, consequently, a missed opportunity.  
 
221 
 
Another interviewee outlined a different issue concerning the lack of coherence in the NGO 
position on participation, by arguing that there was a big question as to where the focus of the 
concept lay; with the people, as intended beneficiaries, or with the NGOs themselves. For this 
interviewee, the PRSP process must allow continuous engagement on the part of NGOs, which 
requires multi-channels that are open, non-bureaucratic and can involve informal discussions 
with power-holders as issues arise.  This would be better than always having a formal meeting 
framework where the same people attend every meeting in a ritualized manner.  A significant 
problem remains how to provide effective feedback mechanisms concerning MKUKUTA 
processes so that NGOs and their constituents can then act on key issues and present their own 
arguments and strategies. 
 
A crucial aspect relating to the provision of effective feedback mechanism concerns language. 
Interviewees pointed out that in the rural areas people do not speak English well enough to 
understand the issues involved in the PRSP process.  Thus, having PRSP documents and 
meetings in Swahili is very important, but the problem remains that many materials are not 
translated well from English into Swahili so there is little reach of the documents, and the 
process itself, up country. This, for a considerable number of interviewees, is a deliberate state 
strategy, which is used in order to win the war of position. A related point, outlined by several 
interviewees, was that much work has been done on participation in MKUKUTA but remains on 
shelves and is never used to stimulate discussions or inform practice. As a result, state hegemony 
is maintained partly by narrowing down the number who can access materials related to 
MKUKUTA and by restricting the distribution of documents based on debates with this 
relatively small group of people, who have been able to read them. 
 
A number of interviewees made the point that the preponderance of umbrella groups makes the 
structure of the NGO sector unwieldy.  TANGO (2010: 1) (which is the largest umbrella group) 
argued that despite the existence of a number of umbrella groups in the NGO sector „not much 
has been done in terms of fostering ethical conduct and adherence to the principles of good 
governance among CSO.‟ Since 2003, the work of the influential Foundation for Civil Society 
(FCS) has added to the complex and unwieldy structure of CSOs in Tanzania. FCS operates as a 
support organization aiming to „empower citizens through the provision of grants, facilitating 
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linkages and enabling a culture of ongoing learning to civil society‟ (FCS, 2008). The work of 
FCS is explicitly aligned with the PRSP process, in focusing on the provision of intermediary 
support mechanisms for CSOs to enable them to reduce poverty effectively as set out in the 
MKUKUTA and Vision 2025. A final important point outlined by several interviewees regarding 
participation is the arcane and lengthy funding application processes to bilateral donors and the 
Foundation for Civil Society, which means that few people can understand them fully. This 
undermines the ability of many civil society organizations to participate in the PRSP process and 
militates against perceptions of ownership of processes and policies. 
 
Most NGO officials argued that processes involved in participating in the PRSP are complicated 
and limit the effectiveness of their contributions. The majority of NGO officials were concerned 
with processes more than questions of policy substance.  For a minority of interviewees it is vital 
that NGOs taking part in the PRSP process change their focus from processes to substantive 
policy-making issues if their participation is to be meaningful. This is difficult as it requires 
NGOs to formulate both individual strategies and coordinated input on policy-making across all 
members of the Macro Group. The umbrella groups also have the added difficulty of trying to 
put forward the views of their memberships, which are spread across the entire country.  
MKUKUTA has been characterized by the rise of a small group of NGOs, which have a 
significant influence on civil society input but also by an increase in the organization and 
presentation of counter-hegemonic discourses by a number of NGOs. The amount of lobbying 
and advocacy activities engaged in by elite Tanzanian NGOs has increased appreciably since the 
inception of MKUKUTA (See chapter 5 for details of the rise of advocacy and lobbying among 
Tanzanian NGOs, in general). For example, two large NGOs, TGNP and Hakikazi Catalyst, 
reviewed the national budget for 2005/2006, producing critiques and suggested alternatives after 
convening a series of seminars with the public and involving the media (Mbilinyi and Rusimbi, 
2005).  
 
As PRSP II was rolled out, a small group of NGOs consolidated their powerful position within 
the civil society sector. At the same time other associational groups were marginalized, to a large 
extent because they do not have „forms amenable to development contracting‟ (Green, Mercer 
and Mesaki, 2010: 40), which is the preferred modus operandi of the donors. Furthermore, rural-
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based NGOs continue to have little input into PRSP processes. The level of access to basic social 
services, notably education and health, at the district level remains „poor‟ (Semkwiji, 2009: 8). 
However, the  participation of associations from rural areas at the 2010 Civil Society 
Organizations‟ National Consultative Meeting on the PRSP was „weak‟ (Policy Forum, 2010: 
13). Thus, there is a lack of activity on the part of NGOs precisely where facilities and services 
are most ineffective in the country. Nevertheless, the donors involved in the PRSP process 
continue to concentrate their funding on a small number of urban-based associational groups. 
 
Overall, PRSP II was characterized by the intensification of donor efforts to move Tanzania from 
a Gemeinschaft (Community) to a Gesellschaft (Association) type of society, where the former is 
„characterized by the social will as concord, folkways, mores and religion‟ and the latter by the 
social will as „convention, legislation and public opinion‟ (Tonnies, 1955: 270). The extent to 
which this aim is being realized is examined in the Fieldwork Findings section. In the Tanzanian 
PRSP process, NGOs provide a challenge to the state in such a way, as they have access to 
finance and power, through the patronage of foreign donors. They also have control of an 
important institutional apparatus, through their dominance of the Civil Society sector, which 
directs input to the PRSP process from associational groups in Tanzania. This control of the 
institutional apparatus within which civil society organizations take part in the PRSP process in 
Tanzania and the patronage of the external donors (which drive the process) allows NGOs to 
present their views on poverty reduction as representing the universal interests of citizens in 
Tanzania.  
  
NGOs regarded the level and type of their participation in MKUKUTA as quantitatively and 
qualitatively better in comparison to PRSP I. For the PF, which became the leading NGO player 
in the MKUKUTA process, „the state, and the VPO in particular, was much more open than 
during PRSP I.‟  However, the interviews show that donor and state management of the process 
remained substantial. The first MKUKUTA meeting to review the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) was set up by the state and the donors. The PF sent three uninvited delegates to this 
meeting, who were allowed to contribute and argued that civil society should be allowed to 
organise its input to MKUKUTA independently of the state. This was agreed by the state and the 
donors. 
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Civil society organizations were involved in the Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) process 
and had input into the PRS Technical Working Group, subsequently producing its own review 
document of the process. However, the PRSP was published before this civil society document 
was finished.  Thus, as with the PRSP I, inputs from civil society and the public were rendered 
largely irrelevant and these inputs were not taken into account at all. 
 
The PF managed to get two people onto the MKUKUTA drafting group and were disappointed 
with the way the process operated, since in their view the team created the ideas first and then 
tried to find evidence to support these perspectives. When the first draft of MKUKUTA came out 
it was in English only. The PF offered to translate the document into Swahili and to simplify the 
content, as it was couched in very technical terms.  After doing the translation, the PF succeeded 
in having the document inserted into four Kiswahili language newspapers and one English 
language newspaper as a way of increasing the transparency of the process by bringing 
MKUKUTA issues to the attention of the (literate) public. 
 
The PF pressured the state to publish the second draft of the document in Swahili, but claimed 
the state reneged on this, after initially agreeing, and published the second draft of the document 
on the web in English only. The state then said they would conduct consultations outside Dar es 
Salaam, but the PF dissuaded them, as they felt it would be disastrous because the document 
used a lot of technical English, which was difficult to understand.  In the end, the PF did a 
straight translation of the second draft into Swahili with no simplification. 
 
Interviewees stated that another reason for the top-down nature of the PRSP process in Tanzania 
is concentration of power with the Executive. Many rank-and-file parliamentarians cannot read 
English well. They get a one page Swahili summary of every law, while full drafts are published 
only in English. Thus, many parliamentarians cannot and/or do not read them and the debate on 
legislation, including laws related to poverty reduction, is consequently narrowly based. This is, 
for the majority of interviewees, another important reason why both national and state ownership 
of MKUKUTA is lacking.  „A small band of key actors and authors within the state write the 
documents,‟ was the summary of one interviewee on this point. 
 
225 
 
The PF‟s own contribution to the first draft of MKUKUTA was a formal paper, which was 
included as one of the key documents in the process. PF officials felt that their recommendations 
were taken on board, particularly concerning the income versus non-income poverty debate and 
in the areas of governance and indicators.  Partly as a result of the PF document, governance was 
elevated to become a separate pillar in MKUKUTA and thus required outcomes and 
measurements of progress. This is exactly in line with the donor agenda. For the donors the 
inadequacy of governance in Tanzania has been identified as a fundamental cause of lack of 
„development.‟ 175 Thus, having „governance‟ as a separate pillar in the PRSP 176 allows donors 
to focus on whether targets and benchmarks in this sphere have been met and to relate any 
failures to bring about poverty reduction directly to „poor governance‟ rather than 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
The fact that the PF‟s formal submission, along with others from major NGOs involved in the 
process, have been included in full, means that the document is unwieldy. The PF, therefore, has 
been pushing for prioritisation and simplification of points and indicators in order to make it 
actionable.  However, the state‟s position is that civil society has been consulted and that part of 
the process is finished. Thus, one of the core principles of PRSPs - that there should be tightly 
formulated and costed poverty reduction plans, rather than „wish lists‟ - is almost completely 
ignored in practice, through state desire to show the donors that there is an acceptable level and 
type of civil society participation in MKUKUTA. 
 
Many interviewees stressed the confusion they felt over ownership in the MKUKUTA process.  
It was pointed out that the poverty reduction procedure is supposed to be owned by the country 
with the state acting as „caretaker,‟ by implementing what has been agreed by the stakeholders.  
Thus, MKUKUTA should be owned by the stakeholders but it is the state that puts MKUKUTA 
into practice. For most interviewees, therefore, it is the state which is the real „owner‟ of the 
process and the document and the views of NGOs have little impact in terms of influencing 
policy formation.   
 
                                                          
175
  It was less than twenty years ago (in 1994) when the main donors suspended aid to Tanzania, citing governance 
failure as the core reason. See chapter 3 for details. 
176
  See chapter 3.  
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For NGO officials interviewed it is difficult to separate out these different aspects of ownership. 
Interviewees argued that the criteria used by the state in accepting or rejecting what is put 
forward by NGOs and other stakeholders as part of the PRSP process is not clear and this leads 
to participation and ownership being nebulous and largely meaningless concepts. One 
interviewee gave an example of the general concerns of NGO officials regarding this point in 
stating that ideas are important only if the people with them are convinced of their worth and 
have the will and the power to promote them.  If NGOs state that they want the infrastructure to 
be improved in order to boost the economy then there should be clearly stated processes involved 
through which the state has to respond to this „participation.‟ However, for the interviewee, it is 
clear that the state will act only if they are convinced by the idea themselves and believe that 
they will meet the approval of the external donors. There are no formal institutional means in the 
PRSP process to challenge state rejection of ideas put forward by civil society organizations and, 
thus, participation and ownership mean little to them.   
 
For a considerable number of interviewees, the main point of the PRSP process is that the state 
should be open to ideas from Tanzanian individuals and groups and will act on them.  However, 
interviewees argued that in reality, ownership is a very political concept and donors play a 
controlling role. It was pointed out, in this regard, that FONGOs in the country run some good 
projects with grassroots groups, which benefit poor and marginalized peoples, but there is no 
national „ownership,‟ since the state has no say in where the funds go and how they are utilized.  
FONGOs are unlikely to transfer „ownership‟ of finance for such projects, since they are not 
convinced that state accountability is better than it has been in the past. The state is unlikely to 
challenge the way they operate, as they play a valuable service delivery role and are well 
connected to powerful donors. 
 
For most of the interviewees, creating greater levels of trust between the state and NGOs, will 
take a long time and involve the creation of robust public-management systems, capacity 
building and political will. Increasing the partnership aspect of the PRSP process will therefore 
take time. Though this is obvious to all participants, the donors want relations between major 
stakeholders to be changed and rebuilt overnight.  The long-term aspect of change in political 
processes and relationships between different agents of development is not accommodated by the 
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donors. They require quick results, based on superficial „participation‟ from NGOs in order to 
satisfy tick-box procedures. This perception reveals that most NGO officials taking part in the 
PRSP process argue within the conventional liberal discourse; the concentration is on temporal 
and spatial issues (lack of ability for NGOs outside urban centres to participate), while 
substantive policy alternatives are not proposed. 
 
In overall terms, MKUKUTA is regarded as involving quantitatively and qualitatively better 
participation on the part of NGOs than PRSP I.  However, the majority of NGO officials 
interviewed argue that participation remains a vague concept and it is not clear to any of the 
stakeholders taking part in the PRSP process how it should occur and with what outcomes. 
Moreover,  the other core concepts of the PRSP process, „partnership‟ and „ownership‟ are also 
unclearly conceptualized and require long-term changes, which the donors fail to appreciate in 
their desire to bring about quick results, in order to show that Post-Washington Consensus 
policies are effective.  In addition, the ability of state officials to comprehend the new discourse, 
systems and policies, which have been adopted as part of the PRSP process, continues to be 
weak, according to most interviewees. Consequently, MKUKUTA is characterized by a lack of 
coherence and cohesion, as was the case with PRSP I.   
 
7.7    Trade Union Engagement in the PRSP Process 
Since the World Bank and the IMF were founded in 1944, their relationship with trade unions 
has been largely non-existent for much of the time. The work of trade unions has only become of 
concern to the IFIs since the imposition of SAPs during the early 1980s, when conditions „were 
perceived by many developing country trade unions to negatively affect employment and 
conditions of work in formal labour markets‟ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis added). Since the 
1990s, dialogue between the IFIs and the global labour movement has increased but trade unions 
remain suspicious of the IFIs following the consequences of SAPs. The 1995 World 
Development Report - ‘Workers in an Integrating World’ - has a chapter on the work of trade 
unions, which outlines opposition to structural adjustment programmes as a „negative effect‟ of 
their work, „despite the apparent success of many of these initiatives since 1991‟ (World Bank, 
1995: 81). No analysis is provided of why unions have opposed SAPs and no evidence is set out 
to show how the „success‟ of structural adjustment has been measured. Moreover, the use of the 
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qualifier „apparent‟ is a further indication of a less than convincing argument. 
 
The IFIs state (World Bank, 2007) that they have increased interactions with trade unions, 
through meetings with global federations because they recognized their representative mandate 
and because they were experienced in debating economic issues. This can be seen as 
disingenuous at best, since if these are the real reasons, why were they not recognized many 
years before by staff at the IFIs? Other reasons for not engaging trade unions in dialogue before 
the 1990s are alluded to later in the document, where it is stated that, for the IFIs „trade union 
confederations were overly critical of their economic policies and failed to recognize many 
instances where sound economic policies led to sustained economic growth, sustained job 
creation and poverty reduction‟ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis added). Therefore, engagement 
did not occur because the World Bank regarded the stance of trade unions towards their policies 
as overly confrontational. It is also argued in the same document that, states in developing 
countries, have deflected trade union criticisms of „the impact of IFI-sponsored structural 
reforms‟ (ibid) by claiming that they had no control over the conditionalities attached to them, 
when in fact they do have responsibility for decisions taken on economic matters.  
 
Thus, the IFIs are arguing that many of their policies produce excellent economic results in 
developing countries (though no empirical examples are cited) and unions are wrongly critical of 
them. Furthermore, when policies do produce negative results for the labour market it is due to 
the way they have been implemented at national level, therefore union criticisms should be 
directed toward their own states. This does not sit easily with the title of such World Bank 
documents as „Essential Action: Structural Adjustment and Labour – Tanzania‟ (World Bank, 
2000 emphasis added), which includes a series of references to the Tanzanian state‟s adoption of 
privatization programmes „in consultation‟ with the World Bank and asserts that the state „has 
agreed to‟ privatize the Dar es Salaam container terminal, rather than „has decided to.‟  
 
By the end of the 1990s meetings between the IFIs and global labour federations had become 
regular and in 2002 a formal protocol was adopted for biennial meetings with „enhanced 
dialogue‟ (World Bank, 2007: 2) and follow-up mechanisms to ensure that commitments were 
being honoured. The biennial meetings have continued since their inception and at the 2009 
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meeting the shift of the IFIs (from the hard line neo-liberal policies that characterized the 
original Washington Consensus) 
177
 is apparent in the discussion when their officials state, „smart 
subsidies‟ that are „well-targeted, time-bound and had a low fiscal cost were acceptable‟ as a 
means to help the poor who were most affected by the economic crisis (World Bank, 2009a: 4). 
Union representatives at the discussion concluded by stating that through interacting „better‟ and 
in a more „informed way‟ with the IFIs, they could go on to „make a difference‟ which was their 
yardstick for participation (World Bank, 2009a: 14). 
 
The difficulties involved in „making a difference‟ are highlighted by the response of the World 
Bank when pressed by union representatives to make the inclusion of a labour clause in public 
procurement a mandatory requirement. The reply was that this would be very unlikely, as it 
required the approval of the Executive Directorate in order to amend World Bank policy, which 
would be hard to obtain (World Bank, 2009a).   
 
The international trade unions bodies were positive about the PRSP initiative when it was 
formally instigated in September 1999, arguing that despite its limitations, unions should get 
involved as much as their capacity allowed, since ignoring the process could lead to a „PRSP that 
undermines workers rights‟ (ICFTU, 2001: 8). The World Confederation of Labour (WCL, 2002: 
3) „welcomed the intention of the IMF and the World Bank to focus on poverty reduction and 
participation.‟ However, they became increasingly critical of the IFIs failures to bring about the 
participation of labour movements in PRSP processes after 2001 (GURN, 2011, ICFTU, 2001).  
 
These criticisms provided the impetus for a ten-month study from January to October 2003 by 
the IFIs and the global unions on the nature and extent of trade union participation (Egulu, 
2004a, Egulu, 2004b). For the Global Union Research Network (GURN), this study was of 
significance, since independent trade union research on the PRSPs is vital in order to put „in 
place policy alternatives to those that are advanced by the Washington-based institutions.‟ 
(GURN, 2011: 1). The study was also timely, as many PRSPs were moving into their second 
phase with new documents in train, which had the potential to provide findings capable of 
informing the way processes might be amended to include more effective labour movement 
                                                          
177  See chapter3 for an analysis  relating to Tanzania 
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participation than had been the case with the first phase of PRSPs. This study took the form of a 
ten-point questionnaire administered by the World Bank, the ICFTU and the WCL, which was 
used as the basis for a scorecard on trade union participation in the PRSP process, centred on 
three main themes (Egulu, 2004a). First, the „State of Social Dialogue‟ assessed the enabling 
environment for consultations. Second, trade union „Participation‟ was analysed, focusing on the 
level of consultation involved. Third, the „Labour Content‟ of the PRSP was examined, centring 
on the way labour market issues were covered (Egulu, 2003). 
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Several key findings emerged from the survey. First, trade unions remain sceptical of an 
initiative instigated by the IFIs. Second, lack of capacity within unions limits the effectiveness of 
their participation. Third, shallow and ill-prepared consultation deters effective union 
engagement. Fourth, trade unions are grouped in the „CSOs Stakeholder Group‟ in the World 
Bank‟s PRSP Sourcebook but lack ties and identification with other civil society groups. Fifth,  
labour market interventions are not covered centrally in the PRSP process. Key concerns for 
unions, such as ways in which high levels of unemployment lead to poverty and the policy 
implications of this, are often inadequately covered or absent from the PRSP process (Egulu, 
2004a and 2004b).   
 
The heightened interest in trade unions on the part of the IFIs can also be seen from the way the 
World Bank has increased the content of its documentation on trade union participation in the 
PRSP process, which used to be minimal. The Bank now states that trade unions „are 
encouraged‟ to participate in the PRSP process and regards them as „key organizations‟ in the 
public and private sector, as well as members of civil society (World Bank, 2010b: 1). Trade 
unions are also recognized as „economic as well as political actors that can change power 
relationships in the way by which wealth is both created and shared‟ (World Bank, 2010a: 2). 
These views contrast markedly with the neglect of trade unions in very important IFI-documents 
relating to the PRSP process, such as the PRSP Sourcebook (World Bank, 2004b). 
 
                                                          
178  The particular issues covered by the three core themes relating to trade union participation in the PRSP process - 
the State of Social Dialogue, the level of Trade Union Participation and the Labour Content of the PRSP - are set out 
in appendices 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6, respectively. 
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Some of the bilateral donors have also produced work on the subject of trade unions but these 
contain questionable arguments. The UK‟s Department for International Development (DFID), 
for example, published ‘How to work with Trade Unions’ in 2005 (revised in 2009). Some of its 
claims are misleading. It is stated for example, that in contrast to „many other civil society 
organizations in DFID‟s partner countries, free trade unions are democratically accountable and 
financially self-reliant‟ (DFID, 2009: 1). While the former point is briefly qualified, the latter 
claim is left to stand. Findings from this research in the context of Tanzania, as well as evidence 
from wider surveys (Egulu, 2004a, 2004b), reveal that weak financial capacity is one of the key 
problems facing trade unions in developing countries. DFID‟s failure to discuss fully the 
financial state of trade unions in developing countries reveals their fundamental lack of 
understanding of a key issue and is an illustration of the failure on the part of most major 
bilateral donors involved in the PRSP process to pay more than lip service to the work of labour 
organizations. 
 
Trade unions were not invited to take part in PRSP I when it was introduced in October 1999 and 
played no role in the zonal workshops, where consultation with CSOs took place, Moreover, they 
were not asked to take part in PRSP reviews. For the General Secretary of TUCTA, this was the 
start of what has been continual hesitation about including the labour movement in the PRSP 
process and also indicates that to become involved unions „have got to kick at their [the 
Tanzanian state] door every time.‟ This view tallies with the perspectives of all the trade unions 
officials interviewed for this research. In this regard, the arguments of trade union officials 
interviewed run sharply counter to those expressed in the JSAs and reports by bilateral donors, 
which claim high levels of civil society participation in, and national ownership of, the 
Tanzanian PRSP process. Interviews with World Bank and NGO officials conducted as part of 
this research revealed an indifference or opposition to trade union participation within the PRSP 
process in Tanzania.  This contrasts strongly with the new World Bank rhetoric of inclusion in 
regard to trade union participation in the PRSP process. The disparity between World Bank 
rhetoric and practice was a major finding of the fieldwork and ran through the arguments of the 
vast majority of interviewees from the trade union movement.     
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After a case for trade union participation in the PRSP process had been formally set out in the 
work of Egulu (2004a, 2004b, 2003), the World Bank moved to capture the terms and conditions 
of that inclusion. The World Bank has set the agenda in terms of issues that trade unions should 
be raising in relation to the PRSP process, which precludes discussion on what, for trade unions, 
is the most important aspect of the PRSP; the fundamentals of macro-economic policies. In the 
case of Tanzania, the state also limited trade union effectiveness by determining the manner of 
their participation. Most importantly, this has involved trade unions placed within a catch-all 
„CSO Stakeholders‟ group, dominated by NGOs. Consequently, the possibilities for labour 
associations to adapt and subvert the dominant discourse are limited, as many issues are raised in 
the forum by NGOs which are not a priority for trade unions. and require a clear vision, a 
considerable amount of financial and technical capacity and a concerted will on the part of the 
trade union movement if counter-hegemonic views are to be put forward effectively. This 
example highlights how the war of position for trade unions in Tanzania involves a struggle with 
the state, powerful transnational actors and, to some extent other civil society organizations, 
making autonomous actions on their part very difficult to mount. Moreover, this case shows that 
the de Tocquevillian perspective regarding civil society, which informs the modus operandi of 
the donors, possesses little explanatory power (see chapters 5 and 6 for other examples where 
this is the case). Trade unions clearly do not participate in the PRSP process in the consensual 
and independent way de Tocqueville saw associational groups engaging with the state in the US 
during the nineteenth century. The Gramscian view of civil society, based on the argument that 
associational groups struggle with the state in a constantly shifting war of position, explains the 
position of trade unions in the PRSP process more accurately. This perspective recognizes that 
the level and type  of participation of civil society groups in national policy-making processes 
depends on the amount of power and resources both they, and the state, possess. The lack of 
capacity and the political will to form a collective vision on the part of the labour movement, 
therefore, are substantive obstacles to the formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse.  
However, the war of position is always fluid (Gramsci, 2011). Consequently, the Gramscian 
approach allows for new actors, from the labour movement, and strategies to emerge from praxis 
(see chapter 5), which can substantially influence the war of position. 
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The disrespect shown to labour organizations by the state is summed up for many unionists by 
the statements made by the permanent secretary for finance (who is also chair of the steering 
committee for the PRSP) to TUCTA officials when questioned about the absence of a formal 
invitation to trade unions. The permanent secretary claimed that trade unions had taken part, 
since some state employees who had played a role in drawing up and/or processing documents 
relating to the PRSP were members of the Tanzanian Union of State and Health Employees 
(TUGHE). The permanent secretary also informed trade union officials that „if you are not 
involved we expect you to gatecrash‟; a statement which has been a source of much annoyance 
to trade unionists. In interviews, the comment was raised by a number of TUCTA officials at 
head office and by officials at individual trade unions. In response to their lack of involvement in 
the PRSP, TUCTA asked the ILO for assistance, which reacted by using Tanzania as a pilot 
country for its Project on Capacity Building for Effective Social Dialogue in the PRSP. This was 
based on emphasising social dialogue as a way to put into practice the ILO‟s Decent Work 
Agenda (DWA) as a key part of the PRSP and as a means of stimulating representatives of both 
labour and capital to participate in the formulation of social and economic policies. Between 
September and December 2001 the ILO ran programmes for TUCTA, as well as the state and the 
Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE), encouraging the three groups to set up a tripartite 
forum, which would formulate its own dialogue with other PRSP stakeholders (Egulu, 2004a). 
 
However, the ILO (2001: 15) pointed out that although key employment and decent work issues 
were contained in the Interim-PRSP, they had „largely disappeared from the final version of the 
PRSP.‟ Overall, „labor issues do not feature prominently in the 53-page PRSP‟ (Egulu, 2004a; 
73). The state responded in 2001 by providing add-ons in an attempt to create employment. First, 
it set up supplementary programmes to create jobs and to address the problem of child labour. 
Second, (in line with donor-driven economic policies) it launched a micro-finance initiative in 
February 2002. This was aimed at providing start-up capital for the poor as a way of generating 
employment in the private sector in rural areas (Wangwe, 2004, Yaron, 2004). Third, the state 
instigated a review of its National Employment Policy (URT, 2000b).  
 
Few tangible benefits occurred as a result of these initiatives from the point of view of the 
unions. The state‟s Second Progress Report on the PRSP (2001/2002), does not refer to trade 
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unions at all. The report limits itself to stating the need for the „mainstreaming‟ of civil society 
participation in the PRSP process and capacity building of CSOs in general (URT, 2003b: 76). 
 
Research and analysis by the state (URT, 2004a) and NGOs (Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002a) 
highlights issues regarding poverty reduction, which are integral to the work of trade unions, 
such as the need to focus on improving the terms and conditions of employment for the 
workforce. Despite the publication of this research, possible roles for trade unions in poverty 
reduction strategies are not discussed. This situation spurred the trade union movement into 
doing its own research and in September 2004 TUCTA published 'Trade Unions Input into the 
PRSP Process’ (TUCTA, 2004a). The publication of this document marked a watershed in the 
state-trade union relations in post-liberalization Tanzania. Key arguments put forward in the 
paper clearly showed that the trade union movement was willing to engage in a war of position 
with the state. It argued that the PRSP has been „super-imposed‟ on Tanzania by the IFIs 
(TUCTA, 2004a: viii), and castigated the World Bank for concentrating on economic growth 
„without looking at who gets what or produce [sic] what‟ (ibid). It also pointed out that „workers 
were not involved in contributing towards documentation of PRS I‟ (ibid). The report concluded 
that the PRSP process has „made more people poorer and poorer‟ (TUCTA, 2004a: ix) and failed 
to create employment. However, no counter-hegemonic discourse from the labour movement 
was put forward in the document and no follow-up research was done by trade unionists to this 
end. The state ignored the document and the failure of the trade unions to build on their claims 
with further research and publications meant that no subsequent discussion of the main 
arguments ensued.  
 
This shows the importance of Gramsci‟s (2011) argument that to win the war of position, civil 
society must engage in a protracted struggle, which entails continually building on actions, such 
as the publication of documents.  The trade union movement lacked both the capacity and the 
vision to follow-up on the publication of the document by outlining a counter-hegemonic 
discourse of its own. These limitations on the part of the labour movement notwithstanding, 
agency has been a significant factor in the war of position between trade unions and the state. 
That is, a small number of dynamic trade unionists have confronted the hegemonic discourse of 
neo-liberalism, as put forward in the PRSP process, forcing a response from the state and the 
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donors. The strategic interventions by these actors have met by confrontation and attempts at co-
option by the state. For example, one senior TUCTA official was outspoken in criticisms of the 
way the first PRSP was drawn up, arguing that it was a World Bank-led document and copied 
from the Voices of the Poor initiative in its language and ideas. The official also argued that the 
state and the World Bank were manipulating figures used in the PRSP. The figures used as 
baselines, from which targets for improvements were set in various sections of the PRSP, were 
largely taken from the 1988 census. However, the state, with tacit World Bank approval, claimed 
they were from the 2001 census. Thus, the baseline figures had lower values than was the reality 
in 2001, making improvements seem to be greater achievements than was actually the case.   As 
a result of his interventions, the official was at first confronted by state and World Bank officials 
and formally reprimanded for participating „inappropriately‟ in the PRSP process. When the 
official refused to retract his claims and continued to attend PRSP meetings at his own behest, 
the state moved to a strategy of co-option by inviting him to serve on PRSP committees and the 
World Bank financed his travel to Zambia for a meeting. However, the official was informed that 
his formal inclusion in the PRSP process was on an individual basis and that he was not an 
official representative of the trade union movement.  Consequently, when the official is unable to 
attend meetings, nobody from the trade union movement is allowed to deputise. For the official, 
this shows that the participation of stakeholders in the PRSP process lacks transparency and 
accountability. „Who gets to be a representative on MKUKUTA committees is not dependent on 
the importance of the organization they represent but how they are regarded by those in power 
and how committed they are to trying to become a representative,‟ was how this official 
summarized participation.   
  
MKUKUTA objectives and policies have been amended in the light of the experience of PRSP I. 
However, as with PRSP I, labour is  included in MKUKUTA as a cross-cutting, rather than a 
core, issue, which remains a major source of contention between the trade unions and the state. 
Moreover, trade union participation remains subsumed within the „Civil Society Stakeholders‟ 
group, dominated by NGOs. In addition, macroeconomic issues, which have vital consequences 
for the workforce, are still not amenable to substantive discussion concerning possible reforms. 
Thus, as all the interviews revealed, trade unions are marginalized and frustrated participants in 
MKUKUTA. 
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For trade unions the gap between the stated policies of MKUKUTA and practice is a 
fundamental problem. In interviews with trade unions officials, both at the TUCTA head office 
and individual unions, a common theme was the „reasonable‟ rhetoric concerning policies set out 
in MKUKUTA but significant disquiet at the lack of action by the state regarding 
implementation.  For example, although trade unions are designated, on its Poverty Monitoring 
website, as one of the six specific types of non-state actors with which the state works, in 
practice, no initiatives with labour associations have been implemented. Thus, TUCTA (2004a: 
xi) argues that the PRSP is „an academic manual to be used as a reference and not a strategy to 
mitigate poverty.‟   
 
Subsequent research by the state and civil society organizations shows the claim made by 
TUCTA in their 2004 report, that the incidence of poverty is increasing in Tanzania, has some 
credence. According to state statistics the absolute number of people in poverty rose from 11.5 
million to 12.8 million from 2001 to 2007 (Policy Forum, 2008a). Furthermore, the poorest 10% 
of the population were worse off in 2007 than in 2001; their consumption levels fell by over 5% 
(Policy Forum, 2008a). Income inequality worsened in Dar es Salaam from 1991 to 2007 and 
(with regard to figures for 2007) „the economy‟s significant growth since 2000/01 has not 
translated into income poverty reduction‟ (URT, 2009b: 13).  Agriculture is the mainstay of the 
economy, yet for TUCTA (2004: ix), the strategies endorsed by the PRSP in this sector „do not 
favour the poor, rather constraints [sic] the development of small producers.‟  Statistical 
evidence supports this view. For example, the state‟s PHDR 2009 states that „a drop in the share 
of agriculture in total GDP in Tanzania seems to be largely the result of poor sectoral 
performance rather than productivity growth‟ (URT, 2009b: 6).  Furthermore, when the 
population growth rate (2.9%) is taken into consideration, the number of rural poor increased 
between 2001 and 2007, despite a small decline in the incidence of poverty (TEDG, 2009). 
 
The fact that labour is treated as a cross-cutting, rather than core, issue in MKUKUTA was cited 
by many TUCTA officials as a key point. Officials argued that the Ministry of Labour should be 
assigned „core‟ status in the process, rather than a „cross-cutting‟ position. This is the basis for 
the arguments on the part of unions that they do not participate fairly in the PRSP process and 
are wrongly assigned to the catch-all „civil society stakeholders‟ category, where their views are 
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marginalized by the dominance of NGO perspectives. As a result of this marginalization, trade 
union ownership of the PRSP is lacking.  TUCTA officials contended that the World Bank has 
ensured that labour is only classed as a cross-cutting issue, as part of a deliberate strategy aimed 
at winning the war of position. This is because the organization does not want to plan for and 
include labour systematically in the PRSP process but instead would like to see it dealt with 
piecemeal. A TUCTA official argued that the PRSP „only talks about labour as something to be 
exploited and used to raise productivity. No other aspects of labour are discussed in 
MKUKUTA.‟ 
 
For officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions 
179
 two major problems stand out concerning 
trade union participation in MKUKUTA. The fact that trade union input is left out of the final 
document is of most concern, followed by the perception of MKUKUTA as a top-down  
state-controlled process. Thus, trade unions have to continually wait for, and rely on, reports 
from the state, which therefore dominates the process. These points are similar to criticisms 
made by NGO officials (see chapter 5). The major disparity in the views of NGOs and trade 
union officials in this regard relates to the claim of the latter that the labour movement is always 
excluded from state initiatives (the PRSP process being merely one more example) while NGOs 
are invariably included in policy debates with the state but do not contest the parameters set 
around the mode of their participation.  
  
A counterpoint was made by an official at TPAWU, who argued that it was TUCTA‟s decision 
to represent the trade union movement collectively in the MKUKUTA process, collating the 
views of individual unions. This limits trade union involvement and can be contrasted 
unfavourably with the approach taken by NGOs, which apply to sit on MKUKUTA Committees 
individually, and, thus, get more overall representation than trade unions. This argument was 
supported by an officer of the Tanzania Seamen‟s Union (TASU), who stated that TASU has not 
been able to put forward the particular concerns of seamen regarding poverty reduction, as trade 
union input to MKUKUTA is decided on and represented centrally by TUCTA. Moreover, an 
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   MKUKUTA is not of central concern to officials from non –TUCTA trade unions, as they have little or no 
chance to take part in the process, since trade union participation is coordinated through the TUCTA Head Office. 
This issue was raised by all the interviewees. 
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official at the Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU) stated that the union has 
not been involved with MKUKUTA at all and that „TALGWU only hears about MKUKUTA 
from the speeches of the state‟. These answers reveal that TUCTA‟s failure to garner the views 
of individual trade unions on issues relating to MKUKUTA has contributed to a lack of cohesion 
in the labour movement, which has hindered its ability both to form an effective historic bloc of 
oppositional groups and to create a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse. 
 
Officials from the Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW), made the point that members of their 
union, as media personnel, must be included in MKUKUTA, since they are vital in 
disseminating knowledge and ideas to the public. However, neither the TMW nor the Tanzania 
Union of Journalists (TUJ) have the capacity to raise member-awareness of poverty reduction 
strategies effectively, and knowledge of MKUKUTA is low in general amongst journalists. 
There are no concerted media campaigns on MKUKUTA. 
 
The use of English in PRSP documents was cited by trade union officials as a barrier to many of 
the members participating in the process, as they are not proficient in the language. As all the 
senior trade union officials can speak the language fluently, they did not regard dealing with 
trade union matters in English at TUCTA Head Office as a problem. Moreover, since CBAs are 
negotiated through TUCTA‟s Head Office there are no drawbacks in dealing with employers 
over this issue. One of the new guard TUCTA officials made the point that trade unionists find it 
taxing to write funding proposals in English which require „knowledge of precise and technical 
language, and is difficult‟. Capacity building is thus needed in this area as „most of us [trade 
unions] are failing to get funds.‟ For sixty per cent of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions, using 
English is a significant problem, mainly at branch level. It is particularly onerous when dealing 
with new investors, as their management teams do not usually speak Swahili and can be 
dismissive of people who are not fluent in English. For one trade union officer, the lack of 
proficiency in English by trade union officials „is a very big obstacle‟ to helping workers in the 
plantation and agricultural sectors, as most of the new investors will only negotiate in English. 
Thus, trade union representatives „fear meetings with management of newly privatized 
industries.‟ The „vicious circle‟ problem is relevant here. Falling union membership, means less 
funding is available to send union officials on courses to learn English and thus capacity is 
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weakened, which in turn makes it harder to recruit members. Use of English rather than Swahili 
in conducting union business reduces participation in the PRSP process and, thus, is a significant 
contributory factor in the lack of trade union ownership of the PRSP.  
 
7.8 Summary 
The attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the views of civil society organizations through a 
participatory approach to policy creation, which will in turn inculcate national ownership, is part 
of changing modalities of intervention in political processes, aimed in particular at controlling 
groups with low levels of allegiance to the state. Institution building and governance are at the 
heart of the Post-Washington Consensus and this plays out through the PRSP process in the form 
of conflict being eradicated from governing institutions and competing ideas being restricted to 
an arena within the consensus framework on macroeconomic fundamentals. Thus, the PRSP 
process has become a major vehicle to build consensus, pace de Tocqueville, through 
participation and ownership based on the World Bank‟s vision of a depoliticised and 
bureaucratic developmental state. PRSPs are based on the recognition by the World Bank that 
external support for change and development can achieve little if the domestic will to reform is 
missing. External support from the World Bank comes in the form of technical advice and 
financial assistance. Domestically political leaders must build consensus and ownership through 
participatory processes, which inevitably means compensating, neutralizing or marginalizing 
groups that lose out in the process. Therefore, the attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the 
views of civil society organizations through a participatory approach to policy creation can be 
regarded as part of the move to minimise opposition from dissenting groups. Underlying causes 
of political struggles and resistance to change are not addressed.  
 
 Practically, this means the Tanzanian state has to ensure that at the micro-level of policy and 
strategy implementation, the PRSP process is run in a way acceptable to the influential 
multilateral donors, thus, guaranteeing that the final document will be approved at the Joint Staff 
Assessment (JSA) of the IFIs in Washington and receive the support of the major bilateral 
donors, which remain a vital source of finance for the country. The fact that Tanzania remains an 
aid-dependent country (ODA makes up 65.8% of Tanzania‟s gross capital formation) is very 
important in shaping relations between the donors and the state. As a result, civil society 
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organizations regarded as disruptive to the process, such as trade unions, are marginalized. There 
is no reference to trade unions in any of the JSAs or Poverty and Human Development Reports 
(URT, 2009c, 2007e, 2005b, 2003a) produced by the state.  
 
The donors increasingly regard the Tanzanian state as a reliable partner and the country as one 
where they can disburse large amount of aid quickly and effectively. This causes the Tanzanian 
state to have „ever-increasing influence with its donors‟ (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom, 2009: 
295). Consequently, for the state, relations with external donors, as well as the new investors in 
the economy, carry a lot more weight than connections with civil society organizations. 
However, CSOs are of instrumental importance to the state, as their participation in the 
formation of the PRSP must occur in a way which satisfies the donors before funds will be 
disbursed. The publication of its third phase (MKUKUTA II, covering the period from 2010 to 
2015) indicates that the PRSP will continue to be the dominant national development plan in 
Tanzania in the short to medium term, at least. The state has firmly linked MKUKUTA to 
previous national initiatives, stating that it „is a continuation of the long standing national 
commitments to fighting poverty initiated at independence in 1961‟ (URT, 2010b: 1). Gramsci 
(2011b) made the point that, for oppositional civil society groups, a war of position is inevitably 
drawn out. Civil society organizations in Tanzania have now been operating within the PRSP 
framework for over ten years and a number are starting to apply praxis (Gramsci, 2011b), by 
analysing why certain strategies have not worked effectively in the war of position and 
subsequently altering them in an attempt to increase their impact. Consequently, the longer the 
PRSP process continues in Tanzania, the greater the opportunities are for associational groups to 
use strategies effectively within the limited policy space opened up via the PRSP process to 
provide a counter-hegemonic discourse. This could threaten the donor-driven agenda and stretch 
the limits of IFI tolerance for participation on the part of civil society organizations. Therefore, 
while at present, civil society institutions are participating in debates as part of the PRSP process 
within narrowly construed donor-driven confines, they have an opportunity to use the new spaces 
where policies can be contested to open up new fronts in the war of position.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 The Position of Civil Society Organizations in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
In this chapter a summary is made of the main research outcomes, followed by an analysis of 
policy implications arising from the findings. This research has examined, through a Gramscian 
lens, the reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania, centring on the rationale 
for the marginalization of trade unions. This focus required an analysis of four related research 
questions. First, whether Tanzanian trade unions in the post-liberalization period have been 
confined to representing a minority of wage labourers in the formal sector, which, therefore, 
constitute a labour aristocracy. Second, the extent to which the labour movement has created 
alliances with other forms of civil society (thereby embracing social movement unionism) with 
the potential to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which is able to provide a substantive 
challenge to neoliberal hegemony in the post-liberalization era. Third, the reasons why NGOs 
have come to dominate civil society input to national policy-making processes in post-
liberalization Tanzania. Fourth, how trade unions and NGOs have engaged in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers process (the national policy-making instrument which has most 
support from external donors) and with what consequences. First, the main findings from the 
analysis of the central research question are discussed, followed by a critical assessment in turn 
of the major outcomes from the examination of the four related issues. A key conclusion arising 
from the analysis of all the research questions is that a Gramscian approach has considerably 
more explanatory power regarding the role of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania than 
the dominant liberal conception, which draws to a large extent on a misconception of the de 
Tocquevillian perspective. 
 
It is clear from this research that civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is being 
reconstructed as an independent variable, largely through the influence of multilateral and 
bilateral donors. These external donors are promulgating a de Tocquevillian view of civil society 
in Tanzania, based on a vision of a wide variety of freely-formed organizations taking part in 
national policy-making processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the 
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state. This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, avoiding 
dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens.  In reality, however, the 
donors have managed a situation where civil society input to national policy-making processes 
comes overwhelmingly from a few, largely Dar es Salaam-based, NGOs, which are externally 
funded and composed of well-educated professionals, who are versed in the hegemonic discourse 
(which revolves around the concepts of partnership, participation and ownership) in the post-
liberalization period.   Apex associations (notably Policy Forum, TANGO and TGNP) have been 
tasked with drawing into national policy-making processes the participation of grassroots forms 
of associational life, which has proved impossible, through their lack of financial and technical 
capacity, as well as the poor communications infrastructure in Tanzania. Thus, the donors have 
engaged in social engineering, through shaping and controlling which elements of civic life can 
(and which cannot) participate in debates concerning national policy formulation and 
development in post-liberalization Tanzania. Therefore, a civil society based around the 
extensive engagement of associational groups in national policy-making processes, is not 
emerging. This is exemplified by the marginalization of trade unions, which reflects the power of 
external donors to influence the state, concerning which groups it includes (and which it 
marginalizes) within the sphere of civil society, as it has been reconstituted in post-liberalization 
Tanzania.  
 
8.2     The Marginalization of Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
With regard to the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions in post-liberalization 
Tanzania (the main research question), this study showed that a historically-grounded analysis is 
necessary if the reasons for this situation are to be understood in a nuanced way (see chapter 6 
for details). Trade unions developed a culture under colonialism that fostered solidarity and led 
to sustained conflict with state officials and representatives of capital. Therefore, they have 
experience of struggle on behalf of their members and historically have proved capable of 
effective organization and action. However, the legitimacy of trade unions as representatives of 
labour was eroded after independence. The legacy of more than thirty years of one-party rule, 
involving tight control over the labour movement, leading to trade unions being regarded as 
branches of the state, has proved difficult to overcome in the post-liberalization era.  It is, 
therefore, evident that civil society in Tanzania has long been germane to debates regarding 
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participation and citizenship, since key elements of associational life, were used as a tool of 
organization and discipline by both the colonial administration and the one-party state, which 
emerged after independence. Consequently, the legacy of colonialism must be the basis of any 
analysis of civil society in Tanzania. However, this is not the case with regard to the donors, 
which have much influence over national policy-making processes in the post-liberalization 
period (see chapter 3 for details). They have, from the 1990s, eschewed a historically-informed 
strategy and instead tried to build a „new‟ civil society in the country. This approach has failed to 
take into account how the development of Tanzanian civil society from the colonial period has 
affected the current composition and ideologies of various important associational groups, as 
well as their interrelationships and levels of capacity and legitimacy. Thus, participation in 
national policy-making processes is focused on the new, and carefully managed, NGO sector, 
while other forms of civil society are marginalized.  
 
Regarding the position of labour, the ascendancy of market forces that gathered pace under SAPs 
in the 1980s left many Tanzanian workers vulnerable, particularly after liberalization and 
privatization of the economy during the 1990s led to large numbers of redundancies (see chapter 
3 for details).  Trade unions have protested against the negative effects of these changes on 
workers and organized a small number of mass actions (notably the short-lived general strike in 
1994 and the aborted general strike in 2010). These actions had little substantive effect on the 
position of the Tanzanian workforce. However, they were, in Gramscian terms (Gramsci, 2011), 
important in terms of praxis. That is, such processes increased the organizational ability of the 
trade union movement and heightened levels of reflection about the effectiveness of their actions 
among officials and workers, thereby enhancing the possibility of them forming a counter-
hegemonic discourse.  Furthermore, to some extent trade unions in the post-liberalization period 
have become champions of greater state regulation of the economy in the national (rather than 
the international) interest and of the provision of public goods, in the face of opposition from the 
state and the external donors, which seek to maintain neo-liberal hegemony. For example, senior 
TUCTA officials were shocked at the strength of the World Bank‟s opposition to the creation of 
a minimum wage in Tanzania during negotiations. TUCTA contested the World Bank‟s rejection 
of a proposed minimum wage, pointing out to their officials that unless there were some 
agreements on basic costs of living and the wages required to meet them, there would be 
244 
 
difficulty in finding a starting position when representatives of the state, employers and unions 
convened to negotiate.  A national minimum wage was introduced, partly as a result of union 
pressure, though World Bank officials argued that its imposition was an unwarranted 
interference in the workings of the free market and a potential deterrent to inward FDI.  
 
Such arguments on the part of the Tanzanian trade union movement in the post-liberalization era, 
as well as the actions they organized, have been a significant cause of their marginalization. That 
is, these arguments and actions led the major external donors (the World Bank, in particular) and 
the state to regard trade unions as a threat to neo-liberal hegemony in Tanzania. A neo-liberal 
hegemony which is based on attracting inward FDI and giving domestic entrepreneurs the 
maximum opportunity to operate in an economic climate free from „inefficiencies‟ created by 
demands for market distorting policies, such as regulated labour markets. Thus, the Gramscian 
argument, that oppositional civil society groups inevitably have to engage in a war of position 
with the state if a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse is to be formed, is persuasive with 
regard to trade union engagement in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. In addition, the situation has required trade unions to expand their war of position in 
order to encompass an ideological struggle with transnational actors (notably the World Bank), 
which are influential promoters of neo-liberal hegemony at a global level and drive the 
entrenching of a market-driven model in Tanzania (see chapter 3 for details). In contrast, the de 
Tocquevillian view of the relationship between civil society and the state, drawing 
overwhelmingly on his observations of the US during the nineteenth century, has minimal 
explanatory power in the case of post-liberalization Tanzania. The integral state in Tanzania has 
used moral and intellectual leadership and coercive legal-bureaucratic means, both of which, 
Gramsci argued, were necessary if the state was to become hegemonic (Gramsci, 2011). 
Concerning the former, trade unions have been constantly attacked verbally by the state, 
representatives of capital (the ATE 
180
and the CTI 
181
, in particular) and, to some extent, by the 
external donors in the post-liberalization period for their „irresponsible‟ and „unnecessary‟ calls 
for pay rises and industrial actions. In 2010, President Kikwete „lambasted‟ the trade union 
leaders for demanding pay rises, which were beyond the budget of the state. 
182
 With regard to 
                                                          
180
  See for example, „ATE: TUCTA will pay for strike losses‟ in This Day, 6 April, 2010  
181
  See for example, „Call of the strike, CTI urges TUCTA‟ in This Day, 9 April, 2010 
182
  See „TUCTA in new strike ultimatum‟ in This Day, 6 June 2010. 
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the latter element of the integral state, trade unions were threatened with coercive legal-
bureaucratic measures when mounting actions. Senior state officials, including the president, 
declared the proposed general strike in 2010 illegal, and threatened to take TUCTA officials to 
court if they continued to press for the action (see chapter 6 for details). Moreover, trade unions 
were declared ineligible to apply for state funding sources earmarked for „civil society‟ and 
marginalized in all national policy instruments, including the PRSP, which receives the most 
funding and other forms of support from external donors (see chapters 3, 6 and 7 for details). 
Thus, civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is clearly not a level playing-field, since the 
donors and the state have made it impossible for trade unions to take part in national policy-
making processes in an autonomous and consensual manner (pace de Tocqueville).   
 
In responding to their marginalization in the post-liberalization period by the integral state and 
transnational actors, this research showed that Tanzanian labour movement faces two major 
issues; an ideological vacuum concerning perceptions of their role within the sphere of civil 
society and structural constraints caused by lack of finance, falling membership and poor 
facilities.  
 
8.3 Tanzanian Trade Unions and the Labour Aristocracy Debate 
The first issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis concerned the extent 
to which trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania can be regarded as representing a labour 
aristocracy. This research demonstrated that the attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show 
a heterogeneity which casts much doubt on the validity of the labour aristocracy thesis. The 
labour aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzanian trade unions can be criticized in terms of both 
structural and agency-related factors. Concerning the former, a considerable number of trade 
unionists work in jobs with relatively poor terms and conditions of employment, such as 
plantation workers, represented by the Tanzanian Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union 
(TPAWU). In respect of the latter, perceptions of many professions with a high degree of 
unionization by other groups in Tanzania are negative. For example, teachers, represented by the 
largest labour organization in the country, the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU), work in a 
profession regarded as a last resort because of low salaries and status.   
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Furthermore, even in fairly well paid sectors of the economy, such as mining, labour relations are 
confrontational and workers face constant struggles with representatives of capital, who are 
assertively anti-union. The research showed that the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers 
Union (TAMICO) has been involved in continual disputes with mine managers and owners, as 
well as state officials, over the treatment of its members. Conflicts centre on the high level of 
surplus extraction which characterizes work in the mining sector. This creates feelings of 
solidarity between miners and much less well-paid workers, including those in the informal and 
rural sectors. Moreover, research undertaken by the labour movement revealed that many 
Tanzanian trade unionists provide much support for family and friends in the informal and rural 
sectors and have experience of work in both these spheres themselves (see chapter 6 for details). 
As a result, the interests of relatively well-paid trade unionists and marginalized members of the 
workforce are intertwined to a considerable degree. In arguing, therefore, that workers in the 
formal sector of the economy are invariably an elite minority, distanced from the majority of the 
casualized and rural workforce (see chapter 6 for details), the labour aristocracy thesis lacks 
nuance in the case of post-liberalization Tanzania. Moreover, the contention of advocates of the 
labour aristocracy thesis that highly paid sectors of the workforce are inevitably conservative and 
unwilling to formulate, or engage with, a counter-hegemonic discourse was shown to be overly 
determinist in the case of trade unionists in post-liberalization Tanzania. Overall, this research 
found that trade unions and trade unionists in Tanzania have drawn on heterogeneous ideologies, 
livelihoods and actions in the post-liberalization period, which cannot be accommodated within 
the framework of the labour aristocracy thesis. 
 
8.4 Tanzanian Trade Unions and Social Movement Unionism 
Regarding the second issue related to the main research question, labour organizations in post-
liberalization Tanzania have formed few alliances with other civil society groups in post-
liberalization Tanzania and, therefore, social movement unionism has not been adopted (see 
chapter 6 for details). The research found that a few tentative moves on the part of trade unions 
towards forming alliances with marginalized groups in the workforce have occurred. These have 
predominantly taken the form of some individual unions paying greater attention to the 
organization of women and youth members, while, at the centre, TUCTA has created a 
permanent space for a delegate from the youth wing of the movement on its executive. 
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Moreover, a few unions (notably TUICO) have attempted to ally themselves with workers in the 
informal sector (see chapter 6 for details). However, no enduring coalitions between trade unions 
and other civil society groups have been formed in the post-liberalization period. For example, 
trade unions did not work closely with other civil society organizations when engaging in 
actions, such as the proposed general strike in 2010.There is, consequently, little chance at 
present of trade unions collaborating to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, capable of 
challenging state hegemony.  
 
The research revealed that the dominant form of civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania, 
NGOs, (see section 8.5 below)  are indifferent (and in some cases opposed) to trade union 
participation in national policy-making processes in Tanzania (see chapter 5 for details). To a 
large extent, such views are caused by the perception that trade union structures and perspectives 
remain rooted in the past, when they were subsumed within the apparatus of the state.  Moreover, 
many trade unionists themselves remain suspicious of NGOs, regarding them as too closely 
allied to the post-liberalization state and to external donors. The research also showed that trade 
unionists tend to regard NGOs as corrupt and aggressive, as well as lacking roots in Tanzanian 
society and accountability to their constituencies.  Thus, trade unions in post-liberalization 
Tanzania lack a sense of unity with NGOs, as well as other forms of civil society, which makes 
the adoption of social movement unionism problematic in the short to medium-term. Since 
revolutionary unionism was unanimously rejected as a viable trajectory by all labour movement 
officials interviewed as part of this research, trade unions in Tanzania are left with the 
probability of adopting a business unionism approach by default. If this is to be avoided, the 
leadership needs to show clarity of vision in formulating an ideology and strategies for the labour 
movement that have hitherto been lacking in the post-liberalization period.  
 
8.5 The NGO Dominance of Civil Society in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
Regarding the third issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis, NGOs 
have been nurtured by the donors following liberalization in Tanzania, as their preferred type of 
civil society organization. A small number of large, urban-based NGOs have received a 
substantive amount of financial and technical support from external donors (see chapter 5 for 
details). The multilateral and bilateral donors are ostensibly fostering a model of liberal 
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pluralism, based on cultivating a large and diverse number of individual civil society 
organizations in Tanzania. However, they have de facto played a substantive role (through being 
the driving force behind the formation of an NGO apex organization, when others already 
existed and the funding of a few elite Dar es Salaam-based organizations) in creating elements of 
a corporatist civil society model (see chapter 5 for details). As a result of this funding and 
support, a small number of influential NGOs nominally represent the views of the many 
grassroots groups operating outside the urban centres, which do not have the capacity to make 
their perspectives known to the state. These umbrella groups have little contact with grassroots 
groups, which lack the necessary means (such as, email and mobile telephones) to communicate 
effectively. As a result, the mode of participation of civil society organizations in national 
policy-making processes belies the de Tocquevillian vision on which it is based, since a diversity 
of views from citizens‟ groups is lacking and civil society input to national policy-making 
processes is dominated by a small number of well-organized and resourced NGOs. Alternative 
sorts of associational life in Tanzania, which have developed roots as by-products of economic, 
political, social and cultural forces, and, thus, do not need to be created by donors, are 
marginalized.  These types of civil society (often in the form of twilight associations) are 
important to many Tanzanians, in providing financial support, employment opportunities and 
social solidarity (see chapter 2 for details). The fact that they have been almost entirely ignored 
in national policy-making processes shows that the external donors are intent on creating a 
version of civil society in Tanzania in their own image, dominated by actors who come from 
within the hegemonic discourse.. 
 
NGOs have not provided a serious and sustained challenge to hegemony of neo-liberalism in 
Tanzania during the post-liberalization period, for several significant reasons. First, a number of 
the elite NGOs accept the de Tocquevillian perspective that civil society organizations assist in 
forming policies which represent hegemonic universalism, through discussions with state 
representatives, which take place in a trusting, tolerant and transparent political environment. 
That is, these organizations regard themselves as partners of the state in contributing to the 
formation of national policies. Thus, they have accepted the de Tocquevillian discourse, based on 
the belief  that all civil society organizations take part in debates with the state concerning 
national policy formation in a free and equal way. Second, while not actively embracing the de 
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Tocquevillian perspective on civil society participation in national policy-making processes, in 
post-liberalization Tanzania, the majority of NGOs have not considered ways to form a 
concerted counter-hegemonic discourse. The interviews revealed that most NGOs concentrate 
overwhelmingly on day-to-day service delivery activities and, while most have recently created 
advocacy departments,  these have achieved little in terms of setting up and sustaining a 
collective NGO vision capable of countering neo-liberal hegemony. Third, many NGOs are 
reluctant to confront neo-liberal hegemony, through their concerns about the state‟s reaction to 
criticism (as evidenced by its attacks on, and suppression of, Hakielimu and Youth Partnership 
Countrywide, analysed as case studies in chapter 5). Such fears on the part of NGOs have led to 
them self-censoring the way they participate in national policy-making processes in post-
liberalization Tanzania.  
 
A few strategies and actions on the part of NGOs have confronted the hegemony of neo-
liberalism. The Open Sheraton meetings (TGNP) and press campaigns (Hakielimu) are examples 
in this regard (see chapter 5 for details). However, such strategies and actions do not constitute a 
coherent and sustained counter-hegemonic discourse. As with the case of trade unions, a 
Gramscian analysis provides useful insights into the ways in which NGOs have participated in 
national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, which are not possible through 
the application of a de Tocquevillian lens. The de Tocquevillian perspective, based on the 
characterization of consensual civil society-state relations in the formation of national policies, 
which results in a win-win situation, is unable to explain the confrontational reaction of the state 
to TGNP‟s Open Sheraton meetings, including the threat of the use of coercive legal-
bureaucratic measures, based on the claim that the provision of a free drink at these events was 
an illegal inducement to attend. Furthermore, the de Tocquevillian approach cannot 
accommodate the aggressive reaction of the state to the publications of Hakielimu, the platform 
put forward by Baraza la Wanawake and the meetings held by Youth Partnership Countrywide 
(see chapter 5 for details). In contrast, a Gramscian perspective, based on oppositional civil 
society groups engaging in a fluid war of position, is able to provide valid explanations as to why 
the strategies and actions of TGNP, Hakielimu, Baraza la Wanawake and Youth Partnership 
Countrywide drew a response from the integral state encompassing both „moral and intellectual 
leadership‟ (Gramsci, 2011) and coercive legal-bureaucratic means (Gramsci, 2011), as was the 
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case with its response to trade union strategies and actions (see section 8.2 above). The use of 
moral and intellectual leadership took the form of arguments, on the part of the state, that its 
vision and strategies were informed by evidence-based research and represented the universal 
good for Tanzanian society, while dissenting civil society voices were based on uniformed 
contentions, driven largely by the interests of their foreign funding agencies. The employment by 
the integral state of coercive legal-bureaucratic measures was manifested in the de-registration of 
Youth Partnership Countrywide and Baraza la Wanawake, so they could no longer function as 
civil society organizations, and the banning of all Hakielimu materials from Tanzanian 
educational establishments 
. 
8.6 Trade Unions and NGOs in the Tanzanian PRSP process 
The fourth issue related to the main research question examined in this thesis, focused on how 
trade unions and NGOs have participated in the PRSP process in Tanzania. The Tanzanian PRSP 
process is premised on the participation of a mass of citizens, resulting in widespread national 
ownership of the policy outcomes. 
  
Regarding participation, TUCTA officials argued that the Tanzanian state formed a Civil Society 
Stakeholders (CSS) group within the PRSP process to present a single view, which weakens 
trade union arguments, as they are filtered through one large and undifferentiated civil society 
voice. The state created the CSS group despite the fact that officially it defines civil society as 
consisting of four separate sections; the private sector, NGOs, community based organizations 
and trade unions. Consequently, conflicting civil society perspectives are lost in the PRSP 
process, where outcomes are presented as being based on „consensus‟ and „win-win scenarios.‟ 
For TUCTA officials, trade unions should be included in the PRSP process (as well as all 
national policy-making processes) in a separate section, as their work is vital to poverty 
reduction since, „we represent labour, which is the most crucial aspect of productivity,‟ in the 
words of one interviewee.  However, the PRSP process is based on the designation by the donors 
and the state of the „poor‟ as „objects‟ who can be „known‟ and  „acted upon‟ (Wignaraja 2006, 
1992).  They are not conceived of as „subjects‟ who „know themselves‟ and „can act for 
themselves.‟ The donors and the state believe that, having identified these objects, they can then 
act on their behalf to bring them development through national policies, which have been derived 
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from listening to their perceived needs expressed in the institutionalized context of civil society 
organizations.  Leaders of the Tanzanian trade union movement argue that they are legitimate 
representatives of many poor trade unionists. However, they are unable to adequately represent 
their needs, since input from trade unions has to be filtered through the CSS group, which is 
dominated by NGOs. Thus, labour issues, central to poverty reduction, such as enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation, do not receive a platform.   
 
While the structured way in which the labour movement is forced to take part in the PRSP 
process has limited their opportunities to formulate a counter-hegemonic discourse, certain 
individual trade unionists (both from TUCTA‟s head office and from individual trade unions, 
such as TPAWU) have inserted themselves, uninvited, into the PRSP process and driven 
discussions in a more politicized direction than was originally the case in Tanzania (see chapter 7 
for details). The state used various strategies in its war of position to marginalize the influence of 
these actors, including refusing permission for the most dynamic of these individuals to formally 
claim affiliation to the trade union movement during participation in PRSP processes.  
 
The donors driving the PRSP process, and the state (as its owner) have made no efforts to draw 
on participatory models and methods which have a history in Tanzania, such as the self-help 
movement in the 1960s (which drew the rural population into negotiating their developmental 
needs with state officials on a large scale) and clauses from Mwongozo (dating back to 1971) 
relating to the need for managers to lead by example, for ostentation to be eschewed and for 
personal behaviour to be ethical. These clauses are close in form to positions put forward as part 
of „third generation‟ participatory development concerns, stressing the need for ethical behaviour 
by officials involved in development processes (see chapter 1 for details). Workers‟ committees 
were also institutionalized in many workplaces following independence. Whilst regarded as too 
close to management in a lot of cases, they did create an indigenous participatory culture of sorts, 
parts of which could be drawn on in debates about poverty reduction and economic growth. 
Instead of looking for ways to draw on such relevant examples from the past in Tanzania, the 
donors prefer to use a small group of westernised NGOs as a vanguard to put forward the views 
of Tanzanian citizens. 
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Regarding ownership, this research revealed that the concept is flawed on two levels. First, 
requiring the Tanzanian state to show national ownership of policies is an imposition by external 
donors, which acts as an over-arching conditionality. The state is unable to reject ownership of 
policies as a condition, on the grounds that it is inappropriate in the particular socio-economic 
and political circumstances pertaining in Tanzania, if the country wants to receive aid and debt 
relief. Second, even if the merits of ownership are accepted as beneficial to Tanzania, its 
conceptualization and measurement within the Tanzanian PRSP process are questionable. 
Analytical frameworks to measure levels of ownership have been developed by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2004b, Johnson and Wasty, 1993). However, measurement of levels of ownership 
in the Joint Staff Assessments relies on assigning numerical values from 1-5 with no detailed 
descriptors for the different rankings being provided. The assessments thus lack both rigour and 
transparency (see chapter 7 for details). Overall, the narrow base of civil society participation 
results a lack of widespread ownership of the Tanzanian PRSP process. Furthermore, the positive 
numerical scores awarded within the category of „civil society participation‟ in the Joint Staff 
Assessments of the IFIs, are meaningless.  
 
8.7 Policy Implications 
The research has centred on the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions in post-
liberalization Tanzania. In order to play a more meaningful role in civil society, the labour 
movement could adopt various policies. 
 
First, trade unions could use the limited amount of impetus that actions, such as the proposed 
general strike in 2010, has generated, to concentrate on forming a coherent and sustainable vision 
for the labour movement in post-liberalization Tanzania, which is currently lacking. In this 
regard, a focus on re-framing industrial relations within a tripartite system, involving trade 
unions, representatives of capital (in the form of employers associations) and the state, might 
have utility. Key issues, such as employment and livelihoods creation would then be based 
around the arguments and interests of domestic agents, rather than those of external donors, 
intent on establishing the global hegemony of neo-liberalism. An obstacle to the realization of 
such a policy is the continuing aid dependency of the Tanzanian state (see chapter 3 for details). 
This gives the donors substantive leverage over national policies and it is possible that they 
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would put pressure on the state to reduce the influence of trade unions in debates concerning the 
labour market. The opposition of the World Bank to trade union arguments in favour of the 
introduction of a minimum wage in Tanzania provides an illustration, in this regard. This 
example shows the difficulty for trade unions in winning the war of position, since they are 
facing not just the Tanzanian state, but, also the allied power of transnational actors, intent on 
fostering the hegemony of neo-liberalism at a global level. 
 
Second, the Tanzanian trade union movement could attempt to increase its currently weak 
financial capacity through a concerted attempt to raise funds from external sources, particularly 
the international trade union movement. Such forms of support were denied the trade union 
movement by the state following independence, on the grounds that it would lead to the undue 
influence of alien ideas. For such a strategy to succeed, it would necessitate, first, building the 
technical capacity of trade union officials, particularly in terms of training in the area of writing 
funding proposals. This research showed that trade union leaders are becoming increasingly 
aware of how difficult it is to complete complex funding proposals and, in particular, the 
problems involved in using the current key terminology and concepts from the „dominant 
development discourse in ways which will meet with the approval of the donors, who are its 
gatekeepers.  
 
The World Bank and the ILO 
183
 currently do not provide funds for the Tanzanian labour 
movement and the bilateral donors (with the notable exception of DANIDA) remain indifferent 
to the trade unions, preferring to focus on NGOs as civil society partners. For example, although 
DFID has produced „How to work with Trade Unions‟ (DFID, 2009), they have no contacts with 
the Tanzanian labour movement. The same is true for USAID and JICA.  Overall, trade union 
leaders would be in a stronger position to submit effective funding proposals to major external 
donors if they had training in how to focus the content and, in particular, how to use the key 
discourse terms of the post-liberalization period; partnership, participation and ownership. 
 
Third, Tanzanian trade unions in the main have been losing members in considerable number 
                                                          
183
  The ILO has funded projects to assist Tanzanian trade unions in the post-liberalization period (see chapter 3 for    
details).  
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since liberalization, with the exception of the Tanzania Teachers Union  (see chapter 6 for 
details). Campaigns to attract new members could revitalize the movement. Such an initiative 
could involve the systematic targeting of workers in the informal sector, women and youth, 
which would enhance the ability of trade unions to refute the claim that currently they represent a 
labour aristocracy. Evidence from this research revealed that trade unions do not represent a 
labour aristocracy. Nevertheless, the claim that trade unions represent a relatively privileged 
minority of wage labourers in the formal sector has been used by the state as a strategy in its war 
of position since the colonial period. It was employed with particular effectiveness by the one-
party state in post-independence Tanzania to divide and rule the workforce (see chapter 7 for 
details). Thus, initiatives aimed at working with marginalized groups, may enhance the 
legitimacy of trade unions as representatives of the Tanzanian workforce and counter the views 
of citizens (derived residually from arguments put forward by senior officials, including Nyerere, 
during the period of one-party rule) that the labour movement represents an elite minority of 
formal sector workers. Moreover, increasing the membership base would raise income, thus, 
increasing the capacity of trade unions. 
 
Fourth, in addition to working more closely with marginalized sectors of the workforce, trade 
unions could also make attempts to increase cohesion and mutual support within the labour 
movement, as well as collaboration with other forms of civil society, particularly NGOs, as part 
of a move to embrace social movement unionism. Regarding the former, a considerable number 
of the individual trade unions are small and lack the capacity to provide services. Of the twenty 
one trade unions registered with the Office of the Registrar, more than half have less than three 
thousand members and five have fewer than three hundred.  For the members of some of these 
small unions the situation is worse than it was when trade unions were part of a monolithic 
structure in Tanzania.  Polarization has occurred; a few trade unions are doing reasonably well 
under the new system while others are doing worse than when trade unions were part of a state-
controlled structure, as they have to fight for funding and recognition on their own and are not 
apportioned resources from the centre in the way they were under the one-party system. There is 
a danger that small unions will struggle on with little finance and few resources and that this will 
fragment and weaken the trade union movement in Tanzania as a whole. The same argument 
applies to the formation of trade union federations. Multiple federations can be formed under the 
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provision of the 1998 Trade Union Act and the possibility of having several centres of power 
could make the trade union movement less coherent and cohesive and lead to solidarity breaking 
down. Consequently, there is a case for TUCTA to make a concerted effort to increase contacts 
between unions and to formulate an overall vision for the movement which could assist in 
uniting individual organizations. This would require a considerable amount of financial and 
technical capacity, as well as political will, making it important for TUCTA leaders to find 
effective ways to raise funds (see point two above in this section for details). Concerning the 
latter, given the mutual misgivings between officials of trade unions and NGOs in Tanzania (as 
outlined in section 8.4) increasing collaborative work between them requires concerted will and 
imagination on both sides, which is presently lacking.  
 
The focus of this research has been on two types of civil society organizations and accordingly 
the final words should go to their officials. The pressing need for both NGOs and trade unions to 
clarify their positions within the political economy of Tanzania was made apparent during 
interviews and participant observation. A similar point made by a senior official from an NGO 
and from a trade union in different contexts is significant for the future of both of these types of 
civil society organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania. For the former, far too much time is 
taken up by the NGO sector complaining about the role of the state in national policy-making 
processes. The focus of NGOs must shift from this „negativity‟ to an emphasis on forming their 
own strategies and effective participation techniques. It is vital for NGOs „to reflect on their 
work seriously and to form an overall strategic plan. This is not happening currently.‟  According 
to the latter, trade unions over-concentrate on the point that they are marginalized by the state 
through coercive legal-bureaucratic measures, aggressive verbal attacks by senior government 
officials when  defending the interests of the workforce and by being subsumed within an 
undifferentiated mass of civil society organizations, when taking part in national policy-making 
processes, such as the PRSP. These are all state strategies (as part of its war of position, 
Gramscian terms) aimed at marginalizing the labour movement. Trade unions should respond 
less with angry statements about how it is treated unfairly and instead should „come up with a 
very strong and clear position as to how they stand within the civil society sector in Tanzania‟ 
and „why their vision and views merit their separation from the rest of the civil society 
stakeholders‟ when taking part in national policy-making processes.  
256 
 
 
The need for strategic action based on a clear vision of their roles is vital to the future of NGOs 
and trade unions in Tanzania, and by extension, the whole civil society sector. The importance of 
this is evidenced by the reply of a senior trade union official at TUCTA when asked about the 
current level of surplus extraction on the part of the foreign „new investors‟ and the position of 
the external donors and the state regarding this issue. His reply was that all of them are 
concerned only with creating „a profit-driven society, which is draining the blood from 
Tanzanian workers.‟ This view, notwithstanding, Tanzanian trade unions have more possibilities 
to form a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse than at any previous time during the post-
liberalization period. This could be built around a nationalist discourse, focusing on the high 
level of surplus extraction by foreign new investors in lucrative sectors of the economy, notably 
mining. Hitherto, the post-colonial state in Tanzania has appropriated the discourse of national 
liberation. It has argued forcefully, since 1961, that all classes and groups, including trade 
unions, must subordinate their narrow, sectional interests to the greater good: building a strong 
and independent nation, following years of colonial exploitation and repression. In doing so, the 
state has exercised moral and intellectual leadership (in Gramscian terms) to create hegemony. 
However, the state‟s lack of transparency and accountability regarding its stance towards the 
mining industry has been used by the labour movement to claim that it is colluding with foreign 
capital in the appropriation of valuable Tanzanian assets, such as gold and diamonds, which 
belong to the people. This is being done through the exploitation of Tanzanian labour, which 
endures oppressive terms and conditions of labour in these mines, including suppression of trade 
union activities. Whether these claims stand up to close scrutiny is debatable (see chapter 7 for 
details). Nevertheless, they have provided some leverage for the trade union movement in its war 
of position with the state and could lead to the formation of a wider counter-hegemonic 
discourse. As Gramsci pointed out, the war of position is always fluid and the state is clearly 
uncomfortable in dealing with the nationalist rhetoric of the trade union movement, when it 
focuses on the appropriation of lucrative Tanzanian minerals.   
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Appendices 
Appendices 4.1 to 4.7 - Sources of Information for the Research 
184
 
 
Appendix 4.1: Overview of NGO-related Respondents (Purposive Samples) 
 
 
Interviews, respondents and institutions visited during 10 months of Fieldwork 
in 3 sessions 
 
1-5 interviews with –  
 
NGO Officials from Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders ‘Macro Group’ 
Policy Forum  (PF) 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)  
Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE) 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) 
Hakielimu  
Save the Children Tanzania 
ActionAid Tanzania 
 
NGO Officials from Non-Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders ‘Macro 
Group’ but taking part in PRSP process 
Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET)  
Pact Tanzania 
Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) 
Oxfam Tanzania 
 
Official from NGO not taking part in the PRSP process 
Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
184
  All appendices concerning the sources of information for the research start with 4, as they are linked closely to 
issues analyzed in chapter 4. 
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Appendix 4.2: Overview of Trade Union-related Respondents (Purposive Samples) 
 
1-5 interviews with -  
 
Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) 
General Secretary  
Deputy General Secretary (x2) - the post-holder changed between the second and third fieldwork periods 
Director of Economics and Research 
Director of Education 
Director of Gender and Youth Issues 
Adviser on Gender Issues 
Director of Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS 
Senior Adviser DANIDA (seconded to TUCTA on fixed-term contract) 
 
TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union  
Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania   
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania 
Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union 
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
Tanzania Seamen‟s Union 
Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania 
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union  
Tanzania Railway Workers Union   
Tanzania Teachers Union 
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Tanzania Union of Journalists  
Tanzania Union of Government and Health Workers  
 
Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees  
Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania   
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
Tanzania Media Workers Union 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
Tanzania Pilots Union 
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Appendix 4.3: Overview of Other Respondents 
 
 
1-5 interviews with -  
 
Ministry of Labour Officials 
Registrar of Trade Unions 
Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions 
 
Academics 
Professor at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam – specialist in 
labour market issues and work on trade unions 
Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam – 
specialist in civil society, poverty and gender issues 
Professor of Education - University of Dar es Salaam – working on civil society issues 
 
Donors 
Public Information Officer – World Bank 
Education Policy Officer – World Bank 
Senior Adviser – World Bank (seconded from DANIDA) 
Team Leader – Pro-poor Policy and Poverty Monitoring Unit - UNDP 
HIV/AIDS Policy Specialist - UNDP 
Poverty Monitoring Adviser - JICA 
Education Adviser – JICA 
 
Others 
Interviews were conducted with officials from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tanzania 
Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Mkombozi, Aga Khan University, Independent 
Development Consultant (former Country  
Programme Director, Oxfam Tanzania). 
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Appendix 4.4: Full List of Respondents  
 
Officials from ‘Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled 
1. Patrick Ngowi - Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF) Tanzania Programme 
Coordinator, Save the Children (SCF) 
2. Mrs Theofrida Kapinga - Executive Secretary, Tanzania Council for Social Development 
(TACOSODE)  
3. Andrew Mushi - Policy and Advocacy Programme Officer,  
Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) 
4. Professor Haidari Amani - Executive Director, Economic and Social Research 
Foundation Council (ESRF)  
5. Dr Oswald Mashindano - Senior Research Fellow, Economic and Social Research 
Foundation (ESRF) 
6. Mary Rusimbi - Executive Director, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) 
7. Gemma Akilimali - Senior Programme Officer - Activism, Lobbying and Advocacy, 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) 
8. Gertrude Mugizi - Executive Director, Policy Forum 
9. Rakesh Rajani - Executive Director, Hakielimu 
10. Donald Mmari - Consultancy Coordinator, Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation 
(REPOA) 
11. Luca Katera – Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
12. Ms Rose Mushi - Country Programme Director, ActionAid 
13. Mrs Helen Kijo-Bisimba - Executive Director, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) 
14. Daniel Mvella - Programme Manager, Legal and Human Rights Centre 
(LHRC) 
 
Officials from ‘Non-Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled 
1. Fred Kwame - Country Programme Manager, Oxfam 
2. Silas Likasi – Deputy Country Programme Manager, Oxfam 
3. Nora Pendaeli-Mhina – Program Manager, Pact Tanzania 
4. Theo Macha - Program Officer, Pact Tanzania 
5. Dr Joseph Kisanji – Coordinator, Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) 
6. Israel Ilunde - Executive Director, Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC) 
 
Officials from the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) – Head Office 
1. Mr Nestory Ngulla - General Secretary (x2) 
2. Mr Hassan Raha – ex-Deputy General Secretary 
3. Mr Nicholas Ernest Mgaya - Deputy General Secretary 
4. Mr John Gonza - Director of Economics and Research (x2) 
5. Mrs Margaret Mandago - Director of Education (x4) 
6. Mrs Sihan Ahmed - Director of Gender and Youth Issues (x3) 
7. Dr Kassim Meja Kapalata - Director Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and 
HIV/AIDS 
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8. Dr Chande - Adviser on Gender Issues 
9. Mr Holger Hansen - Senior Adviser – DANIDA (Trade Union Component – seconded to 
TUCTA) 
 
Officials from Trade Unions Affiliated to the Trade Unions Congress of Tanzania 
1. Mr Said S. Wamba - General Secretary, Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied 
Workers Union (CHODWAU) 
2. Mr C. M. Samang‟ombe - General Secretary, Communication and Transport Workers 
Union of Tanzania (COTWU(T)) 
3. Mrs Debora Lutwaza - Head of Public Relations, Education and Training, Dock Workers 
Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) 
4. Mr Godwin Ndonde - Legal and Administrative Officer, Dock Workers Union of 
Tanzania (DOWUTA) 
5. Mrs Mgaya - General Secretary, Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union 
(RAAWU)  
6. Mr Hezron Julius Kaaya - Deputy General Secretary, Researchers Academicians and 
Allied Workers Union (RAAWU) 
7. Mr J. S. Makongwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
(TALGWU) 
8. Mr Hassan Khamis Ameir - General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction 
Workers Union (TAMICO) 
9. Mr Makwaya Musu Pingu – ex-General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction 
Workers Union (TAMICO) 
10. Mr Mbao J. S. Saad – ex-Deputy General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and Construction 
Workers Union (TAMICO) 
11. Accountant - Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
(TAMICO). The respondent did not want to be named.  
12. Mr Mchafu Ahmed Chakoma - General Secretary, Tanzania Seamen‟s Union (TASU) 
13. Mr W Kashanda - Head of Research, Loans and Economy, Telecommunication Workers 
Un ion of Tanzania (TEWUTA) 
14. Mr Yahaya Msangi - Head of Research, Planning and Credit, Tanzania Plantation and 
Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU)  
15. Mrs Helen Katala - Head of Education and Gender, Tanzania Railway Workers Union 
(TRAWU) (x2) 
16. Mr Y. B. K. Msulwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Teachers Union 
Abbreviation of Organization (TTU) 
17. Mr Anthony Mtavangu - Head of Education and Training, Tanzania Teachers Union 
(TTU) (x2) 
18. Mr Boniface Y. Nkakatisi - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Industrial and 
Commercial Workers (TUICO) 
 
19. Mr Godfrey Kambenga - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Journalists (TUJ) (x2) 
 
Officials from Trade Unions Not Affiliated to the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania 
1. Mr Eugene Aloyse Kazoka - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of Private Security 
Employees (TUPSE)  
314 
 
2. Mr S. S. Marenda - General Secretary, Industrial and General Workers Union of 
Tanzania (IGWUTA) 
3. Mr Michael Kashemba - Deputy General Secretary, Industrial and General Workers 
Union of Tanzania (IGWUTA) 
4. Mr C. N. Nakuhwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers 
Union (TASIWU) 
5. Mr Juvenalis Lesia - General Secretary, Tanzania Media Workers Union 
(TMW) 
6. Mr Songoro Mynonge - National Chairperson, Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW) 
7. Mr Hamid Yassin - National Treasurer, Tanzania Media Workers Union 
(TMW) 
8. Mr Joseph Maseke - General Secretary, Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers 
Union (WAMEUTA) 
9. Captain Joseph Ibanda - General Secretary, Tanzania Pilots Union 
(TPU) 
 
Government Officials 
1. Mrs Dorothy Uiso - Registrar of Trade Unions, Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, 
Ministry of Labour (x3) 
2. Mr Gabriel Murumbe – Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions 
Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour (x3) 
 
Officials from Other NGOs 
1. Mrs Pili Mtambalike - Programme Officer. Media Council of Tanzania 
2. Ms Claire Lwehabura - Project Officer, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
3. Ms Elsie Downham - Official, Mkombozi (Liberator) 
 
Officials from Supranational Organizations 
1. Catriona Byrne - HIV/AIDS Specialist, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
2. Rosalie Ferrao - Public Information Officer, Public Information Office, World Bank 
3. Rest Lasway - Education Specialist, World Bank 
4. Astrid Ruge - Special Assistant to the World Bank Country Programme Manager 
(Seconded from DANIDA) 
5. Amon Manyama - Team Leader - Pro-Poor Policy and Poverty Monitoring, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Officials from Bilateral Donors 
1. Tamahi Yamauchi - Poverty Monitoring Adviser, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) 
2. Kazuyo Igarashi - Education Adviser, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
 
Academics 
1. Professor Samuel Chambua - Acting Head of Department, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Dar es Salaam (x2) 
2. Professor Issa Mcholo Omari - Professor of Educational Research and Private Consultant, 
University of Dar es Salaam 
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3. Dr M. K. Ngaiza - Senior Lecturer in Poverty, Gender and Development, Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), University of Dar es Salaam 
4. Dr Euan Davidson – Lecturer, Aga Khan University, Dar es Salaam 
 
Others 
1. Mark Waite - Development Consultant (Former Country Programme Director of Oxfam) 
2. Mr Omar Faruk Osman - Secretary General - Eastern Africa Journalists Association 185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
185  The recording of the titles of interviewees reflects the way they were given during interviews. 
All interviewees were post-holders at the time of interviews. Where the job title has „ex‟ as a prefix, this reflects the 
fact that at the time of subsequent interviews, the post-holder had changed. 
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Appendix 4.5: Questions to NGO Officials 
 
1. What are the main issues facing NGOs in Tanzania? 
2.  What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the point of view of NGOs 
in Tanzania? 
3.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between NGOs and the trade union 
movement in Tanzania? 
4.  What are your views concerning use of English when dealing with NGO issues in 
Tanzania? 
5.  What are your views on the relationship between NGOs and the government in 
Tanzania? 
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Appendix 4.6: Questions to TUCTA Officials, TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Union Officials 
and Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Union Officials 
 
1. What are the main issues facing the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
2.  What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the point of view 
of the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
3.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between the trade union 
movement and NGOs in Tanzania? 
4.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between „new investors‟ 
and the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
5.  What are your views on mergers between trade unions  
           in Tanzania? 
6. What are your views concerning the use of English when dealing with trade 
union issues in Tanzania? 
7.  What are your views on the relationship between the trade union movement 
and the government in Tanzania? 
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Appendix 4.7  Key Government and Civil Society Documents used 
 
PRSP-related  
MKUKUTA and MKUZA Review (2009) 
MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2007/08  
MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2006/07  
MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 7 (2007) 
MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 6 (2007) 
National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP II) (2010) 
National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP) (2005) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy: The Second Progress Report 2001/02 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) (2000) 
Government - Poverty and Human Development Reports (biannual) 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2009  
Poverty and Human Development Report 2007 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2005 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2003 
Government - Other 
Employment and Labour Relations Act No. 6 (2004b) 
 Integrated Labour Force Survey (2007) 
NACONGO (2010) 
Procedures For Registration Of Non Governmental Organizations Under The Non Governmental 
Organizations Act No. 24/20002 
The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (1999) 
Trade Unions Act, 1998  
Views Of The People 2007 
Civil Society 
Hakielimu - Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji? Great Policies… but Implementation? (2005) 
Hakielimu - Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings from Government Reviews (2005) 
Hakielimu, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) - 
Access to Information in Tanzania: Still a Problem (2005) 
Hakielimu and DSA-TWG - Growing Out of Poverty: A Plain Language Guide to Tanzania‟s NSGRP 
(2005) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Bouncing Back: Some Grassroots Responses To The PRSP (2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Influencing Poverty Reduction Strategy: PRSP, PRS And The PMMP (2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Plain Language Guides (2010)  
Hakikazi Catalyst - Tanzania NGO Policy Forum: Towards A Protocol For Engagement In The Policy 
Process (2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst – The NGO Policy Group: Towards Formalisation? (2002) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre - Labour and Employment Issues (2002) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre Annual Report (2004) 
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Appendix 5.1 Overview of NGOs Interviewed 
186
 
Name  Macro 
Group   
Type of 
NGO 
Focus of Work Base Website Publications 
NGO Policy 
Forum (NPF) 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy 
1.Participation – 
Active Citizens‟ 
Voices  
2. Public money 
3. Local 
governance 
DSM  Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers and  
Annual 
Reports 
Tanzania 
Gender 
Networking 
Programme 
(TGNP)  
Founded – 1993 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy and 
Training 
1. Gender  
2. Social 
transformation to 
enhance equity 
DSM Yes Yes – books, 
journal articles 
and own 
papers  
Tanzania 
Education 
Network 
(TEN/MET) 
Founded – 1999 
No Umbrella Advocacy  
1. Education – 
furtherance of 
quality basic 
education for all 
DSM Yes Yes – Reports 
and 
newsletters 
Tanzania 
Council for 
Social 
Development 
(TACOSODE) 
Founded – 1987 
187
 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy and 
Training 
1. Capacity 
building to achieve 
social Justice 
DSM Yes Yes – 
newsletters 
Economic and 
Social Research 
Foundation 
(ESRF) 
Founded – 1994 
Yes Unitary Research and 
Policy Analysis 
1. Capacity 
building - policy 
analysis and 
development 
management 
DSM Yes Yes –  own 
research-based 
papers  
Research on 
Poverty 
Alleviation 
(REPOA) 
Founded – 1995 
Yes Unitary Research, Training 
and Policy Dev. 
1. Pro-poor growth 
2. Poverty 
reduction 
DSM Yes Yes –  own 
research-based 
papers  
Legal and 
Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC) 
Founded – 1995 
Yes Unitary Research, Training 
and Policy Dev. 
1. Legal/Human 
Rights issues 
DSM Yes Yes –  own 
research-based 
papers  
                                                          
186  As the appendix relates to the work of NGOs in Tanzania and is linked closely to issues analyzed in chapter 5  
(The NGO Sector in Tanzania)  it starts with 5.  
187
 TACOSODE has existed since 1965 under another name as a joint government- voluntary sector organization. 
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Oxfam 
Tanzania 
Active since 
early 1970s. 
Current 
strategic plan-  
2007 – 2017 
No 
 
Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
Service-delivery 
1.Quality of 
education 
2. Smallholder 
agriculture 
3.Accountable 
governance 
DSM Yes Yes –  own 
research-based 
papers  
Hakielimu 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Unitary Advocacy 
1.Provision of 
quality basic 
education 
2. Democratization 
of governance 
DSM Yes Yes, books, 
booklets, 
articles, own 
research-based 
papers 
Save the 
Children 
Tanzania 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
service-delivery 
1. Education,  
health care and   
shelter for 
vulnerable children 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers 
ActionAid  
Tanzania 
Founded – 1998 
Yes Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
service-delivery 
1.Education – 
formal/non-formal 
2.Advocacy – 
economic policies 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers 
Pact Tanzania 
Founded – 2002 
No Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy – Training 
Mentoring, Technical 
Assistance 
1.Capacity building: 
areas – HIV/AIDS, 
OVC 188 Governance 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers  
Youth 
Partnership 
Countrywide 
(YPC) 
Founded – 2002 
No Unitary Advocacy 
Building local 
democracy – 
accountability of 
local govt. 
authorities 
Kibaha No Yes – booklets 
and reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
188
  OVC = Orphans and Vulnerable Children. 
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Appendices 6.1 to 6.6 – Information and Issues Concerning Trade Unions 189 
 
Appendix 6.1    Tanzanian Unions Registered with the Office of the Registrar of Trade 
Unions  
Name of Trade Union TUCTA Membership 
Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) Yes 
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU)  Yes  
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers 
(TUICO) 
Yes  
Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees 
(TUGHE) 
Yes  
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union 
(TPAWU) 
Yes  
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union 
(CHODAWU) 
Yes 
Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers Union 
(RAAWU) 
Yes 
Communication and Transport Workers Union (Tanzania) 
(COTWU–T) 
Yes 
Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) Yes 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) Yes 
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) Yes 
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union (TASIWU)  No 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
(TAFICAWU) 
No 
Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania (TEWUTA) Yes 
Industrial and General Workers union of Tanzania  (IGWUTA) No 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees (TUPSE) No 
Tanzania Seamen‟s Union (TASU) Yes 
Tanzania Union of Journalists TUJ) Yes 
Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW) No 
Tanzania Pilots Union TPU) No 
Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU) No 
Source: McQuinn (2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
189  All appendices containing information and issues relating to trade unions start with 6, as they are linked closely 
to issues analyzed in chapter 6 (Trade Unions in Tanzania). 
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Appendix 6.2 Tanzanian Trade Unions – Resources 
  
Trade Union Education/ 
Training  
Department 
Research/ 
Economics 
Department 
Gender  
Department 
or Officer 
Website Journal or 
Newsletter 
Email 
TTU  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
TALGWU No No No No No Yes 
TUICO Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
TUGHE No No No No No Yes 
TPAWU No No No No No Yes 
CHODAWU No No No No No Yes 
RRAAWU No No No No No Yes 
COTWU–T No No No No No Yes 
TRAWU No No Yes No No Yes 
TAMICO No No Yes No‟ No Yes 
DOWUTA Yes No No No No Yes 
TASIWU No No No No No Yes 
TAFICAWU No No No No No Yes 
TEWUTA No Yes No No No Yes 
IGWUTA No No No No No Yes 
TUPSE No No No No No Yes 
TASU No No No No No Yes 
TTUJ No No No No No Yes 
TMW No No No No No Yes 
TPU No No No No No No 
TAWU No No No No No No 
Source: McQuinn, (2011, 2009).  For purposes of identification, full names of trade unions with their abbreviations 
in brackets are provided in appendix 6.1 above. 
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Appendix 6.3  Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Figures   
Name of Trade Union Number of Members 
Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) 157,000  
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
(TALGWU) 
37,493 
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial 
Workers (TUICO) 
37,022 
Tanzania Union of Government and Health 
Employees (TUGHE) 
35,868 
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers 
Union (TPAWU) 
26,461 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied 
Workers Union (CHODAWU) 
15,183 
Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers 
Union (RAAWU) 
9,830 
Communication and Transport Workers Union 
(Tanzania) (COTWU–T) 
9,612 
Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) 7,063 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
(TAMICO) 
6,456 
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) 2,700 
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
(TASIWU) 
2,147 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
(TAFICAWU) 
2,000 
Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania 
(TEWUTA) 
1,478 
Industrial and General Workers union of Tanzania  
(IGWUTA) 
1,000 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees 
(TUPSE) 
600 
Tanzania Seamen‟s Union (TASU) 270 
Tanzania Union of Journalists TUJ) 153 
Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW) 51 
Tanzania Pilots Union TPU) 50 
Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU) 21 
Source – McQuinn (2011) 
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Appendix 6.4 
 
Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (1) 
 
The State of Social Dialogue: looks at the enabling environment for consultations in a particular 
country, focusing on:  
 
- The trade union situation 
- Violations of trade union rights 
- Constitutional provisions 
- Labour legislation 
- Ratification of ILO core conventions 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
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Appendix 6.5 
 
Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (2) 
 
Trade Union Participation in the PRSP process: looks at the level of consultations with trade 
unions, focusing on: 
 
- At what stage were trade unions invited – at the very start, mid-point or not at all? 
- Did trade unions make „noise‟ before being invited? 
- Did the labour ministry help? 
- If not invited at all, what steps did trade unions take? With what results? 
- Participation/chairing of thematic groups? 
- What views were espoused? Written document? 
- Does the PRSP contain trade union views? 
- If not, what have trade unions done? 
- Alliances with civil society organizations? 
- Alliances with employer federations/ 
- Involvement of the ILO? 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
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Appendix 6.6 
 
Scorecard on TU Participation in the PRSP (3) 
 
Labour Content of the PRSP: centres on the labour market issues covered in the PRSPs:  
 
- Employment 
- Pensions reforms 
- Social security measures 
- Wage policies 
- Human resource development 
- Technical, entrepreneurial vocational education and training (TEVET) 
- Labour code changes 
- Informal sector politics 
- Core labour standards 
- Anti-child labour policies 
- Micro finance 
- Occupational health and safety for workers 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
